Last Updated:
Thursday, July 26, 2007 06:10:59 PM
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Know Your 4th Amendment Rights and The Patriot Act
by
Greg Szymanski, JD, July 23, 2007
Last Updated:
Thursday, July 26, 2007 06:10:59 PM |
ithout
question, The Patriot Act has made it easier for officials to
undertake warrantless searches and seizures previously protected
by the 4th amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In theory, prior to The Patriot Act officials needed probable
cause or in some cases reasonable suspicion to invade a
citizen's privacy. Now, mere suspicion of wrongdoing whether
reasonable or not is enough, destroying a cherished legal
standard.
The two most disturbing elements in the Patriot act are the
words "suspicion" and "domestic terrorism" as this gives
officials an open door policy into a citizen's home or personal
items without clearly defining what constitutes domestic
terrorism, leading to mere criticism of government as a possible
violation.
Although this may seem trivial to the average person, it's legal
ramifications are grave since it opens the door for abuses of
privacy reminiscent to Nazi Germany.
However, in light of the grave ramifications most Americans
remain compliant to governmental abuses and ignorant of their
4th amendment rights as well as the legal exceptions to that
cherished Constitutional protection.
Here is a brief overview:
The 4th Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of
persons and property. This applies to citizens and
resident aliens,
applying to state court proceedings through the 14th
amendment.
A "Search" under the law means any governmental
intrusion of a
reasonable, justifiable expectation of privacy. A
reasonable expectation
of privacy must be both objectively and subjectively
reasonable,
according to the Katz case. Objective and subjective
are important legal
words and in a privacy case both standards must be
met.
When it comes to legal Standing to raise a privacy
complaint, it must be
remembered a third party cannot assert the privacy
rights of another, as
the complainant must have a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of
privacy.
For example, co-conspirators don't automatically
have standing to assert
other co-conspirator's rights. Overnight guests have
standing, but
visitors for a commercial transaction do not.
One interesting area in hot debate concerning the
right to privacy is the
widespread field of electronic surveillance.
Remember, surveillancece is
always permitted with the consent of one of the
parties and "false
friends" can give consent.
Prior to the Patriot Act, warrants were needed based
upon probable cause
and no consent (a difficult legal standard to meet),
but now mere
suspicion may suffice, making electronic
surveillance a handy
governmental tool to spy without judicial oversight.
In summary, with the passage of the Patriot Act we
have allowed the
government to by-pass probable cause a standard
which meant: the
likelihood of evidence being discovered, other
procedures to obtain the
evidence have failed, and wired facilities are
connected to some type of
crime. Further the warrant must describe a person,
conversation and be
limited in time. Surveillance must stop after
conversations are recorded
and are not applicable to pen registers and bank
accounts.
However, now with the Patriot Act all these
limitations have disappeared.
And here in a nutshell are some other limitations
and legal concepts put
into jeopardy with the passage of the Patriot act:
Aerial surveillance: no search was previously
allowed from public
navigable airspace and it must not have been
physically intrusive.
Curtilage (a legal concept determining the
boundaries of your living
space): This previously applied to the 4th Amendment
protections but
without judicial oversight can easily be ignored.
Factors included
proximity to one's home, area fenced, nature of the
land's use and
whether steps were taken to protect the area from
observation.
Open Fields: there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy and even 4th
Amendment doesn't apply.
Trash: no reasonable expectation of privacy if left
at curb. 4th Amendment
also doesn't apply to dumpsters left in the alley.
Other terms important to understanding your 4th
Amendment rights:
Seizure of Person: when a person submits to a show
of authority or when a
reasonable person would not feel free to walk away
from police. An arrest
is an example of a "seizure", but not all police
questioning is
considered a "seizure of person."
Seizure of Property: This relates to the
government's physical control
over a thing. Warrants were usually required unless
a legal exception
existed. This is not applicable to electronic
tracking devices and de
minimus drug field tests.
Probable Cause To Arrest: This requires substantial
trustworthy evidence
that a violation of law has been committed and the
person to be arrested
committed the violation. Remember, with the passage
of the Patriot Act
this evidence can be obtained without probable cause
protections.
Probable Cause to Search: This requires evidence
which supports the
conclusion that the specific items to be searched
are connected with
criminal activity and the items will be found in the
place searched.
Reasonable Suspicion: This is a lesser standard than
probable cause which
existed prior to the Patriot Act in certain limited
situations, including
stop and frisk, administrative areas, school, border
and workplace
searches. This, however, requires specific facts
that criminal
activity is afoot. It also can justify without
probable cause limited
search and seizure if police believe the suspect is
about to or recently
has committed a crime.
Individualized Suspicion: This is not required if a
neutral criteria is
used. For example, sobriety checkpoints and airport
searches are
considered areas where the public benefit outweighs
the private
concerns, allowing everyone to be searched without
even mere suspicion.
Search Warrants: To make sure it is legal watch for
three things: Validly
issued by a neutral magistrate concluding fair
probability that evidence
will be found based on sworn affidavits containing
specific facts.
Particularity, meaning items seized must be
described in detail. Scope,
meaning area searched limited to areas that listed
evidence could
reasonably be found. Remember, the arrest must be
timely and not stale and
the officer presenting the warrant must knock and
announce unless
reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances exist.
Student Searches: Only reasonable suspicion is
needed for student
searches, including drug testing for sports.
Public Employees: Drug testing is OK even if absent
individual suspicion
if real and substantial risk to public safety or
national security.
Exceptions to Warrants: (Reasonableness applies)
exigent circumstances or
hot pursuit; searches incident to a lawful arrest;
auto exception; stop
and frisk; consent; plain view; inventory searches;
administrative/regulatory searches; border searches
and sobriety
checkpoints.
Note: Every one of the exceptions mentioned has a
detailed analysis, but
for the sake of brevity we will forego those
explanations, leaving the
following two legal concepts as our ending to this
cursory overview of
your 4th amendment rights.
Exclusionary Rule: This legal concept is applied
also to the states in a
case called Mapp v. Ohio and deters police
misconduct by excluding
illegally obtained and seized evidence. This also
applies to the 5th and
6th amendments. Remember, evidence itself and the
"fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine makes all evidence obtained after
excluded from the
prosecutor's case-in-chief, but can be used to
impeach a witness or in
grand jury proceedings.
Limitations to the Exclusionary Rule: illegally
seized evidence can be
used to impeach if no motion to suppress is made and
if no taint is purged
by other factors including intervening time,
voluntariness, inevitable
discovery, evidence obtained from a non-police
informant or independent
source, good faith belief in validity of warrant and
a statute
authorizing seizure or a harmless error.
We hope this helps you understand your rights better
and how the Patriot
Act interferes with established legal principles.
Further, it is sad
the many lawyers in Congress, who understand these
principles, have bowed
down to the New World Order, making the Constitution
as President Bush
stated "Just a God Damn piece of paper."
Further, the focus on the 4th Amendment stated above
revolved around
criminal procedure, but interestingly enough the
origins of search and
seizure law arose from seditious libel
investigations closely connected
to our 1st amendment free speech rights. Here is a
portion of a legal
article written by William J. Stuntz, explaining the
origins of the 4th
Amendment and criminal procedure.
by William J. Stuntz
The focus of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law is
day-to-day criminal
investigation: police searches and seizures,
interrogation of suspects,
and so forth. In this Article, Professor Stuntz
argues that Fourth and
Fifth Amendment history has a very different focus.
The Fourth and Fifth
Amendments arose out of heresy and seditious libel
investigations, in a
time when police forces did not exist. In the late
nineteenth century,
when the Supreme Court first took a hand in crafting
Fourth and Fifth
Amendment doctrine, the key cases involved railroad
and antitrust
regulation - a far cry from ordinary criminal
investigations, and far
removed from the common concerns of police
misconduct. In both the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law's
primary effect seems to have been to make it harder
to prosecute
substantively controversial crimes: heresy,
sedition, or unpopular trade
offenses at the time of the Founding, regulatory
offenses in the late
nineteenth century. Criminal procedure 's history
thus has little to do
with day-to-day criminal investigation - little to
do with the police -
but has a great deal to do with substance, with what
conduct the state
may criminalize. This unusual history, Professor
Stuntz contends, is
crucial to any understanding of the strange features
of the current law
of criminal investigation. In particular, it goes
far toward explaining
that law's failure to come to grips with police
violence, surely the most
important category of police misconduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following anomaly: The law of criminal
procedure closely
regulates when a police officer can look in the
glove compartment of my
car or ask me questions about a crime, but it pays
almost no attention to
when (or how often or how hard or with what weapon)
he can strike me. We
have very detailed law governing a host of
evidence-gathering issues, but
surprisingly little - and surprisingly lax - legal
regulation of police
coercion and violence. This state of affairs is both
strange and wrong.
It is also a product of criminal procedure's odd
history.
One aspect of that history is familiar. Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law
are the traditional guardians of a particular kind
of individual privacy
- the ability to keep secrets from the government.
The most famous and
important search and seizure cases of the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries involve government officials
rummaging through
private papers, subpoenaing private documents, or
eavesdropping on
telephone conversations.(1) Similarly, the privilege
against
self-incrimination arose in part from claims that
one should not be
required to disclose one's thoughts or beliefs under
pain of criminal
punishment.(2) This strand of thought about the
privilege has mostly died
out today, but as recently as a generation ago
privacy was the dominant
explanation for why the privilege existed.(3) And
the privilege at its
heart has always protected a form of secrecy - the
right not to share
one's testimony with the government.
But there is another, less noticed strand of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment
history. Privacy protection in the past had little
to do with ordinary
criminal procedure. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
arose out of heresy
investigations and seditious libel cases, not
murders and robberies. In
the late nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court
first took a hand in
crafting Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, the key
cases involved railroad
regulation and antitrust - again, a far cry from
ordinary criminal
litigation. In both the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the law's
primary effect seems to have been to make it harder
to prosecute
objectionable crimes - heresy, sedition, or
unpopular trade offenses in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regulatory
offenses in the late
nineteenth century. To a surprising degree, the
history of criminal
procedure is not really about procedure at all but
about substantive
issues, about what conduct the government should and
should not be able
to punish.
Fourth and Fifth Amendment history thus has more in
common with the First
Amendment and Lochner v. New York(4) than with
criminal procedure as we
know it today. Fourth and Fifth Amendment law has
traditionally limited
government evidence gathering in order to guard
individual privacy, but
the limits and the protection have mattered most in
settings in which
there have been serious concerns about the
government's power to regulate
the relevant conduct. Meanwhile, those bodies of law
had only a small
effect on run-of-the-mill criminal investigations
and prosecutions. It is
as if privacy protection were a proxy for something
else, a tool with
which courts or juries could limit the government's
substantive power.(5)
This system began to break down near the turn of
this century, with the
advent of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman
Act, and other
statutes designed to regulate business. These
statutes dramatically
altered the substantive effect of constitutional
privacy protection,
transforming it into a tool for preventing unwelcome
regulation of
business. Some courts embraced this transformation
(this was, after all,
the Lochner era), but by the end of Theodore
Roosevelt's presidency that
path was already largely abandoned. Foreshadowing
the switch in time of
1937, the Supreme Court began to erect unprincipled
boundaries around
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections in order to
limit their
restrictive effect on regulatory statutes. Yet the
underlying focus of
the law - the idea that the Constitution places
great value on one's
ability to keep information out of the government's
hands - remained,
setting the stage for the conflicts and
inconsistencies that riddle
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law today.
The results of this history can be seen today both
in what the law
regulates and in what it leaves alone. If the law of
search and seizure
now seems obsessed with evaluating the privacy
interest in jacket pockets
or paper bags, that is a consequence of the strong
tradition of using
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law as a shield against
government
information-gathering - a tradition that has more to
do with protecting
free speech than with regulating the police. If
privacy seems
surprisingly unprotected when government agencies
search regulated
businesses or when government employers search their
employees, that is a
consequence of the early twentieth-century conflict
between privacy
protection and the emerging regulatory state.
Finally, if the law all but
ignores police violence outside of interrogation
rooms, if it pays more
attention to what police officers can see than to
what they can do, that
too is a consequence of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments' odd history.
Except for the last generation or so, that history
has had surprisingly
little to do with the police. It has had more to do
with the substantive
law of crimes, with what activities the government
should and should not
be able to punish.
Of course, the substantive issues that shaped Fourth
and Fifth Amendment
law are long since settled. The government cannot
prosecute people for
sedition or heresy. Regulatory crimes abound, and
few people think they
raise serious constitutional problems.(6) Meanwhile,
the law of criminal
procedure still follows the path marked out by these
old battles. We have
taken a privacy ideal formed in heresy cases and
railroad regulation
disputes, an ideal that had no connection to
ordinary criminal law
enforcement, and used it as the foundation for much
of the vast body of
law that polices the police. Predictably, the
combination has not worked
out very well.
Part II of this Article discusses the Fourth
Amendment's
eighteenth-century roots. Part III turns to the
origins of the privilege
against selfincrimination. Part IV examines the role
both doctrines
played during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Finally,
Part V offers an account of how we got to where we
are, of the transition
from Lochner-era Fourth and Fifth Amendment law to
the Warren Court, and
from the Warren Court to today. These discussions
are not detailed, and
there are no impressive new discoveries. The basic
outlines of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment history have long been fairly clear.
I wish only to
suggest that those basic outlines, especially the
eighteenth-century
disputes that led to the Fourth Amendment together
with Boyd v. United
States and its nineteenth-century progeny, paint a
different picture than
the one we usually see.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The literature on the Fourth Amendment's origins is
sparse, but that may
be because agreement is so widespread. Like the rest
of the Bill of
Rights, the Fourth Amendment was prompted by
complaints pressed during
the Constitution's ratification.(7) Also like other
items in the Bill of
Rights, the Fourth Amendment echoed several state
constitutional
provisions.(8) But its real source, historians seem
to agree, was the
same as the source of those state provisions: a trio
of famous cases from
the 1760s, two in England and one in the
colonies.(9) All of the
literature on the Fourth Amendment's origins focuses
on these three
cases, which were not only well known to the men who
wrote and ratified
the Bill of Rights, but famous throughout the
colonial population. Any
effort to understand the Fourth Amendment's roots,
then, must start with
these cases and the legal context within which they
operated.
--------------------------------------------------
Here are some famous quotes concerning freedom and
liberty:
"In the end more than they wanted freedom, they
wanted security. When the
Athenians finally wanted not to give to society but
for society to give
to them, when the freedom they wished for was
freedom from
responsibility, then Athens ceased to be free."-
Edward Gibbon
(1737-1794)Source: Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, 1909
=
"If men use their liberty in such a way as to
surrender their liberty,
are they thereafter any the less slaves? If people
by a plebiscite elect
a man despot over them, do they remain free because
the despotism was of
their own making?": -- Herbert Spencer - (1820-1903)
British author,
economist, philosopher 1884
=
It is foolish in the extreme not only to resort to
force before necessity
compels, but especially to madly create the
conditions that will lead to
this necessity." : Benjamin Tucker, Liberty, May 22,
1886
=
"The industrial way of life leads to the industrial
way of death. From
Shiloh to Dachau, from Antietam to Stalingrad, from
Hiroshima to Vietnam
and Afghanistan, the great specialty of industry and
technology has been
the mass production of human corpses." -Edward Abbey
=
"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem
is civil obedience.
Our problem is that numbers of people all over the
world have obeyed the
dictates of the leaders of their government and have
gone to war, and
millions have been killed because of this obedience.
. . Our problem is
that people are obedient all over the world in the
face of poverty and
starvation and stupidity, and war, and cruelty":
Howard Zinn
=
The feeling of patriotism - It is an immoral feeling
because, instead of
confessing himself a son of God . . . or even a free
man guided by his
own reason, each man under the influence of
patriotism confesses himself
the son of his fatherland and the slave of his
government, and commits
actions contrary to his reason and conscience.": Leo
Tolstoy, Patriotism
and Government
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