Worlds Within Worlds
- The Holarchy of Life
(Chapter 7)
by Andrew P. Smith, Oct 24, 2005
(Posted here: Sunday, May 27, 2007)
7. THE LAYER OF THE LAW
"Three cosmoses taken together include in
themselves all the laws of the universe."
-Gurdjieff
1
"The whole moon and
the whole sky are reflected in one dewdrop on the grass."
-Dogen2
We have now followed the holarchy from atoms
up to the highest levels of existence for which we have any
knowledge of. We have seen that despite the enormous variety of
existence, differences in form, function and scale, life at all
levels follows certain fundamental principles. In Part 2 of this
book, we will examine how the holarchy was created, and how it
continues to grow and change, through the process of evolution.
To conclude this Part, however, it would be useful to summarize
the major principles that we have found. I will do this in the
form of ten laws or rules governing the holarchy.
Principles of the Holarchy
1. Universality. All aspects of
existence can be understood in terms of holons, which contain
holons as well as are contained within them.
2. Classes. There are two kinds of
holons, autonomous or fundamental holons and intermediate or
social holons. Fundamental holons, including atoms, cells and
organisms, can exist independently of higher-order holons as
well as within them. Social holons exist only within
higher-order holons.
3. Subclasses. There are two kinds of
fundamental holons, inert and interactive. Inert holons exist
independently of higher-order holons. Interactive holons
associate with each other and form all the higher stages (social
holons) of their level of existence.
4. Emergence. Each holon has emergent
properties not reducible to those of its component holons. These
properties generally include a longer lifetime and greater
stability, as well as more specific properties.
5. Properties. All holons exhibit
three fundamental properties: a) assimilation or growth; b)
adaptation or self-maintenance; and c) communication.
Assimilation is broadly defined as interaction with a
lower-order holon; adaptation as interaction with a higher-order
holon; and communication as interaction with a holon of the same
stage or level. In addition, fundamental holons exhibit a fourth
fundamental property, reproduction.
6. Organization. Fundamental
interactive holons simultaneously complete one level of
existence and begin the next higher one. They contain all the
lower holons in the level they complete, preserving as well as
transcending their properties. Social holons form intermediate
stages within a level of existence. They do not preserve the
properties of their component holons, but transform these
properties into emergent ones.
7. Dimensionality. Within any level of
existence, each holon exists in one more dimension of space or
time than holons on the stage immediately below it. The holon's
emergent properties are directly related to this additional
dimension.
8. Participation. Fundamental holons
may participate in some of the emergent properties of the higher
stages in which they exist.
9. Perspective. Any holon's
perspective of itself and other holons is relative, and depends
on its relationship to them. A holon's perspective of holons
below it is most nearly complete and real; these holons are
perceived as exterior to the holon. Holons above it but on the
same level of existence are perceived as interior to the holon.
Holons on levels above the holon are not perceived to exist at
all.
10. Asymmetry. a) Any level or stage
of existence depends on the levels or stages below it; the
converse is not true. b) Any single holon depends on the holons
directly above it; the converse is not true.
Analogies in the Holarchy
This list is not meant to be complete, of
course. There are many other important properties of holons,
some of which will be discussed later. But these ten rules
summarize most of the essential points that were presented in
the preceding chapters, and more specifically, provide powerful
evidence for one of the central themes of this book--that there
are many analogies between different levels of existence. We
could regard this point as a metarule, that is, as a
higher-order rule that emerges from all of the other rules:
Analogy. Holons on equivalent stages
in different levels of existence are analogous to one other,
with respect to both their properties and their relationships
with other holons.
In addition to being a central unifying
principle of the holarchy, the analogy metarule provides a very
powerful tool for investigating the holarchy--which is to say,
all of existence--further. To the extent that analogies exist
between holons on one level of existence, and those on another,
we can use them to predict new properties of holons with which
we are not very familiar, or even to predict the existence of
new holons themselves. We got a taste of this approach in the
preceding chapter, where I speculated on the form that a higher
level of existence would take, based on what we know about our
own level and lower levels.
In the second part of this book, where I will
be discussing evolution and other processes of change in the
holarchy, I will use this analogical approach extensively.
Evolution, of course, is a process about which we have very
little direct evidence. The physical and biological levels of
the holarchy were completed millions of years ago, and many of
the most important transitions during this period, such as those
from atoms and molecules to cells, and from cells to organisms,
left few if any traces visible to us today. Thus the views of
science about how these new forms of life emerged are based
almost entirely on intelligent speculation, on how the known
properties of atoms, molecules and cells might have enabled them
to associate into more complex forms of life. Even the evolution
of organisms, for which we do have fossil evidence, still
presents major unresolved problems. For example, we know from
fossils some of the major stages that occurred in the evolution
of the human brain, but we still don't understand exactly how
our brains evolved. How was it, for example, that the modern
Homo sapiens brain could emerge 50-100 thousand years ago,
apparently with all the intellectual potential that our brains
have today, even though most of that potential would not be used
for millions of years? Even less do we understand, as I
emphasized earlier, how consciousness fits into the process of
evolution.
Evolution of our past, then, is a major dark
area in our understanding. But future evolution is even murkier.
Where is the earth in general, and the human race in particular,
going? Are we likely to be replaced by a new species? What kinds
of new social organization will emerge? Even though evolution is
occurring among us right now, we have a very dim understanding
of it, because it occurs over such immensely large time scales,
and because, as we saw earlier, it's difficult for us to observe
ourselves and our connections with others as objectively as we
can observe lower forms of life.
Analog thinking, it seems to me, is ideally
suited to address both of these questions--how evolution
occurred in the past, and how it's occurring now and will occur
in the future. This approach, in effect, allows us to expand
what knowledge we have of one part of the holarchy to another.
The evolutionary principles that we find operating in one area
of existence should be applicable to other areas--if we take
proper precautions. As we saw earlier, these precautions include
taking into account a) the differences between stages and levels
of existence; b) the fact that our own level of existence is
still evolving, whereas evolution of lower levels is complete;
and c) our perspective of different levels of existence is
different.
Even taking into account these factors,
significant differences between equivalent holons on different
levels of existence seem to remain. An atom, for example, seems
quite different in its properties from a cell, nor is a cell
completely analogous to an organism. So we must always use
analog thinking carefully, and interpret those insights it seems
to provide us with some caution. However, if we confine our
comparisons, as much as possible, to adjacent levels of
existence, we should be able to minimize these differences.
Holon Substitution
I will use this approach in the second part
of this book, and in particular, a speculative tool that I refer
to as holon substitution. The principle underlying holon
substitution is very simple. We take a scientific law or
scientific theory that is widely accepted and well supported by
evidence, and restate it in terms of the holarchy. When we do
this, the theory will contain terms that refer to certain kinds
of holons and/or certain stages or levels of existence. We then
substitute for these terms equivalent terms from the next higher
(or lower) level of existence. To the extent that the two levels
are analogous, the new law or theory so derived should have a
degree of truth as an explanation of processes on that level.
Let me illustrate this principle with an
example. A basic scientific law, more specifically, a law of
biology, states that:
"the information needed to reproduce
an organism is contained within the genes of any one
cell of that organism".
This statement is based, of course, on the
fact that new individual organisms--animal as well as plants,
higher species as well as lower--develop from single cells.
Normally, these cells are specialized reproductive cells, or
gametes, and in the case of the sexual reproductive process used
by our own species and most other multicellular organisms, two
gametes must fuse to form a single cell. However, the same
genetic information present in a fertilized reproductive cell is
also present in all the other, non-reproductive (somatic) cells
of the organism, and as recent breakthroughs in cloning have
demonstrated, any one of these other cells, if subjected to the
appropriate conditions, has the potential to develop into
another complete organism.
I don't mean this in a rigidly deterministic
sense--that every aspect of an organism is specified by its
genes--but only that the genes do determine the kinds of
properties that distinguish one kind of organism from another.
As we will see in Part 2, it appears that genes do not actually
contain all the relevant information needed to create a new
organism. Still, we can accept the above statement in a loose
sense. Having done this, let's now restate it in terms of the
holarchy:
"the information needed to reproduce
a fundamental holon on the mental level of
existence is contained within a higher stage physical
holon of any one fundamental biological holon
of that mental holon."
This re-statement is bound to seem a little
clumsy and confusing at first, because it replaces common terms
we all understand with the more specialized language of the
holarchy. To make it easier to see this repacement process, I
have underlined the new terms. An organism, as we have seen, is
a fundamental holon on the mental level of existence. Genes are
contained in chromosomes, which are a higher physical stage
within cells, which are fundamental holons on the biological
level.
Having restated this biological law in this
way, I will now substitute, for each term related to the
holarchy, an equivalent term from the next higher level of
existence:
"the information needed to reproduce
a fundamental holon on the transmental level of
existence is contained within a higher stage biological
system of any one fundamental mental holon of that
transmental holon."
Finally, we translate back from the
specialized terminology of the holarchy to more familiar terms:
"the information needed to reproduce
a superculture is contained within the brain of any one
human being of that superculture".
In this translation, note that I am
considering the brain to be analogous to the genome, as was
discussed in Chapter 4. This last statement, then, represents an
application of a fundamental biological law to what we would
call a social or cultural process. It says, in effect, that just
as an organism can reproduce itself by means of the genetic
information stored within any one of its cells, an advanced
human culture could reproduce itself from the knowledge in the
brain of any one of its members. In other words, one of its
members (obviously, to be more precise, we would need at least
two) would be sufficient to colonize another planet and create
another complete human civilization.
Though I am not going to propose that this
statement is a fundamental cultural law, it makes enough sense,
I believe, that we can imagine it could be true. We could
certainly conceive of two human beings, a man and a woman, being
transported to another planet where, given the appropriate
physical and biological conditions, they could start a
self-sustaining colony that over time would develop into an
essential replica of the earth's civilization. To reproduce all
our modern technology, they would presumably require a great
deal of external information. Yet much of modern civilization
could be reproduced simply on the basis of the knowledge the two
colonists contain within their brains--mental knowledge about
how to interact with others in families, groups, societies and
still larger social organizations. As I discussed in Chapter 4,
this is compressed information. It enables human beings to
reproduce themselves--not just physically and biologically, but
mentally--by specifying a relatively small number of units of
interaction, and the rules governing these interactions.
To the extent that we can fairly easily
conceive of this scenario, the holon substitution process we
used to arrive at it is fully justified. For even if this
hypothesis turned out not to be true, it is undoubtedly close to
being true, and in science, hypotheses that are simply close are
valuable steps towards getting at a more complete picture of
reality. If a hypothesis is not true, we might then ask why it
isn't true, what about the hypothesis would have to be modified.
And this brings us to our next point.
We saw earlier that analogies between lower
levels of existence and our own may be incomplete to some extent
because our level is not complete; it's still in the process of
evolving. To the extent that our hypothesis about cultural
reproduction is not true, then, the incomplete evolution of our
culture could provide an explanation for this. Notice that the
hypothesis specifically refers to reproduction of a hypothetical
higher level of existence which, so far as we know, does not yet
exist. Thus if cultural reproduction is not yet possible in this
manner, it might become so later. That is--and this is a very
important point about analog thinking--not only do we see an
interesting and feasible possibility, but we see how the
realization of this possibility might depend on further
development of our culture. In other words, this is not only a
hypothetical law, but a prediction of how future evolution will
occur.
Let's take the process of holon substitution
a step further. We have just seen that this technique predicts
that the human brain contains the information needed to
reproduce a larger culture. The same approach also predicts that
this larger culture has its own informational holon, analogous
to the brain in the organism, and the genome in the cell. This
larger holon, on the one hand, would play an important role in
actualizing the superculture--just as the brain actualizes the
organism by regulating the activity of internal organs, and the
genome actualizes the cell. On the other hand, it would contain
all the information needed to create a still larger holon--a
holon that would transcend many complex forms of planetary
organizations.
That last statement implies the existence of
a second level of existence above our own--a level as far above
a postulated planetary culture as the latter is above we
individual human beings. At this point, we are getting into the
range of very far-out speculation. However, if we confine the
discussion to this postulated mental level informational holon,
we can see a great deal of evidence for its emergence. It would
consist of all the information associated with our technology,
our scientific, philosophical and academic knowledge, our
institutions of government, business, and so on.
Furthermore, we would predict that as the
planetary holon or superculture evolves and emerges, this
informational holon would become increasingly compressed, just
as the information in the brain and the genome is compressed.
Evidence of this compression, too, is quite clear. Gregory
Chaitin, who we have seen originated this concept, points out
that scientific theories represent a compression of observable
information. Indeed, one measure of the validity of a scientific
theory is the extent to which it compresses information--that
is, abstracts and generalizes data and observations about the
world. Darwinism, for example, compresses an enormous amount of
information about observable changes in individual organisms
into a few rules of evolution. Relativity theory--and before it,
Newtonian theory--compresses an enormous amount of observations
of the cosmos into a few concepts of mass, force and energy.
Genetic theory compresses observations of DNA into a few rules
of heredity.
Compression is also evident in many other
areas of knowledge. For example, almost all large insitutions in
our society--government, business, medical, educational, and so
on--are in the process of transferring all their records to the
computer. Putting information on a computer doesn't reduce it,
but it does compress it, not simply in a physical sense (getting
rid of paper), but in Chaitin's more precise sense. Information
in the computer is stored in the form of not only files, but in
the applications that run the files. The applications contain
the rules that allow the compressed information in the file to
be expanded into the form in which it becomes user-friendly.
In conclusion, if we take analogies between
different levels of existence seriously, we can see the outlines
of where our civilization might be headed. Different in some
respects as this civilization may be from lower levels of
existence, there are general principles that it would seem to
follow. In particular, a re-organization and compression of
information seems to be essential to the emergence of a new
level of existence.
In the final chapter of this book, when I
discuss ongoing and possibly future transitions in the earth, I
will return to the subject of information at the social level. I
will also discuss other organizational changes consistent with
the emergence of a higher level holon.
Structures, States and Levels
The holarchical model I have been developing
is relentlessly linear. Every form of existence is placed on one
vertical scale, with all differences being ascribed to a single
(conceptual) dimension of higher vs. lower. Many theorists
strongly object to this idea, which seems to smack of
reductionism. In Chapter 4, for example, I pointed out that Ken
Wilber has proposed a four scale model, in which inner and
outer, as well as individual and social, aspects of reality are
distinguished. I tried to show there how neither of these
distinctions is necessary, that both of them can be understood
in terms of higher vs. lower.
Critical to my argument in Chapter 4,
however, was ignoring the hard problem aspect of
consciousness--the actual experience we have of the world. I
agree with Wilber that consciousness in this sense is not simply
emergent from physical, biological or even mental
processes--that is, it is not related to them in the same way
that they seem to be related to each other. In Chapter 6, I
suggested the simplest way to view consciousness was as a
transcendent phenomenon, some portion of which is experienced by
holons on different stages and levels of the holarchy..
Nevertheless, the relationship of
consciousness to holarchy seems to be a complex one. The essence
of the problem is that we human beings--a particular holon on a
particular stage of a particular level of existence--are capable
of accessing many different states of consciousness. There is
our ordinary waking consciousness, of course, and deep and
dreaming sleep, recognized by everyone. There are various kinds
of altered states of consciousness, some of them induced by
certain drugs, others perhaps inducible by unusual experiences
or practices. Then there are higher states of consciousness,
discussed in the previous chapter. How are we to make sense of
all these states of consciousness? Is it really possible to
understand them all in terms of a single scale model?
As a springboard into this issue, I propose
to use a recent online debate between two prominent
theoreticians in this field: Allan Combs, author of the highly
acclaimed book on consciousness, The Radiance of Being
(1995); and Wilber. Both of these men, I'm quite sure, are very
much opposed to the kind of one dimensional model I have been
developing, yet they also disagree quite strongly with each
other. Their debate
3
on this issue, I think, goes a long way towards illuminating the
problems that arise when we try to understand the relationship
between different states of consciousness to the ordinary world
that science understands. After highlighting these problems, I
will then discuss my own approach to the issue of states of
consciousness.
The central issue of the debate, I believe
it's fair to say, revolves around the number of "dimensions" a
model of consciousness requires. By dimensions, let me again
emphasize, I don't mean spatial or temporal dimensions, as I
discussed them earlier in connection with my model of the
holarchy, but rather conceptual dimensions, or variables.
Allan Combs distinguishes between three such dimensions, which
he calles states of mind, states of consciousness, and
structures of consciousness. He defines their relationship to
each other as follows:
"States of mind play out their roles
on larger stages which I call states of
consciousness...structures of consciousness [in turn]
provide a platform for states of consciousness in much
the same way that states of consciousness provide a
platform for states of mind...I regard structures of
conscious to be process structures of the same general
type as states of consciousness, but larger."
4
For example, a state of mind, in Combs'
terms, might be a particular mood a person is in. That mood is
one of many different moods that person might experience, all
within the same state of consciousness--our ordinary, so-called
waking consciousness: "Each [state of consciousness] represents
an entire experience of reality that can change over time, but
which tends to be more stable and lasting than states of mind."
5
This state of consciousness, in turn, is embedded in a
structure of consciousness that can support many other
states of consciousness--for example, those associated with
dreaming sleep, drugs, or various forms of meditation. The
structures of consciousness in which states are imbedded
include, in Combs' model, "the archaic, magic, mythic, mental,
and integral structures of consciousness,"6
a classification he takes more or less directly from the
philsopher Jean Gebser (1986).
Ken Wilber also discusses consciousness in
terms of three conceptual dimensions, two of which seem to be
very similar to Combs'. Wilber describes structures, states and
levels of consciousness. Levels of consciousness (or of reality)
are basically the same as the levels of the holarchy as I have
defined them in this book. Wilber's structures of consciousness,
on the other hand, like those of Combs, are drawn from Gebser,
though he does not confine his classification to them, but adds
on some other, higher structures. Wilber also modifies the
notion of structures somewhat, speaking of both permanent and
transitional structures. I don't think that is an important
concern of us here, however.
7
Wilber's states of consciousness also seem to
be similar to those of Combs--again, the terminology is the
same: waking, sleep, drug-induced, etc. Again, however, Wilber
recognizes more higher states than does Combs, and these higher
states, in particular, are most essential as a bridging concept
between structures and levels. A person at one level of
existence has a particular structure of consciousness--say
rational--yet may be able to access a higher level. Rather than
saying the person accesses a higher structure, Wilber says the
person accesses a higher state: "a person can peak experience
any higher state that has not yet become a permanent structure."
8
So a structure, to Wilber, implies a degree of permanence (even
a transitional structure is by no means a fleeting affair),
while a state may be a brief "taste" of a higher structure made
through a lower structure:
"Those two dimensions or variables
(structures and states), when combined with the fact
that the subject of one level can take an object from
another level...gives us three largely independent
variables."
9
The most significant disagreement between
Wilber and Combs, though, which I want to focus on here,
concerns the relationship between structures and states of
consciousness. Though as I just pointed out, both men seem to
define both structures and states in a very similar manner,
Wilber argues that their conceptions of the relationship between
these two are very different:
"Combs presents his version of states
and structures by, in my opinion, getting the
definitions of states and structures backwards. Instead
of seeing that a given state (such as drug, waking,
dreaming) can contain many different structures (e.g.,
the waking state can contain magic, mythic, and rational
structures), Combs says that a given structure supports
many different states (which is rarely true: the
rational structure, for example, does not usually
support the drunken state, the dream state, the
meditative state, etc.)."
10
How do we sort this argument out? I think the
key lies in the definition of structure of consciousness, so I
am going to begin by providing my own definition, seemingly
somewhat different from that of either Combs or Wilber, but
which will be much more familiar to scientists. I will define
structure of consciousness as a particular type of brain, or
more precisely still, a particular pattern of neuronal
connections/activity within a brain. Actually, this definition
is not quite right. The most accurate definition is a particular
type of social organization composed of human beings with a
particular type of brain. I mention this now because it will be
important later. However, for now, we can simply associate
structure of consciousness with an individual human brain. Some
lower forms of consciousness do not imply any social
organization, and the higher forms that do always imply a
particular type of brain.
We obviously have a different structure of
consciousness, so defined, from that of other animals, including
other primates, but we also have a different structure from that
of people of earlier cultures. We differ from other animals with
respect to the deep structure of our brain, whereas we
differ from our ancient ancestors with respect to the surface
structure of our brain. Differences in deep structure are of
course more profound, but differences in surface structure are
genuine differences as well. They are associated with different
states of consciousness.
Defined in this way, a structure of
consciousness, though not quite the same as what Combs or Wilber
call it, is, I think, completely equivalent. That is, every one
of their structures--magic, mythic, rational, and so forth--is
associated with a particular type of brain structure. Thus
Wilber says:
"Everyone agrees that mental states
and structures have some sort of correlates in brain
physiology."
11
What about states of consciousness?
How is a structure of consciousness, so defined, related to
them? Recall that Combs argues that one structure can support
many different states, while Wilber says basically the opposite.
Consider the former notion first. Combs supports his argument by
pointing out that "a mythic minded inhabitant of the ancient
world of, say, four or five thousand years ago, experienced
ordinary waking states, dreaming, drug facilitated states of
consciousness, and perhaps shamanic trances, much as do people
today."
12
At first glance, this seems straightforward enough--one
structure of consciousness, several different possible states.
But is just one structure of consciousness really involved? The
brain under the influence of drugs does not have the same
(surface) structure as the brain in the absence of drugs. The
patterns of neuronal activity are quite different; not different
just in the sense that the patterns are different when we think
or do one thing as opposed to another, but different in the
sense that large areas of the brain are activated or repressed
which ordinarily are not. Surely if we are going to argue that
the differences between the surface structures of the mythic
brain and the rational brain under ordinary nondrug conditions
are great enough to constitute differences in structures of
consciousness, we are justified in saying that the differences
between either one of these surface structures in the
ordinary state and a drugged state are also sufficient to
constitute different surface structures. In all cases,
remember, the deep structure of the brain is the same; what is
different is the surface structure. Indeed, the surface
structure is the structure of consciousness, as I am
defining it here.
We can make a similar argument with respect
to other states of consciousness. The surface structures of the
brain associated with deep sleep, or with dreaming sleep, are
very different from those active when one is in the state we
refer to as awake. Likewise, surely, for any genuine shamanic
trances. Each of these states, therefore, has its corresponding
surface structure, and to the extent that people of earlier
cultures really could experience these states in the same way we
do, I would argue they had the same surface structures we had.
What they apparently lacked was that part of the brain
associated with rationality.
What about the reverse relationship between
states and structures, Wilber's contention that one state can be
associated with several structures? To illustrate this, he
points out that "the waking state can contain magic, mythic, and
rational structures."
13
If "waking" is indeed to be regarded as a distinct state
of consciousness, then Wilber is correct. The problem with
understanding the waking state in this manner, though, is that
we share it not only with our early ancestors, but also with
many lower animals. We would have to say that we ordinarily
experience the same state of consciousness as a dog, for
example. Even if we could accept that--stressing that "state of
consciousness" implies nothing at all about functional
capacities--we run into further problems when we try to draw a
line. Is a fish awake? Is an insect? A cell? (And is a cell
exposed to a certain drug in the same "state" as a human under
the influence of the same drug?).
Because of these considerations, I think
"state of consciousness" should be defined in such a way that it
always has a one-to-one relationship with structure. Rather than
say that we ordinarily experience a "waking" state, why not just
say we ordinarily experience a "rational" state? When we are
awake we are usually in this state, and conversely, when we are,
say, dreaming or under the influence of some drug, we are not in
this state; so generally nothing is lost by not referring to
waking state at all. It's true that we can experience
nonrational or transrational states when we are awake, but these
are generally not referred to by psychologists as "waking"
states, so there should be no confusion by dropping this latter
term entirely. Clearly, when we say we are in the waking state,
we mean that we are in the rational state--and when we
say that our mythic ancestors were in the waking state, we mean
that they were in the mythic state. (So while I will sometimes
use the term "waking" in the following discussion, it is
intended to mean "rational", or in the case of some earlier
human beings, the equivalent state).
To summarize the argument so far, I have a)
defined structure of consciousness as the surface structure of
the brain; and b) contended that for every such structure, there
is one, and only one, corresponding state of consciousness.
Structure and state now are unified, no longer requiring two
conceptual dimensions, as they do in the models of both Combs
and Wilber. By unified, I don't mean they are the same thing,
that state is structure, but only that there is always a
one-to-one correspondence between them. If we know the state, we
know the associated structure, and vice-versa.
Now let's consider Wilber's third conceptual
dimension, level of reality. As I pointed out earlier, this
corresponds to the stages and levels of the holarchy, and thus
at first glance, we seem to be able to conceive of a unification
here, too. Surely every structure/state of consciousness as I
have defined it is associated with a particular stage in the
holarchy. The rational structure of consciousness we ordinarily
exist in corresponds to our stage in the mental level, while the
magic and mythic stages that preceded us correspond to lower
stages. As I discussed in Chapter 4, these stages take the forms
of certain kinds of social organization. By participating in
these societies, we access some of the mental features
associated with them. Indeed, as I noted earlier, a structure of
consciousness, most accurately defined, is not a particular
surface structure in the brain, but a particular social
organization of such surface structures. So there is a very
clear relationship between many states of
consciousness--rational, mythic, magic, and so forth--and what
Wilber calls levels of reality.
However, there seems to be a problem when we
consider other states of consciousness that we can access, such
as deep sleep, dreaming, and drug-induced states. I said earlier
that there is a different structure for each of these states. If
so, it seems we must postulate several different structures in
any one human being--one for "waking" (that is, rational or
mythic or magic, etc., depending on the level of
development of the person), one for sleep, one or perhaps
several for states associated with drugs, and so on. This
threatens to complicate greatly the holarchical model, adding
cumbersome epicycles to it, as Wilber would say. Is there any
way we can avoid this?
Let's take a closer look at these other
states of consciousness. Begin with sleeping states;
conventionally, we identify two such states, deep sleep and
dreaming. Both of these states, most psychologists would agree,
are lower than our "waking" state
14.
Other animals also sleep, and probably some of them dream. So we
can, I suggest, regard these states of consciousness as
associated with lower structures of consciousness. These
structures are not something that have to be added on to our
holarchy, but are already there. They correspond to
brains, or to informational holons of some kind, of lower stages
on our level, or in the case of deep sleep, perhaps of a lower
level. We humans can access these states of consciousness
because we have these holons. We are composed of cells, tissues
and organs, and our nervous system, in particular, has a highly
holarchical organization that includes the brains of lower
animals (MacLean 1990). In other words, I am suggesting that
deep sleep is a state of consciousness corresponding to very
lowly-placed holons in our body--perhaps cells or (non-nervous)
tissues; while dreaming is associated with higher holons, but
still well below the rational structures.15
What about states of consciousness associated
with ingestion of various kinds of drugs? I think we can
usefully approach this issue by distinguishing two different
ways in which drugs may act (understanding that some drugs,
under some conditions, may act in either or both ways). Some
drugs induce their effects by altering part of our "waking" or
rational structure of consciousness. The best example is
alcohol. Inebriation is not a "natural" state of
consciousness--that is, a state associated with some structure
that in some form of life is the primary one of consciousness.
It is "pathological" or "abnormal" in the sense (not necessarily
pejorative) that it alters a natural state, preserving or
enhancing some of its features, while repressing or modifying
other features. The structure of consciousness associated with
alcohol, then, or with other drugs of this kind, is not one we
can readily identify on the holarchy, but this is not really a
problem. A cancerous growth is not normally found on the
holarchy, either. Nevertheless, we can understand where in the
holarchy cancer fits in, without adding a whole new stage of
existence. We can proceed in basically the same manner in
conceiving of the structure of consciousness induced by drugs
like alcohol.
Drugs of the other class induce higher states
of consciousness, at least under some conditions. These would
include psychedelics such as LSD and mescaline. These drugs, I
contend, do not simply alter our ordinary, rational structure of
consciousness, but transform it, creating a new structure of
consciousness. What is this new structure? Recall that our
ordinary, rational structure is a particular social organization
composed of human beings with a particular brain surface
structure. Drugs that enable access to a higher state must
create a different surface structure that is part of a different
social organization. As I suggested in Chapter 6, we might think
of the next higher state of consciousness as associated with the
entire earth, and that to realize this state, one must break the
ordinary connections between oneself and other people. This new
structure of consciousness, then, results from this process of
breaking connections.
A similar type of argument, I think, can be
applied to any other state of consciousness of which human
beings are capable of accessing. The essence of the argument is
that every state of consciousness is associated with a specific
structure, and this structure, if not that associated with
ordinary, "waking", rational consciousness, is either a) a lower
structure, corresponding to a lower holon in our body; b) an
altered form of our rational structure (or even, perhaps, of
some lower structure); or c) a higher structure, associated with
a higher state of consciousness.
In summary, the holarchical model developed
here allows us to understand what others call structures, states
and levels of consciousness, all within a single conceptual
dimension. Any stage or level in the holarchy, I contend,
corresponds to one, and only one, structure of consciousness;
and any one structure of consciousness, in turn, corresponds to
one, and only one, state of consciousness. Such a unification
not only provides, in my view, a simpler way of understanding
how and where consciousness fits into the holarchy; it also
avoids some apparent problems with the multidimensional models.
As I pointed out earlier, Wilber and Combs both see a disconnect
between states and structures, the one arguing that one state
can coexist with many different structures; the other, that one
structure can be associated with many different states. I think
all three of us agree on what are different states of
consciousness--at least with respect to lower states. By
defining structure in a somewhat different way from either
Wilber or Combs, however, it becomes possible to set up a
one-to-one correspondence between structures and states.
This correspondence is not just a matter of
convenience, of going with the simplest way of looking at
things. If we don't adhere to it--if, for example, one kind of
state is compatible with several different structures--we can
fall into some apparently paradoxical situations. Consider this
passage from Wilber:
A given level of self, generally, can
interact with different levels of reality, to various
degrees, so that we need to keep these two (structures
and realms) as independent variables...Thus, for
example...consciousness can turn its attention to the
material plane (using its epistemological eye of flesh),
the intermediate plane (using its epistemological eye of
mind), or the celestial plane (using its epistemological
eye of contemplation). The material, intermediate, and
celestial planes are the ontological levels...The eyes
of flesh, mind, and contemplation are the
epistemological levels correlated with (and disclosing)
those ontological planes of sensibilia, intelligibilia,
and transcendelia...These two independent scales, in
other words, can be stated as "level of consciousness
investigates planes of existence"; but they can also be
stated as "level of consciousness investigates other
levels of consciousness."
16
How can one level of consciousness
"investigate" another level of consciousness? I don't believe it
can. When we meditate, we don't investigate another level of
consciousness "from" our own; we change our level, from
one to another. To the extent that we experience a higher level,
we no longer experience, or identify with, the lower
level we were associated with. True, we can "investigate" higher
consciousness by writing or discussing our experiences of it,
but this clearly is not what Wilber means, or should mean, by
this term. Surely what he means is "experience", and once this
word is subsituted for "investigates", it seems to me, the
impossibility of the project becomes obvious.
Wilber, I think, would agree with this, and
say that he was using "investigate" in a somewhat loose sense.
But his assertion that one state can coexist with different
structures does strongly imply that something can exist
simultaneously in two modes of consciousness, so to speak, and
in other usages, I think he really accepts that it can. Consider
the earlier part of the above quote: "consciousness can turn its
attention to the material plane...the intermediate plane...or
the celestial plane." The key phrase here is: "turn its
attention to." One state of consciousness can look at or
observe these different levels (stages), but it can't
experience them all. We can look at a dog, but we can't
experience the dog's consciousness. That's obvious, of course,
but it implies a less obvious, and more profound, truth: we
can't experience the stage of existence on which the dog exists.
(I can't experience your consciousness, either, but I can
experience the stage of existence on which you exist).
It might be that we could experience the
dog's stage of existence while in another state of consciousness
(induced, for example, by some hypothetical drug that basically
inactivated the higher portions of our brains that dogs don't
share). But then we could no longer be able to experience the
rational level in which we normally inhabit. We can only be in
one state of consciousness, associated with one structure of
consciousness, at a time. If we experience a different state,
that is through a different structure.
Conclusions
I believe a single scale model of holarchy
can adequately represent our understanding of different states
of consciousness, as well as it can represent the various
physical, biolotical and mental processes discussed earlier in
this book. A model, of course, is not reality. To argue for a
linear model of something is not necessarily to say that it is
linear, but only that some of its main features can be
represented in a linear fashion without seriously distorting or
misrepresenting it. Like evolutionist John Ball, then, I will
"ignore the critics' tirade that real world is more complex. The
real world is always more complex, which has the
advantage that we shan't run out of work."
17
Having observed the holarchy in some detail,
we are now ready to consider how it came to be. In this first
part of the book, we have seen what the holarchy is--the
different kinds of holons, their properties and their
relationships to each other. In the second part of the book, we
will try to understand what the holarchy was, and what it
may yet become. We will look at how it grows and develops
over time.