The Village Voice: Features: When John Kerry's = Courage Went M.I.A. by Sydney H. Schanberg

features

Senator Covered Up Evidence of P.O.W.'s Left=20 Behind
When John Kerry's = Courage Went=20 M.I.A.
by Sydney H.=20 Schanberg
February 24th, = 2004 1:00=20 PM

enator John Kerry, a decorated battle veteran, = was=20 courageous as a navy lieutenant in the Vietnam War. But he = was not=20 so courageous more than two decades later, when he covered = up=20 voluminous evidence that a significant number of live = American=20 prisoners=97perhaps hundreds=97were never acknowledged or = returned after=20 the war-ending treaty was signed in January 1973.
The Massachusetts = senator, now=20 seeking the presidency, carried out this subterfuge a little = over a=20 decade ago=97 shredding documents, suppressing testimony, = and=20 sanitizing the committee's final report=97when he was = chairman of the=20 Senate Select Committee on P.O.W./ M.I.A. Affairs.
Over the years, an = abundance of=20 evidence had come to light that the North Vietnamese, while=20 returning 591 U.S. prisoners of war after the treaty = signing, had=20 held back many others as future bargaining chips for the $4 = billion=20 or more in war reparations that the Nixon administration had = pledged. Hanoi didn't trust Washington to fulfill its = pro-mise=20 without pressure. Similarly, Washington didn't trust Hanoi = to return=20 all the prisoners and carry out all the treaty provisions. = The=20 mistrust on both sides was merited. Hanoi held back = prisoners and=20 the U.S. provided no reconstruction funds.
The stated purpose of = the special=20 Senate committee=97which convened in mid 1991 and concluded = in January=20 1993=97was to investigate the evidence about prisoners who = were never=20 returned and find out what happened to the missing men. = Committee=20 chair Kerry's larger and different goal, though never stated = publicly, emerged over time: He wanted to clear a path to=20 normalization of relations with Hanoi. In any other context, = that=20 would have been an honorable goal. But getting at the truth = of the=20 unaccounted for P.O.W.'s and M.I.A.'s (Missing In Action) = was the=20 main obstacle to normalization=97and therefore in conflict = with his=20 real intent and plan of action.
Kerry denied back then = that he=20 disguised his real goal, contending that he supported = normalization=20 only as a way to learn more about the missing men. But = almost=20 nothing has emerged about these prisoners since diplomatic = and=20 economic relations were restored in 1995, and thus it would=20 appear=97as most realists expected=97that Kerry's = explanation was=20 hollow. He has also denied in the past the allegations of a=20 cover-up, either by the Pentagon or himself. Asked for = comment on=20 this article, the Kerry campaign sent a quote from the = senator: "In=20 the end, I think what we can take pride in is that we put = together=20 the most significant, most thorough, most exhaustive = accounting for=20 missing and former P.O.W.'s in the history of human = warfare."
What was the body of = evidence that=20 prisoners were held back? A short list would include more = than 1,600=20 firsthand sightings of live U.S. prisoners; nearly 14,000 = secondhand=20 reports; numerous intercepted Communist radio messages from = within=20 Vietnam and Laos about American prisoners being moved by = their=20 captors from one site to another; a series of satellite = photos that=20 continued into the 1990s showing clear prisoner rescue = signals=20 carved into the ground in Laos and Vietnam, all labeled = inconclusive=20 by the Pentagon; multiple reports about unacknowledged = prisoners=20 from North Vietnamese informants working for U.S. = intelligence=20 agencies, all ignored or declared unreliable; persistent = complaints=20 by senior U.S. intelligence officials (some of them made = publicly)=20 that live-prisoner evidence was being suppressed; and clear = proof=20 that the Pentagon and other keepers of the "secret" = destroyed a=20 variety of files over the years to keep the P.O.W./M.I.A. = families=20 and the public from finding out and possibly setting off a = major=20 public outcry.
The resignation of = Colonel Millard=20 Peck in 1991, the first year of the Kerry committee's = tenure, was=20 one of many vivid landmarks in this saga's history. Peck had = been=20 the head of the Pentagon's P.O.W./M.I.A. office for only = eight=20 months when he resigned in disgust. In his damning departure = statement, he wrote: "The mind-set to 'debunk' is alive and = well. It=20 is held at all levels . . . Practically all analysis is = directed to=20 finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any = effective,=20 active follow-through on any of the sightings . . . The sad = fact is=20 that . . . a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade = does=20 not appear to be an honest effort and may never have been." =
Finally, Peck said: = "From what I=20 have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, = even=20 inadvertently, was in fact abandoned years ago, and that the = farce=20 that is being played is no more than political legerdemain = done with=20 'smoke and mirrors' to stall the issue until it dies a = natural=20 death."

What did Kerry do in = furtherance of=20 the cover-up? An overview would include the following: He = allied=20 himself with those carrying it out by treating the Pentagon = and=20 other prisoner debunkers as partners in the investigation = instead of=20 the targets they were supposed to be. In short, he did their = bidding. When Defense Department officials were coming to = testify,=20 Kerry would have his staff director, Frances Zwenig, meet = with them=20 to "script" the hearings=97as detailed in an internal Zwenig = memo=20 leaked by others. Zwenig also advised North Vietnamese = officials on=20 how to state their case. Further, Kerry never pushed or put = up a=20 fight to get key government documents unclassified; he just = rolled=20 over, no matter how obvious it was that the documents = contained=20 confirming data about prisoners. Moreover, after promising = to turn=20 over all committee records to the National Archives when the = panel=20 concluded its work, the senator destroyed crucial = intelligence=20 information the staff had gathered=97to to keep the = documents from=20 becoming public. He refused to subpoena past presidents and = other=20 key witnesses.
When revelatory sworn = testimony was=20 given to the committee by President Reagan's national = security=20 adviser, Richard Allen=97about a credible proposal from = Hanoi in 1981=20 to return more than 50 prisoners for a $4 billion = ransom=97Kerry had=20 that testimony taken in a closed door interview, not a = public=20 hearing. But word leaked out and a few weeks later, Allen = sent a=20 letter to the committee, not under oath, recanting his = testimony,=20 saying his memory had played tricks on him. Kerry never did = any=20 probe into Allen's original, detailed account, and instead = accepted=20 his recantation as gospel truth.
A Secret Service agent = then working=20 at the White House, John Syphrit, told committee staffers he = had=20 overheard part of a conversation about the Hanoi proposal = for=20 ransom. He said he was willing to testify but feared = reprisal from=20 his Treasury Department superiors and would need to be = subpoenaed so=20 that his appearance could not be regarded as voluntary. = Kerry=20 refused to subpoena him. Syphrit told me that four men were = involved=20 in that conversation=97Reagan, Allen, Vice President George = H.W. Bush,=20 and CIA director William Casey. I wrote the story for=20 Newsday.
The final Kerry report = brushed off=20 the entire episode like unsightly dust. It said: "The = committee=20 found no credible evidence of any such [ransom] offer being = made."=20

A newcomer to this = subject matter=20 might reasonably ask why there was no great public outrage, = no=20 sustained headlines, no national demand for investigations, = no=20 penalties imposed on those who had hidden, and were still = hiding,=20 the truth. The simple, overarching explanation was that most = Americans wanted to put Vietnam behind them as fast as = possible.=20 They wanted to forget this failed war, not deal with its = truths or=20 consequences. The press suffered from the same ostrich = syndrome; no=20 major media organization ever carried out an in-depth = investigation=20 by a reporting team into the prisoner issue. When prisoner = stories=20 did get into the press, they would have a one-day life span, = never=20 to be followed up on. When three secretaries of defense from = the=20 Vietnam era=97James Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, and Elliot=20 Richardson=97testified before the Kerry committee, under = oath, that=20 intelligence they received at the time convinced them that = numbers=20 of unacknowledged prisoners were being held by the = Communists, the=20 story was reported by the press just that once and then = dropped.=20 The New York Times put the story on page one but = never=20 pursued it further to explore the obvious ramifications. =
At that public hearing = on September=20 21, 1992, toward the end of Schlesinger's testimony, the = former=20 defense secretary, who earlier had been CIA chief, was asked = a=20 simple question: "In your view, did we leave men behind?" =
He replied: "I think = that as of now,=20 I can come to no other conclusion."
He was asked to explain = why Nixon=20 would have accepted leaving men behind. He said: "One must = assume=20 that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the = United=20 States . . . was quite weak. We were anxious to get our = troops out=20 and we were not going to roil the waters . . . "
Another example of a = story not=20 pursued occurred at the Paris peace talks. The North = Vietnamese=20 failed to provide a list of the prisoners until the treaty = was=20 signed. Afterward, when they turned over the list, U.S. = intelligence=20 officials were taken aback by how many believed prisoners = were not=20 included. The Vietnamese were returning only nine men from = Laos.=20 American records showed that more than 300 were probably = being held.=20 A story about this stunning gap, by New York Times = Pentagon=20 reporter John W. Finney, appeared on the paper's front page = on=20 February 2, 1973. The story said: "Officials emphasized that = the=20 United States would be seeking clarification . . . " No = meaningful=20 explanation was ever provided by the Vietnamese or by the = Laotian=20 Communist guerrillas, the Pathet Lao, who were satellites of = Hanoi.=20
As a bombshell story for = the media,=20 particularly the Washington press corps, it was there for = the=20 taking. But there were no takers.
I was drawn to the = P.O.W. issue=20 because of my reporting years for The New York Times = during=20 the Vietnam War, where I came to believe that our soldiers = were=20 being misled and disserved by our government. After the war, = military people who knew me and others who knew my work = brought me=20 information about live sightings of P.O.W.'s still in = captivity and=20 other evidence about their existence. When the Kerry = committee was=20 announced (I was by then a columnist at Newsday), I = thought=20 the senator=97having himself become disillusioned about the = Vietnam=20 War, and eventually an advocate against it=97might really be = committed=20 to digging out the truth. This was wishful thinking.
In the committee's early = days, Kerry=20 had given encouraging indications of being a committed = investigator.=20 He said he had "leads" to the existence of P.O.W.'s still in = captivity. He said the number of these likely survivors was = more=20 than 100 and that this was the minimum. But in a very short = time, he=20 stopped saying such things and morphed his role into one of = full=20 alliance with the executive branch, the Pentagon, and other=20 Washington hierarchies, joining their long-running effort to = obscure=20 and deny that a significant number of live American = prisoners had=20 not been returned. As many as 700 withheld P.O.W.'s were = cited in=20 credible intelligence documents, including a speech by a = senior=20 North Vietnamese general that was discovered in Soviet = archives by=20 an American scholar.
Here are details of a = few of the=20 specific steps Kerry took to hide evidence about these = P.O.W.'s.=20

He gave orders to his committee staff to shred crucial = intelligence documents. The shredding stopped only when = some=20 intelligence staffers staged a protest. Some wrote = internal memos=20 calling for a criminal investigation. One such memo=97from = John F.=20 McCreary, a lawyer and staff intelligence = analyst=97reported that=20 the committee's chief counsel, J. William Codinha, a = longtime=20 Kerry friend, "ridiculed the staff members" and said, = "Who's the=20 injured party?" When staffers cited "the 2,494 families of = the=20 unaccounted-for U.S. servicemen, among others," the = McCreary memo=20 continued, Codinha said: "Who's going to tell them? It's=20 classified."

Kerry defended the shredding by = saying the=20 documents weren't originals, only copies=97but the staff's = fear was=20 that with the destruction of the copies, the information = would=20 never get into the public domain, which it didn't. Kerry = had=20 promised the staff that all documents acquired and = prepared by the=20 committee would be turned over to the National Archives at = the=20 committee's expiration. This didn't happen. Both the staff = and=20 independent researchers reported that many critical = documents were=20 withheld.

Another protest memo from the staff reported: "An = internal=20 Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig = [Kerry's staff director] as the conduit to the Department = of=20 Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted=20 information from this Committee . . . lines of = investigation have=20 been seriously compromised by leaks" to the Pentagon and = "other=20 agencies of the executive branch." It also said the Zwenig = leaks=20 were "endangering the lives and livelihood of two=20 witnesses."

A number of staffers became increasingly upset about = Kerry's=20 close relationship with the Department of Defense, which = was=20 supposed to be under examination. (Dick Cheney was then = defense=20 secretary.) It had become clear that Kerry, Zwenig, and = others=20 close to the chairman, such as Senator John McCain of = Arizona, a=20 dominant committee member, had gotten cozy with the = officials and=20 agencies supposedly being probed for obscuring P.O.W. = information=20 over the years. Committee hearings, for example, were = being=20 orchestrated to suit the examinees, who were receiving = lists of=20 potential questions in advance. Another internal memo from = the=20 period, by a staffer who requested anonymity, said: = "Speaking for=20 the other investigators, I can say we are sick and tired = of this=20 investigation being controlled by those we are supposedly=20 investigating."

The Kerry investigative technique was equally soft in = many=20 other critical ways. He rejected all suggestions that the=20 committee require former presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, = and=20 George H.W. Bush to testify. All were in the Oval Office = during=20 the Vietnam era and its aftermath. They had information = critical=20 to the committee, for each president was carefully and = regularly=20 briefed by his national security adviser and others about = P.O.W.=20 developments. It was a huge issue at that time.

Kerry also refused to subpoena the Nixon office tapes = (yes,=20 the Watergate tapes) from the early months of 1973 when = the=20 P.O.W.'s were an intense subject because of the peace = talks and=20 the prisoner return that followed. (Nixon had rejected = committee=20 requests to provide the tapes voluntarily.) Information = had seeped=20 out for years that during the Paris talks and afterward, = Nixon had=20 been briefed in detail by then national security advisor = Brent=20 Scowcroft and others about the existence of P.O.W.'s whom = Hanoi=20 was not admitting to. Nixon, distracted by Watergate, = apparently=20 decided it was crucial to get out of the Vietnam mess = immediately,=20 even if it cost those lives. Maybe he thought there would = be other=20 chances down the road to bring these men back. So he = approved the=20 peace treaty and on March 29, 1973, the day the last of = the 591=20 acknowledged prisoners were released in Hanoi, Nixon = announced on=20 national television: "All of our American P.O.W.'s are on = their=20 way home."

The Kerry committee's = final report,=20 issued in January 1993, delivered the ultimate insult to = history.=20 The 1,223-page document said there was "no compelling = evidence that=20 proves" there is anyone still in captivity. As for the = primary=20 investigative question =97what happened to the men left = behind in=20 1973=97the report conceded only that there is "evidence . . = . that=20 indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small = number"=20 of prisoners 31 years ago, after Hanoi released the 591 = P.O.W.'s it=20 had admitted to.
With these word games, = the committee=20 report buried the issue=97and the men.
The huge document = contained no=20 findings about what happened to the supposedly "small = number." If=20 they were no longer alive, then how did they die? Were they = executed=20 when ransom offers were rejected by Washington?
Kerry now slides past = all the radio=20 messages, satellite photos, live sightings, and boxes of=20 intelligence documents=97all the evidence. In his comments = for this=20 piece, this candidate for the presidency said: "No nation = has gone=20 to the lengths that we did to account for their dead. = None=97ever in=20 history."
Of the so-called = "possibility" of a=20 "small number" of men left behind, the committee report went = on to=20 say that if this did happen, the men were not "knowingly = abandoned,"=20 just "shunted aside." How do you put that on a gravestone? =
In the end, the fact = that Senator=20 Kerry covered up crucial evidence as committee chairman = didn't seem=20 to bother too many Massachusetts voters when he came up for=20 re-election=97or the recent voters in primary states. So I = wouldn't=20 predict it will be much of an issue in the presidential = election=20 come November. It seems there is no constituency in America = for=20 missing Vietnam P.O.W.'s except for their families and some = veterans=20 of that war.
A year after he issued = the committee=20 report, on the night of January 26, 1994, Kerry was on the = Senate=20 floor pushing through a resolution calling on President = Clinton to=20 lift the 19-year-old trade embargo against Vietnam. In the = debate,=20 Kerry belittled the opposition, saying that those who still = believed=20 in abandoned P.O.W.'s were perpetrating a hoax. "This = process," he=20 declaimed, "has been led by a certain number of charlatans = and=20 exploiters, and we should not allow fiction to cloud what we = are=20 trying to do here."
Kerry's resolution = passed, by a vote=20 of 62 to 38. Sadly for him, the passage of ten thousand = resolutions=20 cannot make up for wants in a man's character.

Additional research: = Jennifer=20 Suh

Related Articles: =
"Did=20 America Abandon Vietnam War POWs?" by Sydney H. = Schanberg
"Follow=20 the Microfiche"

Related = Articles:=20
"Did=20 America Abandon Vietnam War POWs?" by Sydney = H.=20 Schanberg=20
"Follow=20 the Microfiche"=20
Vets = Demonstrate Against=20 'Jane Fonda Kerry' on Park Ave ( 2 min. 8=20 = sec.)

Letter=20 to the Editor | E-M= ail=20 Story | 3D""=20 Voice Newsletter = |=20 3D""=20 Prin= ter=20

Recent = stories by=20 Sydney H. Schanberg

Follow=20 the Microfiche=20
When=20 John Kerry's Courage Went M.I.A. Senator Covered = Up=20 Evidence of P.O.W.'s Left Behind =97 Senator Kerry = may have=20 been courageous as a navy lieutenant in the Vietnam = War, but,=20 alleges Sydney H. Schanberg, he was not so brave more = than two=20 decades later, when he covered up evidence that a = significant=20 number of live American prisoners=97perhaps = hundreds=97were never=20 acknowledged or returned after the war-ending treaty = was=20 signed.=20
Did=20 America Abandon Vietnam War POWs? Part 2 A Closer = Look at=20 an Ugly Issue=20
Did=20 America Abandon Vietnam War POWs? Part 1 A Closer = Look at=20 an Ugly Issue=20
George=20 Bush, Make-Believe President Not Qualified, Not = Truthful,=20 Not Wise=20
Clark's=20 Run Still Clouded Why Didn't He Warn Us About War = in Iraq?=20
The=20 Bodies Come Home The president is grieved by U.S.=20 casualties. He also worries they'll cost him votes. = =97 The=20 president is grieved by U.S. casualties, and he also = worries=20 that they=92ll cost him votes. Sydney H. Schanberg = describes the=20 slog and the funerals.=20
Bloomberg'= s=20 Mixed Report Card Better Than His Poll Figures, = but Needs=20 to Take Off the Gloves=20
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