n
the 24th of October, presidential candidate Barack
Obama, D-Ill., added his name to the list of
senators, led by Chris Dodd, D-Conn., who oppose
immunity for telecoms who have participated in
domestic spying. As this debate heats up in the
Senate and in the papers, Americans are confronted
with an unsettling reality: Private companies have
more control over our personal information than we
do.
While the interactive revolution was touted as the
democratization of information, it has also greatly
accelerated the consolidation of power in the hands
of both government and industry. Whether we're
talking on our cell phones, paying bills online, or
doing research for a paper, our communications now
leave an elaborate footprint. It is these footprints
that advertisers are so hungrily compiling, creating
massive databases to track our daily movements in
order to better pitch us products down the line --
or to share with the government.
Mark
Andrejevic's new book
iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era
explores the implications of the disenfranchising of
Americans in the interactive era. Who owns our
information? How is it shared? How will advertisers
and the government use our information in the
future? Andrejevic sat down with AlterNet to share
what he's learned through his research.
Onnesha Roychoudhuri: Throughout the book, you argue
that interactivity does not necessarily mean
democratization. Can you explain?
Mark
Andrejevic: Living through the '90s, there was this
euphoric set of predictions about the empowering and
democratizing capacity of the new medium. I read
that against what the current political and economic
situation looks like today. We live in a society
that has become increasingly economically stratified
in the past decade and also increasingly
unresponsive democratically.
Yet
we're still bombarded with the type of claims that
Time magazine made when it named "us" as the
person of the year. Time says that the
current situation is about the many wresting power
from the few and how this is going to transform the
world. The book documents a whole barrage of these
types of claims. Very often they're made in the
abstract: "Interactivity will have the power to
challenge entrenched monopolies and overturn elitist
hierarchies," "It allows the public to seize the
means of production." I'm not out to debunk the
claim that this potential exists. What concerns me
is the way in which the celebration of the potential
so quickly slides into a claim that this potential
is being actualized. What we have to do is find a
way to distinguish between the promise that resides
in these interactive technologies and their actual
application. And then to be able to distinguish
between which applications live up to that promise
and which don't.
OR: What are some of the technologies that fail to
live up to the promise?
MA:
TiVo is basically a market research technology. The
people who came up with the idea thought they'd get
between viewers and broadcasters. This is a quantum
leap in the ability to measure the audience,
facilitated by these interactive technologies. When
TiVo came out, the New York Times said that
against the background of TV, the history of
commercial broadcasting looks like a Stalinist plot
erected from above. The implication was that we were
now overcoming the planned economy of mass society
and realizing the true emancipating potential of
this interactive society.
Similarly, Wired magazine has recently been
making a big deal out of cloud computing. This is
the movement of data, resources and even software
onto the servers of companies like Google and Yahoo
that makes it possible for us to access our data
wherever we go. The way Wired magazine puts
it, our information and our data resources are
moving into the "Internet cloud." That makes it
sound so airy and free, when, in reality, what's
happening is our information is moving into these
huge server farms that are privately owned and
controlled. They're not cloudy; they're these huge
constructions that Google is building along the
Columbia River Gorge. Once we put our data there, it
can be sorted, aggregated, mined. It becomes a huge
treasure trove of information that these commercial
organizations have control over and that very
likely, the government is going to become
increasingly interested in.
OR: You write that many of these technologies create
a situation in which we the watchers are in turn
being watched. The history of this has its roots in
advertisers seeking information on the audience. One
particularly poignant example of this was your
discussion of Archibald Crossley, father of the
ratings system, rooting through peoples' garbage to
find out what people were consuming.
MA:
We have this history of commercial broadcasting that
from its very inception relied on gathering
information about the audience. The problem of the
audience actually emerges with the advent of
broadcasting. They come up with radio technology
wonderfully efficient to get information out there.
Because you don't have to print copies of newspapers
and circulate them, you can just throw the
information out in the air, the audience disappears.
The history of the ratings industry is trying to
make that audience reappear in palpable ways.
It's
the interactive capability of digital technologies
that really promises to deliver. Every transaction
can be measured. Every act of media consumption can
be located in time and space. Various ratings
industry are working on the anytime, anywhere media
monitoring device. They want to find a way to
measure every exposure to commercial media. The
device is designed to detect encoded signals in
audio frequencies. So if you go near a TV or radio,
any kind of audio broadcasting, it will detect that
you've been exposed to that message. Further
extensions include GPS incorporation to see which
billboards you might have passed. Or maybe even down
the road radio frequency ID detectors (RFID) that
would allow measurement of exposure to advertising
with embedded RFID chips.
If
you have some kind of a portable network device that
can be identified as connected with a particular
individual and all of one's media exposure flows
through that device, listening to podcasts or
streaming radio, watching downloaded video, reading
online magazines and newspapers, it almost seems
like the convergent solution to the problem that's
created for media monitoring by the advent of
convergence.
OR: You actually argue that the freedom consumers
experienced earlier in the inception of interactive
technologies has become more restrictive. You write,
"The heady Napster era of free and uncontrolled
downloading is reliant, paradoxically, on a relative
lack of interactivity and the resulting anonymity
afforded users." What changed?
MA:
People are much more wary of file sharing than they
once were because they understand that the things
that they do online leave a trace. In some cases,
it's led to legal action. The ability to monitor
what people do online is only increasing. The more
interactivity becomes ubiquitous, the end point is
that all of the things that we do online leave a
trail. To the extent that that information can be
gathered and acted upon, the certainty that any
violation of any intellectual property rules will be
followed by some kind of repercussion will increase.
I
was in Australia a couple of summers ago, and I had
with me a DVD that had a proprietary format,
high-definition version of the movie I wanted to
watch. So I popped it into my laptop, and thought I
would watch the high-definition version. When I
popped it in, I got a little prompt that said, "You
need to register online in order to watch this. So I
went online and registered, and then I got a message
that said, "Sorry, you're in Australia and this is
not licensed to play in Australia." This wasn't a
coding problem. I had a U.S. laptop and a U.S. DVD.
It was a way in which region coding was enforced by
the network itself. It's a small detail, but what it
means to me is that when it comes to the type of
control that the RIAA and the motion picture
industry are interested in enforcing, interactivity
is only a threat if it's not ubiquitous.
Interactivity can facilitate illegal file sharing,
but when interactivity become ubiquitous, when our
media players are networked, it's going to be much
easier to monitor and control how we use the data
that we both store on our machines and that we store
remotely in these servers that we access.
OR: Throughout the book, you use examples that make
it very clear that while a technology is designed to
appeal to a consumer, there are often tradeoffs. One
that struck me was Google's e-mail service, Gmail. A
lot of people use it, largely out of necessity
because it enables a very high storage capacity.
What is the trade-off?
MA:
The trade-off is convenience for a loss of control
over information about you -- even the words that
you've written. Gmail was a paradigm-shifting
moment. Instead of rationing out free e-mail in
little tiny bits to entice people to pay for more,
they could throw open their servers and use the
information that's stored there. Google realized
that they could make peoples' productivity their
own.
I
don't want to deny that there's a wonderful
convenience to Gmail. But once we write our messages
and send them, Gmail has records of those and they
can keep them indefinitely. They've said that at
some point, they're going to purge them from their
frontline servers. It's not clear to me whether they
plan ever to get rid of them on their online or
backline storage servers. Google is going to have
increasingly large amounts of information about the
population. At the very least, someday it's going to
be a treasure trove of information for some
sociologist documenting the early 21st century.
It's
not entirely clear what type of rights Google has
over that information. They obviously can't publish
an epistolary novel based on our letters. That would
seem to be an infringement of our copyright, but
they do have the right to go through and search for
keywords that they can use for customizing
advertising. As far as I can tell, there's nothing
to stop them from creating sophisticated databases
that identify trends and correlations in the types
of things that people write.
OR: A lot of this information is used to create
targeted ads. It's the Amazon books notion of, "If
you like this book, you might like our
recommendation." What's wrong with having ads
customized for us? Don't we want to have products
that are better suited to us?
MA:
It's important to point out that there is a blurring
line between commercial and government surveillance.
We live in a world in which the government wants
increasing access to the communications of
Americans. They want it with less accountability and
more monitoring power than ever before. They've made
this interest quite clear in approaching the
telecommunications companies and companies like
Google and Yahoo to get information about Americans.
The
type of legislation that is currently being
considered and debated has to do with granting the
state more power to access information about
Americans. There's an economic incentive to gather
this information, but once it's gathered, the state
has the incentive to use that information for other
purposes.
OR: What's the downside of customized advertising?
MA:
I think there's a point at which we're going to
start to be concerned about the level of
customization even as it's associated with
advertising itself. I don't want to watch ads for
stuff that I'm not interested in, but I'm going to
get a little creeped out when ads reach a level of
customization that evinces familiarity with my
personal life. Imagine a world where advertising has
the capacity to know things like, "Hey, saw you were
shopping for Rogaine, and you just joined an online
dating site. Having trouble getting dates? Worried
that it might be because you're bald? Here's our
latest remedy." There's the potential for
advertising based on your medical history, not
because those records become public, but because we
shed that information online when we go to websites
that are devoted to particular medical conditions.
What if it starts to target consumers based on some
interaction of details of their medical lives and
their love lives or the intersection of those two?
Maybe advertisers will respect that limit, but
nothing historically suggests to me that they have
any respect other than what works. I have a concern
about what types of insecurities, fears and
fantasies advertisers will be able to tap into and
manipulate when they have much more information
about us than we have about them. That's a certain
type of power in terms of information asymmetries.
When advertisers know much more about us than we
know about what they've gathered about us and what
they're doing with that information, they may come
to have a certain type of control over us.
OR: Part of that is ostensibly the lack of laws
surrounding the ownership of our information.
Companies essentially own our information and can
sell it and can change the terms of what they
initially said they would do or not do with the
information.
MA:
A lot of this information is being gathered
speculatively. There's an understanding that in an
information society, information is a valuable
asset. I think in many cases companies understand
that they can use the information for customizing
ads, and down the road they'll have even more
information and what they have now may become even
more valuable.
I
don't dispute the convenience of customized
advertising. I think all of us, to the extent that
we're going to be barraged with advertising, would
prefer it to have some relevance. Of course that
takes as given a world in which we're constantly
barraged with advertising. That may be something
that we may want to challenge the whole model of
having advertising be the dominant way that our
communication and information is provided to us.
OR: Having just traveled and been in a number of
airports, it seems like the public presence of
advertising is getting exponentially worse. Every
ticket, every surface you could imagine is covered
with an advertisement. And it's usually thematic.
So, you're going up the escalator, and it's 30 ads
for a single phone. You can't choose to not look at
it.
MA:
It's in the men's rooms over the urinals. The other
day I was flipping through the channels, and in a
women's volleyball game, the players had temporary
tattoos of sponsors on their arms. There are two
components to that. One is the component of living
in a world where the whole landscape is commodified,
but the other is how that shapes the type of media
that we consume. Advertising has a huge shaping
influence on some media. In particular I'm thinking
of TV news. They have to create formats and
programming that take their primary goal as creating
a forum for advertising that will be desirable to
advertisers. Drawing viewers is part of that, but
there are different ways to draw viewers. News
media, especially television news, have done such a
horrible job of informing viewers. Just think of the
buildup to the war in Iraq.
Commercialization doesn't just clutter our
environment, it also shapes the type of information
that's available to us. Commercial supported media
gives us particular types of content. In certain
ways it avoids content that it thinks might not
create the kind of environment that's conducive to
advertising. We get lots of news as entertainment.
Tons of staged conflicts between screamers on the
left and screamers on the right because it's a good
circus sideshow and it's cheap.
OR: You write that WalMart claims to have one of the
largest commercial databases of consumer
information. There's WalMart, Gmail, basically
consumers go physically or virtually, our
information is being stored. You mentioned a
relative works at these data collection companies.
She couldn't show you your file, but she gave you
access to hers. What was in it?
MA:
She showed me the most basic version of hers. It was
20 pages. It was mainly public records and
correlations of public records. Not only did it have
information that they were able to collect about
when she registered her car because she left
information about where she lived at the time, but
there was also an ongoing chain. When you find out
where she lived during a particular time period, you
can cross-reference that with all the other people
who have listed that same address at the time. This
kind of ongoing series of data is what companies
call nonobvious relationship awareness. You could
trace all the people that she's had as roommates and
all the people that they've had as roommates and so
on. As far as I remember from that record, they
stopped with all the people who had lived at the
same places that she lived. She didn't send me the
legal stuff. That company does have access to that
so all of the legal background check, any crimes
that you may have committed or legal cases that
you've been involved in. There's a huge trove of
public record stuff. What these companies do is
collect that, pay for it, aggregate it and connect
it to private and propriety databases that they're
also able to purchase or collect.
OR: It's so asymmetric, because while we're giving
bits and pieces of information as we go about our
lives, there are these companies that are basically
compiling all of that and creating a very elaborate
ID.
MA:
Infrastructure makes a difference. One of the other
false truisms of the information society is that
ownership of resources doesn't really matter
anymore, because it's all about intellectual
production and creation. Owning databases and owning
the processing power to sort through those
databases, owning the servers that are able to store
all of that information, gives one a certain type of
control over information that the rest of us don't
have.
There's this huge infrastructure investment that's
taking place just in data storage. I just imagine
these huge factories that don't contain people but
contain information about people. We generated that
information and it's being put to work. It's not
just about privacy; it's about productivity. We're
becoming so incredibly productive in terms of the
information that we throw off as we go about our
lives. but we don't have any control over what it is
that we've produced. The control over what we've
produced is turned over to the companies that are
able to store and use the information. That again
feels to me like a power issue.
OR: How do social networking sites like Facebook fit
into this picture?
MA:
Both Facebook and MySpace recently announced that
they see their social networking sites as a
productive factory of marketing information. If you
think back to that image of Crossley sorting through
peoples' trash, this is a quantum leap. You're not
only taking the castoffs of peoples' consumption
processes, but you're tapping into their
communications, their fantasies, their dreams. All
of the social connections that they build with one
another become this mine of information to be used
for instrumental applications for, in this case,
commercial purposes. Those sites are basically
factories of personal and aggregate information
about very desirable demographic. That's why Rupert
Murdoch is willing to pay so much for a site like
this.
OR: While social networking sites are indirect ways
that advertisers tap our information, there are more
direct ways. You write about different campaigns to
come up with a jingle or to customize your own
product.
MA:
I'm struck by the military language that advertisers
use. They talk about target marketing, and if you
look in trade magazines, very often they'll use the
visual metaphor of a target. "You've got to hit the
audience on the target." Very often what we're
engaged in as we participate in these user-generated
content campaigns is targeting ourselves. A lot of
what gets described as participation is
participating in helping marketers in shooting at us
more effectively. That's only power sharing if we've
accepted that principle, and say yes, as a society,
what we would like to do with our participation
skills is engage in the process of marketing to
ourselves. But we don't get to set the goals. We
just get to participate in a goal that's already
been set for us.
What's interesting is the way in which these
campaigns enlist consumers to take marketing
priorities. It actually works to create subjects who
embrace priorities that were not their own as their
own. Help make commercials for us. On the one hand,
it enlists a creative potential, people want to
create things and the wonderful thing about
technology and the Internet is that it really is
empowering in terms of giving people the ability to
participate in media production. It's so easy to
make your own video or podcast now if you have
access to some relatively inexpensive technology.
But to take that power and then turn it to the ends
of marketing to yourselves and others. The companies
are going to validate what you do and might even
give it some air time, but in exchange what you have
to do is inhabit the marketing mindset and turn your
creative abilities to the ends of marketing. The
more that interactivity comes to mean participating
in marketing to ourselves, the more we start to
think about what democracy and participation means
in terms of adopting the priorities of marketers.
OR: Talk about the Television Without Pity online
community that you explored. This was a case where
bad TV is written about with wit.
MA:
We might imagine that if people get to participate
more, and they're very critical of the type of
programming that's available to them, that might
lead to some change in the programming that's
available. I'm not ruling that out, but what
intrigued me was that the Internet can actually
function as a compensatory mechanism. If the TV
program is really bad, you can actually entertain
yourself by pointing out how bad it is and making
fun it and actually turn bad TV into something
that's more entertaining than it would be without
this interactive component to it. I wrote a previous
book about reality TV, and I had to watch a lot of
Big Brother, the U.S. version. The first season was
so boring, but I went into the bulletin boards and
the chatrooms and the online community was very
smart and interesting. That made the viewing
experience more fun without actually making the
content of the programming any better. That's the
symptom of a kind of savvy, sarcastic society.
OR: You talk about the promise of interactivity in
politics as similar to that of marketing. There's a
sort of dystopic example you give of each individual
in a family is "marketed" differently on a candidate
-- or disincluded altogether if they're not deemed
an important vote. This seems to get at an important
distinction between customization and
discrimination. Can you talk about this?
MA:
The flip side of customization is discrimination,
and I'm concerned with how this functions in a
political context. If I don't get a customized ad
for a Ferrari because I'm the wrong demographic, no
big deal. I do worry about how customization plays
out as discrimination in the era of targeting
campaigning. Excluding particular groups from
information about a candidate or an election because
of their past pattern of voting (or nonvoting)
lowers the amount of political information out there
and may prevent people from entering into the
political process. In a democracy, we're supposed to
know as much as possible about the candidates'
positions, and they're only supposed to know
selected information about our policy preferences.
The prospect of mass customized politics shifts the
balance: politicians learn as much as possible about
us in order to craft a selective image that can be
customized for target audiences. Different people
vote for different versions of the same candidate.
I'm not saying this doesn't happen already, but
customization promises to exacerbate the process. It
also shifts the balance of power; we should know
more about candidates than they do about us. It also
facilitates misleading and manipulating campaigning.
OR: You compare government's post-9/11 surveillance
to online dating. Explain.
MA:
We live in a world in which the equation of
interactivity with monitoring has become insidiously
pervasive. Commercial entities invite us to
participate, when what they really want to do is
gather information about us. The government enjoins
us to participate in the war on terror by submitting
to increased surveillance -- and, significantly,
watching over one another. Security, in these
troubled times, means turning the country into a
huge neighborhood watch program. But what's good for
national security is also portrayed as good for
personal security -- in the era of
neoliberalization, the two become one and the same.
The
"democratization" of interactive technologies
results in widespread access to selected monitoring
strategies. You can buy your own, cheap video
monitoring system for your home at Wal-Mart. You can
background-check your neighbors, friends and family
online. You can download a voice-stress analyzer to
use on your kids or your significant other. What
interests me is the dual purposing of interactive
surveillance: You might buy a home surveillance
system for protection against theft -- or
infidelity. More and more we are being told that in
an increasingly risk-permeated society we need to
embrace technologies of surveillance -- not just be
submitting to them, but also by using them on one
another ... for national security and/or personal
security. These reality shows that show us how to
conduct forensic analysis of the rooms of potential
dates or to submit them to lie detector
interrogations seem symptomatic of the popular
embrace of interactivity as surveillance.
OR: How can we seek true interactivity? In other
words, is there hope?
MA:
I wouldn't have gotten worked up enough to write the
book if I didn't think there was some hope. Digital
media technologies have amazing potential for the
facilitating the information access, deliberation
and accountability that are crucial to a truly
democratic society. The fact that they can do so
doesn't mean that they necessarily will -- that's
the fallacy of most of the celebratory rhetoric
about digital democracy.
We
need to make them work for democratic ends. First,
power sharing means participation not just in the
strategy for obtaining a particular end, such as
selling a product or promoting security, but in
defining what those ends are. Participation in the
process of marketing to ourselves is not true
interactivity, because the ends are given in
advance: Sell more products to more people.
Commercial participation doesn't include the option
of deciding, for example, that less marketing might
be a desirable end. I think true interactivity also
entails shared control over the networks and the
databases. I'm not saying that we should get rid of
commercial databases, but we shouldn't confuse our
participation in creating them with empowerment or
democracy. Where it really counts for democratic
purposes we should consider the potential of
nonprofit, public and independent databases and
networks. Who says all information databases have to
be privately held -- what about public libraries?
Who says all networks have to be privately owned and
operated? For much of its history, the Internet
wasn't. Even in the information age,
bricks-and-mortar infrastructure matters -- whoever
owns or controls it will be able to set the ends for
which it is put to use.
Onnesha Roychoudhuri is a
San Francisco-based freelance writer. A former
assistant editor of AlterNet.org, she has written
for AlterNet, The American Prospect, MotherJones.com,
In These Times, Huffington Post, Truthdig,
PopMatters, and Women's eNews.