- ROBERT ROGERS BLAKE, Ph.D.
- Professor of Psychology, University of Texas
- R. C. DAVIS, Ph.D.
- Professor of Psychology, Indiana University
- LOUIS A. GOTTSCHALK, M.D.
- Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Research Coordinator,
Department of Psychiatry, Cincinnati General Hospital
- LAWRENCE E. HINKLE, Jr., M.D.
- Associate Professor of Clinical Medicine in Psychiatry,
New York Hospital — Cornell Medical Center
- PHILIP E. KUBZANSKY, Ph.D.
- Chief Psychologist, Boston City Hospital
- MALCOLM L. MELTZER, Ph.D.
- Staff Psychologist, District of Columbia General Hospital
- JANE S. MOUTON, Ph.D.
- Social Science Research Associate, University of Texas
- MARTIN T. ORNE, M.D., Ph.D.
- Teaching Fellow, Department of Psychiatry,
Harvard University Medical School
-v-
The editing of this book was carried out as a project
of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. Dr. Robert T. Bower,
director of the Bureau, generously gave his time and talents to this
project.
Valuable assistance in editing the contributors'
manuscripts was given by Nadine Pitts, Frank G. Davis, Merle Goldberg,
and Doris F. Julian.
The preparation of the chapters contained in this book
was supported in part by the United States Air Force under Contract
18(600) 1797 monitored by the Rome Air Development Center of the Air
Research and Development Command and under Contract AF 49 (638)-187
monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research of the Air
Research and Development Command.
The work of the editors was greatly facilitated by
representatives of the Air Force, particularly Major Leo N. Brubaker
and Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Work.
The chapters by Dr. Martin T. Orne and by Dr. Lawrence
E. Hinkle, Jr., draw upon work supported by the Society for the
Investigation of Human Ecology, Inc.
-ix-
|
Introduction |
1 |
1 |
The Physiological State of the Interrogation Subject
as it Affects Brain Function |
19 |
|
Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr. |
2 |
The Effects of Reduced Environmental Stimulation on Human Behavior: A Review |
51 |
|
Philip E. Kubzansky |
3 |
The Use of Drugs in Interrogation |
96 |
|
Louis A. Gottschalk |
4 |
Physiological Responses as a Means of Evaluating Information |
142 |
|
R. C. Davis |
5 |
The Potential Uses of Hypnosis in Interrogation |
169 |
|
Martin T. Orne |
6 |
The Experimental Investigation of Interpersonal Influence |
216 |
|
Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton |
-xi-
7 |
Countermanipulation through Malingering |
277 |
|
Malcolm L. Meltzer |
|
Author Index |
305 |
|
Subject Index |
316 |
-xii-
. . .
wollte nur forschen, Raetsel loesen, ein Stueckchen Wahrheit aufdecken.
Dies mag vielen wehe, manchen wol getan haben, beides nicht meine
Schuld und nicht mein Verdienst. Sigmund Freud in a letter to Romain Rolland, May 13 1926 *
Introduction — manipulations of human behavior
In recent years, concern has been expressed, in both scholarly and
popular literature, about the dangers of scientific developments that
could be used to control and manipulate human behavior. The fear is
frequently voiced that techniques have been developed to an extent
which threatens fundamental values of Western civilization.
Anxious alarms and dramatic speculations have overshadowed reports
of sober efforts to determine which dangers are real and which imagined.
This book represents a critical examination of some of the
conjectures about the application of scientific knowledge to the
manipulation of human behavior. The problem is explored within a
particular frame of reference: the interrogation of an unwilling
subject. A number of scientific areas have figured prominently in
speculations regardirig the application of science to the manipulation
of behavior in interrogation (69). For this work, scientists who had
done research in each of these areas were asked to review the state of
relevant knowledge in their fields, to consider whether and how it
might be applied by interrogators, and to evaluate the recourse
available to highly motivated persons for resisting the attempted
influence. Their reports constitute the body of this book.
Attention has been focused on interrogation because of the central
position this topic has had in recent public discussions of
prisoner-of-war behavior — issues that made scientific methods of
manipulating behavior a major public concern. Much of the work in this
book was sponsored by the U. S. Air Force because of their interest in
the problems which face the prisoner of war. Such aspects of prisoner
exploitation as ideological conversion and the elicitation of false con-
-1-
fessions have received relatively more
public and academic discussion than the attempts to elicit factual
information through interrogation. Nonetheless, the editors believe
that there are some major advantages to approaching the broader topic
of the manipulation of human behavior by limiting attention initially
to the latter type of situation. The background of recent concern with
these problems may illuminate some of the considerations leading to the
particular emphasis of this work.
The notoriety that Communist exploitation of United
Nations prisoners of war has received in the United States gave impetus
to professional and lay concern with problems of the manipulation of
behavior. Various writers have associated the compliance effected by
Communist captors with phenomena observed in the laboratory; e.g.,
effects reported following experimental work in pharmacology, hypnosis,
sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, semi-starvation, electrical
stimulation of the brain, as well as in social-psychological
investigations of persuasion and group conformity pressures (3, 10, 13,
14, 16, 20, 23, 24, 28, 32, 39, 67).
The most radical expressions of concern have alleged
that techniques for manipulating behavior are now capable, or are at
least on the threshold of being capable, of eliminating the
determination of the subject as a barrier to successful influence (21,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 52, 60). These claims have been
challenged: other investigators have been impressed by the strength,
stability, and resilience of long-established values and social
controls, and by rational regard for self-interest, either as limiting
the compliance of those subjected to coercive and persuasive influence
attempts, or as enabling the subject to resist completely (2, 4, 7, 11,
15, 18, 50, 53, 54, 55, 65, 66, 68).
Certain other commentators have viewed the successful
exploitation of captives in Korea and similar incidents as less
indicative of increasing perfection in the arts of influence and
coercion. They have attributed the successes of the captor to
individual defects of background and stamina in the prisoners who
collaborated, or to a general deterioration of the vitality of social
values and controls in contemporary society (16, 25, 31, 61, 62, 63).
Scientific examination of the manipulation of behavior
has been made difficult by the intensity of the recent controversy over
national
-2-
prisoner-of-war
policy. Concepts such as determinism vs. moral responsibility are among
the philosophical and value considerations implicit in this debate
which have added considerably to the problems already posed by existing
biases. There has been dispute regarding the extent to which individual
repatriated prisoners of war are legally or morally responsible for
deviations from ideal standards of military conduct, especially in the
matter of yielding information or making "confessions" to the captor
(9, 25, 31, 39, 41, 47, 49, 54, 64).
A central question of fact has stood out in this
controversy, quite apart from the moral and philosophical issues
raised: whether all individuals, regardless of how strongly motivated
to resist, could be made to comply with demands for information,
"confessions," or other collaboration by methods employed by the
Communists, provided that the intensity, duration, and quality of the
pressures were sufficiently great. Popularly, this proposition was
phrased: "Every man has his breaking point." It gained acceptance as a
premise in policy formulation, although the question remained regarding
which, if any, of the situations encountered by United States prisoners
of war in Korea approached those extremes of "stress" that no
individual could be expected to lesist (40, 48, 64, 68).
Critics of the policy evolved after the Korean War —
"The Code of Conduct" — argued that the failure of the policy makers to
consider imminent developments in scientific methods of human
manipulation has been a more serious error than a lack of understanding
of the practices actually encountered by prisoners in Korea. One
scientist (39, page 54) has written: ". . . one thing is certain — our
national policy concerning the conduct of our prisoners of war has not
yet fully faced up to psychological developments which are appearing
over the horizon of the future." His own conclusion was that armed
forces could protect information from an enemy only by denying it to
persons subject to capture or, where this was not feasible, by giving
such persons means for destroying either themselves or their memories.
In the study leading to the present book, the U. S. Air
Force through their sponsorship has sought an authoritative examination
of publicized speculations regarding the possible use of scientific
developments in the manipulation of behavior against future prisoners
of war. A specific objective has been to examine an enemy's possible
use of scientific techniques to elicit guarded information from
captives, which is the form of prisoner exploitation having the most
immediate and and direct military significance.
It is axiomatic that interrogation has become a highly
overdramatized subject. Aside from treatments of its more sensational
aspects,
-3-
very little information on the topic
appears in open-source literature. The dearth of sober information on
interrogation has had the unfortunate consequence of facilitating the
exploitation of United States prisoners of war by Communist captors
(64).
Our purpose here has been to bring together in one book
authoritative information on methods of behavioral control that have
been the subject of considerable speculation in discussions of
interrogation. Scientists representing a variety of fields have
examined a number of hypothetical means that might occur to an
interrogator for eliciting information against the will of his subject.
Their attention has been more on what could be done than on what
actually may have been done.
All the questions that are frequently raised about these
methods cannot be answered by such an approach, however, since many of
them are not translatable into scientific terms.
Many scholars have observed that science replaces magic
and witchcraft as societies secularize. The problems of living in the
present age remain much as they have always been, however. They
generate many of the same wishes and terrors. The aspirations and
anxieties that not so long ago were projected onto conceptions of the
wizard and witch are now directed to the scientist.
Two of the most basic of life's problems are linked to
the individual's power position vis-à-vis his fellow men: the inability
to make others fulfill one's wishes; and the reverse, the fear of being
controlled by others, with the consequent loss of the autonomy that is
believed to be fundamental to the conception of the self. These
opposites are incongruously exaggerated in paranoid thinking, one of
the most prevalent mental symptoms of Western man. They doubtless exist
in the fantasy of most persons, to extents that differ from paranoia in
intensity and pervasiveness.
The profound fascination of the topic under
consideration may stem from the primitive, unconscious, and extreme
responses to these problems, which gain expression in myth, dreams,
drama, and literature. On the one hand, there is the dream-wish for
omnipotence; on the other, the wish and fear of the loss of self
through its capture by another. The current interest in problems of
manipulation of behavior involves basic ambivalences over omnipotence
and dependency, which, if projected, find a ready target in the
"omniscient" scientist (30).
-4-
The "mad scientist" of the horror movie and novel has
been with us for many years. More recent fiction has enlisted him in
the service of the great nation-state. With the perfection of
mass-destruction weapons and the elaboration of totalitarian efforts to
control human behavior, the myth has begun to converge with aspects of
reality.
Conjectures concerning the prospects of "total
annihilation of the human will" appear almost as frequently as those
regarding the threat of mankind's total destruction by thermonuclear or
similar weapons. Regarding weapons of physical destruction, responsible
scientific evidence is offered along with uninformed and ill-informed
surmises, both in support of forecasts of doom and in rebuttal. In the
case of the threats science poses to human autonomy, however,
sensationally speculative expressions, like those of the Brave New World
that Aldous Huxley (21) recently revisited, have enjoyed a near
monopoly. In professional journals and publications, as well as in
statements for popular consumption, scientists have sometimes
contributed to uncritical thinking regarding the potential application
of scientific developments to the control of human behavior. Some
scientists have done so in their zeal to make the public aware of the
dangerous tool which the techniques for manipulating behavior could
become in the hands of totalitarian and other irresponsible
practitioners. A common error has been to assume that some scientific
development, or some explicit scientific theory, was being applied by
Commanist "brainwashers" and other manipulators (2, 4, 5, 18). Other
scientists, and interpreters of science, have also contributed to the
identification of the behavioral scientist as a powerful and
unscrupulous practitioner of the arts of influence, as in Vance
Packard's Hidden Persuaders (45).
It has been pointed out that the ways in which the
popular communication media define the problem are akin to those of
prescientific times (56). Raymond Bauer (2) has noted the resemblance
of the concept "brainwashing" to demonology: the idea of the
"brainwashed" does not differ greatly from that of the "possessed" (6).
"The battle for the mind" (52), sometimes fought against "the hidden
persuader," has many elements of the occult.
Viewing the problem in magical or diabolical terms is
not an altogetlier irrational analogy, given the existence of those who
simultaneously practice and seek perfection of the means for
controlling behavior and conceive of their efforts as directed toward
"possessing the will" of their victims. As one of us has pointed out in
discussing
-5-
Communist interrogation and
indoctrination practices (6), the Western conception of "brainwashing,"
in terms akin to "possession," is matched by the Communists' view of
what they seek and how to achieve it as exorcism. Thus, the Chinese
Communist leaders not only find nothing to resent in charges that they
"brainwash" their opponents (cf. 1), but regard the term as a quite apt
and honorable description of what they wish to achieve. To take another
example, the symbolic imagery of the medieval Hexenhammer (22) is reflected in the designation of the Soviet World War II inquisitorial apparatus as SMERSH ("Death to Spies") (57).
Scientific sobriety demands that the dry examination of
experimental evidence replace the lively books on exorcism of ancient
times. As in many contemporary works which are closer to the livelier
lore of ancient times, however, the present review deals with human
concerns antedating science that are at the root of the central
question: "Can man really be made to behave contrary to his profoundest
beliefs and his conscious self-interest?"
Symbols of science can be used in a magical way, as much
of the "brainwashing" literature illustrates. Various writers have
invested the techniques of interrogators with the magic of science by
attaching technical labels to what actually have been traditional and
pragmatic practices (2). In assuming the attitude of the "hard-headed"
scientist toward the problem, there is a danger in falling into an
equivalent misuse of science. This would be the case were one, in
effect, to attempt to counter those who present a diabolical image of
the "brainwasher" by invoking superior scientific deities to frighten
this specter away. Thus, magical thinking and projections, as has been
indicated, pervade prevalent judgments regarding the significance of
the behavioral alterations that interrogators can effect. By
substituting impassive scientific names for ordinary language with its
intense connotations for human values, the impression may be given of
eliminating not only these extravagant judgments but also almost all
the human significance of these effects. In this way, for example,
"treachery" can become mere "attitude change" or "a shift in the
subject's frame of reference."
Difficulties inhere in dealing scientifically with a
problem that relates so immediately to basic human values. Assumptions
in this work hold the person against whom the interrogation efforts are
-6-
directed — who is designated following
common intelligence usage as "the source" — to be highly motivated to
safeguard the information; and that, at least initially, the source
regards denying information to his interrogator as "more important than
life itself." It apparently has not been a rarity for individuals
undergoing interrogation to say "go ahead and shoot" in the face of a
convincing threat of death, and yet to reveal the information thus
guarded under seemingly mild pressure later (8). Similarly, Western
jurisprudence recognizes that lengthy interrogation, even without
physical coercion, can produce "unwilling" confessions, true or false,
of capital crimes. Divergent interpretations have been placed on
reported cases of individuals who have resisted very intensive
interrogations without divulging information. Some use it to
demonstrate the existence of an unconquerable, inextinguishable human
will. Others regard the instances of successful resistance to
interrogation as mere illustrations of remediable deficiencies in
interrogation technique.
Neither this nor any other scientific volume, in the
opinion of the editors, can resolve the differences implicit in these
two orientations, or yet other interpretations. On the basis of
scientific tests alone, they are difficult to resolve even with a
completely deterministic set of assumptions. As the approach of this
review illustrates, for any given set of motivations of the source,
however powerful, one can at least speculate about possible
manipulations to overcome them. On the other hand, it is possible to
speculate about methods of heightening motivations and defenses against
any conceivable manipulative assault. Exclusively scientific tests
probably cannot foreclose either possibility at this time.
Another important qualification to conventional ideas
about the ultimate limits of the control of human behavior will become
apparent in some of the discussions that follow. The purposes that men
have in seeking to control, or to influence, the behavior of others
involve the distinctively human capabilities of men and their
significance for one another. The major fallacy of the totalitarian
interrogator grows out of a poor appreciation of this fact. Some of the
chapters here indicate that there are limits to which the ability of a
source to reveal information can be separated from his willingness to
do so. The analytic divisions we make between such aspects of mental
activity as the recall and transmittal of information on the one hand
and motivations on the other do not correspond to behaviors that are
totally independent of one another in the organism. Furthermore, much
of the use one person can make of another resides in the latter's
ability to function in a voluntary fashion: in his having
-7-
initiative, making choices,
preferring, and rejecting. The fallacy of belief in the possibility of
total control for any purpose stands out as bizarre in the extreme when
acted on by those whose purposes involve the control of self-initiated
behavior. An example, simultaneously tragic and ridiculous, is the
ideological interrogation.
A system in which mental conformity is sought through
coercion and manipulation embodies an ever-present fear on the part of
the controllers that conformity will be based on opportunism rather
than conviction. In oppressive ideological systems, such as modern
Communism, which demand "true sincerity" from their subjects rather
than mere outward conformity, the inquisitorial process appears to be a
natural development. It is a difficult matter to determine whether
thoughts are indeed "true thoughts." The inquisitorial process, being
itself highly coercive, reinforces the original suspicion regarding
opportunistic conformity. In a vicious circle, coercion is used to
produce conformity, generating fears that the conformity produced is
insincere, generating in turn further coercion to make it "sincere."
The abhorrence of these practices by those subjected to them makes the
fears of the controllers well founded and further reinforces the
vicious circle.
Under these circumstances, the ultimate test of the
loyalty and sincere devotion of the individual to the system is his
acceptance of the inquisitorial process itself: the purge, coercion,
confession, and the entire paraphernalia of enforced conversion. Malleus Maleficarum
(22, page 212) provides an illustration of the manner in which the
victim is compelled to adopt the frame of reference of the inquisitor:
He
[the suspected witch] must be asked if he believes that there are such
things as witches, and that such things as were mentioned could be
done, as that tempests could be raised or men and animals bewitched.
Note that for the most part witches deny this at first;
and therefore this engenders a greater suspicion than if they were to
answer that they left it to superior judgment to say. . . . So if they
deny it, they must be questioned as follows: Then are they innocently
condemned when they are burned? And he or she must answer. (Cf.
Krivitzky, 26, page 141.)
One final
test of loyalty demands that the prisoner act as though he hated
himself with the intensity of the criminal definition which the system
has placed upon him.
At the outset of the study the impression of the editors
from their prior investigation of interrogation problems was that the
effectiveness of scientific innovations for controlling human behavior
may have been exaggerated in most public discussions. Before final
evaluations, alarming or otherwise, were ventured from a human
standpoint regarding the significance of the control over behavior
-8-
which scientific developments will
make possible, it was felt that a more sober, systematic, and accurate
examination was required from a purely objective perspective. This
evaluation relates to the applicability of such developments to a
specified type of objective and to the nature and limits of the
alterations of objective behavior that these developments will permit a
would-be manipulator to induce in a resistant person. Although such an
effort cannot settle the philosophical and emotional questions raised
about the significance of the control which can be exerted, it can
indicate that some are ill-founded and others premature. Yet others
relate to very real matters.
This work does not represent an attempt to minimize the
problem. The conclusions reached do in fact show that many developments
can compound tremendously the already almost insuperable difficulties
confronting the individual who seeks to resist an interrogator
unrestrained by moral or legal scruples. On the other hand, it can be
shown that many of the measures popularly supposed to render an
interrogator omnipotent actually have no demonstrable applicability to
his purposes. Other measures that appear to have high potential utility
for the control or influence of behavior seem to owe their
effectiveness to quite different kinds of processes than popularly
supposed. Among the latter are "placebo" measures, the success of which
depends largely upon the attribution to them of a nonexistent potency
by the subject, and at times the manipulator. Knowledge, it appears, is
a "two-edged sword" in interrogation.
The latter fact is a source of some comfort. Several
scientists have reported on the possible applications of scientific
knowledge that might be made by the most callous interrogator or power.
The results of their thinking are available here for anyone to use,
including the unscrupulous. The alternative is to confer on the
would-be manipulator a monopoly of knowledge by default. His success,
as the various chapters of this book illustrate, depends heavily on the
ignorance of his victims. Skinner (58) has argued that those who are
most concerned with restricting the vulnerability of men to control by
others have the most to gain from a clear understanding of the
techniques employed (pages 320-322). (See also Skinner, 59.)
The question of controlling fundamental attitudes and
values may hold greater interest for many than our attention to the
eliciting of guarded facts by interrogators. Much concern of recent
years regard-
-9-
ing behavior control, as has been
discussed, has centered on connotations that have come to be conveyed
by the term "brainwashing." The source of this concern is the belief
that individuals can be "changed" in some fundamental way by devious
and mysterious acts of influence. Certainly, Communist practitioners of
"thought-reform" visualize the creation of a "new man" as their
objective. People of Western nations, frightened and puzzled by these
Communist practices, have also felt that the behavior displayed by many
victims of such efforts could be explained only in terms of some very
basic changes within the individual.
The difficulties confronting attempts to examine such
complex issues scientifically argue in favor of dealing first with
simpler and more objective forms of behavioral influence. In the
"brainwashing" model, we have a basically nonrational attempt to effect
nonrational changes of subjective states. Practitioners of
"thought-reform" seek "real" changes in beliefs and values. They demand
that the victim be "honest, sincere, and full" in his
"self-examination, repentance, and change" (27). It is difficult to
find objective indicators of the extent to which a "thought-reformer"
has achieved "honesty and sincerity," and particularly difficult when
given the special ideological meanings such terms have for the
practitioners of "thought-reform." As for producing "real" and
"fundamental" changes in the person, the superficial and stereotypical
concepts about human personality on which Communist " thought-reform"
efforts are predicated might lead one to expect that any fundamental
changes they produce must be accidental rather than a realization of a
deliberate objective.
There is no question that it is possible for men to
alter, impair, or even to destroy the effective psychological
functioning of others over whom they exercise power. The concepts
influence, control, and manipulation denote a certain kind of
alteration: the consummation of a purpose of the influencer in the
behavior of the influenced. If we wish to examine scientifically
questions denoted by the terms influence, control, or manipulation, we
must be able to observe objectively and to define in precise terms both
the effects sought and those obtained.
A focus on the elicitation of guarded factual
information simplifies the analytical problem considerably by posing a
model that involves such objectively specifiable purposes and effects.
To achieve further simplicity for purposes of this review, the
contributors were asked to consider as their primary model
interrogations where the interrogator's objectives consisted of
obtaining simple, objective information regarding the physical world.
-10-
Interrogators in
this age of "psychological warfare" increasingly seek "social and
psychological intelligence" from their sources. As in most social
science interviewing, the content of this type of reporting depends on
such factors as the subjective state and the personal and cultural
frames of reference of the reporter. Considerable simplification is
achieved by avoiding the complex problems of interviewing, which
involve influencing persons to report psychological and social
information accurately, and the infinitely more complex question of
what constitutes accurate information on such topics.
There are various motivations or values which may
underlie the resistance of a source to an interrogation attempt. The
interest here is in any method through which these bases of resistance
may be changed, outweighed, neutralized, or circumvented so that the
person comes to behave in a manner he was originally strongly motivated
to avoid. The particular form of behavior toward which attention is
directed, the imparting of factual information, has various
peculiarities. Some of these distinctive features are considered in the
reviews. Few experiments, however, have dealt directly with attempts to
elicit precisely this form of behavior. The attention of the
contributors was broadened of necessity to exploit the relevance of
experiments studying interpersonal influence on other forms of behavior.
This book does not pretend to examine the processes by
which fundamental and lasting alterations of the value system of a
subject come about. Nonetheless, in the review of experimentation on
interpersonal influence (Chapter 6), it was imperative to consider
knowledge developed through experiments that involved theoretical
concepts such as "changes in attitude or belief." From the present
perspective, the validity of such observations does not depend upon the
degree to which observed changes truly reflect stable and lasting
changes in the subject. When a determination is made that later
behavior negates some value strongly affirmed earlier in the
experiment, or the reverse, the experiment accords sufficiently with
the questions being posed here.
Although the kind of influence attempt considered here
represents a considerably simpler problem than the attitude changes or
even attitude reporting used here for some inferences, it nonetheless
involves the production and observation of complex, symbolic, learned
human behavior. Thus, evidence regarding the manipulations that are
possible of the salivary response or other simple responses of either
animals or humans would not provide answers to the questions raised by
this review.
-11-
We have attempted here to communicate scientific
information to scientists, and the work originally undertaken for the
U. S. Air Force has been revised and supplemented to this end. Emphasis
has been placed on detailing the scientific implications of both the
general and the specific subject matters, and their value for theory
and research. The number of relevant questions left unanswered by the
study points to the need for further investigation of the problem under
consideration. The contributors represent a variety of scientific
fields, and their material either separately or in the aggregate will
undoubtedly hold interest for specialists in still other fields. The
writing style here is akin to the broader style of papers designed for
presentation at meetings of representatives from several different
scientific disciplines.
This work might help the armed forces to offset the
lack of knowledge that was in part held responsible for much of the
success Communist captors achieved in interrogation of United States
prisoners of war in Korea (64). Its value for this purpose is limited
in that it assumes an interrogator who pursues his objective of
developing information rationally. Past experience indicates that
practices encountered by prisoners of war are not determined
exclusively by considerations of logic (5). A rational examination of
the problem cannot lead to predictions of a nonrational opponent's
actions. Historically, there has been frequent resort to coercive
practices for eliciting information, despite abundant evidence that
such measures are relatively ineffective. Some estimates of what an
opponent is likely to do, in addition to those based on considerations
of what it will be feasible and advantageous for him to do, are
required in devising measures for thwarting enemy exploitation attempts
against prisoners of war.
If the present study also receives the attention of
interrogators, it may offset their tendency to adopt the sensational
stereotypes of interrogation on which many of them appear to have
modeled their practice in the past.
This book is based exclusively on publicly available
scientific material. Parallel, but secret, investigations can be
presumed to have been undertaken by a number of police and intelligence
systems.
-12-
Although the
generally available literature would probably reflect in an over-all
way the achievements of secret research, it is conceivable that some
unknown discoveries or applications may have been made. Our
contributors have indicated gaps in specially relevant knowledge, many
of which would not be pursued intensively in the ordinary course of
scientific development. Largely, however, the unanswered questions that
are central to the topic of this book also point to critical gaps in
present scientific knowledge.
It should be noted that interrogations almost
invariably proceed in private. The two major sources of information
about them are: practitioners of the "art" and their victims. The
former are generally required to guard the details of their craft as
secrets; the latter may have a limited perception, understanding, and
memory of what they have experienced. It is possible that practice in
some respects has advanced beyond the level of the inferences and
conjectures presented here. In other respects, experience has proven
that some potentialities of interrogation have been overestimated. Free
access to the guarded handbooks of interrogators everywhere probably
would not lead to any substantial modification in the general
conclusions of this review.
A thorough review has been attempted of the scientific
areas that have figured most prominently in speculations concerning
"scientific interrogation."
Because of its defensive application during
interrogation, one aspect of the problem receiving special
consideration in this book is the ability of the source to thwart his
interrogator by feigning psychological disorder. Malingering is a
time-honored tactic. Its discussion here illustrates some of the
implications of personality evaluation for manipulative situations.
Personality evaluation historically has been considered
a clinical adjunct to manipulation. Its application requires the
manipulation to be "tailor-made" to the specific individual differences
encountered in the intelligence source. No comprehensive discussion of
this topic has been attempted here for several reasons: (a) most means
of personality evaluation require the willing cooperation of the
subject, which is not likely to be obtainable from reluctant sources;
(b) assessments not requiring the cooperation of the source (e.g.,
observation, graphology, analysis of speech or gestures) yield
notoriously poor agreement among independent judges or observers,
unless the behavior
-13-
is
categorized into minutiae that are difficult to interpret meaningfully;
(c) knowledge is lacking on how to effect maximal exploitation by
differential treatment of sources on the basis of personality
information, if it were available in reliable form; and finally (d)
consensus on a theory of personality, which is critical to the
integration and application of personality data, does not exist.
Published speculations that electrical stimulation of
the brain might be employed for purposes of nefarious influence led the
editors to believe initially that an examination of this area should
also be included in this book. The notion that the action of the brain,
and thereby the action of an individual, might be controlled directly
is an ancient one. Electrical brain stimulation was one of the methods
"Big Brother" used in Orwell's 1984 to control his subjects.
Scientists, including Lilly (13, 29), Miller (39), Olds (42, 43) and
Sargant (52), have indicated that recent experimental developments give
some basis to the fiction-writers' conjectures. Observations, primarily
from animal experimentation, led to the following surmises. First, and
earliest, were possibilities suggested by observations of Penfield (46)
that cortical stimulation might elicit "memory" and some spontaneous
verbalization of information. Second, animal experiments raised the
possibility that subjective experiences from subcortical stimulation
might be so intense as to provide a basis for the administration of
reinforcements of unprecedented strength. Also, the possibility was
raised that organisms might be made more "teachable" by direct
interventions of this kind.
The editors asked Sidney Marvin, M.D., Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research, who has been working on subcortical stimulation
for pain relief in human subjects, to review current knowledge and
techniques in this area from the perspective of this book. Colonel
Marvin found that experimentation had not progressed sufficiently to
allow for other than conjectural statements regarding the questions
raised. The editors believe it sufficient for the purposes of this
volume to quote briefly the general conclusions of Colonel Marvin's
report:
. . . In conclusion it
should be said that in its current status: (1) subcortical
electrostimulation is strictly in the research stage of development and
that information is sketchy and variable, (2) precise implantation of
electrodes into a given brain location is possible only within ±0.5 cm,
a reasonable estimate of the present accuracy, (3) although damage to
the central nervous system by such techniques is relatively minimal and
usually reversible, still it is a major factor to be considered, (4)
current knowledge and working concepts of neuroanatomy and other
related disciplines are insufficient. . . .
-14-
Unless
knowledge and techniques exist far more advanced than those known to
the Western scientific community, intracranial stimulation as presently
known would not be employed in any rational attempt to elicit
intelligence.
Also excluded from
these pages is a consideration of the role of Pavlovian conditioned
reflex theory in interrogation. The notoriety attained by this theory,
as explaining the inspiration and effectiveness of Communist techniques
of coercive interrogation (20, 32, 36, 52), has prompted studies by
other investigators. A number of students of the subject (2, 4, 17, 18,
55, 56) have refuted the contention that Pavlovian theory influenced
these practices, whereas Schein (56) and Farber, Harlow, and West (10)
indicate the inadequacy of simple conditioning models to account for
the kinds of complex behavior patterns produced in the course of
interrogation.
Contributors have been free to choose eclectically
whatever models and theories appeared most adequate to their respective
topics. On the whole, matters of length, level of generality, and
organization similarly have been left to the judgment of the individual
contributors.
In those cases where the contributors to this book were
not themselves highly conversant with interrogation practices, the
editors have drawn on their own experience and on research that they
have conducted on interrogation in advising the contributors and in
editing the chapters. The editors thus actively sought to increase the
relevance of the reviews to the realities of interrogation.
ALBERT D. BIDERMAN
HERBERT ZIMMER
Washington, D. C.
March 1960
1. Ai Ssu-ch'i. "On problems of ideological reform". Hsueh Hsi, 1951, 3.
2. Bauer R. A. "Brainwashing: Psychology or demonology?" J. soc. Issues, 1957, 13(3), 41-47.
3. Bexton W. H. Some effects of perceptual isolation on human subjects. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, McGill Univer., 1953.
4. Biderman A. D. Communist techniques of coercive interrogation. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, December 1956. AFPTRC Development Report TN-56-132.
5. Biderman A. D. "Communist attempts to elicit false confessions from Air Force prisoners of war". Bull. N. Y. Acad. Med., 1957, 33, 616-625.
6. Biderman. A. D. Effects of Communist indoctrination attempts: Some comments based on an Air Force prisoner-of-war study. Washington, D. C.: Office of
-15-
6. Intelligence Research, U. S. Dept. of State, October 7, 1957. External Research Paper No. 132.
7. Biderman A. D. "Effects of Communist indoctrination attempts: Some comments based on an Air Force prisoner-of-war study". Soc. Probl., 1959, 6, 304-313.
8. Biderman A. D. Social-psychological needs and "involuntary" behavior as illustrated by compliance in interrogation. Sociometry, 1960, 23, 120-147.
9. Biderman A. D., and Monroe J. L.
"Reactions to the Korean POW episode". A paper read at the Annual
Convention of the Amer. Psychol. Ass., Washington, D. C., September
1958.
10. Farber I. E., Harlow H. F., and West L. J. "Brainwashing, conditioning, and DDD (debility, dependency and dread)". Sociometry, 1957, 20, 271-285.
11. Federn E. "The endurance of torture". Complex, 1951, 4, 34-41.
12. Galambos R., and Morgan C. T. "The neural basis of learning". Handbook of Physiology. Washington, D. C.: Amer. Physiol. Soc., in press.
13. "Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry". Factors used to increase the susceptibility of individuals to forceful indoctrination: Observations and experiments. New York: GAP Publications Office, December 1956. GAP Symposium No. 3.
14. "Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry". Methods of forceful indoctrination: Observations and interviews. New York: GAP Publications Office, July 1957. GAP Symposium No. 4.
15. Hacker A. "Dostoevsky's disciples: Man and sheep in political theory". J. Politics, 1955, 18, 590-613.
16. Haring J. "Preface" (to special issue on "Brainwashing"). J. soc. Issues, 1957, 13(3), 1-2.
17. Hinkle L. E., Jr. "In Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry", Methods of forceful indoctrination: Observations and interviews. New York: GAP Publications Office, July 1957. GAP Symposium No. 4. Pp. 285-292.
18. Hinkle L. E., Jr., and Wolff H.
G. Communist interrogation and indoctrination of "Enemies of the State.
Analysis of methods used by the Communist state police. (Special
Report), A.M.A. Arch. Neurol. Psychiat., 1956, 76, 115-174.
19. Hunter E. Brainwashing: The story of men who defied it. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956.
20. Hunter E. Brainwashing in Red China. New York: Vanguard Press, 1953.
21. Huxley A. Brave new world revisited. New York: Harper Bros., 1958.
22. Institoris (H. Kraemer) and Sprenger J. Malleus Maleficarum. Translated by Montague Summers. London: J. Rodker, 1928.
23. Janis I. L. Are the Cominform countries using hypnotic techniques to elicit confessions in public trials? Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., April 25, 1949, RM 161.
24. Jordan H. "You too would confess". Argosy, February 1957, 15-17, 57-63.
25. Kinkead E. In every war but one. New York: Norton, 1959.
26. Krivitzky W. G. In Stalin's secret service. New York: Harper Bros., 1939.
27. Lifton J. "Thought reform of Western civilians in Chinese Communist prisons". Psychiatry, 1956, 19, 173-195.
28. Lilly J. C. "Mental effects of reduction of ordinary levels of physical stimuli on intact, healthy persons". Psychiat. res. Rep. Amer. Psychiat. Ass., 1956, 5, 1-28.
29. Lilly J. C., Hughes J. R., Alvord
E. C., Jr., and Galkin T. W. "Brief, noninjurious electric waveform for
stimulation of the brain". Science, 1955, 121, 468-469.
-16-
30. Mausner B., and Mausner Judith. "The anti-scientific attitude". Scient. Amer., 1955, 192, 35-39.
31. Mayer W. E. "Why did so many GI captives cave in?" U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1956, 56-62.
32. Mayo C. W. "Destroying American minds — Russians made it a science". U. S. News and World Report, November 6, 1953, 97-101.
33. Meerloo J. A. M. "The crime of menticide". Amer. J. Psychiat., 1951, 107, 594-598
34. Meerloo J. A. M. "Menticide". In Conversation and Communication, New York: Internat. Univer. Press, 1952. Pp. 149-157.
35. Meerloo. J. A. M. "Thought control and confession compulsion". In R. M. Lindner (Ed.), Explorations in Psychoanalysis, New York: Julian Press, 1953. Pp. 28-37.
36. Meerloo J. A. M. "Pavlovian strategy as a weapon of menticide". Amer. J. Psychiat., 1954, 110, 173-196.
37. Meerloo J. A. M. "Medication into submission; the danger of therapeutic coercion". J. nerv. ment. Dis., 1955, 122, 353-360.
38. Meerloo J. A. M. The rape of the mind. Cleveland: World Publ. Co., 1956.
39. Miller J. G. "Brainwashing: Present and future". J. soc. Issues, 1957, 13(3), 48-55.
40. "Misconduct in the prison camp: A survey of the law and an analysis of the Korean cases". A student note. Columbia law Rev., 1956, 56, 709-794.
41. Murray J. C. "Singing is for the birds". The Army Combat Forces J., 1955, 6(1), 15-21.
42. Olds J. "A physiological study of reward". In D. C. McClelland (Ed.), Studies in motivation. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, Pp. 134-143.
43. Olds J. "Self-stimulation of the brain: Its use to study local effects of hunger, sex, and drugs". Science, 1958, 127, 315-324.
44. Orwell G. Nineteen eighty four. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1949.
45. Packard V. The hidden persuaders. New York: McKay, 1957.
46. Penfield W., and Rasmussen T. The cerebral cortex of man: A clinical study of localization of function. New York: Macmillan, 1950.
47. Peterson D. B. Prisoners swayed didn't fall: Communists "sold" very few, says top Army psychiatrist. U. S. News and World Report, August 28, 1953, 35, 28.
48. Prugh G. S., Jr. "Justice for all RECAP-K's". The Army Combat Forces J., 1955, 6(4), 15-26.
49. Piagh G. S., Jr. "The code of conduct for the armed forces". Columbia law Rev., 1956, 56, 686-687.
50. Riesman D. "Some observations on the limits of totalitarian power". Antioch Rev., 1952, 12, 155-168.
51. Rolin J. Police drugs. Translated by L. J. Bendit. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
52. Sargant W. Battle for the mind. New York: Doubleday, 1957.
53. Schein E. H. "Reaction Patterns to severe, chronic stress in American Army prisoners of war of the Chinese". J. soc. Issues, 1957, 13(3), 21-30.
54. Schein E. H. "Epilogue: Something new in history?" J. soc. Issues, 1957, 13(3), 56-60.
55. Schein E. H. "Brainwashing". Encyclopedia Brittanica, in press.
56. Schein E. H. "Brainwashing and totalitarianism in modern society". World Politics, in press.
-17-
57. Sinevirskii N. Smersh. Edited by K. Hill and M. Hill. Translated by C. W. Boldyreff. New York: Holt, 1950.
58. Skinner B. F. Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1956.
59. Skinner B. F. Walden II. New York: Macmillan, 1959.
60. Tennien M. No secret is safe behind the Bamboo Curtain. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952.
61. "U. S. Congress, Senate". Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Communist interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation of American military and civilian prisoners. 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 2832, December 31, 1956. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957.
62. "U. S. Congress, Senate". "Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations". Hearings, June 26, 1956. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956.
63. "U. S. Dept. of the Army". Communist interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation of prisoners of war. Army pamphlet No. 30-101, May 1956. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956.
64. "U. S. Dept. of Defense". POW: The fight continues after the battle. The report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, August 1955. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955.
65. West L. J. "United States Air Force prisoners of the Chinese Communists". In Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Methods of forceful indoctrination: Observations and interviews, New York: GAP Publications Office, July 1957. GAP Symposium No. 4, pp. 270-284.
66. West L. J. "Psychiatric aspects of training for honorable survival as a prisoner of war". Amer. J. Psychiat., 1958, 115, 329-336.
67. Winokur G. "The germ warfare statements: A synthesis of a method for the extortion of false confessions". J. nerv. ment. Dis., 1955, 122, 65-72.
68. Wolff H. G. Commitment and resistance. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Soc. Sci. Res., Inc., January 1959. Study SR 177-D, Special Report No. 3.
69. Zimmer H., and Meltzer M. L. An annotated bibliography of literature relevant to the interrogation process. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown Univer Med. Center, 1957.
-18-
When an interrogation is carried out for the purposes
of intelligence, we may assume that it is intended to obtain
information and not simply to produce compliant behavior on the part of
the man being interrogated. One might describe an interrogator as a man
who tries to obtain information from another man who may or may not
possess it and who is not necessarily motivated to give the information
if he does. The interrogator would like to have this man produce his
information rapidly, accurately, completely, and without amendments or
additions. In the words of the law, he wants "the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth" — and often he wants this as soon as
possible because the information that he seeks has perishable
qualities. In the urgency of his need, he may interrogate a man who is
injured, fatigued, or in pain. He may use various maneuvers such as
prolonged or repetitive interrogation in order to overcome his
informant's unwillingness to give information. In doing so he incurs
the risk that his efforts may produce compliant behavior without
eliciting accurate information.
The information that the interrogator seeks represents
what his source still knows about various events, situations,
organizations, devices, etc., to which he has been exposed in the past.
The most complete and accurate information that he can hope to obtain
can be only an approximation of the "true facts of the case" even "under
-19-
the best circumstances." It is the
purpose of this chapter to inquire into these "circumstances," to
consider some of the situations where interrogation may be carried out,
how these affect an informant's ability and willingness to give
information, and what the ideal circumstances of interrogation may be.
The term "circumstances" is taken to mean "the condition of the man
being interrogated and the situation in which he finds himself at the
time." We shall not consider methods of interrogation or the nature of
the interrogation process, but rather the limitations placed upon these
by the state of the man who is being interrogated.
The human brain, the repository of the information that
the interrogator seeks, functions optimally within the same narrow
range of physical and chemical conditions that limit the functions of
human organs in general; and it has, in addition, certain special
limitations of its own. Any circumstance that impairs the function of
the brain potentially affects the ability to give information as well
as the ability to withhold it.
Some aspects of the physical and chemical conditions
necessary for the normal function of the human brain are rather
precisely known. The brain, like other organs of the human body, exists
in an "internal milieu" which is maintained in a remarkably steady
state by a great number of feedback mechanisms, some quite complex. Any
disturbance in the constancy of this milieu brings into play
homeostatic responses which may involve the great majority of bodily
processes as well as the activities of the man as a whole. When
environmental conditions pose a threat, these mechanisms are capable of
creating major alterations in the internal economy and in many facets
of behavior (59, 129, 130). It is largely in this manner that changes
in the condition of the man being interrogated may affect his ability
to give accurate information.
Some features of the internal milieu may be considered
briefly in order to illustrate some of the vulnerabilities of the brain
to external influences.
The temperature of the human internal environment is
maintained very near 37.5° C. A rise in temperature above 44° C (112°
F) (10, 33, 121), or a fall below 24° C (75° F) (73, 116) may damage
the brain permanently or be fatal. An elevation of body temperature to
41° C (106° F) or above — which may occur during the fever accompanying
-20-
disease or during heat stroke —
nearly always impairs brain function. Sometimes such impairment appears
at much lower temperatures. Similarly, a depression of body temperature
to approximately 31° C (88° F) — a level which is sometimes produced
artificially during anesthesia or which may occur naturally in men
after extreme exposure to cold — also impairs brain function (2, 9, 37,
62, 123). The nature of the impairments of brain function that occur
during these and similar disturbances of homeostasis are discussed
shortly. These impairments show many points of similarity, regardless
of the conditions causing them.
The concentration of the fluid in the internal milieu
is maintained remarkably close to 310 miliosmols per liter. An increase
in its concentration (as may occur after hemorrhage or after injuries
that create shock) may impair the function of the brain. A decrease in
its concentration (which can take place if a man is forced to drink
excessive amounts of water over a short period of time) also may impair
brain funtion (38, 134). 1
The internal milieu contains a number of organic and inorganic
substances in solution, and the concentration of each of these is also
maintained at a remarkably steady level. Disturbances in the
concentration of any of these substances, upward, downward, or in their
relative proportions, may impair brain function. This impairment may be
produced directly by the effect of these changes on the brain, or
indirectly through the impairment of the function of other vital
organs, which in turn produce a disturbance of the internal milieu. It
would not be profitable to attempt to list the limits of the various
elevations, depressions, or relative disproportions of these substances
beyond which an impairment of brain function may occur. In practice no
single change occurs, but rather a disturbance of the concentration of
several. A variety of rather common conditions may produce such
disturbances. Among these are excessive sweating, deprivation of water,
diets deficient in salt, ingestion of excessive amounts of water or
other nonsalty beverages over a short period of time, ingestion of
excessive amounts of salt in food when water is restricted, ingestion
of sea water in the absence of other water, poison-
-21-
ings of various sorts, vomiting or
diarrhea from any cause, burns, shock caused by injuries, hemorrhage,
and impairment of kidney function (14, 30, 42, 43, 100, 134). Even very
rapid breathing, which sometimes occurs in people who are anxious or
afraid, may lead to chemical changes in the blood that cause
disturbances of brain function (17, 36, 77, 96).
Many of the crude procedures that interrogators have
utilized from time to time to make informants "tractable" and to "make
them talk" have an adverse effect upon the composition of body fluids:
the "hot box" or "sweat box"; the deprivation of water; the salty diet;
the "water treatment"; the use of emetics to produce vomiting; and the
use of cathartics such as castor oil to produce diarrhea. These
procedures have been used by both European and Oriental interrogators
in the historical past. They were also in use quite recently in
Communist countries, and perhaps still are. American prisoners of war
encountered some of them during World War II and the Korean War, and it
is likely they will encounter some of them again in the future.
The brain, like other organs, maintains its functions
by constant metabolic activity. The basis for this activity is energy
obtained by the oxidation of the organic chemicals available from food.
Thus, a constant supply of oxygen must be brought to the brain by the
blood in the amount of approximately 50 cc per minute (40, 66, 102).
The most common way by which the brain becomes deprived of oxygen is by
failure of the circulation (65), which may be brought about by loss of
blood from hemorrhage, by shock resulting from injury (which has an
effect on the circulation quite similar to that of hemorrhage), or by
illness. Such failure of the circulation may occur also when a man is
forced to stand still in a fixed position for a long time. It is
responsible for the common phenomenon of the soldier who faints while
standing at attention (20, 22, 89, 90, 107). Transient circulatory
failure is also involved in "emotional fainting," which occurs as a
result of an acute fall in blood pressure produced by an "emotional"
stimulus. Failure of the circulation has other adverse effects on
cerebral metabolism in addition to the effects produced by relative
anoxia.
Unlike other organs, the brain cannot use proteins and
fats as sources of energy, and thus must rely on carbohydrates (65). It
is, therefore, peculiarly sensitive to deficiencies in its supply of
sugar, a substance normally present in blood. Small increases in sugar
concentration, which usually occur after meals, have no discernible
effect on brain function, but relatively small decreases in
concentration
-22-
may have a distinct effect on mood
and behavior. Small decreases set in motion homeostatic processes that
lead to feelings of nervousness, restlessness, sweating, and inability
to concentrate (27, 36, 92). A fall in blood sugar occasionally occurs
in people who are anxious or fearful, and seems to contribute to their
symptoms. A serious deficiency of blood sugar profoundly impairs brain
function (65). This is one of the terminal events of starvation, and it
contributes to the final stupor of the starved man (54, 67).
The brain is not dependent on the immediate level in
the blood of any foodstuff other than sugar, but it does ultimately
suffer if it is deprived of other foods over a long period of time. The
prolonged deficiency of protein and fat, which is usual in general
starvation, very probably contributes to changes in brain function
occurring under these circumstances (1, 18, 54, 67, 82). More immediate
and readily recognizable changes in brain function occur when the diet
is relatively deficient in one of the accessory foodstuffs, or
vitamins, which the body cannot produce itself, but which it requires
in minute but definite amounts. Among these the "B" group of vitamins
are the most immediately relevant to the brain, probably because they
take part in various processes of carbohydrate metabolism. A relative
deficiency of thiamin (vitamin B1) causes beriberi; a deficiency of
niacin causes pellagra; a deficiency of vitamin B12 causes pernicious
anemia; and a deficiency of pyridoxine (vitamin B6) causes nervousness,
insomnia, weakness, abdominal pain, and difficulty in walking. All
these diseases may be associated with pronounced changes in brain
function (95, 99, 120). Beriberi and pellagra have been endemic among
prisoners of war from time immemorial (54).
The normal function of the brain is also dependent upon
the removal of metabolic end-products from the fluid that surrounds it.
Especially when there is impairment of the lungs, liver, or kidneys
(the organs primarily involved in maintaining the normal composition of
the blood and in clearing it of toxic substances), the internal milieu
becomes deranged and impairment of brain function follows. The kidney
is the organ most often implicated in this phenomenon because it is
highly vulnerable to many common disturbances. Dehydration, surgical
shock, hemorrhage (14, 38, 43), or the circulatory impairment produced
by very long standing (20, 22, 89, 90, 107), all may impair kidney
function to such an extent that the internal milieu may be seriously
disturbed.
In summary, brain function is readily impaired by
disturbances in homeostasis. It is easily disordered by physical
abnormalities that affect the body as a whole, including such common
conditions as
-23-
fever, a profound lowering of body
temperature, dehydration, overhydration, disturbances in the
composition of the blood, disturbances of respiration, shock,
hemorrhage, diarrhea, vomiting, poisonings, starvation (partial or
complete), and even static postures that are too long maintained. The
disturbance of brain function produced by each of these-and indeed that
produced by any homeostatic disturbance, or by any physical or chemical
assault upon the brain — is remarkably uniform in many of its features.
Even though the symptoms produced by any given homeostatic disturbance
(such as overbreathing or dehydration, for example) may exhibit certain
idiosyncratic features (such as muscle cramps or thirst), there are
fundamental common elements in the disturbances of brain function which
follow from all these types of assault.
All severe and uncompensated disturbances of homeostasis produce a
syndrome of disturbed brain function which, in civilian life, is most
commonly encountered in hospitals. This syndrome (officially, the
"brain syndrome") 2 occurs
in acute and chronic forms (128), and includes deliria of various
sorts, some of which have been given the names of drugs or diseases
thought to cause them. The present consensus is that the "brain
syndrome," whether acute or chronic, is fundamentally a single
syndrome, regardless of its cause (24, 25, 29, 76, 92, 97, 108, 128,
131).
The "brain syndrome" in its fully developed state is an
across-theboard impairment of brain function: an impairment of all
those aspects of mental activity that are commonly tested when the
physician undertakes to assess the "mental status" of the patient. A
patient exhibiting this syndrome can no longer carry on his usual
complex activities, assume his daily responsibilities, or cope with
interpersonal relations. As its symptoms develop, he may become
restless, talkative, and delirious; ultimately, he becomes totally
confused and lapses into unconsciousness.
The full-blown "brain
syndrome" usually occurs in people who are distinctly ill, injured, or
depleted. Generally, such people are interrogated only when it is
feared that their information may be
irretriev-
-24-
ably lost. Their deranged condition
is easily recognized, and the information that they give can be
evaluated with this in mind. However, under less drastic conditions the
syndrome may develop slowly and be difficult to recognize, and its
existence may elude an interrogator.
In the earliest stages of the "brain syndrome," the
subject experiences the various uncomfortable symptoms associated with
his physical state: pain, fatigue, thirst, hunger, drowsiness, or the
like. He loses some of his capacity to carry out complex
responsibilities accurately, speedily, effectively, and to plan and
delay his activities. This is especially noticeable in his impaired
ability to meet new situations and his occasional lapses in dealing
with familiar situations (24, 25). His interpersonal relations may
deteriorate; conflicts arise which he might have avoided under other
circumstances. He is likely to become emotionally labile, irritable,
depressed, jumpy, and tense, and at other times to be unexpectedly
blunted or apathetic in his reaction. His concern for the finer aspects
of human behavior-for neatness, accuracy, honesty, veracity, and
kindness, as well as patriotism and honor — may fall off to varying
degrees, whereas at the same time he shows an increased and at times
frantic concern for his more immediate bodily needs such as food,
water, sleep, rest, and the alleviation of pain.
In this early stage of the syndrome, the only outward
manifestations of disturbed behavior, other than those directly
associated with illness, injury, or depletion, are likely to be a
slight deterioration of dress, speech, and personal appearance. The
subject's performance on short-term tasks, including psychological
tests of moderate complexity, may not be outside the normal range (24,
25), especially if he is highly motivated at the time. Yet, despite his
ability to rise to a short-term challenge, his performance on tasks
generally will be slowed, less accurate, and less effective. If his
premorbid level is unknown, a moderate deficit may be undetected. Frank
disorientation may be absent. He is more likely to be vague and
forgetful about time, place, and person, to have to be reminded, or to
make a conscious effort to remember.
People who are injured, ill, or depleted by combat or
exposure are often interrogated if they seem to be in good condition
and capable of pulling themselves together. Under these circumstances
they may be subject to disturbed brain function in this earlier and
subtler form. The presence of this condition may not be recognized by
either the interrogator or the man being interrogated, even though the
source may wish to cooperate with his interrogator and may appear
-25-
to be mentally "normal." However, the
subject's memory may be especially deceptive. There may be a distinct
hiatus in his memory, without its being noticed either by the source or
by one who examines him. More often he is vague, uncertain about
details, and has temporary blocks of memory, especially for the
nuances, or the finer (and sometimes the most important) details.
In this state, the subject may have no frank illusions,
hallucinations, or delusions, but he overvalues small events,
misinterprets, blames others, and accepts explanations and formulations
which he might reject as patently absurd under different circumstances.
He does not confabulate, but he may be willing to state that a report
is "clearly true," or that an event "actually occurred," when in fact
the report merely could be true, or the event might have occurred. His
intellectual functions, his judgment, and his insight decline to a
similar degree.
As the "brain syndrome" develops, the subject's dress,
behavior, and speech deteriorate further. His orientation for time,
place, and person becomes increasingly deficient. Initially he may have
been quite aware of the impairment of his mental faculties, and his
awareness potentiates the apprehension that he may experience. The
subject is especially prone to become fearful if his illness is
precipitated rather suddenly by acute infection, injury, poisoning, or
dehydration. When it comes on more slowly or is due to starvation, his
mood may be one of apathy or depression.
The subject is quite likely to have thinking
difficulties and sensory experiences, illusions, delusions,
hallucinations, and projective or paranoid thinking. Frequently these
contain naively transparent elements of wishful thinking. If starved,
he may believe that he is about to receive a large meal or he may see
it before him. Such experiences may be frightening. If the syndrome
develops gradually, he may perseverate, or pointlessly repeat a
fragment of thinking, speech, or behavior; or he may confabulate and
create figmentary "memories" to cover up actual defects in his memory.
Such confabulation may occur even if the subject has a reputation for
the utmost adherence to veracity. Since he may be more than usually
suggestible (131), the combination of confabulation and suggestibility
may make it possible to elicit from him a plausible story that is
largely figmentary.
Other mental activities deteriorate also. His
intellectual functions fall off. His capacity to calculate, to
abstract, to estimate time, to recall items, digits, or stories is
impaired. General information that one might expect him to know is not
available to him. His judg-
-26-
ment is faulty. Although he may at
first have had some insight into the fact that he has lost his
faculties, later he may have none at all. His memory becomes defective,
at first for recent or special events, and later for all sorts of
events and topics. The subject's awareness is increasingly clouded, and
he becomes more and more drowsy as the process advances to the
borderline of the pathological.
The state just described is not uncommon among men who
have been through prolonged combat (114) or through prolonged and
depleting activities of any sort (4, 39, 83, 124, 135), in men who are
injured, who are ill, who have undergone serious exposure to the
elements, and who are malnourished or deprived of water. It can be
assumed that the U. S. Armed Forces would not deliberately create such
a state in prisoners of war, but it is quite likely to occur among them
naturally, simply because men often become prisoners of war after
strenuous combat, and may be ill or wounded. It can be assumed that
future enemies probably will create such a state in American prisoners
of war, although they may not do so with any sophisticated intent.
Historically, it has been the common practice of captors, police, and
inquisitors to isolate their prisoners in places that are cold, damp,
hot, unventilated, unsanitary, and uncomfortable, to deprive them of
food, fluids, sleep, and rest and medical care, and to beat, torture,
harry, overwork and threaten them, as well as to question them
interminably with leading questions. Such procedures have been used
partly because they make prisoners more "pliable," more "ready to
talk," and more "cooperative." They are very likely also to make the
information obtained from the prisoner increasingly unreliable.
The phenomena just considered relate to men who have
suffered some disturbance of their homeostasis — some measurable change
in the internal environment affecting the body as a whole, other organs
as well as the brain. People who experience the effects of isolation,
fatigue, or sleep loss may show no measurable disturbance of their
general homeostasis. They may nonetheless exhibit impaired brain
function, for the brain has special vulnerabilities over and above
those that it shares with other organs. It is possible to have
disturbed brain function in the absence of any other significant
alteration in homeostasis.
-27-
The brain of man is
an organ that deals with "information," using this term in the
technical sense as it is used in communications theory (135). The
accumulation and transmission of information in this sense is a
characteristic of all living organisms. The nervous system of the
higher animals is a specialized apparatus capable of dealing with
information in complex ways and thereby greatly increasing the general
adaptive capacities of the animal. The exceedingly complex nervous
system of man has this fundamental function. It takes in information
from the organs of special sense, and from the sensory nerve endings
within the body and its surfaces, and transmits this information to the
brain. There it is analyzed, organized, evaluated, stored, and used as
a basis for organizing the activities of the man as a whole. We might
say that "information" arising from the configurations of minute
amounts of energy is the substrate for the activities of the brain, in
somewhat the same sense that "food" is the substrate for the activities
of the gastrointestinal tract.
Deprived of information, the brain does not function
"normally." It must have a certain quantity of patterned, meaningful,
sensory input from the external environment, and some opportunity to
organize its output as behavior (31, 60, 74, 86, 87, 91, 136). Nor can
the brain perform one sort of activity continuously and maintain its
efficiency. Even though the task undertaken is entirely "mental" (or,
as one might say, involves only the carrying out of activity within the
brain), and no significant changes in the general physical state of the
individual occur as a result of it, the phenomenon of "fatigue"
eventually supervenes, and brain function deteriorates (4, 32, 41). In
addition to this, the brain requires "sleep" from time to time — a
cessation of its "conscious" pattern of activities; otherwise its
functions suffer (35, 64, 84, 98, 118). Thus the brain has special
vulnerabilities of its own; it cannot function "normally" unless it
receives a certain amount of information upon which to operate, and it
cannot carry out a single pattern of activities unremittingly and
indefinitely.
These points are considered briefly.
The experiments of Hebb and others (11, 44, 45, 53, 55,
56, 80, 109, 126), who have concerned themselves with "sensory
deprivation," have consisted of putting men into situations where they
received no patterned input from their eyes and ears, and as little
patterned input as possible from their skin receptors. In some cases
there was a
-28-
diminution in sensory input itself;
but it appears to have been the lack of patterning, the paucity of
information, that was important. The subjects were deprived of
opportunity for purposeful activity. All of their other bodily needs
were taken care of-food, fluids, rest, etc. Yet after a few hours the
mental activities of the participants began to go awry. Their capacity
to carry out complex tasks and to perform well on psychological tests
fell away. They developed illusions, delusions, and hallucinations, a
mood of fearfulness, and many of them discontinued the experiment.
Such experimentally contrived situations are by no
means the same as those of persons in prolonged prison isolation, yet
undoubtedly some aspects of these observations on sensory deprivation
are applicable to our understanding of the reaction of the individual
to prolonged isolation. It is well known that prisoners, especially if
they have not been isolated before, may develop a syndrome similar in
most of its features to the "brain syndrome" (57, 58, 91). They cease
to care about their utterances, dress, and cleanliness. They become
dulled, apathetic, and depressed. In due time they become disoriented
and confused; their memories become defective and they experience
hallucinations and delusions. In these circumstances their capacity for
judgment and discrimination is much impaired, and they readily succumb
to their need for talk and companionship; but their ability to impart
accurate information may be as much impaired as their capacity to
resist an interrogator.
Classically, isolation has been used as a means of
"making a man talk," simply because it is so often associated with a
deterioration of thinking and behavior and is accompanied by an intense
need for companionship and for talk. From the interrogator's viewpoint
it has seemed to be the ideal way of "breaking down" a prisoner,
because, to the unsophisticated, it seems to create precisely the state
that the interrogator desires: malleability and the desire to talk,
with the added advantage that one can delude himself that he is using
no force or coercion. The prisoner himself may be taken in by this and
later stoutly maintain that the interrogator "never laid a hand on me."
However, the effect of isolation upon the brain function of the
prisoner is much like that which occurs if he is beaten, starved, or
deprived of sleep.
The fact that some people, who have been through prison
isolation before, or who can create for themselves an active and
purposeful inner life of fantasy, can endure isolation for a long time
(5, 15, 75) does not vitiate the fact that total isolation effectively
disorganizes
-29-
many people who are initially obliged
to undergo it, even when it is not carried out under circumstances of
uncertainty and threat, as it usually is. There appears to be a wider
range of variability in the capacity of men to withstand isolation,
sleep deprivation, and fatigue than in their ability to withstand
dehydration or fever, for example, even though ultimately brain
function may be deranged by all these conditions. We shall consider the
basis for this.
For reasons not yet known, a brain cannot continue to
function without occasional periods of sleep. The amount of sleep men
require is quite variable. Some can function effectively for fairly
long periods with relatively few hours of sleep obtained at irregular
intervals (64, 68). Under experimental conditions men have been known
to endure for more than a hundred hours without sleep at all (16, 35,
46, 72, 98, 118, 123), and for more than two hundred hours with only a
few brief naps (64). Yet most people deteriorate markedly after about
seventy-two hours without sleep, and all deteriorate sooner or later
(35, 46, 64, 118, 122). The highest functions suffer first; the
capacity to cope with complex and changing situations without making
mistakes or errors in judgment is often the first to go. This is
followed by a deterioration of dress, speech, and behavior; dullness;
emotional lability; defects of recent memory; disorientation;
hallucinations, delusions, thinking disturbances; and impaired judgment
and intellectual functions, all increasing in severity with the passage
of time (35, 46, 64, 72, 98, 118, 122). Even at a fairly late stage of
this deterioration, people faced with an acute challenge and highly
motivated to meet it may briefly perform complex tasks quite
adequately; but ultimately even this capacity is lost (4).
Sleep deprivation affects brain function directly,
while producing little or no change in the general internal milieu.
Efforts to demonstrate a disturbance of the general homeostasis
consistently associated with lack of sleep have been largely futile
(84, 118). The constituents of the blood and the function of organs
other than the brain may show little or no abnormality in those who
have been without sleep for many hours. People whose thinking and
behavior are seriously deranged may show "nothing wrong with them" on
physical examination or various chemical tests. Their demonstrable
defect is a disturbance of brain function.
-30-
“Fatigue” is a term which has more than one scientific
meaning, as well as more than one popular meaning. We shall use it to
denote a group of somewhat similar phenomena which occur in muscles,
in reflex arcs, and in the brain. “Muscle fatigue” is
precisely defined and denotes the deterioration in the function of a
muscle produced by its steady or repeated activity. The phenomenon is
readily measured and reproduced. It is associated with measurable
changes within the muscular system, and it has its counterpart in the
“muscle fatigue” that occurs in the intact man after
muscular activity. The fatigue of neural arcs is similarly definable
and reproducible. On the other hand, “fatigue” of the man as
a whole has been given various definitions (4, 32, 88). It is often
seen in people who are depleted or ill, but no measurable bodily
change is necessary to it or consistently associated with it. The
“fatigue syndrome” may be produced in a man if he is put to
performing a given task over and over, without rest and without
change. After a while he performs this task less rapidly, less
efficiently, less effectively, and with more mistakes. This falling
off in his performance on the specific task is usually accompanied by
a feeling of “weariness,” or “fatigue.” His
impaired performance on this task is not necessarily associated with
any other changes in his bodily functions, and his performance on any
other task may be unimpaired; indeed, if he is suitably motivated, he
may perform even the task that fatigued him quite adequately for a
short period of time (4, 32). In addition, the rapidity with which the
fatigue syndrome develops is influenced by the attitude of the man to
the task that he must perform (4, 32, 81).
“Fatigue”
and impaired performance of the degree just described, or of even
greater degree, is readily produced by purely “mental”
tasks; and if such tasks are continued long enough, performance
deteriorates to the extent that the task can scarcely be carried on
(4). However, the most extreme degrees of fatigue that have been
studied have been associated with combat or with other extremely
trying military operations where muscular activity, lack of sleep, and
sometimes injury played a part in their production (4, 8, 13, 32, 41,
49, 50, 81, 83, 88, 111, 114, 115, 135). Bodily changes were therefore
present. The fatigue that occurs in combat or other military
operations is like that occurring during the prolonged and unremitting
interrogation carried out by state police in various countries
(57). The observed mental phenomena are quite similar in both
cases. The profoundly
-31-
fatigued man, after combat or
military operations, or after prolonged interrogation, shows a
deterioration of his speech, dress, and general behavior, emotional
lability and blunting, confusion, disorientation, defects of memory,
hallucinations, delusions, illusions, paranoid thinking, impairment of
intellectual functions, loss of judgment, and very little insight (4,
57, 114). Perseveration and confabulation may occur under these
circumstances, as they also may after sleep loss (114). In addition,
profound anxiety is often exhibited by those who have been in prolonged
combat and who have undergone terrifying experiences (114).
The symptoms of disordered brain function that occur
under these conditions differ little, except in detail, from those of
the "brain syndrome," as this is produced by disturbances of
homeostasis. It is easy to differentiate a man who has been long
isolated or who is profoundly sleepy or tired from one who is suffering
the effects of pneumonia, gunshot wounds, or starvation; but this
differentiation is made upon the basis of symptoms and signs other than
manifestations of disturbed brain function. It is not profitable to
argue whether or not the symptoms produced by isolation, fatigue, and
sleep deprivation should properly be classified under the "brain
syndrome." However, if one assumes that the effective performance of
complex tasks, alertness, orientation, memory, discrimination, and
judgment are dependent upon the function of the brain, then there can
be no doubt that isolation, fatigue, and sleep deprivation produce
disturbances of brain function. If one accepts that the function of the
brain is always associated with electrochemical events occurring within
it, then these changes in brain function are, in fact, "organic," as
are all brain functions. So far as "organicity" is concerned, the
effects of isolation, fatigue, and sleep deprivation upon the brain are
different from those produced by pneumonia, starvation, or gunshot
wounds primarily in the rapidity of their occurrence and the extent to
which they can be reversed. Not all of the phenomena that may occur as
a part of the "brain syndrome" have yet been described as occurring
during isolation, fatigue, or sleep loss, but this seems to be a
function of the limited number of observations that have been made on
people who are subject to these conditions in extreme degree.
On the other hand, there is a difference in the
predictability of the point at which disturbed brain function will be
produced by these various circumstances. One can state within rather
narrow limits the
-32-
levels of body temperature, blood
glucose, or oxygen saturation, beyond which a severe disturbance of
brain function can be expected. Isolation, sleep loss, and fatigue,
however, present no such narrow limits. It is probably correct to say
that if any of these are carried on long enough they will disorganize
the brain function of anyone; but the differences in the ability of man
to withstand these conditions are very wide. Under experimental
conditions, some people have succumbed to sensory deprivation within
one-and-a-half hours, whereas others have maintained adequate function
for thirty-six hours or more (126). Under prison isolation, as this has
been carried out by Russian and Eastern European state police, most
prisoners developed symptoms of disorganization within three to six
weeks (57); but some have been known to endure this for many months
(15, 75), and some have succumbed within days. After forty-eight hours
without sleep, some people become disorganized and ineffective, whereas
others have been known to go as long as a hundred hours with their
functions largely intact (35, 64). A task that will fatigue some men
within a short while can be carried on by others for many hours with no
evidence of fatigue (4, 32).
It must be conceded that these differences in the
ability of men to withstand isolation, fatigue, and sleep deprivation
may be based on subtle differences in their genetically inherited
characteristics; but if this be true, no evidence has yet been brought
forward to substantiate it. On the other hand, there is abundant
evidence to indicate that the personality of a man and his attitude
toward the experience that he is undergoing affect his ability to
withstand it. People who enter prison with attitudes of foreboding,
apprehension, and helplessness generally do less well than those who
enter with assurance and a conviction that they can deal with anything
that they may encounter. Those who readily withdraw into a life of
meaningful fantasy and intellectual activity seem to do better than
those who are dependent upon activity and interaction with other
people. Some people who are afraid of losing sleep, or who do not wish
to lose sleep, soon succumb to sleep loss; others, convinced that they
can stay awake indefinitely, have done so for well over a hundred hours
(64). A great number of reports from industry, and from experimental
observations, indicate that the attitude of workers and experimental
subjects is as important in determining the rate at which they fatigue
as are the tasks they undertake (4, 81). Troops, carried without sleep
or rest to the limit of endurance, have been able to straighten up and
present a smart appearance for a short time when an appeal was made to
their pride (118). In short, the brain, the organ that deals with infor-
-33-
mation, also organizes its responses
on the basis of information previously fed into it. This information,
in the form of a personality developed through the experiences of a
lifetime, as well as immediate attitudes and the awareness of the
immediate situation, conditions the way that the brain will react to a
given situation. There can be no doubt that personality, attitudes, and
the perception of the immediate situation seriously influence the
ability of a brain to endure the effects of isolation, fatiguing tasks,
and loss of sleep.
In a certain sense one might regard isolation, sleep
loss, and fatigue as direct assaults upon the brain; for the first can
be regarded as depriving the brain of the substrate of its operations,
and the last two can be regarded as leading to the depletion of
processes in the nervous system which can only be repaired with a
period of rest. However, hypotheses such as these cannot easily be
applied to the explanation of the human reactions to pain, hunger, and
situations interpreted as dangerous or threatening. Here one is dealing
with a form of sensory input that may be of great intensity, but which
is not in itself disorganizing to brain function even if continued
indefinitely. Pain of fairly high intensity may be borne by individuals
over a long period of time without necessarily producing impairment of
their highest integrative functions (8, 50). In the heat of combat or
of physical contests intensely painful conditions may pass quite
unnoticed and may not impair performance. When the attention is focused
elsewhere by various means, such as hypnosis, the pain of childbirth or
of surgical operations may be withstood and not be remarked upon (103,
125). The reaction to pain is therefore quite variable (3, 6, 7, 28,
48, 50, 63, 69, 78, 93, 94, 112, 132, 133). So likewise is the reaction
to hunger (21, 34). Hungry men have produced intellectual and artistic
output of a high order, and have been responsible for extraordinary
military feats. Men have undergone prolonged fasts without significant
impairment of their highest faculties. And, so far as dangerous
situations are concerned, there are some who are stimulated or even
exhilarated by them, and many others who act as if they do not regard
them as dangerous at all.
Thus, hunger, pain, signals of danger, and similar
forms of sensory input cannot be shown to be necessarily toxic to the
human brain, for, under the right circumstances, any individual
apparently can
-34-
tolerate them indefinitely. The
weight of evidence is that it is not the sensory input itself, but the
reaction of the individual to this input which may adversely affect his
brain function. This is not so with isolation, sleep deprivation, and
fatigue, where the effects are intrinsically adverse, and the reaction
of the individual is a factor only in determining how long these
effects can be withstood. With hunger, pain, and signals of danger, the
adverse effects on brain function may be entirely the result of the
reaction of the individual. Activities of the brain, initiated in
response to incoming information, lead to an impairment of brain
function. This special vulnerability of the brain to its own
activities, long suggested by clinical observation, has recently
received experimental support (24, 25).
The syndrome commonly associated with the reaction to
hunger is slow in developing, but it can be expected to occur in the
majority of those who are exposed to prolonged hunger from any cause
(18, 67). It has been seen among starved populations (1), among inmates
of concentration camps (54, 70), and among prisoners of war (47, 61,
67, 104), and has been reproduced experimentally (18, 67, 82). This and
other rigors of the prison camp experience were probably responsible
for a good deal of the symptomatology that occurred among American
prisoners in Korea (79, 105, 113). People deprived of food very soon
develop a persistent hunger, which does not leave them until death
approaches or nutrition is restored (18, 21, 54, 67). Accompanying this
hunger there is a constant preoccupation with food, which may encompass
the greater part of waking thoughts and activity (18, 54, 67). As
starvation progresses, the niceties of dress and behavior are
neglected, and if the lack of food carries with it a threat of death,
behavior may cease to be governed by the restraints of "honesty,"
"unselfishness," "pride," and "honor," which are active under normal
circumstances; in short, the very highest integrative functions drop
away (18, 54, 67). During the earlier stages of hunger, irritability
and emotional lability are the rule, but later profound and continuing
apathy occurs (18, 19, 54, 61, 67, 104). In the most advanced stages of
inanition, defects of memory, confusion, hallucinations, delusions, and
intellectual deficits become evident (1, 54, 67). Advanced inanition is
associated with major changes in the physical state of the individual.
Although it is quite possible that this state is directly responsible
for the derangement in brain function which takes place, the
disturbances of behavior and of mood which occur during the
-35-
early part of starvation are present
long before any significant derangement of the internal milieu can be
demonstrated (18, 19, 67).
It is not to be taken that the reaction to hunger is
always the same. In starved communities, in concentration camps, and in
experimental situations, some people endure hunger for a long time, and
maintain their highest level functions with very little evidence of
disorganization until the effects of illness or lack of food supervene
(1, 18, 19, 54, 67, 70). Such people, although they do feel hunger and
are aware of it, are able to engage in thought and behavior other than
that centering around a preoccupation with food; their symptoms are
less outstanding and their behavior is more "normal." So far as is
known, this greater ability to withstand hunger has no constitutional
or genetic basis; on the other hand, the attitude of the man to the
experience that he is undergoing appears to be of great importance in
determining his capacity to endure hunger.
The investigation of pain has been especially
enlightening in this regard, because many careful laboratory studies
have defined the difference between the "sensation of pain" and the
"reaction to pain" (3, 50, 52, 110, 132, 133). The sensation of pain
seems to be roughly equal in all men, that is to say, all people have
approximately the same threshold at which they begin to feel pain, and
when carefully graded stimuli are applied to them, their estimates of
severity are approximately the same (6, 28, 48, 50, 51, 71, 85). In
general, the reaction to pain is in proportion to its severity, and the
most intense pains incapacitate men for any sort of complex function
during the period of their duration. Yet exception must be taken even
to this statement, for when men are very highly motivated, as they may
be when their own lives or the lives of others are at stake, they have
been known to carry out rather complex tasks while enduring the most
intense pain. The variability of human reactions to the moderately
severe grades of pain, such as those found in various diseases, is
notorious. Some people perform quite effectively over many years while
experiencing the pains of chronic headache, peptic ulcer, arthritis, or
similar conditions; others with like amounts of pain are severely
incapacitated (3, 6, 7, 8, 28, 48, 50, 63, 69, 78, 93, 94, 103, 112,
125, 132, 133).
The adverse reaction to chronic pain of moderate
severity is clinically familiar. It is characterized by withdrawal from
the more complex and responsible functions of life, a certain amount of
irritability
-36-
and emotional
lability, and concentration upon personal comfort and survival at the
expense of the needs of others and of the society. Under experimental
circumstances, those who try to "carry on" while experiencing moderate
pain show impairment of their performance on complex tasks, impairment
of decision making, loss of efficiency, and difficulty in estimating
time (8) — symptoms which would be expected to occur in the
early stages of the “brain syndrome” and much like those of
people who have suffered the destruction of a small segment of their
cerebral hemispheres (24, 25).
It is possible that the
differences in the way that various people react to pain may be partly
determined by their constitutions, for it sometimes appears to the
clinical observer that people of “mesomorphic” build, the
heavily muscled and big-boned individuals, are those who react to pain
with stoicism or with anger and a mobilization for action that
temporarily enhances their performance; whereas the lighter and
asthenic “ectomorph” often reacts to pain with withdrawal,
incapacitation, self-concern, and anxiety. Yet the exceptions to this
are many, and the variations in the reaction of the same person from
time to time are great. In general, it appears that whatever may be
the role of the constitutional endowment in determining the reaction
to pain, it is a much less important determinant than is the attitude
of the man who experiences the pain (3, 6, 7, 48, 50, 52, 69, 94, 110,
112, 125, 132, 133).
Threats of any sort, direct, implied, or symbolic, are not
necessarily derived from sensory input which is intrinsically
“unpleasant.” The question of the intrinsically noxious
nature of a threat does not even arise. Complex situations, symbols,
and small cues arouse potent reactions entirely because of the
interpretation put upon them. In different men similar situations
produce different reactions. Some men react to ostensibly dangerous
situations with continued effective performance. When men react to
such situations as threatening, and when their reactions are
characterized by anxiety or other intense emotions, these reactions
may disorganize their brain function. Intense anxiety, for example, is
sometimes associated with defects in every area of performance that is
impaired in the “brain syndrome.” Threat is not usually
thought of as a “physical” stimulus and the syndrome of
anxiety is quite distinct from “brain syndrome.” However,
the defect in function that occurs in the anxious man is quite
real.
-37-
Pain, hunger, and threats are usually thought of as
psychological stimuli because the conditions that produce them may not
be noxious unless perceived to be so. The features that determine
whether or not a man will perceive a given situation as noxious — his
personality, his past experiences, his immediate mental set, and the
characteristics of the situation — are outside of the scope of this
chapter, but we must take due note of their importance.
On the other hand, the psychological reactions to pain,
hunger, and threats will be discussed. These reactions are not called
"organic reactions," and they are not considered to be part of the
"brain syndrome," but this is a sterile distinction.
The same considerations that were applied to the
reactions to isolation, fatigue, and sleep loss apply also to those of
pain, hunger, and threats. Insofar as mood, thought, and behavior are
functions of the brain, the disturbances of mood, thought, and behavior
that occur in reaction to pain, hunger, or threat are disturbances of
brain function. Insofar as all brain functions are concomitants of
electrochemical events in the brain, these disturbances are "organic."
Yet the impaired function associated with anxiety is distinguished from
the "brain syndrome" because of its reversibility, and because of the
relatively greater disturbance of mood and behavior than of
intellectual functions, memory, or orientation that usually occur with
anxiety. Yet impaired brain function, not entirely distinguishable from
the organic reaction pattern, and in effect "permanent," may in some
cases be produced by anxiety alone (24, 25).
Quite aside from the question of whether or not the
reaction to threats, hunger, and pain may be directly associated with
changes in brain function, there is no doubt that it may be associated
with notable changes in the function of other organs. When
environmental conditions pose a threat, adaptive mechanisms are capable
of creating important changes in the internal economy (59, 129, 130).
Manifestations of disturbed function of the gastrointestinal and
cardiovascular systems are most frequently reported by prisoners (57),
but disturbance of any organ system may occur. In the absence of other
causes of disease, dysfunctions produced in this manner are not usually
fatal, although they may be. When combined with the effects of
isolation, loss of sleep, or starvation, they lead to rapid
deterioration and sometimes to death. Even if one were to overlook
entirely the
-38-
direct effect upon the brain of
reactions associated with anxiety, fear, or depression, the indirect
effect of the homeostatic derangements that often occur at the same
time would ultimately be deleterious to brain function.
We have drawn a distinction between the "willingness"
of a man to give information and his "ability" to do so. The
implications of this may now be considered.
As the master organ of human adaptation, the brain
functions as a whole in enabling man to carry out the exceedingly
complex activities of life in the societies that he has erected. Even
impairment of the lower level functions of the nervous system, for
example, of sight, hearing, or motor function, to some extent impairs
his performance of these activities. Yet many of the highest level
activities of man remain possible despite such impairment. Milton was
blind, Beethoven was deaf, and Winston Churchill was not the last
statesman to carry on after he had suffered a cerebro-vascular
accident. The part of the brain essential to these highest level
activities, without which they cannot be carried on, is the most recent
evolutionary development and the part particularly well-developed in
man: the cerebral hemispheres, the neopallium. It is this that must be
intact for the performance of the creative and responsible tasks that
confront a mature man and, in fact, for all those "conscious"
activities that are part of being an alert, sentient, and civilized
human being.
Within the cerebral hemispheres are many discrete
pathways which have to do with lower level functions, including those
of sight, hearing, and the motor functions that have been mentioned.
These lower level functions are relatively localized. Damage to their
pathways can impair them temporarily. But the highest level functions,
those necessary for the adequate expression of human needs, appetites,
and drives, those which provide the mechanisms for symbolic activity
("memory," "abstraction," "cognition," "integration," "reason," and so
on), and those which enable men to tolerate frustration, to deal
effectively with threats, and to maintain effective and well-modulated
defense reactions, do not appear to be localized within the hemispheres
(24, 25).
In carrying out these highest integrative functions,
the cerebral hemispheres behave somewhat in the manner of a
data-processing machine that has "digital" (or "counting") and
"analogue" (or "meas-
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uring") characteristics, as well as
many other characteristics not yet duplicated by man-made apparatus
(26). The cerebral hemispheres have no specific pathways associated
with "abstraction," "cognition," "integration," "reason," or similar
mental activities. Rather, they include a maze of potential pathways,
over any of which the complex patterns of activity associated with the
highest integrative functions may be set up. Thus, when any part of the
hemispheres is damaged, none of the highest integrative activities are
entirely lost, but the capacity to perform all is impaired to some
extent. It is for this reason, undoubtedly, that anything that impairs
the function of the cerebral hemispheres-direct injury, drugs, toxins,
diseases, homeostatic disturbance of all sorts, isolation, sleep loss,
fatigue, and some reactions to pain, hunger, and threats — ultimately
produces a global impairment of the highest integrative activities.
Yet it is also true that some high level functions of
the brain are more vulnerable than others. It seems to be a
characteristic of the central nervous system that those functions that
are "newest" and most complex, those which have appeared most recently
in evolutionary development, are most vulnerable and drop out first
when the function of the brain is impaired. The cerebral hemispheres
provide no exception to this general rule. When they are impaired, the
first functions lost are those that are thought to be the most complex
and to have been acquired most recently by civilized man: the capacity
to carry out the highest creative activities, to meet new, challenging,
and complex situations, to deal with trying interpersonal relations,
and to cope with repeated frustration (24, 25). Relatively small
degrees of homeostatic derangement, fatigue, pain, sleep loss, or
anxiety may impair these functions.
As impairment of brain function continues, somewhat
less complex activities deteriorate. There is a lessening of the speed
and efficiency with which the ordinary tasks of daily life are carried
out. Concern about "accuracy," "propriety," "moral rectitude," "honor,"
and "feelings of other people," and similar "socially oriented"
behavior falls away, and an increased concern about sleep, rest,
comfort, food, and other bodily needs becomes apparent (24, 25, 54,
67). There is less adherence to niceties in speech, behavior, and
dress. Emotional displays lose some of their social orientation.
Judgment and insight are less acute. These complex aspects of brain
function may be distinctly impaired, whereas orientation, memory,
recall, and the capacity to perform well on psychomotor tests are still
intact.
Symptoms of impaired orientation appear as impairment
proceeds. Memory becomes faulty, the capacity to recall remote events
being re-
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tained after memory for recent events
is lost. Difficulty in simple computations becomes evident, and
impairment of performance on tests becomes quite noticeable.
With still further impairment awareness becomes
clouded. It is at this point that misinterpretations, illusions,
delusions, and hallucinations may appear, and "delirium" may occur.
Large defects in memory and profound impairment of discrimination and
judgment are evident. As they develop, confabulation may take place and
perseveration is likely.
With further deterioration of brain function, loss of contact with reality and finally loss of consciousness occur.
It is notorious that threats, pressures, and
deprivations, skillfully manipulated by police and interrogators with
long practice in their use, will "break" almost any man, "soften him
up," "make him cooperate," and "make him talk." They succeed because
the most complex, the most "civilized," and the most "socially
determined" aspects of human behavior are most affected by these
procedures. The "less civilized" behavior patterns, directed at comfort
and survival, are brought to the fore in a man whose capacity for
judgment and discrimination is diminished. "Honor," "bravery,"
"security," "loyalty," and "patriotism" then have less weight in
determining his behavior; pain, fear, and confusion have more.
Rationalizations come easier to him, and points that once seemed
important are now unimportant. He becomes more "willing to give
information."
"Willingness to give information" is an "attitude," a
"mental set," an "increased propensity of the individual to react in a
given manner." It is not, in itself, a discrete function of the brain;
it is a statement about the likelihood that a given pattern of reaction
will occur, provided this reaction pattern can occur. Various degrees
of "willingness" exist so long as the brain has any "ability"
whatsoever to give information. The "ability to give information" is a
statement about the capacity of the brain to furnish information: the
possibility that it can do so under any circumstances. "Willingness"
and "ability" are not necessarily parallel.
It is easy to see why various police procedures often
increase the willingness of men to give information. So far as one can
tell, the willingness to give information is not determined by any
constitutional factor or by the direct action of any agent from the
outside, but by information already within the brain, what might be
called its "directions for action." Most of the "directions" which call
for a prisoner to withhold information were implanted there by his
society. They are the sum total of those learned reactions that have
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to do with "loyalty," "honor,"
"propriety," "security," and so on. As brain function is impaired,
information derived from past experience generally becomes less potent
as a guide for action, whereas information derived from the immediate
experience, pain, thirst, discomfort, and threats to life, becomes more
potent. The "attitude" is likely to change, and the man becomes more
"willing" to do whatever is necessary to secure his comfort and
survival.
The new "attitude," the newly increased propensity, is
directed toward doing whatever is necessary to secure comfort and
survival. It is directed toward "compliance," toward doing what the
situation seems to demand. This new state of the informant may be a
trap to an interrogator, especially if he is a vigorous and persistent
man with a good hypothesis as to what he might uncover. He is now
dealing with a man who is likely to have lost some of his finer
capacity for discrimination and judgment, whose insistent physiologic
needs impel him toward ready solutions that may serve to relieve him of
his discomfort, whose memory for details may be fuzzy and confused, and
who is more than usually ready to accept a plausible suggestion. The
source is, indeed, more prepared to talk, but he is also more likely to
be inaccurate and to give false, misleading, incomplete, or inexact
information, of a type like that which his interrogator happens to be
seeking. The fact that the giving of this information does not redound
to his credit or to his long-term self-interest and the fact that he is
prepared to state that it is true, and later to defend his statements,
should not be taken as evidence of its accuracy.
Note that these are statements of probability; they are
not absolute. "Willingness" is not necessarily enhanced as "ability"
deteriorates. Our simple hierarchical outline of the way that brain
function falls off is generally true. All the disturbing influences
that we have mentioned can be accompanied by the "brain syndrome," and
can ultimately cause disorganization and unconsciousness. However, one
cannot make a more exact statement, because the precise nature of the
symptoms and the facility with which they are produced are dependent
upon the personality of the prisoner, what has happened to him before,
and how he views the circumstances in which he finds himself at the
time (24, 25, 131). These factors have a great deal to do with the form
of the "brain syndrome" produced by disturbances in homeostasis. They
determine whether a man becomes garrulous or withdrawn, anxious or
angry, paranoid or trusting. They likewise determine the form of the
"brain syndrome" produced by isolation, sleep loss, and fatigue, and
they further have an important influence upon his ability to withstand
pain and hunger, and they
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approach being an absolute determinant of whether or not a "threat" will produce a disorganizing reaction.
Unwillingness to give information is a mental set. If
it is strongly imbedded in a man before his capture, it may continue to
govern one aspect of his behavior right up to the point of delirium or
unconsciousness, no matter what symptoms he may develop. Some people
-criminals adhering to the "code of the underworld" (127) as well as
prisoners of war adhering to the "finest military traditions" (119) —
do not give information although they reach the point of
disorganization or death. The evidence suggests that a learned reaction
pattern, if sufficiently reinforced, can sometimes govern a specific
aspect of behavior as long as a man retains the capacity to carry out
that behavior.
From the theoretical point of view it is hard to escape
the conclusion that a man is best able to give accurate information
when he is in an optimal state of health, rest, comfort, and alertness,
and when he is under no threat. This would seem to be the optimal
situation for interrogation. Any attempt to produce compliant behavior
by procedures which produce tissue damage, disturbances of homeostasis,
fatigue, sleep deprivation, isolation, discomfort, or disturbing
emotional states carries with it the hazard of producing inaccuracy and
unreliability.
However, it is often necessary for the interrogator to
question people who are experiencing moderately severe effects of
illness, injury, fatigue, discomfort, or anxiety. A body of practical
experience indicates that relatively reliable information can be
obtained from most such people, if the information sought is neither
complex nor extensive. The interrogator faces two special hazards under
these circumstances. First, the source may have a fairly serious degree
of mental disturbance that is not immediately evident and it may escape
the interrogator's attention. Second, any informant in a threatening
situation is liable to say whatever will please his captors, even
though he may not do so intentionally. These ever-present hazards of
interrogation are enhanced under adverse circumstances. It may be
assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the simpler,
the briefer, and the more readily verifiable the information that is
sought, the more likely is the evidence of the source to be of value.
On the other hand, granting that various procedures
designed to make men more compliant will impair their ability to give
accurate information, do these procedures not cause men to give more
information than they might otherwise have given? Cannot a man be made
to reveal information against his will?
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Disordered brain
function is indeed easily produced in any man. No amount of "will
power" can prevent its occurrence. It can be produced without using
physical means, that is, by fatigue or sleep deprivation. Since it may
be associated with mental clouding, confusion, lack of discrimination,
impaired judgment, and increased suggestibility, it is probably true
that most men can be brought to a state where they will agree to
statements that are dubious, incomplete, or quite inaccurate. Under
these conditions some men will make up entirely fictitious stories
incriminating themselves. Therefore, it is usually not difficult to
obtain signed "confessions" that are biased, incomplete, inaccurate, or
even totally untrue. This is the means by which Communist state police
have produced false confessions with great regularity (57), although
not with universal success (12, 101, 106, 117, 119).
Most people who are exposed to coercive procedures will
talk and usually reveal some information that they might not have
revealed otherwise. However, there is no evidence that a man must
always reveal a specific item of information that he possesses.
Disturbed brain function of the subject does not allow the interrogator
to abstract information at will. An interrogator may occasionally trick
a disturbed man into revealing bits of information that he had intended
to conceal, but information so revealed is likely to be limited and
interspersed with unreliable statements. If he elects to do so, a
prisoner may endure to death or disorganization without revealing what
he knows. Very few men, however, can hold themselves to such rigorous
behavior through all the vicissitudes of captivity.
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Glazer H. S., et al. "The effect of Vitamin B deficiency induced by
desoxypyridoxine in human beings". J. lab. clin. Med., 1953 42, 355-357.
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121. Wakim K. G. "The physiologic effects of heat". J. Amer. med. Ass., 1948, 138, 1091-1097
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123. Wayburn E. "Immersion hypothermia". A.M.A. Arch. int. Med., 1947, 79, 77-91
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This chapter is concerned with experimental
investigations of the effects upon human behavior of a reduction in
either absolute or relative amounts of sensory or perceptual
stimulation. Experimental efforts to achieve such a reduction in
environmental input to the organism have been referred to in the
literature by various terms, of which the most common appear to be
"sensory deprivation," "sensory isolation," and "perceptual isolation."
Although it is difficult to distinguish between the use of these terms,
an effort will be made to examine the similarities and differences
found in the growing number of investigations in this problem area.
Regardless of the differences in descriptive terminology, these
conditions have been observed to produce marked changes in the behavior
of subjects exposed to them. These changes have included modifications
in thinking, perception, and feeling states, as well as an increase in
imagery, often bizarre in content. It is the purpose of this chapter
(a) to examine briefly the sources of interest in this problem, (b) to
review the extant experimental literature in order to assess the
current status of knowledge
________________
Partial assistance for the
preparation of this report was provided by the Office of Naval
Research, Contract Nonr. 1866(29). The author would also like to thank
R. R. Holt and P. H. Leiderman for their critical reading of the
manuscript and their many helpful suggestions.
-51-
about this problem, and (c) to review briefly its implications for our general understanding of behavior.
Interest in these problems by diverse groups long
antedates the current concern. Small (71), in 1900, summarized a great
deal of data relevant to the relationship between social life and
solitude. He offered the generalization that
All
knowledge of self and things is relative. Personal orientation depends
largely on objects in the visual field. In the presence of a desert, a
prairie, a sea, or the sky; in an absolutely dark cavern, or on the
summit of a mountain, a feeling of disproportionateness between the man
and what he sees overwhelms consciousness. Paralysis of association
results. Retrogression to a half-vegetative state like that of infancy
follows. If the eyes be open, they do not see. They have neither
fixation point nor accommodation. Their gaze is as vacant as in the
early days after birth, as stolid as the frozen stare that follows
death. All the life that there is, lies within. When that which has
seemed real, abiding and certain in the objective field becomes a
blank, the psychic condition passes rapidly through a change whose
nearest analogue is the bladder of air in a receiver from which the air
is being exhausted. In the effort to expand itself to the range of its
new conditions, the self finds itself only a loosely related mass of
reflexes from experience, distrusts their coherence and their
affinities, sees the flitting nature of consciousness, loses tself in
the Unknown. (17, page 39.)
Until
recently our primary sources of data on this problem have been the
autobiographical accounts of prisoners, explorers, and shipwrecked
sailors. They have reported rather dramatic, often gripping accounts of
the response to isolation in narrow and cramped prison quarters, in
endless days at sea, or in stark and desolate polar regions. Reports by
Bombard (11), Byrd (15), Ritter (63), and Burney (13), to mention only
a few, describe the inexorable monotony of these conditions and report
unusual changes in thinking, feeling, and perception. Hallucinationlike
experiences seemed quite common and a marked hunger for contact with
people and things were manifest. These accounts, as well as a variety
of other anecdotal literature, suggested the key role of a varied
external environment against which to verify internally arising
percepts and ideas. Two recent reviews have summarized these somewhat
scattered, largely autobiographical reports (50, 72).
In recent years, interest in a systematic study of
these problems has heightened considerably. This increase of interest
can be at-
-52-
tributed to converging influences
coming from three major sources. The first of these sources has been
the rapid pace of development in several scientific disciplines.
Advances in neurophysiology have led to a gradual revision in our
conception of the nervous system and have produced data that provide
changing physiological models for psychological events (37). There are
now available increasingly sophisticated electrophysiological methods
of measuring neural function at various levels of the nervous system.
Recent reports (29, 61) have demonstrated electrical changes in the
central nervous system followfag reduced sensory input. These changes
are believed to have chemical consequences. Neurochemistry has begun to
provide techniques for evaluating the nature of these consequences.
Psychoanalysis is another discipline in which interest
in these issues is growing. Here, increasing emphasis is placed on the
importance of understanding ego functioning and its role in mediating
behavior. From this viewpoint, the question may be raised, "If the ego
is the executive aspect of personality, enabling the individual to cope
with reality, what becomes of ego functions in the absence of an
external environment with which to cope?" Although Freud (31) dealt
with these issues early in his work, interest in an experimental
approach to this problem is relatively recent. The work of Hartmann
(36) in elaborating the theoretical basis of "ego psychology" is
important in this development.
A second major source of interest in human response to
restricted environments has come from the military establishment.
Technological developments, as seen in a variety of military
applications, have given the pursuit of these questions a new urgency.
With the advent of space craft, isolated radar stations, and a
generally increased reliance on automated equipment, the problem of
efficient functioning in severely restricted, monotonous environments
is no longer merely of theoretical or academic interest. The problem of
efficient personnel selection and utilization, in a wide variety of
these circumstances, has provided marked impetus to the initiation and
development of research programs dealing with reactions to limited
sensory and social environments.
In this connection, the experience of prisoners of war
with Communist "thought-reform" has had similar effects. The revelation
that isolation may be one factor in the susceptibility of humans to
radical changes in customary behavior and beliefs has heightened
interest in the study of isolation. The shocked fascination of the
general public, not excepting the scientific community, has served to
highlight the need for a systematic understanding of the effects of
physical and
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social isolation on behavior.
Literature on methods of "thoughtreform" or ideological reform has
attempted to place these procedures in a context which emphasizes the
fact that they are well known and not the result of new discoveries or
magical innovations on the part of the Communists (9, 10, 42, 49, 67).
In these procedures, solitary confinement and monotonous, barren
surroundings play an important role in making the prisoner more
receptive and susceptible to the influence of the interrogator. The use
of this technique rests not on laboratory science but is part of the
empirical know-how of police and military interrogation.
A third major source of interest in these phenomena,
although perhaps less dramatic than the foregoing, has come from
developments within academic psychology. One such development has taken
place in the area of motivation, in which a number of experimenters
(14, 34, 58) have attempted to establish the existence and operation of
what has been called curiosity or exploratory drive as a primary
motive. Attributing a significant role in the determination of behavior
to such a drive, we find that this research has arisen in a context
which seeks to refute the strongly prevalent view of the organism as a
passive receptacle of experience; one which responds only to
drive-relevant stimulation. As formulated by Hebb, "Characteristically,
stimulus response theory has treated the animal as more or less
inactive unless subject to special conditions of arousal." (37, page
244.) In contrast to this approach, studies dealing with the relevance
for behavior of a curiosity or exploratory drive indicate that the
organism has an active need for experience, and initiates and
structures activity in accordance with that need. Studying human
response to restricted environments may indicate the mode of operation
of the "need for experience."
Another development within academic psychology has
contributed to the current concern with the effects of restricted
environments on human subjects. Studies of sensory deprivation early in
the life of animals, and the effects upon subsequent development and
learning, have a relatively long history within psychology. Originally
designed to evaluate the relative influence of innate organizational
processes (as opposed to learning) on perception, these researches have
since been more directly focused on the general effects of early
deprivation upon a variety of subsequent behaviors. Although
experimental work, because of ethical considerations, has of necessity
been confined to animal investigations, clinical and anecdotal evidence
such as the reports of Spitz (73, 74, 75) and others (22, 23, 26, 27),
and those on "feral man" (70, 71) have supplemented these studies.
These reports
-54-
have highlighted the importance of a
full range of early environmental experience to the development of
normal adult functioning. The occurrence of serious and irreversible
disruptions of normal development and behavior has been reported.
Because this work is beyond the scope of the present chapter, the
reader is referred to Beach and Jayne's (5) review of this literature.
Before turning to an examination of the experimental
findings, it may be well to consider some of the methodological and
conceptual problems raised by research in this area. The diversity of
variables involved in a systematic study of response to reduced
environmental stimulation makes for considerable complexity. It will be
useful to take a brief overview of procedures employed by various
investigators.
Three experimental approaches have been identified in
the literature (72). In the first of these, efforts were directed
toward an absolute reduction of input to the organism from the
external world. Lilly (50) immersed two subjects up to three hours in a
tank of slowly circulating tepid water, wearing nothing but a head mask
that covered eyes and ears. There was minimal visual, auditory, or
tactile stimulation. Subjects received an initial set of training
exposures to overcome fear of the situation. On the day of the
experiment, they were placed in the tank and were instructed to inhibit
all movement so far as possible. The use of a soundproof, darkened room
(65, 79) as a method for achieving sensory deprivation is similar in
intent 'o the foregoing procedure. The subject's arms and hands are
enclosed in cardboard cuffs and gloves. Plugs are placed in the ears to
reduce further levels of stimulation. Although absolute reduction in
sensory input is the goal here, this latter method places less of a
restriction on motor activity.
A second approach to reducing sensory stimulation was used by Bexton, Heron and Scott (8). They reduced patterning
of sensory inputwhile retaining levels of input at near normal. In this
procedure using twenty-two male college students, the subject wore a
pair of translucent goggles that permitted the perception of light but
not of objects. Auditory input consisted of the masking sound of fan
and airconditioner motors, and tactile experience was reduced through
the use of cuffs and gloves that permitted no direct exploration of the
immediate surroundings.
-55-
In a third approach, sensory deprivation consisted of monotony
or absence of change in the external environment, e.g., providing a
repetitive auditory experience while presenting the subject with an
impoverished visual field. In this procedure goggles are not used and
the subject is exposed to normally patterned vision of a highly
restricted environment. Wexler, Mendelson, Leiderman, and Solomon (80)
placed seventeen subjects into polio tank respirators with arms and
legs in cardboard cuffs. The repetitive drone of the respirator motor
provided an auditory masking sound, whereas the visual environment
consisted of the front of the respirator and the blank walls of a
screen. Since the ports of the respirator were left open, subjects
breathed for themselves. This procedure relies on monotony to achieve
its effects and is thus similar to situations in which highly
repetitive simple tasks are performed. It is also most similar to the
environment of the prisoner in solitary confinement as well as other
isolation situations as encountered in real life.
Without attempting a comprehensive survey of
methodological problems and issues, some examination of the choices
confronting researchers in this problem area may be helpful. What are
the limitations and problems of these procedures? Efforts at the
absolute reduction of sensory input are limited by the impossibility
completely of doing away with sensory experience in a living conscious
organism. Even the most sophisticated instrumentation cannot eliminate
sensations and perceptions arising from internal body functions. This
end point of the stimulation continuum thus must remain theoretical. To
the extent to which this goal is relevant to testing a variety of
hypotheses, it can only be approximated.
Few if any investigators have attempted a rigorous
definition of the terms they have employed. Most have used their
experimental methods to provide an empirical basis for their
conceptions. Indeed it is understandable that the number of descriptive
terms and phrases in the literature is almost as large as the number of
investigators. Without becoming too deeply embroiled in the
sensation-perception issue, it may be useful to think of attempts at
the absolute reduction of intensity of input to the organism as sensory deprivation, whereas reduced patterning and monotony may be more meaningfully seen as perceptual
deprivation. The outstanding characteristic of the latter two
approaches appears to be the decrease in the structure and variety of
input. This inevitably results in a reduction of information. The term
"isolation" is one which seems to be relevant to the social dimension
rather than to the sensory and perceptual aspects of the various
experimental conditions employed. At this stage of
-56-
our knowledge, it is unclear as to
whether there are different behavioral consequences of sensory as
opposed to perceptual deprivation, in the sense used above. It is
possible to conceive of this range of stimulus conditions as a complex
continuum.
In view of the unique complexities presented by
research in this area, it is clear that somewhat arbitrary choices of
procedure have been made. These choices must be evaluated in terms of
the limitations they impose on the results obtained. Thus the
observation of cognitive and perceptual functioning and the
descriptions of emotional and affective changes makes simultaneous
verbal reports of experience in the experimental situation most
desirable. Retrospective reports raise difficult questions about their
accuracy and make it impossible to study the concurrence of
physiological events and verbal behavior. On the other hand, verbal
reports of experiences by the subject during the experiment provide a
complex feedback situation. The testing of perceptual and cognitive
functions during the experiment constitutes a definite modification of
procedure.
One form of control over the subject's sensory
experience has been achieved in many experiments by restricting his
mobility. This is accomplished by restraining the subject, limiting the
space available to him or by instructions to remain still. This
limitation of mobility reduces kinesthetic and proprioceptive input. It
is difficult to know whether the results obtained are a function of the
additional sense of confinement or restriction which goes beyond
reduction in sensory stimulation.
Most studies in this field have striven for absolute
isolation of the subject from other human contact by avoiding all
communication between subject and experimenter. Although social
isolation contributes to reduced sensory input, whether this reduction
is primarily effective in terms of loss of social contact per se, loss
of patterned stimulation from speech, absolute reduction of sensory
stimulation, or some combination of these is still to be determined.
Furthermore, the social isolation in these experimental
settings is artificial and limited in that the subject knows there is
an observer who is interested in his performance. He usually has good
reason to suspect that this observer has strong motivation to prevent
the occurrence of any long lasting or profoundly debilitating effects.
These implicit aspects of the subject-experimenter contract may be
major factors in the presumed social isolation seen in experimental
studies. These limitations to isolation do not apply to situations such
as those of the prisoner or shipwrecked sailor. In the former case
there are the additional implications of the status of "enemy" which
-57-
undoubtedly also influences the
individual's response. The "escape at will" clause present in
laboratory studies constitutes a major difference from the motivational
conditions of real life isolation situations.
These factors, along with the use of volunteers in
experimental studies, constitute serious limitations to the laboratory
testing of hypotheses regarding responses to real life isolation and
sensory deprivation. We are unable to assess the effects of coercion or
the ultimate consequences of prolonged confinement in a deprived
environment. These conditions undoubtedly have a profound effect on the
motivational aspects of the situation and thus influence response. The
inability to replicate these conditions in the laboratory must limit
our generalizations from the experimental data. In view of these
considerations these data must be interpreted cautiously.
The first experimental work which focused on the
response of man exposed to reduced environmental stimulation per se was
begun in 1951 in the laboratory of D. O. Hebb at McGill University (7,
8, 28, 38, 39, 40, 41, 69). Although earlier studies had dealt with
more limited aspects of this problem, they grew out of an essentially
different experimental interest. The McGill studies initially arose out
of a concern with the contribution of perceptual isolation to the
mechanism of brainwashing and the effects of monotony upon a person
with a long sustained watchkeeping task. Previously Mackworth (52) had
shown that in a vigilance task requiring prolonged observation,
subjects increasingly and strikingly failed to respond to an
appropriate stimulus. From this point of departure, the framework of
these and other studies was expanded to focus on a wide variety of
other variables.
Our approach in reviewing these studies has been
influenced by the consideration that in the early stages of acquiring
systematic knowledge about a problem, it may be useful to
underemphasize considerations of experimental rigor and elegance in
favor of developing a richer background of hypotheses and conceptual
formulations, even if only at a suggestive level. Because of their
exploratory nature, these investigations have often been designed to
look for a wide range of possible relationships, rather than to test
specific, focused hypotheses. For these reasons this review will not
dwell upon limitations of experimental method and procedure. In
general, the studies are uneven in quality, and range from carefully
designed and
-58-
executed procedures to vaguely
formulated, poorly controlled observations with small samples.
Similarly, measurement in these studies has varied from precise
psychophysical calibration to loosely defined clinical judgments
unchecked for reliability. The effort has been to provide a
comprehensive review of all pertinent studies for whatever light they
shed on the problem or support they lend other studies. In reviewing
this work we have largely restricted our concern to the
psychophysiological aspects of experimental work with isolation and
reduced sensory input. No attempt has been made to include the
social-psychological aspects of isolation which, while relevant,
represent a special subproblem.
For purposes of clarity we shall report the findings in
the following categories: perceptual and motor abilities; cognitive and
learning abilities; personality findings; feeling states; imagery; and
physiology. In addition, we shall consider findings bearing on
methodological choices, clinical applications, and a brief survey of
theoretical interpretations. Despite some arbitrariness in these
classifications and the necessity of considering the same experimental
work in several categories, this approach will permit a more coherent
view of the evidence within a given experimental domain. In referring
to these studies, reduced patterning, imposed structuring, and
homogenous stimulation are referred to as perceptual deprivation; absolute reduction in variety and intensity of sensory input will be called sensory deprivation. In a number of experimental procedures elements of both are present.
The problems of vigilance under conditions of
perceptual deprivation have been studied by Mackworth (52). Additional
literature in this area was reviewed by Holland (44), who summarized
these studies as showing a greater over-all percentage of detection
when the number of signals per experimental session increases, and a
more equivocal finding of an increased probability of detection for
longer intersignal times. He interpreted vigilance behavior as a
problem of reinforcement scheduling and probability of response. In
this context, signal detections serve as reinforcements for observing
responses. His own findings confirmed the earlier reports that within a
given session, despite individual differences, the use of a larger
number of signals increased response rate. He calls attention to the
"rather precise control exerted by the environment over the human
operator's observing behavior" (page 67).
-59-
Hochberg, Triebel,
and Seaman (43), working with a different experimental interest,
performed a series of studies on the percepts obtained under conditions
of spatially homogeneous colored illumination over the entire visual
field. These studies were designed to test the hypothesis that a
colored Ganzfeld would lose its color under these conditions.
Utilizing eyecaps made from halved table-tennis balls, these
investigators found that complete disappearance of color was obtained
in most cases, despite considerable individual differences in the
course of the adaptation process and in the phenomenal content during
adaptation.
Similarly, restricting stimulus input to homogeneous
visual stimulation, W. Cohen and Cadwallader (20) studied the effects
of uniform visual stimulation utilizing a different apparatus.
Subjects' exposure to these conditions lasted from three to ten minutes
while sitting alone in a room. The findings showed that under both
monocular and binocular conditions, subjects reported a temporary
cessation of ordinary visual experience after prolonged exposure to a
uniform visual field. With increased exposure to these conditions the
initial reports of the field as being "foglike" changed to an
experience of "blanking out." The "blanking out" or "white-out"
phenomenon often persisted for thirty seconds or more and the
reappearance of the field occurred only after extensive eye movements
and blinking, or with the introduction of an object to the field.
Factors that facilitated "white-out" were found to include both
extensive prior stimulation and scotopic (rather than photopic)
stimulation. A similar finding is reported by Ditchburn, cited by
Bruner (12), who showed that if a visual pattern is stabilized on the
retina so that it is not even displaced by the natural tremor of the
eye, it disappears from view within about six seconds.
Bexton et al. (8), utilizing the procedure of reduced
patterning of stimulus input, had twenty-two paid male volunteer
college students serve as subjects and compared their performance with
an equivalent control group. They were told to lie on a comfortable bed
in a lighted cubicle, and they wore translucent goggles, cuffs, and
gloves. Auditory input was reduced through the use of a partially
soundproof cubicle, a U-shaped foam rubber pillow for the subject's
head, and the masking hum of fan and air-conditioner motors, which was
fed into earphones in the pillow. Upon leaving, after two or three days
in the experimental situation, subjects had difficulty in focusing;
objects appeared fuzzy and did not stand out from their backgrounds;
the environment seemed two-dimensional; and colors appeared to be more
saturated than usual. The experimenters also found deteriora-
-60-
tion in visual motor coordination as
measured by such tasks as the Wechsler Digit Symbol test, handwriting
specimens, and the copying of prose paragraphs. Another study by the
same group (69) showed that performance on the Thurstone-Gottschaldt
Embedded Figures test declined, whereas no change was manifest in a
mirror tracing task. The deterioration of performance on the digit
symbol test has since been confirmed by Davis, McCourt, and Solomon
(21), who studied ten paid volunteer subjects under different
experimental conditions of perceptual deprivation. These investigators
failed to find deterioration in the Witkin Embedded Figures test.
Vernon and Hoffman (76), after conditions of sensory deprivation
lasting twenty-four and forty-eight hours, questioned four subjects
about difficulty in focusing, increased saturation of hues, and lack of
three-dimensional perception, and reported negative findings for all
three phenomena.
Heron, Doane, and Scott (41) extended the duration of
their experimental procedure to six days and served as their own
subjects. They described the disturbances in visual perception as
unexpectedly profound and prolonged, with similar manifestations for
all three participants. These effects included apparent movement
phenomena (with and without head and eye movements by the observers),
distortions of shape, accentuation of afterimages, perceptual lag, and
increases in color saturation and contrast. Further work from the same
laboratory (28) described the fluctuating curvature of surfaces and
lines, and disturbances in size constancy. In addition, these
investigators observed that autokinetic effects were harder to abolish,
larger figural aftereffects were obtained, and spiral aftereffects were
more persistent. A loss of accuracy in tactual perception and spatial
orientation was noted.
Freedman, Grunebaum, and Greenblatt (30) studied the
effects of isolation and reduced patterning of visual and auditory
input upon visual perception. As controls they employed paid male
volunteers, who received only social isolation. To induce perceptual
deprivation, these investigators used translucent goggles, white noise
fed into earphones, cotton gloves, and cardboard cuffs for the
subjects' arms. Each of the eight experimental subjects was placed on a
bed in a lighted room and was instructed not to move about. The control
group of six subjects was similarly treated without the additional
restrictions to visual, auditory, and tactile input. Both groups
remained in the situation for eight hours and had no contact with the
experimenters during this time. They found changes in perception
similar to those cited by the McGill group.
Their report describes measurable perceptual "aberrations" found
-61-
in every experimental subject, but
none in the control subjects. In some subjects these aberrations
persisted for over one hour, and consisted of two-dimensional forms
changing shape and size and of straight lines moving and curving.
Comparing pre- and postisolation performance, they observed a decrement
in size constancy and changes in the Müller-Lyer illusion. In both
instances, changes consisted of increased variability of judgment
rather than unidirectional effects. Visual-motor coordination, as seen
in the copying of Bender-Gestalt figures, was significantly impaired
following exposure to the experimental conditions.
An increase in apparent movement phenomena through
perceptual deprivation has been demonstrated in a study designed
specifically to test this relationship. Ormiston (59) compared thirty
minutes of perceptual deprivation, sensory bombardment, and a neutral
condition for their effects on the perception of the phi phenomenon
with thirty subjects serving in each condition. The deprivation
condition was realized through having subjects sit in a bare room
wearing translucent goggles, ear plugs, and ear muffs. The sensory
bombardment condition exposed subjects to motor tasks, a tape with
varied sound effects, taste and smell stimuli, and a variety of colored
goggles. The neutral condition consisted of having subjects sit on a
couch in a waiting room. A comparison of pre- and posttests showed a
statistically significant increase in the perception of phi for the
deprived group, whereas the bombardment group showed a trend toward
decrease in phi perception. The neutral group showed no change.
Vernon, McGill, Gulick, and Candland (78) studied the
effects of sensory deprivation upon a variety of perceptual and motor
skills. Eighteen paid volunteer subjects were placed in a small, dark,
lightproof, soundproof chamber containing a bed, an icebox with food,
and toilet facilities. Subjects wore gauntlet-type gloves to reduce
tactile stimulation and inhibit movement as well as the noise of
movement. They were instructed to lie quietly and make as little noise
as possible. A control group which did not receive sensory deprivation
consisted of a similarly motivated group of graduate students. The
experimental subjects remained in confinement for one, two, or three
days, at the end of which they were required to perform a variety of
tasks. The effects of sensory deprivation were assessed by a comparison
of differences in pre- and postconfinement scores with those of the
control group who were tested at similar intervals. The findings
revealed significant deterioration in visual-motor coordination as seen
in a rotary pursuit task, a rail-walking task, a mirror tracing
problem, and mazes. In perceptual tasks, such as color
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perception and delayed auditory
feedback, a similarly significant decline in performance was observed.
The only task of this series which did not show a decline was a test of
depth perception, in which a trend was obscured by the large
variability of scores. It should be noted that the mirror-tracing
finding in this study contradicts that reported by Scott et al. (69).
Utilizing the shortest periods of exposure to reduced
sensory input, Rosenbaum, Dobie, and Cohen (64) studied the effects of
0, 5, 15, and 30 minutes of two conditions of visual deprivation upon
tachistoscopic recognition thresholds for numbers. For one group of
sixteen subjects, visual deprivation was achieved by blacked-out rubber
goggles, while a similar second group received perceptual deprivation
through the use of goggles permitting the perception of diffuse light.
These investigators found no differences between their two groups; both
improved with successive days of practice. The five-minute condition
resulted in a lowered threshold for both groups. The thirty-minute
condition produced no change from the zero level. Since none of the
experiments using longer periods of deprivation measured recognition
thresholds, it is difficult to say whether failure to observe changes
in this task was a function of an insufficient period of deprivation or
whether no relation is to be expected.
In summary, the findings of these studies indicate a
generally disorganizing effect of deprivation upon perception. The
effects thus far demonstrated have been confined largely to the visual
modality. These effects include the following: breakdown in
visual-motor coordination, an increase in apparent movement phenomena,
increase in color saturation, decline in size and shape constancies,
loss of accuracy in tactual perception and spatial orientation,
increase in persistence of autokinetic effect, larger figural
aftereffects, difficulty in focusing, fluctuating curvature of lines
and surfaces, and a general decrease in the efficiency of perceiving
relevant stimuli. Although several studies are in disagreement about
some of the above details [e.g., Vernon and Hoffman (76)], most reports
are remarkably convergent in their findings despite wide differences in
experimental conditions. These effects may be best characterized as a
general loosening of subjects' ability to perceive reality and the
weakening of stable internal norms against which to evaluate perceptual
(visual) experieuce. The increase in variability of a number of visual
functions and loss of accuracy may be best understood in these terms.
The breakdown of internal norms is demonstrated in a variety of other
functions and begins to suggest one general parameter which may make
isolation and sensory deprivation effective in increasing
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the vulnerability and receptivity to new external environmental influences.
A wide variety of studies have referred to subjective
reports of difficulty in concentration, attention, and problem solving
following isolation and confinement (8, 16, 17, 30, 65, 80). These and
other studies have also examined the effects of isolation and
deprivation upon a wide range of cognitive functions. Included have
been such abilities as those involved in a variety of intelligence test
performances, learning and association tasks, logical reasoning, etc.
We turn here to a consideration of these aspects of the experimental
literature.
The report of Bexton et al. (8) is elaborated in a
subsequent study (69). These researchers investigated cognitive
performance during isolation and perceptual deprivation. In order to
evaluate the duration of the effects, they examined several other
functions following four days of isolation. On several occasions during
isolation, they had subjects perform tasks such as mental
multiplication, arithmetic catch problems, completing number series,
anagrams, and wordmaking. Despite the fact that the decline in the
twenty-two subjects of the experimental group was not statistically
significant for all these tasks, the deterioration due to the
experimental conditions was consistent. In a second series they found
no change in digit span or analogies during isolation, whereas
associative learning tended to decline, but not significantly. In a
postisolation series they found significant deterioration in judgment
of anomalies and in two block design tasks. Their general findings
suggest that performance on intelligence test items grew progressively
worse as length of stay in the cubicle increased.
Starting with this observation, Vernon and Hoffman (76)
used a procedure of sensory deprivation similar to that described
above. They studied the ability of four paid volunteer male college
students to learn lists of adjectives after twenty-four and forty-eight
hours of confinement. Comparing their experimental subjects to an
equivalent control group, they found that the ability at rate-learning
improved with continued sensory deprivation. In a follow-up study, nine
experimental and nine control subjects, who were all paid volunteer
male college students, were compared for ability to learn a longer list
of adjectives after twenty-four, forty-eight, and seventy-two hours of
sensory deprivation (77). In this instance there were no significant
differences between groups in errors or trials to criterion, although
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the experimental group made fewer
overt errors and showed less variability. Thus, despite failure to
confirm their own previous findings, this study did not support the
deterioration finding of the McGill group.
Goldberger and Holt (32) studied fourteen paid
volunteer male college students under perceptual deprivation conditions
similar to those of the McGill experiments. They utilized the halved
tabletennis ball procedure of Hochberg et al. (43) to occlude vision
and white noise to mask other auditory input. Subjects lay on a bed in
a cubicie for eight hours and were encouraged to talk during their time
in isolation. The following tests were administered at the end under
the experimental conditions: arithmetic reasoning, digit span, and
story recall. Subjects were then taken out of the isolation and a test
of logical deductions was given. Comparison of the performance of the
experimental subjects pre- and postconfinement (without a control
group) showed that only the last of these, logical deductions, reflect
significant impairment.
Davis, McCourt, and Solomon (21) utilizing a
modification of the polio tank-respirator procedure initially described
by Wexler et al. (80) kept five pairs of paid volunteer male college
student subjects in relative perceptual deprivation for over ten hours.
These subjects did not know one another. Although they could talk to
each other, they were confined separately and could not see each other.
In comparing scores before and after isolation they found no change in
performance on a block design task. These authors considered the
possibility of procedural variables causing failure to confirm Bexton
et al. (8) in finding impairment in block design performance.
B. Cohen, Rosenbaum, et al. (17) studied four normal
subjects and six patients from various clinical groups under conditions
of brief deprivation. Subjects were seated individually for one hour in
an isolation chamber in a comfortable chair. They wore goggles which
were either blacked out or else permitted diffuse light perception.
Audition was minimized through car plugs, padded earphones, and the
masking sound of a fan motor. Their fingers were wrapped in elastic
bandages and they wore elbow-length gloves. The instructions were to
relax and move as little as possible. Subjects were also told that they
would perceive sensations ordinarily below conscious awareness. These
experimenters report that there was no "gross cognitive deterioration"
under these conditions as measured by the number of word associations
produced in two minutes. The small sample size, the brief period of
isolation, and the limited measure employed in this study suggests
caution in interpreting this result.
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S. Cohen, Silverman,
Bressler, and Shmavonian (18) reported an exploratory investigation on
four subjects exposed singly to four hours of confinement and
deprivation while seated in an anechoic chamber, with instructions to
keep awake and to estimate the passage of successive thirty-minute
intervals. All four subjects showed an increase in performance on digit
span, and decrease in arithmetic reasoning, abstraction, and general
reasoning. All subjects reported difficulty in problem solving and
logical thinking. The small sample size and absence of a control group
limit the relevance of these findings.
The few reports available, their currently sketchy
detail, and their limited controls make it difficult to arrive at a
firm generalization concerning the effects of deprivation and isolation
on cognitive skills. Some tentative agreements among the studies may be
worth highlighting. It appears that the skill most severely impaired
under these conditions is that of general reasoning and problem
solving, whether the situation involves verbal-conceptual materials or
numbers. On the other hand, in several studies performance on simple
recall tasks or rote learning seems either to improve or else does not
decline. Tasks that involve analysis and synthesis of visual materials
such as block design show equivocal results; in some studies there is
deterioration, in others no change is seen. Some of these equivocal
results may be a function of differences in procedure or duration of
deprivation and confinement. The sequence in which postisolation tests
are administered may be a relevant variable here since the duration of
the effects, if any, is as yet unknown.
The conceptual analysis of cognitive skills into
categories such as reasoning, memory, arithmetic, and manipulation
would serve a very useful purpose in these studies. Goldberger and Holt
(32) offer a tentative generalization which begins to specify some of
the different factors involved in various tasks. They point out that,
"Probably any task that can be done satisfactorily in a single brief
effort by the use of highly overlearned sets of operations (as in
simple arithmetic problems), and any learning or memory performance
requiring passive receptivity (cf., digit span, rote learning) rather
than reflection and manipulation of ideas (cf., logical reasoning)
would be least interfered with by moderate amounts of isolation." (32,
page 109.) This formulation appears to account for some of the reported
results, but the criteria employed to classify cognitive tasks need
further specification and expansion. For example, are there differences
in the types of memory or recall involved in digit span as opposed to
remote memory? Although the available results are certainly
inconclusive, the Gold-
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berger and Holt generalization
suggests that remote recall would be relatively unimpaired by
isolation. This would have implications for one interested in the
interrogation problem where, leaving motivational issues aside, it
would seem that the information a person might recall when cooperating
would be reliable. Furthermore the data suggest a decreased interest in
and ability to reason through the complexities of the
interrogator-prisoner relationship and thus a decreased ability to cope
rationally and effectively with the situation at hand.
Despite the more tenuous nature of the findings in the
area of cognitive skills, to the extent to which a generalization is
possible, it seems that in addition to the decline in internal norms or
standards for perceiving reality, under conditions of deprivation and
isolation there is a lessened ability to reason closely and solve
complex problems. Should such a generalization be supported by
subsequent findings, a relevant question remains about the extent of
such impairment in quantitative terms.
An issue related to that of cognitive functioning in
isolation and deprivation is that of suggestibility. The reported
success of isolated confinement in modifying beliefs and convictions
initially directed interest to the question of suggestibility. Despite
this concern, systematic data on this problem remain surprisingly
sparse.
Heron (39) cited the work of Bexton (7) pertinent to
this issue. After twenty hours of perceptual deprivation, twenty-four
subjects were exposed to a recorded propaganda message consisting of a
ninetyminute talk read in a boring monotone and arguing for belief in
various psychical phenomena. To measure attitude change, a series of
attitude scales of the Bogardus type were administered before and after
confinement. A control group of twenty-seven subjects received both
scales before and after a similar interval. Both groups, experimental
and control, showed a significant change in attitude after listening to
the records. The change, however, was significantly greater for the
experimental subjects. Similarly, measures of interest in the topic and
assessments of its importance showed a greater increase for the
subjects exposed to perceptual deprivation. Although follow-up data
were not systematically obtained, incidental evidence indicated that
for some subjects at least, these effects persisted for as long as
three to four days. Vernon and Hoffman (76) tested subjects for degree
of body sway suggestibility following varying periods of
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sensory deprivation. These authors remark cryptically that attempts to measure this phenomenon "proved unsuccessful."
The question of suggestibility has also been approached
from a different vantage point. Rather than estimate the effects of
isolation upon suggestibility, others have sought to establish a
relationship between suggestibility as a personality attribute and
response to deprivation. Petrie 1
measured body sway suggestibility in a group of nine subjects who had
been exposed to the conditions of confinement and perceptual
deprivation described by Wexler et al. (80). Her observations revealed
a trend toward a negative relationship between amount of body sway and
length of time voluntarily spent in deprivation.
Camberari (16) studied the response to sensory deprivation of twenty
male unpaid volunteer psychology graduate students evenly divided into
suggestible and nonsuggestible groups. This division was based on the
composite scores of these subjects on several tests of suggestibility.
Isolation and sensory deprivation were brought about by suspending
subjects nude in a tank of water by means of a harness. His over-all
findings appear to contradict that of Petrie in that the suggestible
group remained in the situation significantly longer (183 minutes) than
the nonsuggestible group (111 minutes). Upon closer examination,
however, one finds that one of the ten measures in the battery was body
sway suggestibility and that for this particular measure there was a
negative relationship with length of stay similar to Petrie's.
The Camberari data pose the difficulty of interpreting the notion of
suggestibility. The meaning of the term is difficult to assess
independent of the operations defining it and the experimental
consequences. As such it has limited utility for assessing the effects
of deprivation and isolation upon the readiness to modify one's own
conviction or belief in favor of those coming from an external
authority figure. Once again, leaving aside the complex motivational
issues which limit generalization of laboratory studies to real life
situations, we are left with the Heron findings that following
isolation and confinement, beliefs around a topic such as psychical
phenomena change significantly. This observation is also consistent
with the hypothesis of a decline in internal perceptual norms and in
ability to reason efficiently. It would seem likely that changing the
emotional relationship between the authority and the subject would
introduce another complex variable which cannot be assessed without
data. The tendency to modification of belief in experimental
circumstances is
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quite consistent with the reports of
the response of prisoners. It should be kept in mind that in the latter
situation additional elements of uncertainty, stress, and coercion were
brought to bear in inducing these changes (10, 42).
The relationship of personality attributes to tolerance
for isolation is one which has significant implications for issues as
diverse as personnel selection and personality theory. That the study
of response to this situation might be relevant to the study of
personality was pointed out: by Hochberg et al. (43).
Whether any relationships exist between personality factors, the mode in7 which the Ganzfeld
is perceived, and the course of color adaptation, is yet to be
investigated. However, the indeterminacy of the situation, the
individual differences in hallucinatory objects and the intense fear
and feelings of 'going blind' expressed by some of the subjects suggest
a possible method for investigation of personality structure. (page
155.)
We referred previously to the
work of Camberari (16). In addition to finding differences between
suggestible and nonsuggestible subjects in tolerance for sensory
deprivation, he observed a number of related personality attributes
that seemed to differentiate the two groups. The suggestible subjects
appeared to be more productive and more tolerant of regressive
behavior, including delusions, hallucinations, and fantasies. The
nonsuggesiible subjects, on the other hand, tended to be more
threatened by disturbances in body schema, defensive about their
intellectual control, and more aware of external factors which
reinforce reality.
Wexler et al. (80) studied seventeen paid male
volunteer subjects exposed to confinement and perceptual deprivation in
a polio respirator up to thirty-six hours. They used a series of
personality measures including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory and the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. None of the
MMPI scales was related to duration of stay in isolation. For the
Edwards test these authors reported a significant negative relationship
between need Exhibitionism and length of stay in isolation, as well as
near significant positive relationships between the latter variable and
need Affiliation, need Succorance, and need Nurturance. They
interpreted these findings to mean that subjects with greater tolerance
for deprivation relate themselves more genuinely to people and seek
more contact and emotional exchange with others. In a second experiment
(47), with eleven subjects, under more severe conditions of isolation,
these
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investigators failed to confirm the
original findings, observing instead a near significant positive
relationship between need Autonomy and length of stay in deprivation.
Unlike Wexler and his associates, S. Cohen et al. (18),
who studied four volunteer subjects seated in an anechoic chamber for
four hours, found that the two subjects described as "schizoid
personalities" on the basis of clinical interviews and psychological
tests were comfortable in isolation and were willing to prolong it,
whereas the two "fairly well integrated" subjects, who described the
experience as unpleasant, were anxious, and felt that they could not
tolerate the isolation much longer.
In studying ten subjects consisting of normal,
neurotic, schizophrenic, and sociopathic individuals for response to
one hour of isolation, B. Cohen et al. (17) reported that normal and
neurotic subjects exhibited an increased sensitivity to the residual
stimuli in the chamber. The schizophrenic subjects showed no
appreciable increase or decrease in their hallucinatory behavior and
had a generally positive reaction to the situation, devoid of the
anxiety typically exhibited by normal subjects.
A more recent study of the response of schizophrenics
to sensory deprivation was performed by Harris (35). Utilizing a
procedure similar to that of the McGill group, he placed twelve
subjects in isolation for periods up to two hours. He reports that the
patients generally tolerated the procedure well. For the most part,
hallucinations became less intense and less vivid. Over-all
symptomatology either improved or showed no change. These findings
appear to be consistent with those of the two earlier studies cited
previously.
Working in a different theoretical context, Petrie,
Collins, and Solomon (60) attempted to relate pain tolerance, cortical
satiation, and perceptual deprivation. Using kinesthetic figural
aftereffects, measures of pain threshold, and tolerance for isolation
in the polio respirator, their findings tend to support the hypothesis
that susceptibility to satiation is associated with tolerance for pain
and intolerance for perceptual deprivation. Here satiation is seen as a
key factor mediating the perceived intensity of stimulation; the higher
the satiability the less intense are succeeding sensations.
Still another approach was taken by Goldberger and Holt
(33) in their experiment. They emphasized psychoanalytic concepts, such
as resistance to regression and modes of handling primary process
material. Fourteen subjects were rated for the maturity with which they
handled primary process as manifested in Rorschach test responses.
Their verbal behavior during eight hours of isolation and
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postisolation interview was then
assessed by a scheme of content analysis which stressed modes of
dealing with primary process material.
Two relatively independent reaction patterns to
isolation were identified. In the first of these, subjects engaged in a
variety of behaviors within the limits set by the situation and
instructions. They talked freely, experienced pleasurable affect,
little unpleasant affect, thought rationally, and engaged in daydreams,
fantasy, and playful thinking without being threatened by the
situation. In the second reaction pattern, there was unpleasant affect,
anxiety-laden intrusions of the primary process, preoccupation with
terminating the experiment, and impaired efficiency in rational or
secondary process thinking. They found these two reaction patterns to
be significantly correlated in the expected direction with the
Rorschach measure of maturity of handling primary process materials.
Those who on the Rorschach handled primary process in a mature and
effective way were those who reacted in an adaptive way to isolation.
Conversely, those who on the Rorschach handled primary process with
poor control or avoided it reacted negatively to isolation. This
finding is consistent with several others which point to the
exaggeration of usual personality defenses under the stress of
isolation (18, 56, 65). From this point of view it should be possible,
at least theoretically, to predict the dimensions of an individual's
response to deprivation and isolation.
An overview of these data emphasizes the truism of
marked individuality of response. Whether differences observed among
various studies is a systematic function of varying experimental
conditions is as yet unclear. Whereas the findings of Wexler et al.
(80) and Goldberger and Holt (33) indicate a positive relationship
between emotional relatedness and length of stay in isolation, several
others have made a different observation. The findings on
suggestibility as a personality attribute and those on the relationship
to satiation and pain thresholds remain conceptually unrelated to the
other work. The Goldberger and Holt demonstration of relationships
between preisolation personality attributes and the content of response
to isolation is a carefully executed study which has a clear
theoretical orientation and makes complex but reliable assessments of
verbal and other behavior. Other studies have tended toward utilization
of too simplified an index of response such as length of stay which
fails to take into account complex behavior during the isolation
situation. It may well be that personality variables and their
interrelationships are insufficiently reflected in such a simple
measure of tolerance for isolation.
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In addition it would
seem desirable that workers in this area offer a conceptual framework
within which to view personality response. Thus specification of terms
such as "schizoid" and "withdrawn" may have more meaning, permit
replication of procedures, and evaluation of results. Although some of
this difficulty in the present studies stems from their preliminary
nature, there appears to be some insensitivity to the need for both
conceptual and operational specification of measurement and assessment
techniques. Progress with the problem of personnel selection and
utilization for a variety of tasks, as well as theoretical
clarification, awaits such refinement in research programs.
Changes in subjective feeling in response to reduced
environmental input has been a common observation in these studies.
These observations range over many different experimental conditions,
from the uniform visual stimulation presented by W. Cohen (19) in which
the pattern of input to one modality is reduced, to sensory deprivation
in the water tank suspension procedure used by Lilly (50) and Cambareri
(16), where the effort is made at a total reduction of sensory input.
We have already mentioned the breakdown in the subjects' ability to
concentrate, think clearly, and solve mental problems. Bexton et al.
(8) emphasized the progressive increase in irritability during
confinement, followed on release by a sense of being dazed and
confused. They also noted the presence of headaches, fatigue, and mild
nausea, persisting in some cases for twenty-four hours after
confinement.
Lilly (50) whose subjects both had a number of trial
exposures to the situation in order to get used to it found in the
actual situation early feelings of relaxation and enjoyment, followed
by tension, restlessness, and an extremely heightened awareness of
residual stimulation. This course continued into fantasy and reverie,
and finally into the projection of visual imagery. Following the
isolation experience, subjects reported a sense of refreshment as
though having just awakened from sleep. Camberari (16), on the other
hand, utilizing a similar procedure without preliminary exposures,
found no such progressive stages, and subjects came out of the
immersion feeling fatigued rather than rested. Suggestible subjects
felt secure during most of their stay in the tank, although there were
some reports of apprehension, fear, and panic. The nonsuggestible
subjects generally tended to deny any affective or emotional
involvement.
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After prolonged
visual stimulation, W. Cohen (19) found that his subjects had feelings
of drowsiness, excessive yawning, and their voices took on a hesitant,
drawling quality. In a study of perceptual deprivation, Hebb, Heath,
and Stuart (38) reported that subjects who wore earplugs for three
consecutive days while going about their normal activities showed
slight to marked irritability, seclusiveness, and personality
disturbances not due to discomfort. One subject manifested poor speech
coordination while in the experimental conditions. Goldberger and Holt
(32) noted that despite the individual differences in response, all of
their subjects found the experimental situation frustrating because of
lack of things to do, see, and hear, and the physical discomfort
attributed to motor restriction. Comparing sensory and perceptual
deprivation with sensory bombardment, Ormiston (59) found that the
former group reacted with unpleasant affect, whereas the latter group
experienced mixed affect of amusement and anxiety.
Davis et al. (21) required their ten subjects to
complete an adjective check list describing their feelings following
isolation. This was compared with the same check list completed under
control conditions. Significantly more somatic complaints, feelings of
physical inactivity, and mental clouding were checked following
isolation, whereas significantly less satisfaction, elation,
friendliness, and impulsivity were reported.
Several studies indicated a wide range of response
ranging from comfort and satisfaction, through sleep, to unpleasant
affect, anxiety, and paranoid fear (19, 30, 65).
Goldberger and Holt (32) also reported marked
variations in postisolation feeling states. Seven subjects described
such reactions as feeling dazed, disorganized, groggy, dizzy, and
unstable; eight subjects indicated a state of fatigue; four subjects
described motivational changes such as losing interest in things; two
subjects showed virtually no disttirbance.
In part these responses may be interpreted as a
reaction to the novelty and threat of a strange and unfamiliar
situation. Undoubtedly these subjective states also reflect the earlier
discussed individuality of personality response to these experimental
settings. The general response to isolation seems to include boredom, a
general state of restlessness related to inactivity, and often anxiety
or fear of extreme proportions. Postisolation responses most often seem
to reflect fatigue, drowsiness, confusion, loss of time orientation,
and a need to reorient one's self to the familiar aspects of reality.
These subjective states appear to be consistent correlates of the
changes in
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perception, cognitive function, and
personality function previously described. These feeling states would
seem to make one quite vulnerable to new input from a controlled source
such as might appear in the prisoner-interrogator relationship. To the
extent to which an interrogator becomes associated with the reward of
anxiety reduction, providing human contact and directed activity, and
thus providing relief for the cumulative discomfort of isolation, he
assumes a benevolent role which may be one source of his influence.
[See Biderman (9) and Lifton (49).]
Lacking a more adequate descriptive term, we shall in
this section use the term "imagery" in dealing with a wide variety of
phenomena seen in studies of isolation and deprivation, including what
have been called hallucinations, delusions, illusions, fantasies,
daydreams, dreams, hypnagogic states, and the like. As pointed out
earlier, these phenomena constitute perhaps the most dramatic aspect of
this research, and indeed the promise of studying their genesis has
undoubtedly been most responsible for exciting the interest of
clinically oriented groups. Apart from the autobiographical accounts of
isolation, normal persons have rarely reported feelings of
depersonalization, breakdowns in body image, and hallucinatory
phenomena. Furthermore, the ability to produce such states
experimentally brings these concepts much closer to understanding by
permitting close observation and perhaps control. With this
introductory remark, let us turn to an examination of the pertinent
data.
We have already referred to the observation of Hochberg
et al. (43) about individual differences in hallucinatory objects.
Three subjects in one of his studies reported the appearance of such
hallucinatory objects during adaptation, and it was later difficult to
convince them that such shapes had not been included as part of the
experimental procedure. Bexton et al. (8) reported that these phenomena
were largely visual and ranged from simple geometrical forms and
patterns, to simple colors, to complexly integrated scenes which were
sometimes in color and three-dimensional. The latter often contained
dreamlike images. Subjects were able to exercise only minimal conscious
control over the content. The images often involved other senses
including auditory, kinesthetic, and somesthetic elements. There were
also reports of bodily strangeness and peculiar perceptions of body
image. Usually these experiences disappeared when the subject began a
complex task, such as mental arithmetic.
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Time of onset for
these phenomena varied from twenty minutes to seventy hours. In the
supplementary report (39) it is noted that subjects did not believe in
the reality of these experiences and that compared to normal imagery
greater vividness is the main difference. Often there was considerable
movement of the visual patterns, at times sufficiently disturbing to
cause subjects to experience nausea.
To test the notion that residual stimulation was
necessary for the production of these phenomena, these same
investigators placed opaque goggles on three subjects after several
days in isolation with translucent goggles. These subjects had been
'hallucinating' persistently. With this change, they observed an
initial increase in vividness, but in one subject this was soon
followed by a very marked diminution, and by the total disappearance of
these experiences in the other two. With restoration of translucent
goggles, the 'hallucinations' reappeared. Two other subjects, run from
the beginning with opaque goggles and then shifted to translucent ones,
showed an increase in the incidence and vividness of these visual
phenomena.
Under the conditions of isolation utilized in Vernon's
series of experiments, despite some differences in results, a similar
implication emerges (79). Two conditions of sensory deprivation were
compared. In one, nine subjects were blindfolded when they periodically
had to leave the cubicle. As a result of this procedure they were
exposed to a variety of visual stimulation from light leaks, etc. In a
second phase, conditions of deprivation were more extreme; the eleven
subjects did not leave the lightproof cubicle during their stay.
Contrasting the visual imagery reported under these two sets of
circumstances, the authors found that the less extreme condition
produced many more 'hallucinatory' phenomena. In addition there seemed
to be a positive relationship between length of confinement and number
of images. The content of the imagery tended toward simple flashes of
lights or geometric shapes, rather than meaningful, symbolic,
integrated scenes. These authors concluded that confinement permitting
the greatest amount of nonpatterned visual stimulation produces the
greatest., amount and variety of images. A similarly limited amount of
imagery is reported by Ruff et al. (65) who, using both volunteers and
nonvolunteer military personnel as subjects observed 'hallucinations'
in only two subjects out of more than sixty, run under a variety of
experimental conditions of isolation.
Mendelson and Foley (54) observed that a number of
polio patients treated in tank-type respirators developed psychoticlike
symptoms of disorientation, confusion, 'hallucinations,' and delusions.
Physiologi-
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cal, psychiatric, and behavioral
studies of these patients suggested that these symptoms were not a
function of toxic or metabolic factors, but were the result of
conditions of life in the respirator. In a follow-up report discussing
these phenomena, Mendelson, Solomon, and Lindemann (57) summarized the
elements present in these terms: denial of distressing reality;
wish-fulfillment in terms of reassuring, pleasurable life situations;
rehearsallike anticipation of dreaded possibilities. The authors
describe the 'hallucinations' as representing a restitutional attempt
on the part of the ego to predict and cope with anticipated stress.
Starting with these observations, Wexler et al. (80)
placed seventeen normal adult male volunteers in the tank-type
respirator up to thirty-six hours in the perceptual deprivation
procedure previously described. These investigators described the
incidence of a range of mental experiences in their subjects. These
experiences included the occurrence of 'analogies,' 'daydreams,'
'fantasies,' 'pseudosomatic delusions,' 'illusions,' and
'hallucinations.' These phenomena were not related to length of stay in
confinement. Under similar, but more severe, conditions of confinement
these investigators reported a comparable total incidence of these
phenomena, with a higher frequency of occurrence in the categories
reflecting more marked deviations from normal imagery (47). This
observation held true despite the fact that subjects remained in the
experimental situation for a much shorter period.
S. Cohen et al. (18) observed male and female volunteer
subjects seated in isolation for two hours in a dark acoustical chamber
with no orienting instructions, the only sound being a low hum from a
ventilator motor. In this exploratory study the period of deprivation
and isolation lasted two hours. Seven of the ten subjects reported
unusual visual phenomena ranging from flashing lights to moving
objects. The authors suggest classification of the experience on the
basis of criteria such as vividness, recognition of subjectivity of
experience, conscious control, and emotional accompaniments. Another
interesting aspect of this report is the description of changes in the
texture and consistency of the chamber walls and floor. Descriptions of
an actual metal wall included such adjectives as, "soft," "ruglike,"
and "spongy, velvetlike." The lack of orienting instructions in this
experiment introduces an element of anxiety which may be a factor in
the images reported.
Freedman et al. (30) found that several subjects
experienced changes in body image, spontaneous auditory and visual
illusions or 'hallucinations.' These latter were not subject to
conscious control
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and had qualities different from
dreams or daydreams. They appeared to originate outside the self, and
did not seem to be meaningfully related to anything.
Goldberger and Holt (32) also found that subjects in
eight hours of isolation reported the spontaneous occurrence of visual
and auditory imagery different from that perceived in the normal waking
state. These were usually recognized as internal in origin, although
several subjects perceived them as being external. These authors feel
that these phenomena are most like hypnagogic imagery. In addition they
found subjects with body image disturbance, depersonalization, and
dreams dealing with the experimental situation. In discussing these
data, they argue against the use of the term "hallucination" in that it
requires, in addition to an illusory image, a failure to recognize its
unreality. On the other hand, it is known that alcoholic patients in
delirium tremens, or patients under mescaline intoxication may often
recognize the unreality of their percepts and hallucinations. The
definition of terms here is complicated by confusion and inconsistency
in language usage. Goldberger and Holt suggest consideration of these
phenomena in terms of vividness, structure, persistence, realism, and
plausibility. From this standpoint they offer the generalization that
perceptual deprivation during the period of experimental confinement
tends to increase the vividness and structure of imagery without a
breakdown in reality testing.
In summary, there are now several studies which point
to the importance of some extraneous stimulation for the occurrence of
visual and auditory images and hallucinations (39, 65, 79). The role of
body movement as a factor in the causation of these phenomena has been
cited (30, 32, 65). Freedman et al. (30) attribute the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of imagery, at least in part, to differences in motility
and kinesthetic feedback. Although this factor is partially confouuded
with variations in visual input, they point out that in only two
procedures, those of Ruff et al. (65) and Vernon et al. (79), was there
free movement and these two report the lowest incidence of imagery.
Freedman et al. (30) emphasize the role of motor activity in the
general maintenance of spatial and cognitive orientation.
Direct quantitative comparisons of various studies in
this area will require agreement about the descriptive parameters of
the experiences here subsumed under the rubric of imagery. These
dimensions should make possible a more precise evaluation of different
experimental conditions for their relationship to the production of
these experiences. Similarly it would make possible the detailed
comparison of imagery in sensory and perceptual deprivation conditions
to
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that seen in hypnagogic states, mescal intoxication, and experimental response to flicker.
Another problem in the quantitative assessment of the
imagery phenomena lies in the fact that most of the data has been
obtained by retrospective report. This procedure raises difficulties in
the reliable assessment of vividness, frequency, or other suggested
dimensions of analysis. It may be that encouraging verbal report during
the procedure and making simultaneous recordings of other variables
such as physiological responses will make possible independent
assessment of these experiences.
Without such independent assessment it would be
premature to consider the imagery experienced in deprivation
experiments as necessarily indicative of pathology as a number of
reports have implied. Such experiences may indeed reflect creative
adaptations to a special environment. The evidence that artists,
mystics, and religious individuals may utilize isolation for
constructive syntheses of experience cannot be ignored. It would seem
that the response to the increased awareness of primary process
material may be more predictive of adaptation than would the fact of
the increase itself or its content. The imagery phenomena may turn out
to sustain some individuals confronted by real life situations of
isolation and deprivation. On the other hand, the anxiety engendered by
the rise of primary process material may serve to increase an
individual's susceptibility to external pressures as in the
interrogation situation. In general, a broader conceptual framework
than that provided by the model of psychopathology would seem to be
needed.
Apart from an intrinsic interest in the consequences of
reduced stimulation for physiological functioning, such data can also
be compared to concurrent verbal reports of the experience. One such
index of response thus far studied has been the electroencephalogram.
Attention has focused on this instrument in hopes of clarifying the
nature of cortical activity in sensory and perceptual deprivation. In
addition it has been used to make assessments of the sleep-wakefulness
cycle under these conditions.
Heron (39) described the results of periodic EEG
tracings on six experimental subjects. The results showed that slower
frequencies appear in the parieto-occipital tracings taken at sixteen
hours than those taken at the beginning of the isolation period; even
after subjects had emerged from isolation for some hours, the records
had not returned to their normal state. This finding was confirmed in a
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quantitative analysis of wave
frequencies within a given time interval. Furthermore, they found that
records obtained while a subject was 'hallucinating' showed greatly
reduced amplitude and appeared similar to those which might be obtained
from a subject in an alerted state. Though these investigators were
unable to make accurate determinations of sleep-wakefulness patterns,
it was their general impression that subjects slept more during the
early part of their stay in isolation and progressively less later in
the period of confinement.
Studying the EEG correlates of the "white-out"
phenomenon, W. Cohen (19) hypothesized that under conditions of uniform
visual stimulation, the "termination" of visual experience should be
accompanied by a return of alpha activity. Despite considerable
individual differences, he found that in occipital records, strong
alpha activity usually followed the onset of "white-out" with a latency
of one second. In general, the onset of alpha occurred when visual
experience spontaneously became less differentiated. The occurrence of
"white-out" seemed to be related to the amount of alpha shown. Thus
about half the subjects showed little alpha even when kept in the dark
without stimulation.
Vernon et al. (78) in their study of perceptual and
motor skills under conditions of twenty-four, forty-eight, and
seventy-two hours of sensory deprivation, found that despite the fact
that subjects ate well, there was a consistent loss of weight,
averaging two and one-half pounds. Measuring strength of grip with a
hand dynamometer, they observed gains for control and confined groups
except for the seventytwo-hour confined group which showed a slight
loss. A third measure was galvanic skin resistance taken before and
after isolation. The authors hypothesized a gain in skin resistance
because of the quiet and sleeplike conditions for the confined groups.
Instead they found that while control group values rose, a
statistically significant drop from preisolation conditions appeared in
the experimental group. There was, however, no report of control for
the humidity in the chamber.
Utilizing a continuous recording of skin resistance
throughout isolation on their four subjects, S. Cohen et al. (18) found
that resistance rose and remained high for the two subjects comfortable
in isolation. For the remaining two subjects, less comfortable with the
experience, this autonomic index remained low. Ruff et al. (65) cited
observations that confirm the foregoing, and point to skin resistance
measures as a useful reflection of arousal, which parallels overt
behavioral manifestations during isolation.
A similar analysis is provided in a detailed case study
of the psychological and physiological responses of two subjects
exposed to per-
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ceptual deprivation in the tank
respirator procedure (56). General relationships were observed between
patterns of EEG, heart rate, and epinephrine-norepinephrine excretions
on the one hand, and behavioral measures of activity, verbalization,
and emotional responses on the other.
A more detailed analysis of the catechol amine response
of ten subjects isolated in the tank respirator is provided in another
report by this group of investigators (55). Comparing preisolation,
isolation, and postisolation excretion levels, these authors found a
generalized increase in both measures followed by a decline after
removal from the respirator. They emphasized the wide variability of
response, and identified a number of individual patterns which are
masked by the group data. Their findings also showed that of the two
measures, epinephrine seemed to change more than norepinephrine in
response to this stress.
R. C. Davis (24) compared the physiological responses
of twenty-two subjects exposed to minimal stimulation with that of
twenty-eight subjects who received unpatterned stimulation at near
normal levels. The "reduced-stimulus" group lay on a cot in a dark
soundproofed room for about forty minutes, whereas the
"unpatterned-stimulus" group was given continuous moderate light and
sound after five minutes. He recorded circulatory and respiratory
variables and muscle potentials from three locations. Comparing the
changes in the two groups during isolation, the "reduced-stimulus"
group showed a significantly greater increase in muscular and
circulatory activity and a decrease in respiratory activity. The author
finds the responses of the "reduced-stimulus" group similar to those
seen in subjects anticipating a stimulus.
In general, the data on physiological response is
sparse, with much of it resting on case observations. Few of the
studies utilize precise measurement as well as adequate controls and
sample sizes. Nonetheless, a number of indices have by now shown
promise of providing useful information about response to sensory
deprivation. These include EEG, skin resistance,
epinephrine-norepinephrine excretion levels, and muscular, respiratory,
and circulatory activity. There has been frequent mention of movement
of gross musculature as related particularly to the phenomena discussed
in the section on imagery. [The Davis study (24) cited previously
measured muscular activity but not imagery.] Such determinations might
prove helpful in relating the role of kinesthetic stimulation to
behavior generally and to body image in particular. This latter
relationship has been a subject of much speculation.
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tolerated for as long as six days. In
the tank respirator procedure, despite the experimenters having set a
limit of thirty-six hours, subjects have tended to stay much shorter
times. Comparing two sets of conditions of deprivation using this
procedure, it was found that under less severe deprivation, subjects
stayed an average of 18.8 hours. With more extreme conditions, another
group averaged a significantly shorter 8.8 hours (47). Reducing social
isolation by allowing subjects to talk to a second subject in an
adjacent respirator has been shown to increase the length of stay
significantly (21).
Ruff et al. (65) reported on the importance of the
subjects' knowledge of the length of confinement. This knowledge added
structure to the experience and thus increased the capacity to
withstand the situation. They also reported that repeated exposures
have a similar effect in reducing the stress of the experimental
conditions; an observation also made by Lilly (50). Upon repetition,
the situation loses some of its novelty and the subject becomes better
able to assume an attitude of passive acceptance. They make the general
observation that when subjects are run to maximum tolerance, the
decision to leave is made when there is an impending or partial
breakdown of personality defenses.
The option of leaving at will, available to all
subjects in laboratory research on this problem, complicates
extrapolation of these findings to real life situations. Nevertheless,
the data on length of stay are useful, insofar as they permit some
assessment of the total impact of isolation and deprivation.
Another issue which some investigators have examined is
that of orientation in time. In general, these studies have shown a
wide range of response, from minimal to gross disorientation in time
judgment. Lilly (50) reported a subjective postisolation impression of
being out of step with time, as though the day had started all over
again following isolation. This was not confirmed by Camberari (16).
Wexler et al. (80) reported data for seventeen subjects which showed no
consistent pattern of either underestimation or overestimation of time.
Comparing these results to those obtained under more severe
deprivation, it was found that in the latter conditions average time
error was greater (47). This difference did not achieve statistical
significance and appears to have been, in part, an artifact of the
relative availability of time cues under the two conditions.
In a situation requiring the estimation of successive
thirty-minute intervals, S. Cohen et al. (18) found that the two
subjects comfortable in isolation underestimated the passage of time,
whereas the two disturbed by the experiment overestimated time in
isolation. Ruff
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et al. (65) cited the importance of
awareness of time as an orienting factor during deprivation which adds
structure to the experience. Their subjects showed a general tendency
to underestimate time. The loss of time awareness often seemed to make
the experiment intolerable.
Goldberger and Holt (32) also referred to this lack of
time orientation as an important source of frustration in isolation.
Time seemed to pass very slowly for their subjects. Despite this, their
judgments were surprisingly accurate, with a relatively small but
consistent underestimation. This finding suggested to the authors the
relative independence of experiencing time from the act of judging
time. Ruff et al. (65) have suggested that the underestimation of time
is a defensive maneuver where the subject avoids a premature
anticipation of his release from confinement. Thus he avoids the
frustration of having to remain in the situation at a time when he
might otherwise expect release.
The importance of time orientation in influencing
response to isolation and confinement is well documented. Burney (13)
describes the elaborate procedures he developed for telling time and of
his precise knowledge of dates during eighteen months of solitary
confinement. Anecdotal reports have cited very complex schemes worked
out by subjects to maintain their orientation in time. Just as
deprivation and isolation appear to disrupt general cognitive
orientations, so too this situation appears to have similar disruptive
effects on time perception. As such, resistance to the disintegrative
effects of deprivation and isolation might well emphasize the
importance of developing orienting anchors in the external environment
for both time and space.
Although the implication of most studies thus far
discussed has been that deprivation produces "stimulus-hunger," only
one study has made a direct attempt at its measurement. The boredom and
restlessness mentioned in the section on feeling states may refer to
the phenomenon. Lilly (50) has explicitly described "stimulus-hunger"
in the following terms.
. . . a
tension develops which can be called a "stimulus-action" hunger; hidden
methods of self-stimulation develop: twitching muscles, slow swimming
movements (which cause sensations as the water flows by the skin),
stroking one finger with another, etc. If one can inhibit such
maneuvers long enough, intense satisfaction is derived from later
self-stimulations. (50, page 6.)
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Bexton (7), using
the apparatus previously described, attempted to determine whether
perceptual deprivation would lead subjects to elect to listen to
materials they might otherwise consider uninteresting or tedious. These
subjects, college students, had an opportunity to listen to records of
five minutes' duration. These records contained the following types of
material: eight repetitions of the 16-bar chorus of "Home on the
Range"; two talks for children, taken from a religious primer; radio
commercials for soap; and part of a stock market report. Subjects were
divided into two groups of four each. One group heard the records
before isolation, whereas the second group was told nothing about it
until several hours after entering isolation. Once in the experimental
situation, subjects were told they could hear any of these materials,
whenever and as often as they liked. They found that the four subjects
exposed to the material before isolation universally disliked the
records and only asked to hear them a total of nine times. The other
group asked for the records fifty-three times, and reported that they
helped to relieve the boredom. In addition, it was found that the rate
of requests for the records was dramatically higher during the second
half of the confinement period. Previous exposure to the material
seemed to be the principal factor influencing the demand for
stimulation.
One major problem that subjects report in the
deprivation situation is the lack of things to see, hear, do, or think
about. This subjective complaint seems to have clear relevance to the
notion of curiosityexploratory drive studied in experimental work with
animals. The isolation conditions thus seem to increase receptivity to
otherwise dull, uninteresting material. Whether the same is true for
"ego-alien" material is not yet known. In the context of other
disruptions of the individual's functioning, this effect appears to
magnify the affective value of stimulation. Quantification of these
phenomena might provide a useful index for comparing the relative
severity of deprivation conditions.
We have already referred to the findings of Ruff et al.
(65) in highlighting the effects of time structure in increasing the
tolerance of subjects for deprivation. Such factors as provision of
tasks during isolation, specification of the length of deprivation, and
previous exposure to isolation result in making the experimental
conditions more tolerable to subjects. The comparison of two conditions
of confinement in the tank respirator has also pointed to the increase
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in stress and decreased length of
stay that accompanies an increase in isolation and reduced contact with
experimenters and environment (47). Additional papers discuss other
variables operating to influence response to isolation and deprivation
(18, 46). These include such factors as experimenter's expectations,
subject-experimenter relationship, and the physical setting of the
experiment.
Kandel, Myers, and Murphy (45) compared the effects of
two sets of instructions on the reporting of visual sensations in ten
minutes of darkness. They found that one group, who were told the
experiencing of such sensations was to be expected under these
conditions, reported significantly more visual sensations than did
another group, told that these sensations appeared in psychiatric
patients. Prior verbalization of "fantasy material" through exposure to
Rorschach cards did not increase the number of sensations reported when
compared with a group not given this test.
A number of other procedural issues require further
clarification. We have mentioned earlier that all of these studies have
employed volunteer subjects, generally paid volunteers, with the
exception of that of Ruff et al. (65). When, in one study (80), these
volunteers were questioned about their motivation for participating,
they offered, in addition to the money, reasons such as aiding science
and testing themselves. There is no such data available on possible
differential reactions of volunteers and nonvolunteers. Similarly, one
must leave open the possibility that solitude and perceptual
deprivation sought at the individual's own need or whim may have
different effects than when imposed by an experimenter who creates a
highly artificial situation so that he may systematically observe the
subject. Another issue related to the work of Kandel et al. (45) cited
above, is that of the experimenter's purpose in the research.
Instructions that stress endurance, or content of thinking, may produce
different responses than do those that state the experimenter's
interest to be in the problem of rest and relaxation.
These studies highlight the importance of procedural
variables and limit the direct comparison of studies utilizing
different procedures. They emphasize again the need for specification
of experimental purposes and for procedural choices consistent with
those purposes. In this connection the importance of evaluating the
total context and its implicit motivational and emotional consequences
needs to be clearly recognized.
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The application and relevance of these findings to
diverse areas of interest have proceeded along with the basic
exploration of these phenomena. One of the earliest interests in this
area was reported by Spitz in a series of articles (73, 74, 75) which
dealt with the deleterious developmental and behavioral effects of
institutionalization and separation from the mother upon infants. A
reading of these reports indicates that perceptual deprivation was a
prominent feature of the experience of these children.
A more direct application of isolation and deprivation
to clinical procedures has been attempted recently (1, 2, 3, 4). In
these procedures, patients with a variety of clinical diagnoses were
kept in a darkened hospital room, wore translucent goggles, and had
their arms in cardboard cylinders. These periods of isolation ranged
from two to six days. Although few of the cognitive changes described
earlier were observed, these investigators concluded that deprivation
led to a state of disorganization, and in some cases precipitated
psychotic reactions. On the other hand, some groups, particularly
depressives, seemed to show improvement in the form of increased
motivation, socialization, and assertiveness.
Phenomena akin to those reported in isolation and
deprivation have also been reported in aviators, especially in high
speed, high altitude flying. Citing clinical material on these flyers,
Bennett (6) compared their reactions to those seen in isolation
studies. Operating in a severely restricted environment with extremely
monotonous stimulation, aviators have reported feelings of isolation,
unreality, and dreamlike states. Evidence suggests that these feelings,
called by some the "breakoff phenomenon," occur at times in
approximately one-third of jet pilots.
Earlier reference was made to the response of prisoners
who in solitary confinement apparently experience similar reactions.
Meltzer (53) reported the occurrence of a range of effects in such
prisoners. These included, on the one hand, occasional tense pacing,
restlessness, tension, and assaultiveness. On the other hand, some
prisoners exhibit a regressed, dissociated, withdrawn, hypnoid, and
reverielike state. Hypochondriacal states of a transient type were also
seen.
Already mentioned is the work of Mendelson and Foley
(54) which showed the importance of isolation and deprivation in polio
patients. Two recent papers have appeared that stress the importance of
these findings in understanding a number of phenomena seen in medical
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practice (48, 81). These reports
stress the relevance of this work to the hallucinations of cataract
patients, and to the disturbances seen in patients with orthopedic
disorders who are suspended in traction.
Perceptual deprivation also has relevance to prolonged
and repetitive tasks in man-machine systems, such as long distance
driving, flying, assembly line production, continuous monitoring duty
at isolated stations, etc. The factor of the external environment and
its influence upon behavior is increasingly being recognized for its
role in a wide variety of practical situations. The findings discussed
in this chapter may account for such things as accidents, loss of
efficiency, and emotional alienation often observed in these situations.
Focused research on the responses of human subjects
exposed to reduced environmental stimulation has only recently begun.
The phenomenal growth of interest in this problem and some reasons for
this have been discussed. Many of the investigations referred to in
this paper are pilot studies; others leave much to be desired in rigor,
elegance, and methodological sophistication. At the same time, these
investigations now provide a rich source of new observations and
hypotheses, which touch on a wide variety of issues. The findings,
tentative though they are, have important implications.
The results of this work, of the research on curiosity
or exploratory drive, and of studies on early sensory deprivation
converge to provide a revised conception of human motivation. This
conception recognizes and emphasizes the "immediate drive value of
cognitive experience" as a necessary factor in a theory of motivation
(37).
From the viewpoint of theory this work has important
implications for several scientific disciplines. Methodologically it
makes available a technique for the relatively controlled study of
imagery and hallucinations, a problem thus far inaccessible to
experimental observation without the use of drugs. Practically, it
suggests a whole range of applications from management of medical
patients to highway design.
Theoretical accountings of how reduced environmental
input produces the various responses described in previous sections
have varied widely. Our purpose here will be simply to indicate the
range of explanations used and some of the terms of their analyses.
Rapaport (62) discusses these data from the viewpoint
of psychoanalytic theory, in the context of the relationship between id
and ego functioning. In a detailed discussion of these issues, he
states that
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in the absence of external
stimulation, the ego becomes unable to maintain its autonomy from the
id and the "effectiveness of these (ego) structures in controlling id
impulses may be impaired" (page 19). The reduced control of these
impulses may be manifested in the difficulty of thinking, in the
unpleasant affect, emotionality, and content of imagery previously
discussed. In this formulation, ego functioning is closely tied to
external stimulation. Ruff et al. (65) extend this notion to account
for individual differences by using the concept of sharpness of ego
boundaries. Orientation in time and space structure the situation and
may thus help the individual retain ego autonomy by keeping some ego
functions in operation. Since isolation destructures the id-ego
relationship, initial variations in the differentiation of ego
boundaries may account for the individual differences seen.
The increased awareness of primary process material
states in psychoanalytic terminology what others have described as the
heightened awareness of internal bodily states. The decline in
perceptual stability and reasoning and the increase in anxiety and
imagery seem to arise not only as a function of the increased
sensitivity to one's own thoughts, feelings, and ideas but also because
of the absence of an external reality against which to validate one's
inner experiences experientially or consensually. Although periodic
"regression in the service of the ego," to use Kris's phrase, can be
quite productive and creative, the sustained inability to go through
the validation process seems both to increase anxiety and the distance
from the social community. Burney's (13) reluctance to leave his
solitary confinement after eighteen months, which has been observed in
other autobiographical reports as well, may be one manifestation of
this process. At the same time, if one accepts Hebb's notion of the
"immediate drive value of cognitive experience" (37), the increased
receptivity to any cognitive experience as seen in the brainwashing
reports becomes more comprehensible.
A recent paper by Bruner (12) places the work on
deprivation in a functional context. Perception is seen as instrumental
behavior that permits the organism to manage its necessary transactions
with the environment. Successful management of these transactions
depends on acquiring an adequate internal model of the external world.
Early sensory deprivation interferes with the learning of a stable
model. Thus the organism becomes limited in acquiring a full range of
efficient problem-solving strategies. Deprivation in adult life
interferes with the perceptual-cognitive maintenance needs of the
organism. Thus, it disrupts the vital evaluation process by which one
monitors
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and corrects the models and
strategies used in dealing with the environment. Freedman et al. (30)
utilize a similar notion of "perceptual degradation" to account for
their findings. They attribute the observed phenomena to the organism's
continuous search for order and meaning in the unstructured perceptual
environment provided in their experimental setup.
From a neurophysiological point of view, Lindsley (51)
emphasizes the function of the reticular activating system because of
its role in attention, perception, and motivation. This system serves
the homeostatic function of adjusting input-output relationships.
Sensory deprivation is one of a class of conditions which upsets the
balance and thus disturbs the regulating function of the ascending
reticular activating system. With markedly reduced input, perception is
disrupted; attention gives way to distractibility; interest gives way
to boredom; and activity is either held in abeyance or becomes highly
stereotyped and nonadaptive. Heron (39) points out how sensory and
perceptual deprivation may be equivalent. He cites evidence to show
that the capacity of a stimulus to evoke and maintain arousal is lost
upon repeated exposure of the stimulus. Hebb (37) presents an excellent
theoretical discussion of the implications of the concept of arousal
and the manner in which these findings bear upon a variety of issues in
motivation theory, such as the generality or specificity of drive
states, the need for varied stimulation, and the intrinsically
rewarding quality of cognitive activity.
These findings are relevant to the problem of
interrogation. There are no experimental data available in the studies
reviewed bearing directly on the relationship of isolation and
deprivation to the amount and accuracy of information which can be
obtained when under interrogation. Nonetheless, the findings reported
suggest some major parameters which may facilitate or inhibit the
disorganizing effects of isolation.
Before considering further the implications of these
studies for the interrogation problem, it may be important to point out
some limitations. There has been some tendency to equate the effects of
sensory and perceptual deprivation studies with those reported under
conditions of solitary confinement. One possibly gratuitous assumption
in equating the two is that. the nonpatterned stimulation in these
studies simply accelerates the debilitating effects observed with
social isolation alone. Several studies (21, 30, 32) explicitly control
or account for the social isolation variable as contributing little to
the effects observed. Schachter (66) studied the reactions of five
students to social isolation without interference with ordinary sensory
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input. He concludes that for
isolation two to eight days seems to produce relatively little of the
painful effects seen in the autobiographical reports of sailors and
explorers. However, specific investigations of the social factors in
the sensory deprivation studies will be necessary in order to make a
more precise generalization.
We have earlier elaborated some aspects of the
differences in motivation between the experimental situations and the
real life conditions. Because of these differences, and of limited
data, caution in generalizing the relevance of these experimental
studies is necessary. Pending clarification of these issues, some
tentative implications may be suggested as relevant.
The loss of internal standards and the absence of
opportunity to validate one's ideas against an objective reality would
seem to apply in real life as well as in experimental circumstances.
The boredom, restlessness, irritability, and other mood changes
observed also may well apply. The stimulus-hunger and increased
suggestibility which have been observed may make an individual more
vulnerable to revealing information he might otherwise withhold,
particularly when accompanied by the social uncertainty induced in the
interrogation situation. Unprepared for these consequences of isolation
and deprivation, like many experimental subjects, an individual may
become apprehensive and indeed panicked by his reactions. The
appearance of hallucinatory-like phenomena and their emotional
accompaniments have often been quite anxiety provoking. On the other
hand, previous exposure to these circumstances, familiarity with their
consequences, and training individuals in techniques of dealing with
them may well increase resistance. Knowledge of the importance of
retaining spatial and time orientation, and self-stimulation in
concrete tasks, are two examples of techniques for reducing stress by
increasing psychological structure. Schachter (66) points out that
isolates who are able to keep occupied with distracting activities
appear to suffer less and be more prone to the state of apathy.
Schonbach (68), in an experimental study, has demonstrated that a state
of deprivation is far more bearable under conditions of irrelevant and
distractive thought than under conditions where thought is concerned
almost wholly with the source of deprivation.
Since direct research on the problem of resistance to
interrogation in a realistic setting is difficult, some reliance on the
type of study reviewed here is necessary. Further investigation of
these problems will undoubtedly continue to shed new light on
resistance to the disorganizing consequences of deprivation. However,
despite their often dramatic results, these studies have remained
within the limi-
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tations posed by ethical
considerations and have not pushed subjects to their ultimate limits.
Indeed, polio patients survive years in respirators without psychosis,
whereas prisoners, sailors, and explorers often successfully endure
long months of severe deprivation and monotony. Furthermore, the
autobiographical evidence, even if selfselected, implies that the long
term effects are reversible and in some instances leave the individual
with a sense of having achieved a new and better personality synthesis.
From this point of view, the findings reviewed must be considered as
suggestive, rather than spelling out in final terms the complete and
precise parameters of response.
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16. Camberari J. D. The effects of sensory isolation on suggestible and nonsuggestible psychology graduate students. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univer. of Utah, 1958.
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Cessation of visual experience under prolonged uniform visual
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The purpose of this chapter is to review available
scientific knowledge on the use of pharmacologic agents to influence
the communication of information which, for one reason or another, an
informant does not wish to reveal. This problem in communication is not
an unfamiliar one to the psychiatrist, who often aims to recover
unconscious conflicts or memories from the neurotic or psychotic
patient in the hope of producing therapeutic benefit. The purpose of
this chapter, however, is not so much to review our knowledge on how to
bring to a person's awareness, the feelings, impulses, and ideas of
which he is not consciously aware; rather, the object is to focus
particularly on the problem of getting data from a source of
information when the individual is aware of the information but does
not want to communicate it, either because the giving might incriminate
him or put into possible jeopardy an aggregate of people toward whom he
feels strong allegiance, identification, and belonging.
In the physician's customary role as a helping person
and as a healer, it is generally contrary to his method of operation to
employ any coercion, overt or subtle, to induce a patient to behave in
a way that may be detrimental to himself or to his social or national
group of origin. Coercion may be used, however, if the patient is
considered to be behaving in a manner that is destructive to himself
(e.g., a diabetic refusing to take insulin or an alcoholic refusing to
stop drinking) or to his social group. Furthermore, the code of ethics,
particularly of the psychiatrist, ordinarily binds the physician to keep
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confidential the secrets that his
patients impart to him, whether or not the patient has been aware or
unaware of their nature. In the practice of psychiatry, the code of
respecting and keeping the confidences of a patient is considered to be
a tool that facilitates the confession or expression of otherwise taboo
material from the patient. The psychiatrist's office is, ideally, one
place where the patient finds that he has immunity from punitive or
disapproving action by the society in which he lives, except for the
adverse criticism forthcoming from the patient's own internalized
standards of behavior.
Occasionally the psychiatrist's occupation brings him
into contact with patients with whom the psychiatrist himself is led
into a conflict between his interest in championing the welfare and
privileged communications of his individual patient and that of the
welfare of the group: family, city, state, nation. In such a quandary,
e.g., the question of what to do about a person who has confided his
participation in a major crime, the physician's obligation to the
individual and to the community may be in opposition to one another. In
this position the physician may be forced to disqualify himself as a
continuing confidant for the patient until the patient has remedied his
social obligation to the state.
Mentioning these situations and the customary attitude
of the medical profession has a bearing on the substance of this
report. The use of drugs in obtaining a confession from a criminal, or
in obtaining information that a source may consciously wish to keep
confidential for fear of repercussion to himself or his group, is
fraught with ethical conflicts for the physician. This explains in part
why there is a relative paucity of systematized published scientific
investigation by physiciaits on this matter. The general feeling in
western countries regarding the employment of chemical agents to "make
people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic
study of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. It has not,
however, precluded considerable speculation on the subject, some of it
rather unrealistic.
Much relevant scientific information has been published
on the therapeutic employment of drugs. The bulk of the medical
articles of the last few years on the effects of drugs on behavior
deals with the use and effects of these drugs on the mentally ill
population. In fact, a growing avalanche of articles of this type
sprang up with the advent of tranquilizing drugs. From this large body
of publications, the reviewer aims to extrapolate to the problems of
interrogation. Then, there is a notably smaller group of studies that
deals principally wiih explorations in methods of assessing the
psychopharma-
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cologic effects of drugs on
relatively normal individuals. From these studies, too, the reviewer
aims to transfer what has been learned to the problems of
interrogation. Finally, there are the relatively rare published
investigations on the use of drugs for purposes of interrogation in
police or security procedures; these are reviewed carefully because of
their direct relevance.
No published reports have come to the attention of this
author detailing the scientific application of drugs by intelligence
agencies of any nation as a means of obtaining information. Apparently,
what knowledge is available, whether derived from haphazard experience
or systematic study, is not accessible in open sources. This reviewer
found only two references touching on this topic. Rolin (112) casually
claims that the Nazis used mescaline to get information from prisoners
at Dachau. In discussing the methods of communist indoctrination of
Americans who have fallen into the hands of communists or
communist-controlled countries, Hinkle (62) has stated that the methods
of Russian interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old
police methods that have been systematized, and are not dependent on
drugs, hypnotism, or any other special procedure designed by
scientists. 1
Methodological Problems in Determining the Applicability of Drugs
to Interrogation Procedures: Nonspecific Effects of Drugs on Verbal
Behavior
One of the crucial questions arising in evaluating the use of a drug
for interrogation techniques is what responses are related to the
pharmacologic activity of the drug administered and what responses are
related to some other aspects of the transactions taking place when a
person receives medication from another person. A large variety of
nonpharmacologic factors can affect the responses of an individual
after getting a dose of medication (see also Masserman and Pechtel,
102). In fact, one of the major problems plaguing investigators of
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ps class="continued"ychopharmacologic relationships is how
to discriminate the factors that are responsible for observed effects,
how to single out factors so their sole effects can be observed, and
how to study summation and combined effects of different factors.A
series of nonpharmacologic factors within the total transaction of a
person giving another person a drug has been found to be more or less
capable of contributing to the responses occurring with administration
of the drug. These factors may be listed and what is known about each
will be taken up separately.
- Reactions due primarily to the "placebo phenomenon."
- Silent administration.
- Reactions to attitudes or motivations of the person administering the medication and interacting with the informant.
- Drug effects modified by the current state of the recipient organism.
There has been an increasing interest in the importance
and mechanism of action of the placebo (46, 67, 83, 135, 136). The
studies of Beecher and his group (7, 8) indicate that 30 to 50 per cent
of individuals are placebo reactors, that is, respond with symptomatic
relief to taking an inert substance. If one is interested in the
pharmacology of a new drug and tries it out on a group of patients, a
third to a half of this group will be relieved of their symptoms by a
placebo; they react favorably to the syringe, pills or capsule,
regardless of what it contains. Thus they dilute the significant data
derived from the half or two-thirds of the group that react only to the
active ingredient in the syringe or capsule. In studying a new
drug-whether one is interested in applying its pharniacologic effect
toward the alleviation of pain, amelioration of emotional distress, or
the facilitation of communication of covert information-the scientist
is not primarily interested in the subjective and behavioral effects of
syringes and pills. Thus the scientist is obliged to take into account
the placebo reactors, who must be screened out if one is to get an
accurate idea of what the drug itself does.
Of course, to relieve pain or facilitate communication
in a patient or prisoner, the "placebo phenomenon" can be made use of
itself and
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the investigator can expect that in
30 to 50 per cent of trials pain may be relieved or interrogation may
be facilitated.Some additional factors are known which increase the
likelihood of a placebo effect:
- A sympathetic woman investigator can obtain a higher
percentage of pain relief from various niedicatimis than can a colder,
more remote male (7).
- Individuals under increased stress are more likely to respond to
placebos (9).
- Greater responsiveness is associated with certain personality
characteristics according to Rorschach findings with placebo reactors
in a group of 162 postoperative patients: (a) more than one "insides"
response; (b) Sum C > M; (c) A% < 50%; (d) CF > FC; (e) more
than two “anxiety” responses; (f) less than two
“hostility” responses; (g) average F + % 51; (83).
- Clinical psychiatric findings in the same study regarding placebo
reactors found greater responsiveness characteristic of individuals
who are more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside
stimulation than on their own mental processes; persons who express
their needs more freely socially, who are talkers, and who drain off
anxiety by talking and relating to others. In contrast to the placebo
reactors, the nonreactors are clinically more rigid and more
emotionally controlled than average for their age and background. No
sex and I.Q. differences between placebo reactors and nonreactors were
found (83).
If one is interested in ascertaining whether a drug produces a
given effect to a degree greater than a placebo, it becomes obvious
that the effect produced by the drug must exceed the chance variations
of the placebo effect to a reliable extent. In experimental
investigations exploring the usefulness of drugs for various purposes,
the placebo and other nonspecific reactions to medicaments must be
separated from the effects specific to the active drug. Devising an
experimental study using infrahuman animals to assess the
pharmacologic effect of a drug only postpones the assessment of the
complicated responses likely to occur when the drug is given to a
human being. For the researcher interested in discriminating specific
from nonspecific effects of drugs, Beecher (7) has outlined a series
of principles and practices on the basis of seventeen drug studies in
which he has participated, as follows:
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The obverse of placebo administration, the deliberate
administration of an inert material, is silent administration, the
unknown administratiou of a pharmacologically potent substance.
The act of administering a medication usually
potentiates its effect since it invokes the status of a professional
person and the prestige of social institutions and organizations that
are a part of the setting. A general recognition of this fact has made
the control of the placebo effect a routine feature of all carefully
designed drug studies. Conversely, silent administration has received
little or no attention.
Not all psychoactive drugs are equally suited to
silent administration. A minimal requirement is the successful masking
of the drug by substances otherwise introduced into the body, such as
foods, liquids, smoke, or air. From this point of view the ideal drug
would be tasteless, odorless, and completely soluble.
Theoretically, the net effect of a silently
administered drug should be equal to its effect following routine
procedures minus its placebo effect. In practice this effect would be
modified by the state of the organism, the general setting in which the
subject finds himself, and his typical and persistent modes of
reacting, i.e., personality-constitutional factors. One may expect a
very different reaction from a subject who is sensitive to his
internal, subjective processes than from one who has learned to
disregard and reject them in favor of "objective" external cues.
Likewise, reactions will vary between subjects who yield to and expand
upon their internal experiences and those who
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strive to maintain a steady state by exercising deliberate control in the manner of negative feedback compensation.
For these reasons it is difficult to specify dosage
levels at which a subject is likely to become aware that he is
responding to a drug, since so much depends on personality and
situational factors and on the subject's previous experience with
drugs. In naive subjects moderate doses which noticeably modify their
behavior may escape their attention, or be ascribed to other sources,
such as fatigue, thirst, apprehension, dyspepsia, etc.
The judicious choice of a drug with minimal side
effects, its matching to the subject's personality, careful gauging of
dosage, and a sense of timing, makes silent administration a
hard-to-equal ally for the hypnotist intent on producing
self-fulfilling and inescapable suggestions. Surpassing "magic room"
procedures in their efficacy, the drug effects should prove even more
compelling to the subject since the perceived sensations originate
entirely within himself.
One of the major problems involved in the assessment
of drug effects is distinguishing the psychopharmacologic effect of a
drug from that consciously or unconsciously desired by the person
administering the drug. Another related problem of consequence is the
extent to which a drug effect, noted by one person using the drugs to
achieve his special aims, may be expected to occur in the hands of
another person using the same drug for an essentially different aim.
Although one assumption of this present report is that drug effects are
to some extent generalizable from one situation to another, the
limitations of such generalizing need to be clarified. The inference
exists that the reaction to a specific drug when used by a physician to
relieve the symptoms of a patient will produce a similar response when
used to extract covert information from a recalcitrant source. In every
instance, where such extrapolations are made from one such situation to
another, the reviewer does so merely because little or no germane
scientific reports are available in connection with the interrogation
situation. In every instance where such an extrapolation is made, it is
for heuristic purposes, and the generalized ideas and concepts require
careful testing and validation.
What is some of the evidence that attitudes and motivation of the giver of the drug may affect the observed responses?
A classical study by Hill et al. (61) illustrates how the behavioral
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effect of a drug may be influenced
by the incentives given for participating in a drug study. The subjects
were former narcotic addicts who volunteered for research. They were
accepted after thorough screening by a board of hospital psychiatrists
and other professional personnel, with a view to selecting only
subjects with histories of repeated relapses to narcotic addiction and
very unfavorable prognoses for future abstention from narcotic: drugs.
Simple visual-manual reaction times were measured: without
administration of drugs; 50 min after subcutaneous injection of
morphine; and 50 min after subcutaneous injection of 250 mg of
pentobarbital; each was measured under four incentive conditions,
defined in terms of the schedule of morphine rewards offered for
participation in the experiments. When a fixed reward was given a week
in advance of the tests, morphine accelerated and pentobarbital slowed
reaction times. When a fixed reward was scheduled for delivery after
completion of the tests, neither drug affected reaction times
significantly. When the amount of the posttest reward was made
contingent upon speed of performance, morphine exerted no significant
effect, but pentobarbital accelerated reaction times. When the same
group of subjects were retested one to three days later, with posttest
rewards again fixed for all subjects regardless of performance,
morphine slowed reaction times and pentobarbitat had no significant
effect. In other words, depending on the incentive conditions arranged
by the investigators, the same dose of either morphine or pentobarbital
exerted. either no effect or acted as a "stimulant" or as a
"depressant" on simple visual-manual reaction times. Nevertheless, the
action of either of these drugs was "specific" with respect to the
actions of the other; thus, the action of morphine changed from
"stimulant" to "depressant" when conditions changed from "low"
incentive (rewards fixed and delivered before testing) to "high"
incentive (rewards contingent on performance and scheduled for delivery
after testing); whereas the action of pentobarbital changed from
"depressant" to "stimulant" when identical changes in incentive were
made. Further analysis of the data of Hill et al. revealed that, in
comparison with the range of changes in mean reaction times produced by
varying the incentive level when no drug was administered, morphine
reduced but pentobarbital increased the sensitivity of the subject's
performance to changes in incentive level.
A study by Wolf and Ripley (137) illustrates further
that the effect produced by a drug depends not only on the particular
agent used, the dose and route of administration, but also on the
circumstances under which it is given or how its effect is measured.
(See also: Rinkel, 110, 111; Sargant, 116.) They observed the effects
of amo-
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barbital (0.1 to 0.5 gm
intravenously) on 700 patients with various complaints, including
hypertension and "tension headache." They found that after
administration of the drug, the patients were "at ease" if the setting
was "secure" and friendly, but the patients were tense and anxious with
equal facility if disturbing topics were introduced during interviews.
The effects of the amobarbital on headache and blood pressure varied
similarly with the nature of the interpersonal milieu. Another
illustration is the report of Beecher (7) that a higher percentage of
pain relief from various medications was obtained by a sympathetic
woman investigator than by a colder, more remote male.
It is now well known that many drugs when taken
internally may produce a transient excitant effect where the user
becomes euphoric, talkative, and sometimes emotionally responsive. For
example, it has been known through the ages that alcohol loosens the
tongue during an excitant phase and that a person with enough alcohol
may reveal things he would not ordinarily discuss. As is also well
known, however, people react differently under the influence of
alcohol. Some become depressed and morose. Some become excited and
volatile. Some talk freely and others shut up like a clam. As has been
previously pointed out, different people may have different reactions
to the same drug and similar reactions may occur to different drugs.
One cannot always predict what type of reaction may be obtained.
Various factors such as sex, intelligence, and mental
and physical condition can influence the speech patterns of an
individual. In order to assess the pharmacology of a drug, the predrug
differences in verbal communication must be taken into account.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that the pharmacologic effect of
a drug interacts with the status of the human organism receiving the
drug.
It is obvious and requires no documentation that
people with differing intelligence and educational level show large
qualitative differences on tests of intelligence. That they speak
differently under standardized conditions of eliciting the speech would
seem to follow, but this has not heretofore been investigated
systematically. It is also
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a common observation that the sexes
use language differently, if not in a formal, structural way, then in
the items of information that they choose to convey in their speech.
Gleser, Gottschalk, and John (54) have studied the relationship of
word-type usage to gender and intelligence as measured by the Wonderlic
test. They obtained five-minute speech samples of a group of ninety
occupationally adjusted, medically healthy individuals. These speech
samples were elicted by standardized instructions given by a male
investigator. The wordtypes were analyzed and scored according to two
systems of categories: a grammatical system and a "psychologic" system.
The "psychologic" system attempted to classify words according to the
emotive, cognitive, and perceptive processes conveyed, and the animate
and inanimate objects denoted, regardless of grammatical part of
speech. Under these experimental conditions, significant differences
were found to occur in the proportion of certain types of words used by
men as compared to women. These differences appeared principally among
the "psychologic" categories of words. For example, women tended to
refer to themselves more frequently than did men. Women expressed more
feeling and emotion, and used more negations. They used relatively
fewer words referring to place or spatial relations and to denoting
destructive action. Significant differences were also found to be
associated, step-wise, with level of intelligence. These differences
occurred principally among the grammatical categories. For example, the
more intelligent adult was found to use significantly more adjectives
and prepositions, but fewer adverbs, verbs, and interjections. A
multiple correlation of . 65 was obtained between these variables and
Wonderlic I.Q. scores. The differences between the sexes in word-type
usage tended to decrease at the highest level of intelligence. These
investigators have published tables of separate word-frequency norms
for males and females and for word categories that vary with
intelligence.
In summary, this study illustrates that gender and
intelligence influence speech patterns at the microscopic level of
word-types. In experimental studies for determining whether or not a
drug will facilitate interrogation, the fact that intelligence and
gender separately affect speech requires consideration. Suitable
controls need to be included in the research design.
There is considerable evidence to support the concept
that the mental and physical state of an individual can affect his
reaction to pharmacologic agents.
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Kornetsky and
Humphries (77, 78) have shown that there are reactors and nonreactors
to drugs and that the reactors are likely to be those who are more
depressed (on the D scale of the MMPI), to have more unreasonable
fears, and overreact to environmental stimuli (the Pt. scale of the
MAIPI). These investigators explored the effects of a placebo,
promazine, secobarbital, and meperidine hydrochloride on a series of
objective motor, intellectual, and perceptual activities, as well as on
subjective responses. The subjective responses were evaluated 30, 90,
150, and 210 min after the drug was taken. Promazine and secobarbital
had an adverse effect on the performance of motor tasks but not on
simple intellectual and perceptual tasks. Meperidine hydrochloride in
50 to 100-mg doses did not impair performance in any of these same
psychologic functions. The more deviant a subject was on four MMPI
scales (psychasthenia, depression, hypochondriasis, and hysteria) the
greater the effect of the drugs. Also, those who were most affected by
one drug were most affected by another. Finally, if large enough doses
of a drug were given, all subjects tended to respond in the same manner.
In a well-controlled study, Lasagna et al. (84)
concluded: "In addition to dose and route of administration, the nature
of the subject and the situation in which a drug is administered are
important determinants of drug effects." Using a double-blind
technique, these investigators administered, in randomized order, a
placebo (1 ml of physiological saline solution subcutaneously),
amphetamine (20 mg/ 70 kg body weight subcutaneously), heroin
hydrochloride (2 to 4 mg subcutaneously), morphine phosphate (8 to 15
mg subcutaneously), and sodium pentobarbital (50 and 100 mg
intravenously) to twenty healthy "normal" volunteers,' thirty patients
in a hospital for chronic diseases, and thirty former narcotic addicts
serving prison sentences in an institution devoted to the treatment of
narcotic addiction. At intervals, before and after administration of
the drugs, the subjects completed a questionnaire designed to measure
the "subjective" mood changes induced, and this was supplemented by
discussing with the subjects their responses to the drugs. In "normal"
and, to a lesser degree, in chronically ill patients, amphetamine
surpassed morphine, heroin, pentobarbital, and a placebo in producing
euphoria. In the narcotic addicts, however, morphine was reported to
produce a more pleasant effect than heroin, amphetamine, or a placebo.
Laverty (85) gave randomized injections of sodium
amytal and a placebo to forty subjects divided into four groups of ten
each: introverted neurotics, introverted normals, extroverted normals,
and extroverted neurotics, as assessed by scores on Guilford's R scale for
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extroversion. The sedation
threshold, as measured by the onset of slurred speech, was highest for
neurotic introverts and it decreased step-wise for each of the groups
in the order given. In other words, the group of introverted neurotics
required the largest amount of intravenous sodium amytal (6.4 mg/kg
body weight) before developing slurred speech.
Weinstein et al. in a series of studies (127, 128)
have explored the differential effects of intravenous sodium amytal on
subjects with preexisting organic brain disease and nonbrain-damaged
individuals with illness not involving the nervous system. Some of the
brain-damaged patients, who before receiving the drug had expressed
awareness of illness and who had good orientation for place and person,
with the drug became disoriented for place and grossly misidentified
the examiners and explicitly denied illness. Weinstein claims that
these changes with sodium amytal occurred only in the brain-damaged
individuals; whereas, in nonbrain-damaged individuals receiving sodium
amytal, the subjects talked of illness in terms of a third person, used
more "concrete" symbols, selectively misinterpreted questions about
illness, and misnamed the examiners in "paraphasic" fashion.
(Incidentally, Weinstein reports that with the types of patients he
studied, sodium amytal did not make them more communicative.) The
significance of Weinstein's investigations appears to be that the
person with brain-damage gets his sensorium more disorganized with
sodium amytal than a nonbrain-damaged individual; an instance,
apparently, of the effect of adding insult to injury.
Hoch, Cattell, and Pennes (64, 65) administered sodium
amytal, pervitin, and mescaline to each of sixteen patients suffering
from the pseudo neurotic form of schizophrenia, twenty-four patients
with an overt form of schizophrenia with slight. to moderate
deterioration, and nine schizophrenic patients with severe
deterioration. With these drugs, especially with mescaline, they found
typical physiologic changes occurring, mainly involving the vegetative
nervous system. However, with most patients, some aspects of the drug
experience seemed to be a direct continuation of previous personality
factors. For instance, a patient who showed obsessive compulsive
features before the drug experiment would tend to show the same
obsessive structure while intoxicated. The same was true about anxiety
attitudes, intellectualizations of conflicts, preoccupations with
artistic, philosophical, or other matters.
Although Beringer () in his drug studies, using
mescaline, did not find any correlation between personality and drug
reaction, Stockings (122) found that cyclothymic and schizothymic
individuals re-
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sponded differently. Bensheim (15)
thought that the cyclothymic group responded with euphoria and
depression to mescaline and the schizothymic group with ecstasy.
Lindemann and Malamud (94), experimenting with sodium amytal, cocaine,
hashish, and mescaline on the same patients, found that each drug has
its specific characteristics, but that the changes produced by a given
drug were molded by the patient's personality (see also, 92, 93).
Guttman and MacClay (59) and Sarwer-Foner (118) also found correlations
between personality and drug reactions. Rubin et al. (114) suggested
that the drug reaction be divided into two parts: those responses that
are characteristic of a drug regardless of the patient in whom they
occur, and those seen in a given patient regardless of the nature of
the drug used. The first could be called a collective reaction and the
second an individual reaction dependent on the individual's personality.
It is perhaps of interest here that Russian scientists
have also emphasized the differential response of different types of
individuals to drugs, specifically chlorpromazine (86).
It has been obvious to those who listen to and study
people with personality disorders that the verbal behavior of an
individual suffering from an emotional disorder is relatively peculiar,
both in form and in content. The depressed person is laconic. The manic
person is diffusely wordy. The hysteric and schizophrenic are quite
variable in the duration and length of their remarks. There are typical
thematic and structural characteristics of the speech habits of
patients with these types of psychiatric disorders. (See, for example,
Gottschalk et al., 56.)
At present, there are more gaps than facts in our
knowledge about the reactions of different personality types to the
same and different drugs. Years of intensive research are needed to
supply some of this unavailable knowledge.
However, it is already acknowledged that individuals
with features of hysterical, conversion, or dissociative reactions are
likely to be suggestible and to react strongly to all
psychopharmacologic agents, including placebos (83, 85).
Drugs may tend to reinforce the need to give for
individuals burdened with feelings of neurotic shame and guilt,
especially if such feelings are enhanced by the interrogator. Drugs may
also furnish the needed excuse and relief from personal responsibility
for sources who violate internalized values and loyalties in revealing
information.
The pharmacologic effect of the drug is probably of
less decisive influence in facilitating information-getting (although
acting as a catalyst) than is the potential readiness of individuals
with such per-
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sonality features to behave in a
typical way under certain circumstances. The consideration of drugs as
an aid to interrogation presupposes a thorough understanding of the
personality characteristics of the informant and of drugs, to predict
what might be expected by their use.
There is evidence that the physiologic condition of
the individual affects his behavior and responsivity to further
incoming stimuli. If so, this propensity is pertinent to our specific
interest regarding the use of drugs in affecting the verbal behavior of
informants.
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the
behavioral alterations that have been noted under various physiologic
conditions are mediated by biochemical changes per se, and to what
extent they are secondary psychophysiologic reactions to subtle changes
in body chemistry. The answer need not occupy us here, except to note
that a chemical alteration within the body is probably one important
feature of the varying responsivity of the individual. Under such
circumstances, the addition of other chemicals complicates the problem
of predicting the behavioral outcome. This is particularly true if the
new chemical introduced into the body is mild in its effects, or if it
is given in a small dosage.
Citation of every technical article bearing on this
point would be unnecessarily burdensome here. Instead, a number of key
investigations are reported to illustrate the point.
Biologic Rhythms. Benedek and
Rubenstein (12, 13) have studied the relationship of associative
material presented by women during psychoanalysis at various phases of
their menstrual cycle, as measured by vaginal smears. These two types
of data, verbal material and physiologic changes in the vaginal
mucosa, were collected and analyzed independently by the two
investigators, one a psychoanalyst and the other an
endocrinologist. After a long period of collecting such data, the
investigators related verbal productions to the phases of the
menstrual cycle. A high concordance between the two types of data
occurred. This has been validated in clinical studies to some
extent. However, because of the importance of the psychophysiologic
implications of this classical study, independent validation by other
investigators would be desirable. In brief, the investigators found
that during the estrogen phase of the menstrual cycle, the women were
more extroverted, had more fantasies, dreams, and subjective
experiences indicating strivings to be loved and impregnated and had
con-
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flicts about
such strivings. During the progesterone phase, the women were more
introverted, were more preoccupied with interests in their own body
and self. During the premenstrual phase of the cycle, there were
increased references to cleaning out, washing out, evacuating, losing
something, and the women were more depressed. Again in these studies,
individual variations occurred in relation to the varying hormonal
phases of the sexual cycle, depending on the woman's personality type
and the kinds of conflicts she had about procreation, childbirth,
mothering, etc.
Nutritional States. Studies of
the effects of the state of nutrition, especially vitamin deficiency,
on human behavior are replete in the medical literature and indicate
that neurological and psychiatric disorders may ensue with various
vitamin deficiencies, particularly of the B complex. The effects of
starvation, voluntary and enforced, in provoking increasing lassitude,
apathy, depression, preoccupation with food, flattening of affect, and
mood are sufficiently well known and are discussed in another chapter
of this study. The more subtle effects of satiation with food and the
brief deprivation of food typical of everyday rhythmical eating habits
on response patterns to psychologic tests and interviewing procedures
have received little careful study, even apart from problems of drug
effects.
Clinical psychiatric experience indicates that some
individuals become querulous, demanding, restless, even paranoid, and
experience hunger contractions if they have not eaten for one to two
hours, although they show no demonstrable pathologic, metabolic
processes. Other individuals may miss several meals, yet experience no
subjective reactions and show no signs of distinctly different
behavior. Gottschalk and Gleser (55) did a controlled study of the
effect of fasting for twelve hours on the speech patterns of six paid
physically healthy and occupationally adjusted volunteers, three males
and three females. MMPI's were obtained on all subjects. No
homogeneous effect of fasting states on thematic speech variables or
on the proportion of various categories of word-types was found under
these experimental conditions. In one subject, however, characteristic
and repetitive reactions occurred to the stress of the mild fasting,
reactions which were principally in the form of significantly
increased references to food, home, mainland, mother, and involving
attempts to bridge the distances between such objects. Hypoglycemic
states were induced by the injection of intravenous insulin in this
same subject and the effects of these states were noted. A repetitive,
but different, thematic reaction occurred to this experimentally
induced hypoglycemia as
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compared to voluntary fasting for twelve
hours. The investigators concluded that fasting for twelve hours was
not enough of a stress to produce consistent effects in the speech
patterns of five, out of six, paid volunteers. Susceptibility of
reacting to twelve hours of fasting was considered to be due to
individual personality features. These investigators did not feel that
this initial study gave them enough data to be able to predict
accurately which subjects might react and which might not react to
this stress.
Isolation and Fatigue. In unnatural
biologic states, such as in experimental or enforced isolation from
other humans or from ordinary levels of physical stimuli (19, 25, 60,
91) or in loss of sleep (124) emotional disturbances and transient
psychotic states have been reported. In states of sleep loss,
paradoxical reactions to drugs may occur. In this connection, Wendt
(129) is quoted as observing: "There are some interesting things about
secobarbital or any of these drugs when ased in individuals under
stress, e.g., after 40 hours of enforced wakefulness people become
irritable, anxious, apprehensive, and difficult to keep awake. A small
dose of secobarbital of 100 mg will wake them up and make them
volunteer to go through another night." To this reviewer's knowledge,
this phenomenon has not been reported elsewhere and it is important
enough to merit. further testing. Such paradoxical effects have been
noted clinically with other drugs, notably amphetamine which may have
a sedative and quieting effect on restless. anxious, irritable small
children with behavior problems presumably associated with psychomotor
or petit mal epilepsy (see Forster, 48) and which may reduce the
agitation of excited schizophrenics (21).
In this brief section, the reviewer, for the sake of
completeness, wants to emphasize that the scientist studying this
problem must realize that he will discover no more information than his
method of evaluation will provide, and that different methods of
sampling the verbal behavior of a subject under drugs may give somewhat
different information about the psychopharmacologic effect of the drug.
Each scientist will tend to use the measuring instrument most familiar
to him, and each instrument or technique will have different merits.
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The questionnaire
of subjective reactions and the directive interview will provide yes
and no answers and some qualified answers to structured concepts and
hypothesis of the investigator. These methods have the advantage of
relative speed and ease of evaluation.
The nondirective interview and the free-associative
technique can be applied in a systematic and quantitative way and
constitute a valuable means of studying the pharmacodynamics of drugs
(see also Kubie, 79 and Wikler, 132), but evaluation of the data is
generally slower and more complicated. Although some specific questions
in the mind of the investigator may remain unanswered (e.g., is the
material fantasy or fact?), these methods may provide considerable
information about the drug's effect on symbolic processes, effects, and
psychodynamic relationships. To approach definitive answers regarding
the potential action of drugs on human behavior, emotion, cognition,
and conation, our knowledge needs to be much more complete at the
physiologic, biochemical, and psychologic levels of organization. The
scientist would best look at his data in as many ways as possible and
use a variety of approaches in studying these phenomena (see also
Wikler, 131 ; Miller, 103).
Several investigators have employed drugs to facilitate the recovery of information not freely yielded by the individual.
In 1921, R. E. House, an obstetrician in Texas,
observed in deliveries in which the mother had been given scopolamine
that in a certain stage of anesthesia or sedation she might be
talkative and reveal things she would not ordinarily discuss. He noted
that after childbirth, the mother frequently forgot that she had
suffered pain, that she had complained of it, and that she had spoken
of personal matters. After the use of scopolamine, often with the
addition of chloroform, had proved to have certain advantages in the
obstetrical management of a woman delivering a baby, House persuaded
himself to extend the use of scopolamine beyond its original purpose to
the interrogation of criminal suspects. He gave many enthusiastic
demonstrations throughout the United States. As a result, newspapers
quickly applied the term "truth serum" to this sedative drug. House's
enthusiasm about scopolamine as an adjunct in obstetrics led him to
overenthusiastic statements about the value of the drug in
interrogation. In 1931, on the basis of two cases, he stated (69) that
a person under scopolamine could not lie and that the drug could
distinguish the innocent from the guilty. This statement is an example
of an
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investigator observing the drug action he wanted to see, but which was not observed in subsequent studies (82).
Since House's early experiments with scopolamine (69),
which led to the misnomer "truth serom," a great deal more has been
learned about drug action. During World War II an interviewing method
employing the administration of an intravenous barbiturate was used
with disturbed soldiers who were experiencing acute war neuroses in
order to allow them, transiently, to relive certain of their battle
experiences which were believed to have aroused persistent emotional
conflicts (58, 117). In psychotic patients, particularly catatonic
schizophrenics, who will not talk and therefore do not participate in
psychiatric therapy or reveal any clues to the mental experiences which
may underlie their disorder, sodium amytal has been used to facilitate
communication with the patient (117). If it works, there is a transient
phase that can sometimes be prolonged by injecting the drug slowly,
during which the patient will answer some questions and communicate
some of his life problems. If the patient passes through this stage
into a deeper stage of narcosis there may be a transient period of
talkativeness as he recovers from the sedation or anesthesia.
For certain personality types, some drugs lower
conscious ego control, thereby facilitating recall of repressed
material and increasing the difficulty of withholding available
information. The ideal drug for an interrogator would be one which not
only accomplishes this feat, but does so without interfering with
integrative capacities and intellectual functioning. Because of the
uncertainty of the truth or falsity of statements obtained under
circumstances of reduced ego control, and because certain drugs may
give rise to psychotic manifestations such as hallucinations,
illusions, delusions, or disorientation, the verbal material obtained
cannot always be considered valid. Such data is not accepted in a court
of justice and the information so obtained is not considered wholly
accurate by the medical profession.
What experimental data and critical reviews are
available which have examined the validity of such material from the
viewpoint of the interrogator's interest in factual Inforniation?
Jean Rolin (112) has written a book entitled Police Drugs
in which he inveighs strongly against the use of drugs for medico-legal
purposes. His argument is in part moral, but it is also based on the
grounds that there is uncertainty as to the truth of revelations
obtained by such means. He concludes that ". . . from a purely medical
standpoint, confessions obtained by drugging are valueless and do not
give grounds for determining responsibility."
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In the same book,
E. V. Saher's (115) chapter on narcoanalysis provides an extensive
review of the literature. In summarizing the viewpoint of the medical
profession on narcoanalysis, he says:
Narcoanalysis is not a sure method of
bringing out the truth and nothing but the truth. Any confession made
is not necessarily true; and if no confession is made this does not
necessarily prove that the patient has not committed the crime with
which he may be charged. Does this mean that narcoanalysis has no
importance at all from the angle of the administration of justice? The
answer to this question is again in the negative, because in many cases
the confession is true and often facts are brought out which are very
helpful to the public prosecutor in proving his case. It seems fair to
say that in the present stage of development narcoanalysis can be of
great help in finding the truth. But it is also a dangerous means of
investigation as the right interpretation of statements made depends
largely on the skill of the analyst. 2
The published experimental studies on the validity of confessions
obtained with drugs are few. Much further careful investigation is
needed to clarify the problems involved. This reviewer was able to
locate only four studies worth reporting here.
The first study is only of borderline relevance and involves the use
of intravenous barbiturates as an aid in the differential diagnosis
between conversion hysteria and malingering. The author (104) claimed
that the use of intravenous sodium amytal was found to be helpful in
detecting (and treating) individuals who were suspected of consciously
distorting and feigning disability. He found such individuals to be
negativistic, sullen, and nonproductive at first under amytal but prone
to reveal the fact of and causes for their malingering as the interview
proceeded. It was common in his experience to turn up a neurotic or
psychotic basis for the malingering. (See Chapter 7.)
The other three studies deserve more detailed review because of
their relative superiority, and thus rarity, as research studies in
this highly specialized and untouched area.
Redlich, Ravitz, and Dession (109) asked a total of nine university
students and professional persons to relate some true shame- or
guiltproducing life incident. Then the subjects were asked to invent a
"cover story" to be told to another examiner who interrogated them
after the intravenous injection of amobarbital, 0.25 to 1.0 gm. In six
of the subjects, the "cover story" was given during the amytal
interrogation, in one it was mixed with the true story, and in two the
true story was given. In nearly all subjects, the "cover story"
contained elements of the guilt involved in the true story. However,
except in
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the cases of those who confessed the
truth, the true story could not be inferred from the story told under
amobarbital. An additional finding of interest was that the more
normal, well-integrated individuais could lie better than the
guilt-ridden, neurotic subjects.
Gerson and Victoroff (53) used amytal interviews on
neuropsychiatric patients who had charges against them at Tilton
General Hospital, Fort Dix, New Jersey. The patients were told that
none of the material from the interviews would be used in the
prosecution of charges against them, since it was considered a breach
of medical ethics and because the material, derived with the full
knowledge and consert of the patient, could not have been presented in
court without violating the Twenty-fourth Article of War and the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution of the United States.
The researchers first gained the confidence of the
patients by discussing their life history. They were not informed that
amytal would be used until a few minutes before narcoanalysis was
undertaken. It was explained that the drug would make them sleepy and
encourage them to discuss things with the doctor that might enable him
to gain fuller understanding of the patients' personality and
motivations. Under these circumstances, the patients' attitude varied
from unquestioning compliance with the procedure to downright refusal
to submit to the injection. (One gram of drug in 10 cc of distilled
water was injected slowly in the median cubital vein.) Questions
relevant to the charges against the patient were not brought up until
later, the initial discussion involving relatively innocuous material
about the patient's personality and life history which had been
discussed previously. A follow-up, waking interview was carried out on
the day following narcoanalysis, during which the covert material
unearthed during the amytal interview was brought up, and possible
psychologic factors in the patient's criminal behavior were discussed.
During the follow-up interview, nine patients admitted the validity of
their confessions and eight repudiated their confessions. Gerson and
Victoroff examined the following factors interfering with the
completeness and authenticity of the confessions: (a) inept
questioning, (b) tendency of the patient to perseverate on unrelated
topics, (c) mumbled, thick, inaudible speech and paralogia, (d)
fantasies, (e) contradictory but apparently truthful evidence, and (f)
poor rapport between doctor and patient. These experimenters concluded
from their study that under sodium amytal subjects could sometimes lie
and that their reasoning powers were sometimes present, although much
distorted. Although they found amytal narcoanalysis successful for the
revelation of deception, they felt that the validity of the information
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garnered by this method was not so
decisive that it could be admissible in court without further
investigation and substantiation. They acknowledged that the doctor
could not tell when the patient's recollections turned into fantasy,
could not positively state whether he was simulating deep narcosis and
actually maintaining his lies, and could not, without social
investigation, determine which of contrary stories told under
narcoanalysis was true.
Clark and Beecher (30) tested the ability of twenty,
paid, volunteer male college students while under drugs to withhold
deliberately information during four to eight hours' sessions from a
male interviewer, who also administered the drugs intravenously.
Thiopental, atropine, amphetamine, methamphetamine, sodium amobarbital,
ethyl alcohol, scopolamine hydrobromide, pentobarbital sodium,
morphine, caffeine sodium benzoate, and mescaline sulfate were given
singly and in combination. The subjects were motivated by their desire
for monetary compensation, their perceived importance of the
experiment, and pride in their integrity and "will power." The
information which the subjects were asked to withhold consisted of (a)
two items of personal information (e.g., birthplace, mother's maiden
name, etc), (b) an "experimental secret" devised to resemble military
intelligence, and (c) a guilt-laden personal experience for which the
subject devised a "cover story." All of this information was reduced to
writing and deposited with a technician. To check possible forgetting,
the subject was asked to produce the withheld information at the end of
the experiment, and this was verified against the written version.
The drugs and combinations of drugs used
in these experiments were given in such large amounts that they
produced grossly abnormal states of mind. At various times, subjects
became semicomatose, mildly delirious, panicky, markedly loquacious,
euphoric or underwent transient dissociative reactions; yet, curiously,
at no time was there sufficient ego impairment that they were unable to
identify the significance of questions about the suppressed information
and avoid answering them in response to direct questioning. As long as
they remained in auditory contact with the interrogator, they
consistently refused to reveal the suppressed items.
The “experimental secret” was not given up by any of
the subjects. Similarly, none of them revealed the suppressed items of
amnestic data in response to specific questioning. However, on two
occasions the names of close relatives being used as suppressed
information were revealed, apparently as slips of the tongue, in the
course of spontaneous, dissociative rambling while severely intoxicated
with scopolamine and thiopental in combination.
The findings with the "cover story" technique were
essentially those of Redlich et al. Under thiopental narcosis, two
subjects produced significant variations in the cover story which
betrayed the content of the true story.
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These
individuals were of a more neurotic character pattern than the other
subjects, and their true stories centered on problems of unresolved
guilt. However, the remaining subjects, if they were able to talk at
all coherently, reproduced the cover stories with remarkable fidelity
to the original version.
In
evaluating the considerable ego-integrity maintained by these subjects,
it is important to consider that they may have felt relatively secure
in a protected experimental situation, in the hands of a responsible
experimenter and physician.
In summary, then, clinical experience and experimental
studies indicate that, although a person's resistance to communicating
consciously withheld information can be broken down with drugs, and
particularly sodium amytal, the interrogator can have no easy assurance
as to the accuracy and validity of the information he obtains (see also
MacDonald's discussion, 100, and that of Inbau and Reid, 71).
Furthermore, a lack of crucial information from a subject under a drug
does not mean that the subject has no information. An interrogator
would have to evaluate many other factors — the personality of the
subject, the milieu, other sources of evidence, etc. — to decide how to
interpret the outcome of an interview with a drugged informant.
After looking at these efforts to elicit information
with a variety of drugs, it may be well to consider each
psychopharmacologic agent in turn, for its possible applicability to
the interrogation situation.
The major share of studies on the use of drugs in
interviewing procedures involves the barbiturates: amobarbital,
secobarbital, and pentothal. These drugs have been found useful in
treating the acute war neuroses (58, 116, 117), and in civilian
practice (23, 32, 106). In psychiatric practice, the purpose of these
drugs is to effect a violent emotional response which may have
cathartic value for the patient. In the hands of some psychiatrists
(117), the emotional reliving enhanced by the drug is not considered
necessarily related to a real experience. In order to bring about a
high degree of excitement, Sargant (117) has recommended putting the
patient back into a past which has been modified by the therapist's
invention. In his drugged
-117-
state the patient accepts a false
version of the facts as if it were the truth, and experiences the
appropriate emotional response.
Sodium amytal has been found helpful in determining
whether or not a subject is feigning ignorance of the English language
(96). It is reported that familiarity with a language will show up
under the influence of intravenous barbiturates.
Kelley et al. (74) reported that more reliable
estimations of intelligence are frequently possible under amytal. They
also found that patients under sodium amytal injection gave a greater
number of Rorschach responses and fewer rejections of cards. This made
diagnoses possible in cases previously considered unreachable. The
responses were found to be qualitatively less bizarre and stereotyped,
permitting more nuances in personality descriptions.
Brickner (22) has recorded many interviews of patients
receiving deep narcosis therapy with barbiturates. The detailed
analyses of the verbal productions of these patients have indicated
certain typical peculiarities worthy of mention in this review. If they
are present, obtained information should be discounted as factual data,
although they certainly may reveal in an indirect way some of the gamut
of life experiences of the interviewee. Brickner noted the processes of
"fractionation" and "recombination" in the verbal productions of
patients under deep amytal narcosis. These processes were operative not
only at the level of words and word elements, prefixes and suffixes,
but also at the level of phrases and clauses, ideas and concepts. The
fractionation and recombination manifested itself in the juxtaposition
of word fragments, phrases, and concepts which are not ordinarily
brought together and in which the connection was often illogical.
Brickner believed that this drug process is a caricature of the waking
process of comparing new stimuli, percepts, and concepts with others,
new and old. He believes that this process of comparison has survival
value and is built into human neural structure.
Sodium amytal injections have not been useful in alleviating aphasic speech defects, secondary to cerebral insult (17, 108).
Although the detection and study of such phenomena are
of basic research interest to the investigator studying the neuro
physiologic correlates of psychologic processes, the decoding of such
verbal material by any interrogator seeking factual information is
likely to present a very difficult problem. It is probably such
phenomena which Gerson and Victoroff (53) observed in their interviews
of criminal suspects under barbiturates and which they found to be one
of the obstacles to assessing the validity of their informants' verbal
productions.
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In summarizing the
specific effects of barbiturates as facilitants in interviewing, the
references already presented and the work of others (32, 101) indicate
that, with some exceptions, the following effects on behavior may be
expected from the administration of barbiturates to human subjects: (a)
decreased attention to stimuli; (b) warmer and more appropriate mood;
(c) decreased anxiety; (d) increased contact and communication; (e)
reduction of psychotic manifestation.
An increasing variety of nonbarbiturate sedatives have
been compounded in recent years. Although they are in wide use, no
experimental studies have compared these drugs to the barbiturates as
adjuncts to interviewing individuals, either to relieve emotional
disturbances or to obtain consciously withheld information.
A list of the chemical and trade name of some of these
drugs may be worth including as an illustration of their variety and
for heuristic purposes: ethchlorvynol (placidyl), glutethimide
(doriden), methyprylon (noludar), methylparafynol (dormison),
captodramin (suvren), oxanamide (quiactin).
A drug that has been used to a fair extent in
pharmacologic therapy, but not, as far as is known, in interrogation
work is amphetamine (benzedrine) and a similar drug, methamphetamine.
Administered intravenously to nonpsychotic
individuals, researchers have found amphetamine to produce a "push": an
outpouring of ideas, emotions, memories, etc. (24, 31, 37, 39, 73, 90).
It is of diagnostic help with psychiatric cases by itself (24, 49, 90,
95, 121), or following an intravenous barbiturate (37, 39, 70, 113). It
is widely marketed and used in combination with a barbiturate as a mild
stimulant drug for patients having neuroses and neurotic character
problems.
Brussel et al. (24) claim that methamphetamine
hydrochloride is useful in the interrogation of the psychopath who
feigns amnesia or withholds vital information which he covers with lies
or cautiously alters as he shrewdly weighs his words. These authors
claim, perhaps extravagantly, that such a psychopath is powerless under
the influence of methamphetamine. Once the drug takes effect, they
hold, the tempo of productivity and the insurmountable urge to pour out
-119-
speech gives the liar no time to
think. They also claim that functional aphasics can be expected to
recover their speech under the influence of intravenous methamphetamine.
It should be noted again that amphetamine and its
derivatives are among the main drugs that have been employed in
well-designed and controlled studies, showing that the effects of drugs
are variable and influenced by personality differences (83, 84, 126).
Pipradrol (meratran) is another drug of the stimulant
type which increases not only psychological activity but motor activity
as well. In reaction to the "inner push" of ideas, emotions, and
speech, some normal subjects report mild euphoria, but others report
tension and displeasure. The occurrence of the predominant
pharmacologic effects of this drug depends to some extent on the
typical personality of the subject (57). Like amphetamine, pipradrol in
single, small doses improves the performance of normal subjects in
tracking tests (107). It has an advantage over amphetamine in having
fewer undesirable side effects, particularly on the cardiovascular
system.
This drug has been used in the treatment of patients
with "simple depressions" (3, 44, 120). Pharmacologic effects are
noticeable in mentally ill patients, but more than a transient
therapeutic effect has not been established. No studies are reported on
the use of this pharmacologic agent for psychotherapeutic or interview
purposes.
Phenidylate (ritalin) is another one of the newer
compounds having analeptic effects, such as producing arousal and
elevation of mood and increasing the rate of communication. In
psychiatric practice this drug has been reported to exert beneficial
effects on psychotic patients receiving reserpine (a rauwolfia
tranquilizer), which sometimes induces manifest depressive reactions in
patients as a side effect (45). But a double-blind, placebo-controlled
study has not found ritalin to be of any benefit in chronic
schizophrenia (29). The analeptic effects of this drug are well
established. The utility for interrogation purposes of the analeptic
properties of this drug, as compared to those of other stimulants, such
as amphetamine, cannot be evaluated from existing information.
Iproniazid is another antidepressive drug. Its
analeptic features were first noted in chronic debilitated tuberculous
patients who were
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receiving the drug as part of an
experimental chemotherapeutic regimen (35). It has been said to improve
the performance of normal individuals, enabling them to work more
energetically and more effectively, and to need less sleep. Iproniazid
has been used in the treatment of mental depression (97) with
encouraging results. Definitive well-controlled studies, however, have
been reported for neither normal subjects nor mentally ill patients.
Several instances of fatal toxic hepatitis have occurred when doses
over 150 mg a day were given. Nevertheless, the advent of drugs of such
a presumably powerful therapeutic effect in depression, owing either to
psychologic conflicts or secondary to chronic somatic illness, opens up
further areas of exploration of relevance to the present topic.
It has been common knowledge for centuries that many
drugs may modify the behavior of man to the extent of producing
psychotic behavior. Hoch et al. (66) have pointed out that acute and
chronic psychosis of the toxic type can be produced in susceptible
individuals by central nervous system depressants (barbiturates,
bromides); central nervous system stimulants (amphetamine, caffeine);
analgesics (acetylsalicylic acid, acetanilid); autonomic activators and
blockers (atropine, scopolaniine); local anesthetics (cocaine,
novacaine); antimalarials (quinine, atabrine); oxytocics (ergot
alkaloids); heavy metals (lead, mercury, arsenic); hormones (thyroid,
cortisone, ACTH); gases, including low and high oxygen concentration in
the inhaled air, and even water in toxic amounts. The interests of
psychiatrists in these phenomena have stemmed largely from the supposed
resemblance of these psychoses to schizophrenia, because of the
time-honored, though as yet unproven, hypotheses (11) that
schizophrenia is due to a "toxin." Since Wikler (131) has recently
reviewed the literature on this subject critically it will not be done
here. Two psychotomimetic drugs are discussed briefly here as examples,
from the viewpoint of their psychopharmacologic effects and their
possible pertinence to interrogation procedures.
Mention was made earlier of an alleged use of
mescaline against concentration camp inmates by German interrogators
(112, page 15).
Mescaline has also been studied as a potential
diagnostic and therapeutic adjunct with psychiatric patients. Cattell
(27) found mescaline to be a useful drug in investigating personality
structure,
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but of no value in the therapy of
psychiatric patients. He studied fiftynine patients, seventeen with
pseudo-neurotic schizophrenia (Group I), twenty-six with overt
schizophrenia but without deterioration (Group II), and sixteen
deteriorated schizophrenics (Group III). New psychodynamic material was
gained from the first two groups, but relatively little from the last
group. Cattell reasoned that the new material obtained in the mescaline
state had been condensed and repressed in the drug-free state.
Mescaline in general (63, 65, 66, 110) has been found to produce
perceptual distortions and hallucinations, accentuation of affective
experiences, and increased psychotic manifestations. In some patients
contact and communication were increased and in others decreased.
Denber and Merlis (40, 41) using 0.5 gm of mescaline in water
intravenously on both psychoneurotic and psychotic patients claimed
that mescaline induced the production of suppressed and repressed
sexual and aggressive conflicts, with a predominance of emotional
rather than ideational reactions.
Hoch (63) noted that mescaline in "normals" produced
more of an "organic reaction" with some schizophrenic features, as
compared to its effect in schizophrenics and latent schizophrenics
where mescaline produced more complete schizophrenic disorganization.
Hoch also emphasized that mescaline produced a falling off in
intellectual functioning.
These articles are typical of the reports on the
psychopharmacologic effects of mescaline. When interrogators
extrapolate clinical psychiatric observations of this kind to the
problems of interrogation, mescaline might serve their purposes in
attempting to create an atmosphere of fear or terror in the informant
and the illusion of magical overpowering omnipotence about himself.
After such a transient state has been created, the susceptible
informant might be induced subsequently to reveal information. The
perceptual and cognitive disturbances produced by the drug make it
unsuitable for obtaining undistorted information while the source is
under its influence. From the viewpoint of the informant, the creation
of a transient psychotic state by the ingestion of mescaline or
lysergic acid might offer him some temporary protection against being
successfully interrogated. An interrogator is not likely to consider an
individual in a psychotic state a suitable candidate for providing
reliable and useful information, at least until the drug effect wears
off.
Lysergic acid (d-lysergic acid diethylamide tartrate)
has been studied recently as a drug which might contribute additional
knowledge about
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the mechanisms and treatment of mental disease in general and schizophrenia in particular.
Busch and Johnson (26) gave 30 to 40 gamma of LSD-25
to twentyone chronic psychotic patients (mostly schizophrenics) and
later to some psyclioneurotic patients. They noted that the drug
transiently increased the mental activity of their patients 30 to 60
rain after ingestion. The effect was a transitory toxic state in which
repressed material came forth "sometimes with vivid realism" and
emotional expression. Busch and Johnson thought that LSD might be
useful as an adjuvant in psychotherapy.
Deshon et al. (42) studied the effect of the ingestion
of 1 gamma per kg body weight of LSD on fifteen normal volunteers.
Alterations were observed in thinking, speech, emotions, mood,
sensation, time perception, ideation, and neurologic signs. The
reaction lasted 12 to 16 hr in most cases, but several days in one
case. The reaction was typical of an exogenous toxic state, simulating
a schizophrenic reaction. The reaction was not specific and the extent
to which it was dependent on the basic personality was not determined.
Bercel et al. (16) studied the relation between the
type of LSD psychosis produced in normals and of the Rorschach Test
findings of the subjects. They could not predict the type of psychotic
reactions from the pre-LSD Rorschach, but they could often say from the
Rorschach records which normal subjects would show psychotic symptoms.
Abramson et al. (1, 2) found, after administering
large doses of LSD-25, that intellectual functioning, as measured by a
battery of tests, was disturbed in many spheres. In another study,
Levine et al. (89) showed that Rorschach Test scores were altered in
the direction of a more psychotic picture.
Davies and Davies (36) treated sixteen mental
defectives with LSD-25 in dosages of 20 to 400 gamma in water for as
many as twenty-six treatments in three months. Seven patients became
more talkative and cooperative. Their "memories were stimulated," but
emotional reactions were limited. No lasting benefits were observed. An
interesting, unexplained phenomenon was that only two out of the
sixteen cases had the expected bizarre hallucinatory experiences.
There are many other reports of experimental and
clinical studies employing LSD-25, but those reported here are fairly
representative. There is enough given here to suggest the possible
applications of LSD to interrogation techniques. It is apparent that
this drug impairs perceptual and intellectual functioning. The
conclusions reached on mescaline hold equally for the possible
applications of this drug to
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interrogation. As a tool in the
advancement of knowledge of psychopharmacology, LSD-25 is a drug on
which clinical and experimental research is likely to continue.
Recently a large number of new compounds with sedative
and anxiety-relieving properties have been introduced, sufficiently
different from the classical sedatives, such as paraldehyde, chloral
hydrate, barbiturates and bromides, to warrant using new terms to
describe them. These compounds are referred to as "tranquilizers" or
"ataraxics." They have been investigated clinically on an unprecedented
scale in the treatment of psychiatric disorders, particularly the
psychoses, and to a lesser extent in the psychoneuroses. The use of
these drugs has revolutionized psychiatric therapeutic procedures,
especially within the mental hospitals. A thorough review of their
effects and mechanism of action in mental illness would be out of place
here. Unfortunately, the usefulness of these tranquilizers in exploring
psychologic processes and in facilitating communication has not been
very extensively tested. Their applicability to interrogation
procedures is still speculative. Yet, for the sake of completeness, and
to indicate the directions further research might take, the psychologic
actions of these drugs deserve mention.
Among the phenothiazine derivatives now in medical use
are: chlorpromazine (thorazine), mepazine (pacatal), perhenazine
(trilafon), proclorperazine (compazine), promazine (sparine),
thiopropazate (dartal), and triflupromazine (vesprin). Of these,
chlorpromazine has been most widely used and investigated at this time.
Therefore, the psychopharmacologic actions of only this compound are
discussed here.
Chlorpromazine (thorazine)
. Delay and his associates (38) appear to have been the first to
explore chlorpromazine in the treatment of mental illness. They found
that the effects of chlorpromazine in patients with manic psychoses
were somnolence, decreased responses to external and internal stimuli,
pleasant indifference, and decreased spontaneity of speech. Subsequent
reports (5, 20, 28, 32, 75, 81, 87, 88, 134) have been in agreement
that chlorpromazine is effective in quieting or abolishing severe
agitation and psychomotor excitement, whether of manic-depressive,
schizophrenic, or toxic origin. Most of these reports agree that the
basic disorder in these conditions is not
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altered by the drug. In the
psychoneuroses, chlorpromazine was reported (52, 80) to decrease
anxiety and tension temporarily, but to have no specific ameliorative
effects on conversion symptoms, obsession, piaobia, depression, or
physical pain. A recent, controlled investigation (123) on the effect
of chlorpromazine on the communication processes of psychiatric
patients has indicated no specific facilitating effect. In normal
subjects, the effect of 10 mg of proclorperazine (a phenothiazine
derivative) was compared with that of 10 mg of phenobarbital. No
specific differences were found on tests of mental performance,
hearing, and pain perception, although a decrement in muscular
coordination and efficiency occurred under proclorperazine (14).
Other phenothiazine derivatives are being extensively
investigated at this time in psychiatric practice with the hope of
finding one with equal or better therapeutic effects and fewer of the
side effects of chlorpromazine, such as Parkinsonism, obstructive
jaundice, dermatitis, tachycardia, etc.
There are no reports of the use of the phenothiazine
derivatives in interrogation and no evidence to support the thesis that
these drugs might be of avail to an interrogator's work, except perhaps
with excited and agitated informants who might be encouraged to report
material in exchange for peace of mind. On the other hand, such drugs
might help a harried informant to keep his knowledge to himself
The principal rauwolfia alkaloids being used in
psychiatric practice are reserpine (serpasil), deserpidine (harmonyl),
and rescinnamine (moderil). Of these, reserpine has been most
thoroughly studied. Its actions are discussed here as representative of
the group.
Reserpine (serpasil).
Reserpine, believed to be the most active of the rauwolfia alkaloids,
was identified by Müller et al. (105), and its sedative and
antihypertensive effects were noted in animals by Bein (10). Initially
the drug was used in the United States for treating high blood pressure
(133). From such experiences it was noted that reserpine produced a
state of calmness without significant impairment of sensory acuity,
muscular coordination, and alertness. The effects of single doses of
reserpine (2.5 to 10.0 mg intramuscularly) were found (98) to be more
marked in patients exhibiting high levels of psychomotor activity,
regardless of the clinical psychiatric diagnosis. Repeated doses of
reserpine over long periods of time reduced or
-125-
abolished hyperactivity,
combativeness, destructiveness, insomnia, flight of ideas, etc., in the
majority of disturbed psychiatric patients, regardless of clinical
diagnosis (4, 6, 47, 51, 68, 76).
The tranquilizing action of reserpine and
chlorpromazine appears to be quite similar. This similarity extends to
some of the side effects, such as miosis, lowering of blood pressure
and body temperature, increase in appetite, nasal congestion, and
Parkinson syndrome. Although certain differences in side effects do
occur, they do not require our attention here.
The literature on the effectiveness of reserpine and
chlorpromazine as aids to individual (119) and group (34) psychotherapy
is extensive. Whereas there is agreement that the drugs lower anxiety
and tension, there are such notable differences of opinion about the
aims of psychotherapy and about what constitutes psychotherapy that no
definite statement can be made regarding this point. If the reviewer
were to add his voice to the disharmonious chorus of viewpoints on this
subject, he would, on the basis of impressionistic evaluations only,
say that the tranquilizers are of some aid in the psychotherapy of
those patients who are so agitated, anxious, and hyperactive that they
cannot sit still very long for psychotherapy. However, working out the
finer nuances of emotional conflicts of a patient in psychotherapy is
precluded when the patient is regularly taking a tranquilizer, because
the patient appears to become too insulated against emotional reactions
to realize or care that he is responding with feeling in some pertinent
way.
As with the phenothiazine derivatives, the place of
the rauwolfia alkaloids in the potential armamentarium of the
interrogation has not been established. There are no relevant articles
on this matter. Speculatively, the tranquilizers might be of avail in
selected informants who are highly agitated and disturbed, and who
might yield information in return for the relaxation they experience
with such a sedative. On the other hand, less emotionally disturbed
informants might strengthen their resolve to retain information under a
tranquilizer. The only way to decide this problem is by experiment.
Furthermore, tranquilizers in moderate dosage do not notably impair
intellectual and sensory functioning. Therefore, their use probably
does not contribute to the distortion of factual information produced.
The dependence of the drug addict on the supplier of
drugs has figured in speculations regarding the use of drugs to control
behavior.
-126-
Such speculations
assume that the need of an addict for a drug is so strong as to
override many other values, including strong social proscriptions when
these conflict with the satisfaction of drug-created needs.
The writer is unaware of any actual or alleged utilizations of drugs in this manner for the purposes of interrogation.
One of the cardinal criteria of addiction is the
occurrence of severe reactions when the drug is withdrawn. Withdrawal
syndromes occur with opiates, barbiturates, and, recently, an animal
study has made this claim for meprobamates (43). Beyond a minimal
dosage and time period, the continuous usage of these drugs produces
addiction in almost everyone (72). No demonstrable impairment of
cognitive or psychomotor functions has been identified in subjects
operating under the maintenance dosage to which they are habituated.
Under most of the opiates, the subject is likely to
show a keen awareness of a limited segment of reality, a decrease in
spontaneity and creativity, a decrease in suggestibility, and an
increase in rigidity and compartmentalization of thinking. As with
other drugs, the reaction varies widely from individual to individual
50, 131).
Information contributed by an addicted source is
naturally suspect, since many addicts have gone to great length,
fabrication of information being the least of them, to maintain their
drug supplies. If a source became addicted as a sequel to the treatment
of injuries, the ability of the interrogator to give or withhold the
drug would give him a powerful hold on the source. It appears unlikely
that this weapon is so unique as to lead an interrogator to create
addiction deliberately. An interrogator who would be willing to produce
addiction would not hesitate to employ more reliable and instantly
effective means for inducing results as unpleasant as withdrawal
symptoms. Since the initial reactions of most subjects to drugs of
addiction are unpleasant, these drugs would not appear to have a role
as positive motivators, except for subjects experiencing pain.
When the effects of a drug are not consonant with the
subject's wishes, the extent to which the subject can successfully
counteract these effects without the aid of other drugs becomes an
important problem. Inasmuch as this is an unusual condition, little or
no empirical information is available. Yet, it may be worthwhile to
indulge in some speculation.
-127-
If the subject
marshals his efforts to fight a drug, one may surmise that he has
become alarmed about its effects on him, and that this alarm most
likely is in the form of anxiety over losing control. Other instances
of this type of anxiety in neuroses, psychoses, and cerebral insult
have demonstrated that it feeds on itself. Specifically, the anxiety
increases in something like a geometric progression whenever the source
of concern is put to the test and adequate control is indeed found to
be wanting, with the mounting anxiety itself contributing to further
loss of control. Some persons more than others habitually use the
mechanism of control and might presumably attempt to do so in this
situation.
Small to moderate doses, although affecting the
subject, might not alarm him, since the drug effects may be within the
range of his ordinary experiences, and since none of the functions
which form the basis for his sense of control may have been seriously
impaired. Because it is difficult for most persons to succeed in their
efforts to relax, the main resultant of any effort presumably is
anxiety and arousal. If this is so, the effect of stimulants would be
intensified, whereas the effect of sedatives might be counterbalanced
to some extent. Here, the question of how massive a dosage of a
sedative the subject could counteract would need to be considered. The
phenothiazine tranquilizers might be expected to produce a sufficient
lack of concern in the subject to prevent his attempting to undo their
effect, or, more directly, preclude a state of arousal.
All these speculations deserve careful experimental study.
A distinction has been made between interviews carried
out for psychotherapy and those to obtain factual information. Although
there has been considerable speculation regarding the possible use of
drugs for the latter purposes, open publications of serious research
dealing directly with such cases are scant. The paucity of reported
studies on the matter has obliged the reviewer to include related
published material of psychopharmacologic studies. When extrapolations
are made from published material of this sort, they are presented as
hypotheses, and in every instance require testing and validation.
-128-
(placebos). Depending on the
personality of the subject and the circumstances under which the
placebo is administered, 30 to 50 per cent of individuals show or
experience a reaction. Well-designed studies can distinguish the
pharmacologic effect of a drug from the placebo effect. The possibility
is raised that an interrogator might exploit the "placebo phenomenon"
with a susceptible subject, instead of employing a pharmacologically
active drug.
An examination of the literature demonstrates that the
effects of drugs vary with the attitude and motivation of the person
administering the medication and the person interviewing the informant.
The sex and intelligence of the subject, the presence of mental or
physical illness, the occurrence of biologic rhythms (e.g., mensis),
state of nutrition (e.g., fasting or nonfasting), degree of fatigue,
and experimental or enforced isolation have been found to affect the
capacity to react and the reaction of individuals to testing
procedures, with or without drugs. The method of sampling the verbal
behavior of an individual under the influence of a drug, directive,
nondirective, free-associative, etc., also determines the kinds of
reactions observed. For these reasons, it is recommended that a variety
of sampling methods be used in experimental studies.
When one examines the literature for experimental and
clinical studies that bear directly on the use of drugs in
interrogation procedures, one finds relatively few studies. Reports
dealing with the validity of material extracted from reluctant
informants, whether criminal suspects or experimental subjects,
indicate that there is no "truth serum" which can force every informant
to report all the information he has. Experimental and clinical
evidence indicate that not only the inveterate criminal psychopath may
lie or distort under the influence of a drug, but the relatively normal
individual may, with many drugs, successfully disguise factual data.
Less well-adjusted individuals, plagued by guilt and depression, or
suggestible individuals, who are compliant and easily swayed, are more
likely to make slips revealing withheld information. Even they may, at
times, unconsciously distort information and present fantasies as
facts. The anesthetic action of the drug, as in narcosis with
barbiturates, can interfere with cerebral functioning and promote the
presentation of fantasy material as fact, or otherwise alter the form
of verbalizations to render them relatively unintelligible. It would be
very difficult under these circumstances for an interrogator to tell
when the verbal
-130-
content was turning from fact to
fantasy, when the informant was simulating deep narcosis but actually
falsifying, which of contrary stories told under narcosis was true, and
when a lack of crucial information coining from a subject under a drug
meant the informant had none to offer. To derive useful information
from an interrogation in which drugs are employed, an interrogator
would have to consider and weigh many important factors: the
personality of the subject, the milieu, other sources of evidence, the
rapport obtained, and the skill of the questioning. These and other
factors affect the validity of information obtained from an informant
under sedation. Analogous considerations apply to stimulants.
Advantages and limitations of a number of different
types of pharmacologic agents as adjuncts to interrogation can be
examined by reviewing clinical and experimental data from the works of
psychiatrists, neurologists, psychologists, physiologists, and
pharmacologists.
Barbiturates tend to increase contact and
communication, decrease attention, decrease anxiety, decrease psychotic
manifestations, and make the mood more appropriate and warmer. When
combined with interview techniques that aim at arousing emotions,
strong emotional reactions may be catalyzed for psychotherapeutic
purposes. Barbiturates have been found helpful in detecting whether an
individual is feigning knowledge of the English language and in getting
mute catatonic schizophrenics and hysterical aphasics to talk. They are
of no avail, however, in remedying the speech defects of true aphasics,
even transiently. The use of barbiturates has helped to get more
reliable estimates of intelligence and personality through
psychological tests, particularly in emotionally upset individuals.
The use of various stimulant and antidepressive drugs
has been explored, for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes in
psychiatric practice, but not to any extent for interrogation.
Amphetamine, pipradrol, methylphenidylacetate have in common the
capacity to produce an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories. An
injection of amphetamine following an intravenous barbiturate is said
to provoke a striking onrush of talking and activity from psychiatric
patients. Without adequately controlling his study, one author claims
that methamphetamine produces such a strong urge to talk that the
criminal who feigns amnesia or withholds vital information cannot
control himself and thus gives himself away. Iproniazid, an
antidepressive drug which is relatively slow and sometimes dramatic in
its thera-
-131-
peutic effect, should be considered
for experimentation. This drug, and similar, less toxic analogs which
are being developed, might be considered for use in special instances.
For example, informants suffering from chronic depression, whether due
primarily to emotional factors, situational stress, or physical
debilitation, might become very responsive after using a medication of
this type. As a class, the stimulants probably present the most obvious
exploitative potential for an interrogator.
The psychotomimetic and hallucinogenic drugs,
mescaline and LSD-25, have been used largely to study the nature of
psychotic conditions and, in a minor way, as an adjuvant in
psychotherapy. The use of such drugs by an interrogator would tend to
produce a state of anxiety or terror in most subjects, and promote
perceptual distortions and psychotic disorientation. Their use could
constitute a definite threat to most medically unsophisticated
subjects, i.e., the threat of making the subject "crazy." Thus, they
emphasize the unrestricted control of the source by the interrogator.
When the subject is not under the influence of such drugs, vital
information might be extracted as a price for ceasing further
medication. An enlightened informant would not have to feel threatened,
for the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal
individuals. The information given during the psychotic drug state
would be difficult to assess, for it may be unrealistic and bizarre. On
the other hand, from the informant's viewpoint, taking LSD-25, secreted
on his person (it is effective in minute dosage), might offer him
temporary protection against interrogation, for it is not likely that
an interrogator would consider an individual in a psychotic state a
reliable source.
The introduction of new drugs like tranquilizers that
sedate but do not impair intellectual functioning in moderate dosage
(e.g., phenothiazine derivatives and rauwolfia alkaloids) has caused a
minor revolution in the psychiatric therapies of agitated psychotic
conditions regardless of type or etiology. There is a possibility that
these tranquilizers might be of use with selected informants who are
highly agitated and disturbed, and who might give information they
prefer to withhold in return for the tranquility they experience with
such a sedative. Under the influence of this drug, the less emotionally
upset informant might find that he can better master his anxieties and
keep his resolve to remain silent. These are all speculations which
require testing and experimentation.
Addiction is an added vulnerability to influence. The
ability of the subject to give information is not notably affected by a
mainte-
-132-
nance dosage. The motivational
effects of obtaining drug supplies, while extreme, are not of a
different order for most subjects than those which the interrogator
could produce by other more rapid means. The exploitation of addiction
probably constitutes a threat to persons previously addicted, or to
those who become addicted in the captivity situation as a sequel to
other aspects of their treatment, rather than through the deliberate
creation of addiction for exploitative purposes.
Another use to which interrogators might put drugs and
placebos would involve their ability to absolve the subject of
responsibility for his acts. The popular meaning of being "drugged" or
"doped" implies that an individual in this state has lost control over
his actions and that society will not hold him responsible for them.
When the transmittal of information is likely to induce guilt in the
source, the interviewer can forestall some of this reaction by the
administration of a placebo or drug. In some cases, this will be all
that is require4l to remove the barrier to information transmittal. In
the avoidance-avoidance conflict between the source's guilt over
yielding information and his anxieties over the possible consequences
of noncooperation, the "inescapable" power of the drug or placebo
serves to justify the source's actions to himself.
What are the over-all conclusions that can be drawn
from this review and critical analysis of the use of pharmacologic
agents in obtaining information? Are pharmacologic agents of any value
to the interrogator in eliciting vital information? The answer is that
drugs can operate as positive catalysts to productive interrogation.
Combined with the many other stresses in captivity that an individual
may be obliged to undergo, drugs can add to the factors aimed at
weakening the resistance of the potential informant. However, for many
reasons, the use of drugs by an interrogator is not certain to produce
valid results. The effects of drugs depend to a large extent on the
personality make-up and physical status of the informant and the kind
of rapport that the interrogator is able to establish with him. Knowing
the pharmacologic actions of a number of drugs, an interrogating team
might choose that chemical agent which is most likely to be effective
in view of the informant's personality, physical status, and the
various stressful experiences he has already undergone. Even under the
most favorable circumstances, the information obtained could be
contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth, especially when
hallucinogenic or sedative drugs are employed.
Are there ways in which the informant can resist revealing vital information under interrogation with drugs? The answer is yes.
-133-
Means are
available to the informant faced with the prospect of being given a
drug to loosen his tongue. The informant should know that a drug of
itself cannot force him to tell the truth, although it may make him
talkative, overemotional, mentally confused, or sleepy. He should also
know that the effects of drugs are quite variable from individual to
individual, and that those who may use drugs against him cannot predict
with certainty what effects will occur in his particular case. To a
victim of such attempts the imperfect predictability of many of the
direct effects and side effects of any drug offers many opportunities
for simulation. It is likely that most nonfatal drugs will have a
transient, time-limited action rather than a permanent one. There is no
need for the informant to become panicky at any bizarre or
uncomfortable reactions he may experience, for these reactions will
probably disappear. Instead of passively accepting the administration
of a drug, without challenging the interrogator's right to apply such
pressure, the informant should effectively delay it, and thus stall a
possibly stressful interrogation under a drug. Finally, since the
interrogator wants accurate and factual information, the informant can
confound the interrogator as to what is fact and fiction by a number of
means. He can simulate drowsiness, confusion, and disorientation early
during the administration of the drug. He can revel in fantasies; the
more lurid the better. He can tell contradictory stories. He can
simulate a psychosis; or, if he cares to go so far, he can even induce
a transient psychotic state by ingesting a small amount of LSD secreted
on his person. By these devices, he can raise serious doubts in the
interrogator's mind as to the reliability of the information given by
him.
As a final suggestion, this reviewer is inclined to
agree with West (130) that the basic training of military personnel can
be helpful in developing techniques of resistance to interrogation. A
brief course on the limitations of the use of drugs in interrogation
and on the kinds of pharmacologic effects to be expected from the
different types of drugs would be helpful. Such training could decrease
the fear, hypersuggestibility, and other deleterious reactions that
evolve from the uncertain, the unpredictable, and the unknown.
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To almost any stimulus from outside the body responds
with widespread changes in its physiologic functioning. Many of the
changes are invisible and unknown to the person himself. In some
situations, these changes have been found to be valuable for
indications of the degree of credence which should be given to a
person's statements. This chapter reviews the responses available for
such interpretations, the validity of the method, and possible
improvements and extensions of its use which may occur in the future.
The use of physiologic responses in police
interrogation has become commonplace. Such practices, long based on
supernatural principles, have in fact been used since ancient times
(35). As long ago as the eighteenth century Daniel Defoe proposed a
test of this sort with a scientific rationale (31). Actual experiment
on physiologic tests of deception seems to have begun with
psychologists in Germany early in the century, with Benussi (2), an
Italian with German training, offering the most extensive and promising
results. Benussi used breathing changes as his principal criterion. A
few years later Marston (29) and Larson (23), on the basis of certain
experimental work, reported success with systolic blood pressure
changes. These two physiologic variables have been the core of
commercial "lie detectors" ever since, with the addition of the
galvanic skin response following the work of Summers (33, 34) in the
1930's.
Under a contract with the Office of Naval Research, which was
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also supported by the other
services, a group at Indiana University undertook a comparison of
variables and combinations of variables that was reported in 1952 (17).
Meanwhile the use of the "standard" methods has spread widely as an
applied art with a certain body of tradition. (Lee (26) gives an
account of current practices.) Controlled experiments, however, on
which to base actual practice have too often been lacking. An excellent
survey of the current status of the field has recently been provided by
Ferracuti (18) in Italian.
The present survey will be organized into the
following topics: (a) Evaluation of present practices. (b) Response
variables and instrumentation. (c) Interrogation procedures. (d) Data
interpretation and operator's decisions. (e) Psychological principles
of lie detection.
We may consider "current practices" en masse and ask
how effective these have been. This problem is considered by Inbau
(20), apparently by comparing "lie detector" results with jury verdicts
and confessions. The agreement between detection and the criterion for
various sets of data is about 70 per cent, with 20 per cent of the
cases discarded as ambiguous.
This figure must be compared, of course, with some
percentage of success to be expected by chance. If every case were
treated independently, the percentage of success would be 50 per cent.
It is, however, common practice to examine a group of suspected
persons, of whom it is known that only one is guilty. If the operator
then selects one from the group as guilty, his chances of being correct
by sheer luck are less than 50 per cent. If, on the other hand, an
operator knows, in a particular situation, that most of the examinees
sent him are later judged guilty, his "percentage of success by chance"
could be much higher.
It would be difficult to analyze field results in
greater detail than in Inbau's review (20). The jury decision is an
imperfect criterion, of course, and may not be independent of the lie
detector results since a prosecutor might be inclined to bring to trial
more cases in which the lie detector results were clear. If the test
has been used widely for screening, as it is reported to be, many
suspects with negative finding on the instrument would not be brought
to court. Most of these would be true negatives, and the percentage of
success might actually be higher if they were included. The percentage
obtained will depend clearly on the group from which it is derived.
Further-
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more, there is no telling exactly
what procedures are used by various examining officers nor just what in
the instrument records (or possibly aside from them) influences the
judgment as to whether the lie detector test indicates guilt. For
determining which methods and conditions give the most valid results,
and whether improvement is actually possible, we must turn to
experimental comparisons. This experimental knowledge of factors which
are likely to influence the outcome could then be used in future
attempts to evaluate uses in the practical situation.
The en masse result leads to the conclusion that
psychological methods of detection in the criminal interrogation
situations do provide information although the amount is uncertain, and
the present problem confronting users is to maximize the information.
Laboratory experiments (17, 23, 33) have generally
reported greater percentages of successful detection than the figure
given by Inbau for field results. He is, however, skeptical of results
obtained from these laboratory experiments. The situations are
different in many wayssome of the differences tending to favor the
laboratory, some the field situation. Although the severity of
consequences in the laboratory is much less, the lying is also likely
to be of a simpler sort and conditions better controlled. With some of
the very high percentages reported for the laboratory studies, there is
some question that the criterion may be adjusted to maximize success on
one particular set of data and thus cannot be expected to have general
application.
At present instruments may be classed into three
groups: (a) the traditional ones which have both laboratory and field
use; (b) those which have been tried in the laboratory, in some cases
incompletely; and (c) those which have possible value but have not been
tested for lie detection.
In the first group the variables are breathing, blood pressure, and galvanic skin response.
Although this variable was the first put to experimental test (2), the particular feature, the I/E ratio, or time of inspiration divided
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by time of expiration, seems to have dropped out of sight in practice. Benussi's experimental report was that during lying the I/E
ratio is increased because of a change in the form of the breathing
curve. It is easy to see why the ratio has been neglected in practical
work, for it is laborious to compute and the determining points in the
breathing cycle are difficult to distinguish, especially in a record
taken at the usual slow speed. In the "Indiana study an attempt to
evaluate it was abandoned because measurements were so unreliable.
Common practice seems to be to regard any marked disturbtnce of
breathing as indicative of deception (24).
The technique of recording the breathing rhythm is
rather simple. The common pneumatic system is open to criticism because
of the nonproportionality introduced by the compressibility of air, the
general inconvenience of keeping the system free from leaks, and the
awkward readjustment when S throws the recorder off scale by a
movement. A simple electrical pickup and recording system can be
substituted (17).
The Indiana study considered two aspects of
respiration: amplitude and breathing cycle time (the inverse of rate).
In amplitude the response in truth telling was an increase, with the
maximum 5 to 10 sec after he delivery of a question. In lying the mean
response was also an increase, but in a lesser amount. The fact that a
smaller increase in amplitude typically indicates deception requires an
operator to make a sort of inverted interpretation on this point.
Breathing cycle time increased in both conditions, but more in lying.
Thus breathing during deception is shallower and slower than in truth
telling. These facts are confirmed by the agreement of the two groups.
There seems to be much better discrimination between the two conditions
when these measures are used in a long series of questions; i.e., they
discriminate poorly at first as compared to other measures, but in the
long run are among the best discriminators. It may be that breathing in
the early part of a series is made irregular by a reaction to the
general situation. After some adaptation it becomes possible to compare
the responses to questions in purer form. According to some later work
(8) the inhibition of breathing seems rather characteristic of
anticipation of a stimulus.
One drawback in the use of respiration as an indicator
is its susceptibility to voluntary control. If an S wished to produce a
confused record he could probably do so by alternating over and under
breathing, if he could keep up this or another program in the face of
questions. But this drawback is not present in breathing alone. If an
examinee knows that changes in breathing will disturb all
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physiologic variables under control
of the autonomic division of the nervous system, and possibly even some
others, a certain amount of cooperation or a certain degree of
ignorance is required for lie detection by physiologic methods to work.
Respiration, therefore, on balance in the present state of knowledge
seems to be one of the better measures.
The systolic blood pressure was first used as a
deception indicator by Marston (29) and the method in common use is the
contribution of Larson (23). It is evidently the chief reliance of
present field practitioners of detection. Inbau (20) and others write
that blood pressure is the main channel for the deception reaction in a
real situation, although galvanic skin response may have greater power
in the laboratory. (It seems unlikely that this is a fundamental
difference between the two measures. The manner in which they are used
and the length of sitting may be involved. The point would seem to
require experimental checking.)
The systolic pressure will typically rise by a few
millimeters of mercury in response to a question, whether it is
answered truthfully or not. The evidence is that the rise will
generally be greater when S is lying than when telling the truth. In
using this measure, the operator, consciously or unconsciously, uses
some sort of cut-off to separate the two categories. Records are often
presented [e.g., (26)] in which a large difference in response to
neutral and critical questions makes the decision obvious. However, as
might be expected, there are instances which are not so clear. The
content of neutral questions will produce variations in the response,
and one must then decide whether a response to a critical question is
"positive" if it is larger than any other, or if it is larger than
average by some amount. It is likely that the criterion is a somewhat
variable one in ordinary practice.
The instrument currently in use consists of a pressure
cuff similar to that used in medical practice, but equipped with a side
branch tube which connects to a tambour through a pressure reducer. The
method is to inflate the cuff (on the upper arm) to a point between
systolic and diastolic pressure; that is, to about 100 mm of mercury.
This may be adjusted from time to time to follow changes in S's blood
pressure. Under these circumstances there is a flow of blood to the
lower arm only during the upper half of the pulse wave, and there is
practically no venous return from the arm since the cuff pressure far
exceeds the pressure in the veins, and occludes them. The side branch
from the cuff will convey pressure variations to the
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tambour and its stylus. Variations
produced both by the pulse and by those slower changes are referred to
as systolic blood pressure variations.
The method has long been criticized (4) for its
technical incorrectness. It does not give a true measure of systolic
(or diastolic) pressure. This criticism has made little impression on
those who use the method, since they can exclaim, with some
justification, "But it works!" It is a more telling objection that the
cuff disturbs the blood supply to the arm a great deal and that it
produces many undesirable side effects (7). The practical stoppage of
circulation can become, in the course of a sitting, quite painful, and
in a long sitting, dangerous. Operators, who are aware of these
consequences, release the pressure from time to time to restore
circulation. The side effects are such as to produce reactions in the
other autonomically controlled variables which one may be measuring,
and even in the blood pressure itself.
The Indiana study used a different method,
unfortunately also open to these objections to occluding the blood
supply. By mechanical means, a steadily increasing pressure was applied
to a cuff and the point of complete occlusion determined by means of a
pulse detector on the lower arm. The experimental results confirm the
opinion that it is one of the better indicators of deception. Again
discrimination is poor (almost nil) in the early part of a sitting and
improves to a high point later.
Recently the writer (7) investigated the requirements
of continuous arterial oressure measurement, and proposed a "closed
circuit" method which uses a strain gauge applied to an artery with
very little pressure. This device is simple to construct and use and
seems well suited to the recording of variations in arterial pressure,
although it will not as now developed indicate the base level of
pressure. It has been used in a number of tests and experiments to
record reaction to stimuli of various sorts (questions, flashes of
light, and warning and reaction signals in decision situations).
Although it has not been tested in a detection situation, there is good
reason to think that it will do at least as well as the occlusion or
near occlusion methods.
In the 1930's Summers (33, 34) reported some rather
spectacular laboratory results in the detection of deception with the
galvanic skin response (GSR). With a certain type of situation he was
able to detect lying better than 90 per cent of the time. Since this
work, the use of the GSR has increased and apparatus for registering it
for detection purposes is made commercially.
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The GSR seems to
be one of the most easily triggered responseseven slight stimuli will
produce the decrease in the electrical resistance of the skin,
reflecting activation of the sweat glands (an internal condition,
rather than the secretion of sweat). Recovery, however, is typically
slow in this variable, and in a routine examination the next question
is likely to be introduced before recovery is complete. Partly because
of this fact there is an adapting trend in the GSR; with stimuli
repeated every few minutes the response gets smaller, other things
being equal.
On the other hand, long term changes in skin
resistance may have a certain significance. A decrease in resistance
which persists for a long period might be more significant of deception
than one which has a quick recovery. In any case there is reason to
believe that the significance of a change is related to the base level
obtaining before it begins (17).
Not all available instruments have a provision for
readily determining base level and long persisting trends. The
structure of a proper instrument is more complex for the GSR than for
the first two physiologic variables, although for modern electronics it
is simple. The resistance measuring principle seems most satisfactory;
a constant current is passed through S, the I/R drop across him is
measured, and its fluctuations recorded.
Such a circuit with a device for automatically setting
the recording pen back on scale is described in the Indiana report. For
satisfactory recording nonpolarizing electrodes are required, although
some commercial suppliers seem to overlook this necessity.
In the Indiana study the GSR was the best of the
indicators in a short series though its power of discrimination fell as
adaptation progressed. The investigation was concerned, however, only
with the short term decreases that follow questions with about a 2-sec
latency. There may be still further power in the GSR when it is used
differently. The interpretation of the response is certainly made
difficult by the confounding adaptation trend, and an interview needs
to be planned to allow for such a trend, results being evaluated with
regard to it.
Although pulse rate is sometimes referred to in
reports of field studies, it is probably little regarded. In fact, at
the usual recording
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speed pulse rate changes (represented in the blood pressure record) would be very hard to discover.
The rate, in the form of cycle time, was included in
the comparison of the Indiana study. The technique was to use a
somewhat faster paper speed and make actual measurements of the time
occupied by a certain number of beats. Contrary to the usual
expectation the predominant response to questions is a slowing of the
rate, reaching a maximum after about 5 sec. In lying the heart rate
slows down more than in truth telling. This response is in part also
the one produced by loud noises (10), threats of shock (17), and many
other types of stimuli not requiring considerable muscular movement. In
comparison with the other variables of the comparative study the pulse
rate variable discriminates moderately well. Apparently it suffers from
the same handicap as GSR — with adaptation, it loses power.
To be interpreted immediately the rate would need to
be recorded by a tachometer such as the one described in (13) or that
manufactured by the Yellow Springs Instrument Company. These
tachometers translate time into a lateral deflection of a recording
pen. Since these instruments are operated by the electrocardiogram,
they are a bit uncertain if S is not in a shielded room. They are more
complex than the GSR instrument and might present problems in the hands
of an inexperienced operator. Nevertheless, heart rate may turn out to
be a very good adjunct in detection.
The volume pulse has been studied in a number of
experiments in the Indiana laboratory in a variety of situations (8, 9
,10) and it was included in the comparison made in the Indiana lie
detection study. The physiologic function is the pulsatile change in
the volume of some part such as the finger. The reaction to stimuli is
typically a decrease in the amplitude of the pulse wave, which is a
manifestation of constriction of the arterioles in the region. This
reaction is produced by questions in an interrogation and is greater
when S is lying than when telling the truth. Under certain
circumstances in a moderately long series of questions the response
differentiates well between truth and lying.
The function is measured by some type of
plethysmograph. The electrical impedance plethysmograph has the
considerable advantage of convenience in attachment. Such an instrument
is moderately complex to build but fairly simple to operate.
The constriction recorded by the plethysmograph is closely related
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to a rise in blood pressure recordings. As a fundamental phenomenon, it may have an advantage in lie detection.
The pressure pulse is distinguished from the volume
pulse in method of recording; a pickup device with a very high
resistance to movement is used. The effects recorded are variations of
the blood pressure rather than local conditions at the site of pickup.
The pulsatile variations are the difference between systolic and
diastolic pressure.
A measure of this sort was tested in the Indiana study
with rather poor results in detection of deception and more recent
studies of other conditions (9) also suggest it is a rather
unsatisfactory variable. Probably systolic and diastolic are correlated
positively to a substantial degree, but as one or the other has a
greater increase, the pressure pulse goes one way or the other.
This variable is in a different class from the
previous ones in that it is under the influence of the central nervous
system rather than the autonomic division (respiration is affected by
both). Although muscular tension can be recorded by other means than
electrical, the operating difficulties of the electrical method are
less with suitable equipment and the records more interpretable. The
EMG can be compared in several places if one desires.
For recording EMG an amplifier is needed, with
sensitivity in about the range of the usual electroencephalograph. The
output of this needs to be integrated in one way or another to make it
easily read (17). The electrodes attached to S are simple metal disks.
The Indiana study included one experiment using EMG in
lie detection, but this was carried out independently rather than as
part of the battery in which various measures were compared. Results
were extremely satisfactory so far as they went. However, the test must
as yet be considered exploratory and needs repetition for statistical
reasons.
Convenient, portable EMG apparatus is now available,
though it is somewhat expensive, and with a little experience an
operator could learn to run it. An important technical limitation is
the necessity for having S in a shielded room (for example, grounded
fly screen), which could be easily provided only in some central
laboratory.
Of course, the skeletal muscle can be activated intentionally by S. If S wished he could contract the measured muscle upon each ques-
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tion and thus confuse the record,
although the strategy would probably not occur to him. Such a movement
would also have the effect of disturbing all the usual measures of lie
detection, and evidently is not a common occurrence. The use of the
method has some interesting possibilities since conflict between two
responses can be recorded (17).
Somewhat similar in operation to the EMG the ocular
movements permit the study of a choice of responses. If two or more
visual targets are provided the eyes may unconsciously turn toward one
or another in response to a question. The method lends itself well to
the map or picture exploration method (see the following).
A substudy of the Indiana lie detection research
tested the power of the ocular movements as a detector with good
results. At least under special experimental conditions good
discrimination can be obtained. This method, however, has the handicap
of being rather cumbersome and slow. It involves photographing the eye
movements with art ophthalmograph and evaluating the record after it
has been developed.
Speed of transmission of the pulse wave along an
artery has been proposed by the group at Washington State University
(5) as a possible indicator of deception. The variable measured is
primarily the pressure increase in the artery that follows a heart
systole and is propagated through the fluid in the artery in a manner
fairly well described by a known equation. (This propagation of
pressure wave is quite a different matter from the flow of blood.) If
the pressure wave is picked up at two points a known distance apart,
its velocity can be calculated. The Washington State group has worked
on a device that would do this automatically.
The velocity, according to the equation, depends on
the level of blood pressure, and it would seem that in the same
individual, variations in pressure would be the principal source of
variation in velocity. Consequently, the scheme would be an indirect
measure of blood pressure.
Since the pickups would be activated by pulse
pressure, and since pulse pressure is quite variable itself, it seems
probable that such
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a device would require a good deal
of monitoring of sensitivity to give suitable readings. The scheme is
also rather complex and seems to be an alternative to the simpler
method of recording pressure described previously.
Recent instrumental developments (11, 12, 36) make
possible the use of the gastrointestinal reactions as a means of
detection. According to one method, gastric or intestinal activity is
recorded from surface electrodes attached to S, one on the abdomen and
one on the arm. Stimulus effects upon GI activity have been
demonstrated (11), though much remains to be discovered about them. A
probable handicap of the method is the extreme slowness of response and
recovery in this sector; it might be necessary to space questions
several minutes apart. Nevertheless, the variable might turn out to be
highly discriminative.
The EEG is a possible response variable for use in
detection although it has never been tested. The problem expected is
that under interview conditions the alpha rhythm would probably be
blocked most of the time, and there would be very little opportunity
for it to exhibit the "arousal" or "alerting" reaction. In other words,
the variable may be too sensitive to all sorts of stimuli and reach its
maximum response, as it were, too readily, but no one can be certain
this would happen without a trial. Equipment for recording the EEG is
basically the same as that described for the EMG. An integrator is not
generally used in connection with it, though such a transformation
might in fact be useful.
Certain general facts and a few known particulars indicate how prior conditions may affect detection results.
A general effect that needs to be taken into account
is the rule of adaptation. Almost all the response variables discussed
are known to become less responsive with repeated stimulation, some at
a greater,
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some at a lesser rate (10). Beyond
influencing the choice of variable this fact should also regulate
procedure. Interrogation would be expected to become progressively less
effective as it proceeds, and the diminishing returns would limit
length of session: one cannot detect a difference between responses
that are practically nonexistent. In other words, instrumental
detection would not be expected to combine well with a "wear-them-down"
procedure. Profitable sessions would then probably be an hour or less.
Furthermore, questioning or stimulation of other sorts
before the instrumental session would undoubtedly also produce a
deadening of response. For example, there is considerable transfer of
adaptation from one stimulus to another in the GSR. Immediately
following a period of highly disturbing events it is possible that an S
might be induced to tell the truth, but the situation would be a poor
one for instrumental methods, since S is already in such a high state
of excitement that increments in the response variables would be small.
This can be inferred from experimental results, but it would be well to
have direct confirmation.
For similar reasons, possibly because of the same
adaptation mechanism, a condition of fatigue or prolonged sleeplessness
would be unfavorable in discriminating truth from falsehood.
Physiologic reactions are likely to be reduced in such circumstances.
This suggestion accords with the common experience of being "too tired
to care one way or the other." The stimulus threshold is raised and the
person eventually falls asleep — a state of relative indifference to
all ordinary stimuli. By the same token one would expect alcohol and
barbiturates, and perhaps tranquilizers, to be unfavorable to detection.
Because of these considerations there may actually be
a contradiction between trying to secure an admission and detecting
lying by instruments. For instrumental detection one needs an S
with a lively autonomic (or sometimes central) nervous system, whereas
fatigue might favor contradictions and admissions. It would seem that
an examiner must determine whether he intends to use instrumental
methods as a means of detection or merely as a stage property for
intimidatin the subject.
The importance of a state of alertness in S is
demonstrated by one of the Indiana studies. A visit to the Chicago
Police Laboratories had brought to light the practice of convincing S
of the power of the
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instrument by "detecting" which card
had been selected from a stacked deck. In a situation which also
required a certain deception by the experimenter, the Indiana
experiments compared the instrumental detections with and without prior
demonstration of the effectiveness of the technique. There was a large
margin in favor of the "no demonstration" procedure. Apparently when S
is convinced that the instrument is infallible, he is resigned and
ceases to be excited about the critical questions. A certain amount of
contest in the situation seems favorable to detection. The experiment
may be taken to show that even for the police officer, honesty is the
best policy.
There is a very attractive possibility of weighing in
advance the testimony of the instruments. If certain Ss are
characteristically "detectable" when telling falsehoods and certain
others are not, it should be possible to assign people in advance to
the one class or the other. The practical advantage is clear; by
deciding at the outset that certain cases are "inoperable" one's
percentage of successful detection and confidence in his results for
the remaining cases can be enormously increased. (See discussion in the
Indiana report (17).) Exclusion of the inoperable cases would be
especially advantageous if their number is small. The possibility of
this classification depends on the consistency with which individuals
respond differentially to critical and neutral questions.
Two experiments in the Indiana series were carried out
to test that proposition, one being included in the report, the other
being completed too late for inclusion. Both studies, based on the
galvanic skin response, found a high degree of consistency among Ss,
especially for those on whom detection failed on the first series of
questions. The second set of questions also failed to detect deception.
The results of the second study, on a larger group, confirm this
finding. The implication is that using one or two pretests in which S
is lying by instruction on known occasions would serve to distinguish
persons susceptible to instrumental methods from those who are not. On
the "susceptible" Ss, the certainty of the detection diagnosis will be
greatly improved. One point needs further investigation: whether or not
a pretest with one set of questions will pick out individuals who are
susceptible to detection with a different set of questions. In the
experiments mentioned the same questions were used for both pretest and
test.
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though they were independent. Field
workers, on the other hand, have developed a variety of ingenious plans
(20, 26) which seem sometimes to be more effective. A radically
different plan is to let S know when a critical question or group of
questions is coming. This procedure is accomplished by going through a
question series in the same order often enough so that S knows what to
expect. A series of responses is then evaluated as a whole: deception
being taken as indicated, on the later repetitions, when responses
become progressively larger as the critical questions are approached
and die out rapidly thereafter. In some variables there is, further,
the possibility of observing a mounting base level as questions near
the climax. For a situation other than lie detection, experiments (16,
32) have demonstrated the progressive increase in reaction to stimuli
as a noxious question is approached. Conditioned responses are said to
be formed to the preceding stimuli on the earlier runs through the
series. As a method of detecting deception there is much to be said for
this organized schedule of questions. Whereas the unexpected question
will produce a brief response, with unidentifiable anticipation
probably enlarging responses to neutral stimuli and confusing the
issue, the organized schedule permits a detection based on a number of
readings, in fact, on the pattern of responses in a whole series. So
far, however, an exact method of evaluating the data is not at hand. It
would be quite desirable to have an experimental evaluation of this
method.
Whatever general scheme of questioning is used, there
must be some regard to the adaptative process already described. Size
of response to a question in nearly all variables is going to be
affected by its position in a series. Current practice evidently
recognizes the fact by avoiding the first position for critical
questions. A position at the end of a series would be almost as
unfavorable, since, other things being equal, the response to a
stimulus in that position will be the smallest. Question series of one
form or another need to be so planned that the adaptation trend can be
discounted in the interpretation.
An operator in field work usually has neither the time
nor the means to make a statistical analysis of his results or perhaps
even to compute the averages of the several responses to all questions.
Apparently the successful operator will learn to decide on the meaning
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of his results by some rules of
thumb which he has difficulty putting into words even to himself. To
exactly what set of cues he is responding it is difficult to say, for
apparently no one has made an analysis of the exact difference between
records which are judged positive and those which are judged negative
or inconclusive.
For the experimenter the problem is different, since
he is obliged to say exactly how he has arrived at an answer. His
procedure, therefore, will usually be, as in the Indiana studies, to
settle upon some rather obvious aspect of response that can be
definitely measured, and then find out how well he can do at detection
with this information about each response. Naturally, he is discarding
a good deal of information while he does this, information about other
features of the response which might be supplementary or superior to
that which he is using. For example, in most GSR work only the maximum
amplitude of the response is considered. It may well be that the
duration of the response also has a meaning (beyond its correlation
with amplitude). In fact, an unreported portion of the Indiana study
indicated that this was true. The field operator might allow for this
feature intuitively along with other characteristics such as latency,
doubleness or singleness of response, rate of rise, etc. Not that the
experimenter could not study these things, but he must take them one by
one, test them singly and according to various rules of combination and
weighting, a laborious and lengthy process. His hope, of course, is
that in the long run he will be able to tell the field operator just
what he should take into account to secure maximum reliability of
decision. Certain suggestions can be offered a priori and some from experimental evidence.
The logic of the detection task imposes certain
requirements. Basically the assignment is one of differentiating two
conditions, truth telling and lying, on the basis of readings which are
correlated with them ("prediction" in the statistical sense of the
word). The operator or experimenter must proceed by finding, for a
given S, the mean response to the critical and to the neutral
questions. The alternative, of simply comparing critical responses of
an S to those of other persons, will not be satisfactory because Ss
differ in their level of responsiveness to any stimulus. By
representing the responses to critical questions by R o and those to neutral questions by R n, we may say the first quantity to be considered is R c — R n.
We must then decide on the basis of data which sign of the result is
indicative of lying, if either. We might, under some circumstances,
then determine from data how many persons will be correctly classified
when the difference is of a certain degree. The number of detections
would
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be maximized by using a low number
as the dividing point, but the number of errors of calling true answers
false would be reduced by using a higher number.
Evaluation of this sort would be premature under many
circumstances. It may well be that the questions asked are not of
equal stimulating power even to those giving true answers. A critical
question dealing with a crime or other "sensitive" information would
doubtless elicit a larger response than, say, a question about an
inconsequential matter. (It is a routine GSR demonstration that words
such as "mother," "sex," "hate," etc., produce more response than, for
example, the names of common articles of furniture.) Hence it is
necessary to complicate the comparison before the decision of truth or
falsity can be made.
The value Rc — Rn for each S should
be compared with that for a group of Ss responding to the same
questions. The function to be used is therefore (Rc
— Rn)Subject1 — (Rc
— Rn)Average Subject. This function
the experimenter would then need to evaluate for its detecting power;
the field operator needs to arrive at an approximation of this
function to reach a proper decision. Having this, the field operator
should ideally be provided with a table showing the probability of
correct detection and the probability of error for each value of the
function. Such tables do not exist at present.
For good discrimination it is essential that measures
to be compared be quite reliable. Each recorded response to a question
may be considered as partly determined by the question and partly by
"accidents" of the environment and in S himself. For example, there may
be some influence of a previous question, of the questioner's tone of
voice, of even trivial events, noises, etc., in the examining room.
Naturally, the first step in securing reliability would be the control
of these extraneous factors. A good examining room should be provided
where outside events are neither seen nor heard and where S cannot see
the examiner nor the operation of the instruments. Despite these
precautions there will still be "error" fluctuations beyond the
operator's capacity to manipulate. These disturbing effects can be set
against one another by the usual technique of repeating the
observations and considering the average of the series.
When several physiologic functions are recorded, or
several features of one kind of response are measured, there is the
further problem of how they should be weighted and combined in making a
"prediction." Several variables, rather than one, would be expected to
provide a more accurate basis for decision. Aside from the usual
advantages derived from multiple measures there is the fact of indi-
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vidual specificity of response,
demonstrated in a number of experiments (22, 28), which would make
multiple measures particularly valuable. Individuals tend to react in
one physiologic sector or another. One individual may "specialize" in a
heart reaction, for example, and another in the GSR. Recording a number
of physiologic variables gives, therefore, a better chance of locating
each person's special kind of reaction.
The Indiana studies have imparted some knowledge of
the methods of combination. In one investigation a large group of
physiologic variables were recorded, more, of course, than would be
practical in a field situation with the idea of comparing their
effectiveness. "Discriminant analysis" was used in the main analysis of
the results. This technique is based upon a computation of optimum
weights to be assigned to the measures in order to give maximum
discrimination when they are added together in standard score form. The
weights derived from one group of Ss must then be tested on another
before they can. be considered as firm. This elaborate method gave
strange results in the Indiana study. First, by use of it on the
original group, truth and lying were differentiated no better than they
were by the best single measure. This result is rare with variables
that correlate with a criterion and only poorly with each other.
Second, the same weights applied to a second group did give a very
substantial improvement indeed, whereas by the operation of random
fluctuation one would expect the second group always to give worse
results than the first. It may be that the second set of data was more
reliable than the first, or fit the assumptions of the model better.
It is still possible that a set of weights suitable
for transfer to field use could be derived in this way. A particular
set of weights, of course, would have to be calculated for the
particular grouping of response variables intended for field use. On
the other hand, it seems likely that a different method of combination
might have greater discriminating power.
In the Indiana group for which discriminant analysis
improved detection but little, a simpler method gave very good results.
It was found, for example, that merely counting the number of variables
showing an indication of lying for each question formed a highly
successful lying score. In this method one is avoiding the assumption
of linear addition, and the good result of this sort of treatment
suggests that it is well to avoid that assumption. There is also a
great deal gained in simplicity.
There is still another possibility—a combination
technique that does not simply add measures together but treats them as
alternatives.
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This technique
remains to be developed, but it is, in fact, the logical approach in
view of response specificity. Suppose, for example, there is an S who
responds in a highly favored sector, such as heart rate, and very
little in another-GSR, vasoconstriction, and other variables. We may
presume that each of the response variables is admixed with a certain
amount of random fluctuation ("error"). For such a case the heart rate
response could be highly differential of truth and lying, but the other
kinds of response would be less than average and, if added to the heart
rate response as standard scores, or more simply combined, they would
tend to offset the positive heart rate indication. It might come about,
therefore, that combining measures in the ordinary fashion would
involve greater error proportionate to "true" score than a single
measure, properly chosen for each person.
An effective plan for this situation would be to
determine by experiment what alternative patterns of response are
discriminative of truth and falsehood. A record could be examined for
such patterns, or, possibly, the pattern to be expected could be
discovered by preliminary trials and a record watched for an
exaggeration of this particular S's special pattern.
In field use, it is quite possible that
interpretations of this sort are actually made, though rather
unsystematically; a large response in one physiologic variable may be
counted heavily, and the neutral indications of other variables not
allowed to offset it. The multiple record would be used in such cases
simply for selecting the most revealing variable for a particular S
when he has one.
The effectiveness of lie detection procedures is
limited by a lack of knowledge of what psychological principles are
involved in successful lie detection. There is little examination in
the literature of the basic psychological principles at work.
Particularly important is the question: "Just what general properties
of a situation provoke the physiologic reactions which make lie
detection possible?"
Prima facie it seems improbable that there is a special
kind of response peculiar to lying. In the early days Marston (29)
recognized that truth and falsity are not psychological
categories. Obviously a person can give a false answer merely because
he is misinformed. If the answer is true to the best of his knowledge
and belief, one would certainly expect no physiologic signs of its
falsity. Marston's contention was, therefore, that the physiologic
reactions were present
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only when there is consciousness of
deception. If this is taken to mean that S must know that his statement
is untrue, it is probably correct in most cases; that is to say that
under some circumstances he would tell the truth. The possibility is
not to be dismissed, however, that detection could be accomplished when
S had completely suppressed memory of an event or distorted the
essential features of it in his own thinking. Evidence of response
under these conditions appears in the "subception" experiments (1, 19,
21, 25, 30).
On the other hand, it seems that trivial deception,
even when fully known to S, would not provoke much physiologic
reaction. A person probably can say he is feeling fine when he is not
without the deception coming to light on the instruments.
It is questionable, therefore, whether the idea of
"consciousness of deception" makes for an appreciable refinement. If it
is true that deception is best with heightened awareness of it, the
characteristics of a situation which will heighten that awareness
require examination.
The physiologic response in lying, as found in
experiments and field trials, is a pattern of changes in the recorded
variables. Essentially the same pattern of response occurs when S is
telling the truth under interrogation, and detection is possible only
because the changes are greater, as a rule, during lying. If the
responses are not specific to lying per se, or to the consciousness of
lying, then knowledge of just what characteristics of a situation
produce them is of first importance.
Three possibilities can be suggested: the conditioned response theory,
the conflict theory, and the punishment theory. Each of these implies a
somewhat different mode of operation in the detection situation.
According to the conditioned response theory
the critical questions play the role of conditioned stimuli and evoke
some "emotional" response with which they have been associated in the
past. This principle is known to operate in situations other than lie
detection. Conditioning of the GSR was demonstrated, for example, in
the experiment of Diven (16), and it is a familiar fact that words such
as those with sexual or other personal association evoke large
responses. It would therefore be expected that questions relating to
some fairly traumatic experience would produce especially large
reactions. If this is the basis of detection, lies about trivial
matters would be nearly impossible to detect. Asserting that a barn is
a house, for example, would produce little response from the ordinary
individual because neither word is connected with any large reaction on
his past life. Denying that he took part in a crime might be
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expected to produce a large reaction
on this theory, because the crime probably produced a large "emotional"
disturbance when it occurred. On the conditioning principle it would
further be expected that the bodily reaction would be somewhat
different, according to the kind of past experience the question was
connected with. [Different stimulus situations do have a degree of
specificity in the kind of reaction they produce according to certain
evidence (6).] Whether, in fact, the physiologic response in lying
differs according to the emotional reaction of S to a question is a
problem deserving some investigation.
The simple conditioning theory can, however, hardly be
the whole explanation of the lying reaction, for in laboratory
experiments, such as some of those in the Indiana study, lying about
rather trivial matters according to instruction did lead to enough
differential reaction to yield a fairly good detection percentage. In
fact, percentages of detection were so high as to suggest that lack of
too great general stress is favorable to detection.
The theory of conflict, following the
psychoanalytic lead, would presume that a specially large physiologic
disturbance would occur when two incompatible reaction tendencies are
aroused at the same time. Whether there is a greater disturbance than
the sum of the two separate excitations is questionable (3), but at any
rate the two would be greater than one. In the process of deception two
reaction tendencies may be expected. Long habit would dispose the
person to answer a critical question straightforwardly. On the other
hand, when he is lying there are circumstances which arouse in him the
tendency to denial. In the Indiana studies one experiment was based
explicitly on this principle, but with the plan of distinguishing the
two response tendencies by different sorts of muscular activity. The
experiment gave good results, but not because it was possible to
distinguish the two reaction tendencies. A better plan might have been
to associate a "yes" answer with one hand and a "no" answer with the
other. The purpose may be served, however, if the two response
tendencies merely summate in the same place, and this could well be the
mechanism by which the usual detection test works.
On the conflict hypothesis, both reaction tendencies
would probably need to be strong for good results. Not much can be done
about the tendency to reveal information openly. On the other hand, the
tendency to deny it may be subject to some manipulation. This
suggestion again leads to a paradoxical recommendation: the situation
must be so ordered that S makes a strong effort to conceal the infor-
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mation. This strategy, opposite to
that which might encourage admissions, may in fact be favorable to
instrumental detection. The experiment, already described, which showed
better detection when S was encouraged to think he might "beat the
instrument" lends itself to this interpretation.
If conflict is the basis of the large reactions that
signify deception, then there is some danger of confusion with large
reactions produced by strictly personal emotional problems. It is an
established fact (see the preceding) that words touching on emotionally
sensitized areas will produce large reactions, regardless of deception.
A question touching on such an area might provoke a reaction greater
than that produced by a mild conflict. Errors from this source would be
checked by comparing the reactions of several persons to the same
questions and, where possible, by comparing a person's reactions to
sensitive questions when he may be lying with those he gives to the
same subject matter when there is no occasion to lie.
A third possible basis of detection is the punishment, or better, threat-of-punishment
principle. According to this idea a person will give a large
physiologic response during lying because he anticipates serious
consequences if he fails to deceive. In common language it might be
that he fails to deceive the machine operator for the very reason that
he fears he will fail. The "fear" would be the very reaction detected.
More analytically put, S is giving a conditioned physiologic response
to the operator's question because the content of the question has been
associated with the possibility of unfavorable consequences. Lying is
technically, then, an avoidance reaction with considerably less than
100 per cent chance of success, but it is the onl'y one with any chance
of success at all. The physiologic reaction would be the consequence of
an avoidance reaction which has a low probability of reinforcement, but
not too low. If the theory has any validity at all it must be supposed
that the physiologic reaction is associated with a state of
uncertainty. It does seem that a lie told with a complete certainty of
its acceptance would be unlikely to produce much reaction; and on the
other hand we have the experimental evidence already mentioned that a
lie told with no prospect of success whatever is also poorly detected.
For good detection a situation may be necessary where S is willing to
gamble on a rather long chance with some hope of success.
To make this punishment theory cover the experimental
results one needs to take "punishment" in a broad sense, since in
experiments S quite often suffers no serious loss if he is detected. He
does, nevertheless, lose the game which he is playing and possibly this
is
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countable as a punishment. There seem to be no experimental observations on the general situation.
On this last type of theory successful detection would
depend a good deal on S's attitude both toward the instrument and the
situation as a whole, for good results would depend on S trying to
"beat the game." If the hypothesis is correct, there would be some
advantage to finding out what his attitude is and possibly encouraging
him to engage in risk-taking behavior. Once again there seems to be all
opposition between procedures designed to secure information and those
that would lead to the best instrumental detection.
Present knowledge is not sufficient to lead to a
decision on which, if any, of these three theories is correct. Since
the theories here discussed are not mutually contradictory, it is quite
possible that all the conditions referred to are actually operative in
some degree in the detection situation. In that event detection would
be best when critical questions are associated with somewhat traumatic
past events, when S is threatened with possible but not certain
punishment as a result of lying, and when critical questions, perhaps
by reason of the uncertain consequences, arouse conflicting reactions
in S.
Although direct, practical experience is lacking, some
general findings of laboratory experiments are applicable. The
relevance of many of the experiments for the criminal detection problem
suffers from the fact that they involved no "crime." This makes them
more pertinent for broader interpretations, however. Experiments
concerned, for example, with discovering a person's birth month, when
he has been told to say no to every question, are closer to the
intelligence interrogation situation than to criminal detection. The
concern in these experiments is with lying rather than with crime. From
their success, we may conclude that crime is not essential for lie
detection.
The intelligence interrogation, however, has certain
peculiarities. Studies directed specifically to these distinctive
problems would be required for more reliable conclusions regarding the
applicability of findings from previous experimentation to practical
employments in intelligence interrogations. One may suppose that the
person questioned, typically, will have little personal involvement in
information sought. The questions frequently will not be about
something he has done or for which he feels responsible or guilty. He
may or may not know what information is important to his interrogator.
Perhaps he is not very deeply motivated to conceal the specific items
or information, but loyalties and threatened penalties may dispose him
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to do so. If the source regards the
matter as unimportant, the motivational aspects of the situation would
be rather like those in the common demonstration of detecting which
card has been picked from a deck, a trick not difficult to do as a
parlor game when a "lie detector" is available. However, if the source
is highly motivated toward concealment and anticipates reprisals if he
"breaks," the situation is rather like crime detection.
Special considerations also arise in the intelligence
interrogation situation because of the kinds of people to be
interrogated, their physiologic condition, their emotional state, and
their attitudes. They differ from both the suspected criminals and the
normal individuals or college students used in most experiments. The
effect of factors like these is scarcely known for the groups already
studied. It is terra incognita for the sources of factual interrogations.
A special condition for the intelligence situation is
that the subject's cooperation in submitting to the instrumental
recording might be difficult to obtain. One naturally speculates about
the possibility of devising a few recording instruments that would need
no attachment to S and might be concealed from him. Considering the
complex problems attending overt electrodes and recorders, the
information gained from hidden instruments is likely to be quite meager
and unreliable. Furthermore, it is not certain that an S who is not
aware of the process would actually respond in the same way as one who
is. It would seem necessary that interrogators use the ordinary type of
instrument and rely on persuasion or coercion to get subjects into it.
There is still the possibility that sophisticated subjects would, under
coercion, introduce confusion by moving about and controlling
breathing. How often this would happen can only be determined through
experience.
Nevertheless, on the basis of the facts known from
laboratory and field work one might expect that the physiologic methods
can be applied to intelligence interrogations with reasonable success.
Most of the considerations already discussed would seem to apply.
In spite of the early scientific foundations of lie
detection in the work of Benussi, Marston, Larson, and Summers (2, 22,
23, 29, 33, 34) there is at present a rather broad gap between current
practice and
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scientific knowledge. There is, on the one hand,
some information from the laboratory, which could be applied, and
there are procedures of questioning, developed in field work, which
await experimental testing. Although variation in procedure and in
selection of cases makes present field data quite difficult to
evaluate, it does seem probable that a significant amount of detection
is being secured by physiologic methods. Laboratory experiments
generally confirm the success of the technique.
Laboratory science can make some immediate contributions to the
improvement of detection methods. Developments have made possible
better instrumentation for the recording and analysis of variables
which currently figure in criminal detection, and suggest the
possibility of recording various others which could increase the
accuracy of detection. For some of these additional variables,
experimental evidence is already available, others have yet to be
tested.
Experiments have also yielded certain results that could be applied
to interrogation procedures, of which the following are illustrative.
The factor of adaption, differential to particular responses, could be
allowed for systematically. The attitude of the examinee influences
results considerably; they are better when he does not believe the
instrument is infallible. Rather, clearer results are obtained when
he believes he has a chance of winning the game. Pretesting of Ss in
order to drop a few prospects from consideration would greatly improve
the confidence users could have in results on those remaining. Making
S take an active part by giving some sort of answer also favors
detection. Feedback of the operator's visible reactions has an effect
on the source's subsequent physiologic responses. Beyond these facts,
experimental evidence bears on a number of other practical matters,
such as the order and nature of questions. Detailed instruction in
these matters to personnel who might become exposed to such
manipulations will go far in frustrating any interrogator who seeks to
make use of them.
With respect to the evaluation of results, experiments have done more
to set the problem than to answer it. Various possibilities of
statistical combinations and evaluations o responses have been tried,
but the optimum method is not yet known.
Much could be learned from planned experimental studies of the
psychological basis of detection.. Precisely what is it that makes the
source's responses different in lying and telling the truth? The
difference might depend on a conditioned autonomic response, ona
conflict of response tendencies, or on the chance of successful
avoidance of punishment, or some combination of these. Knowledge of
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these effects might provide a basis for the choice of conditions that would provoke the most discriminating kind of response.
Further development of the method and. the successful
extension of it to other areas, such as military interrogation, appears
in prospect.
1. Adams J. K. "Laboratory studies of behavior without awareness". Psychol. Bull., 1957, 54, 383-405.
2. Benussi V. Die Atmungsymptome in der Lüge. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1914, 31, 244-273.
3. Bowles J. W. "Electromyographic factors in aircraft control: A muscular action potential study of conflict". Randolph Air Force Base, Texas: U. S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine, 1956. Rep. no. 55-125.
4. Chappell M. W. "Blood pressure changes in deception". Arch. Psychol., 1929, 17, No. 105, 1-39.
5. Dana H. F., Barnett C. C., and Dennison D. R. Improved electronic apparatus for measuring deception induced physiological changes. Mimeographed report from the author, Washington State College.
6. Davis J. F. "Manual of surface electrornyography". Unpublished manuscript. Allan Memorial Institute of Psychiatry, Montreal, 1952.
7. Davis R. C. "Continuous recording of arterial pressure: An analysis of the problem". J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1957, 50, 524-529.
8. Davis R. C. "Somatic activity under reduced stimulation". J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1959, 52, 309-314.
9. Davis R. C., and Buchwald A. M. "An exploration of somatic response patterns: Stimulus and sex differences". J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1957,50, 44-60.
10. Davis R. C., Buchwald A. M., and Frankmann R. W. "Autonomic and muscular responses and their relation to simple stimuli". Psychol. Monogr., 1955, 69, 1-71.
11. Davis R. C., Garafolo, Loraze, and Kverin K. "Conditions associated with gastro-intestinal activity". J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1959, 52, 466-475.
12. Davis R. C., Garafolo, Loraze, and Gault F. P. "An exploration of abdominal potentials", J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1957, 50, 519-523.
13. Davis R. C., Siddons G. F., and Stout G. W. A cardiotachometer. Office of Naval Research, Technical Report No. 5, Contract 908(03). Unpublished manuscript. Indiana Univ., 1955.
14. Dawson H. E., and Davis R. C. "The effects of an instructed motor response upon somatic response to a brief tone". J. comp. physiol. Psychol., 1957, 50, 368-374.
15. DiMascio A., Boyd R. W., and Greenblatt M. Physiological correlates of tension and antagonism during psychotherapy. A study of "interpersonal psychology." Psychosom. Med., 1957, 1999-104.
16. Diven K. "Certain determinants in the conditioning of anxiety reactions". J. Psychol., 1937, 3, 291-308.
17. Ellson D. G., Davis R. C., Saltzman I. J., and Burke C. J. A report of research on detection of deception.
1952. (Contract N6onr-18011 with Office of Naval Research.) Distributed
by Department of Psychology, Indiana Univer., Bloomington, Indiana.
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18. Ferracuti, F. Il poligrafo. In Corso lnternazionale di Criminologia. Roma: Instituto di Criminologia. Presso L'Universita di Roma, 1955.
19. Goldiamond, I. Indication of perception.
I. Subliminal perception, subception, unconscious perceptions: An
analysis in terms of psycho-physical indicator
methodology. Psychol. Bull., 1958, 55, 373-411.
20. Inbau, F. E. Lie detection and criminal interrogation. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1942.
21. Jenkin, V. Affective processes in perception. Psychol. Bull., 1957, 54, 100-107.
22. Lacey, J. I., and Lacey, Beatrice. Verification and extension of the principle of response stereotypy. Amer. j. Psychol., 1958, 71, 50-73.
23. Larson, J. A. The cardio-pneumo-psychogram. J. exp. Psychol., 1922, 5, 323-328.
24. Larson, J. A. Lying and its detection. Chicago: Univer. of Chicago Press, 1932.
25. Lazarus, R. S., and McCleary, R. Autonomic discrimination without awareness: A study of subception. Psychol. Rev., 1951, 58, 113-122.
26. Lee, C. D. The instrumental detection of deception. Springfield, III.: C. C. Thomas, 1953.
27. Malmo, R. B., Boaz, T. J., and Smith, A. A. Physiological study of personal interaction. Psychosom. Med., 1957, 19, 105-119.
28. Malmo, R. B., Shagass, C., and Davis, F. H. Symptom specificity and bodily reactions during psychiatric interview. Psychosom. Med., 1950, 12, 362-376.
29. Marston, W. M. Systolic blood pressure changes in deception. J. exp. Psychol., 1917, 2, 117-163.
30. McConnell, J. V., Culler, R. L., and McNeil, E. B. Subliminal stimulation: An overview. Amer. Psychologist, 1958, 13, 229-242.
31. Moore, J. R. Defoe's project for lie detection. Amer. J. Psychol., 1955, 68, p. 672.
32. Rosenberg, S. The extinction of
the GSR to verbal CS by various types of experimental therapy.
Unpublished master's dissertation, Indiana Univer., 1951.
33. Summers, W. G. A new psychogalvanometric technique in criminal investi. gation. Psycho. Bull., 1937, 34, 551-552.
34. Summers, W. G. Science can get confession. Fordham law Rev., 1939, 5, 334f.
35. Trovillo, P. A history of lie detection. Amer. J. police Sci., 1939, Nos. 6 and 1, 29-30.
36. Wenger, M. A., Engel, B. T., and
Clements, T. L. Initial results with the magnetometer method of
recording stomach motility. Amer. Psychologist, 1955. 10, 452. (Abstract)
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Through the years some lay and professional people
have considered hypnosis almost a magical means of influencing others,
curative, mystical, bordering on the supernatural. This has been so
largely because the phenomenon of hypnosis seems to allow for a high
degree of control of the subject's behavior. However, over the years,
too, evidence has been accruing to suggest that hypnosis is neither
fraudulent as some have maintained nor is it so mysterious as to defy
experimental analysis.
Because of the apparent control of behavior during
hypnosis it has understandably been proposed as a tool for
interrogation. This chapter aims to evaluate these proposals. There is
an utter dearth of literature concerning the actual use of hypnosis in
interrogation. Either this technique has never been used, or if it has,
no one has chosen to discuss it in print. Despite fairly extensive
conversations with experts from a variety of countries, the author has
found no one who admits to familiarity with its use in interrogation.
An approximation to) such usage, however, does exist in isolated
instances with criminal suspects.
Since there is no direct evidence on this problem, it
becomes necessary to analyze the issues and separately evaluate each
question.
________________
This paper is based in part upon work under
a grant from the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology,
Inc.
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behavior appropriate to it,
considerable evidence suggests that at some level the individual
continues to remain aware of the world as it really exists. Another
attribute of the hypnotic state is that the subject experiences it as
discontinuous from his normal waking experience. In association with
this, amnesia for the experience may spontaneously occur. Finally, the
subject generally experiences some compulsion to comply with the
hypnotist's requests, along with a striking disinclination even to wish
resisting them.
It is inappropriate in this context to review in
detail the many theories proposed to account for the clinical
observations. We shall briefly consider some of the theoretical views
most generally held, since their implications differ markedly regarding
the degree to which the state increases the susceptibility of a person
to purposeful influence.
Primarily of historical interest are the views of
Mesmer (13) and his latex followers, who held that hypnosis, or the
Mesmeric trance, results from a flow from the hypnotist to the subject
of a force called animal magnetism. This view is important because it
is the basis of the lingering lay opinion that hypnosis is in some way
an overpowering of a weak mind by a superior intellect. There is no
presentday investigator who would defend this position, and in fact it
is contradicted by recent evidence.
Since the time of Braid (14) in 1843, the view has
been widely held that hypnosis is a state of artificially induced
sleep. More recently, Pavlov (56) proposed a similar view when he
maintained that cortical inhibition, sleep, and hypnosis are
essentially identical. This view is currently held throughout those
parts of the world where Pavlovian theory is accepted as a creed. This
position implies that hypnosis is a state characterized by a profound
neurophysiological alteration and that the subject in trance is somehow
passively compelled to respond when appropriate suggestions are given.
To the American investigator there appears to be overwhelming
experimental evidence against this view. For example, Bass (4) has
shown that the patellar reflex, which disappears in sleep, is not
diminished in hypnosis. Wells (78) et al. have demonstrated that all
hypnotic phenomena can be elicited in a state that in no way resembles
sleep, which would lead one to hypothesize that the sleeplike aspect of
hypnosis is not intrinsic to the state itself but is rather a result of
the suggestion that the subject go to sleep. Barker and Burgwin (3)
have shown that the EEG changes characteristic of sleep do not occur in
hypnosis, although a true sleep may be induced hypnotically. However,
there are two Russian papers (50) which contradict these findings,
claiming that the characteristic rhythm of hypnosis resem-
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bles that of drowsiness and light sleep. These studies have not been replicated.
The view proposed by Janet, Prince, Sidis, Corot,
etc., which was current at the turn of the century, maintains that
hypnosis is a state of temporary dissociation analogous to that which
occurs in hysteria. Although this position seems reasonable in view of
the similarity of the two conditions, it tells us little about the
actual nature of hypnosis. The implicit assumption of this theory-that
hypnosis is a sign of pathology — is not generally accepted today.
The Nancy school, especially Bernheim (9),
revolutionized thinking about the hypnotic state by introducing the
concept of suggestion and suggestibility. This orientation has been
supported most notably by Hull (32), who, in a major monograph on
hypnosis, concluded that hypnosis is primarily a state of heightened
suggestibility. These views focus upon a trait in the subject,
suggestibility, which is heightened by hypnotic induction techniques.
Hull also relates the phenomenon to a habit, insofar as it becomes
increasingly easy for a subject to achieve a state of hypnosis once he
has been able to do so. Although the concepts of suggestion and
suggestibility provide a bridge between hypnosis and the normal waking
state, they do not offer explanations of the causes of the state or of
the ongoing processes of hypnosis.
Welch (77) has attempted to explain hypnosis and its
induction by an ingenious application of conditioning theory, utilizing
the concept of abstract conditioning. He has pointed out that trance
induction proceeds from suggestions which are almost certain to take
effect to those that are more likely to be resisted. Several
suggestions for experimental testing of this theory have never been
followed up.
In contrast to the foregoing views, which focus either
on the hypnotist or on some trait of the subject, several more recent
approaches have been concerned with the interaction between the subject
and the hypnotist. Schilder (63), White (83), and Sarbin (61) have all
in one way or another emphasized the social relationship which exists
in the hypnotic situation and especially the needs of the subject in
this context. Also, Kubie and Margolin (40) and Milton Erickson (20)
have concentrated on the subject's psychodynamics as being most
relevant to the induction of hypnosis. White's view (83) is perhaps the
first major formulation of this kind, and it represents a major
departure in thinking about the trance state. He emphasizes that
hypnosis takes place because the subject wishes to play the role of the
hypnotized subject as currently defined by the subject and the
hypnotist. It should be noted that the concern is with the subject's
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wish to be hypnotized, and this
motivation is considered of primary importrace to the induction of
hypnosis. All the theories of this group, which might be called the
"motivational theories" of hypnosis, emphasize the subject's wish to be
in a hypnotic trance. Although other concepts are of necessity evoked
to explain various phenomena in hypnosis, the actual occurrence of the
trance state is related to the wish of the subject to enter hypnosis.
This writer is a proponent of this approach, and the critical comments
in this report are undoubtedly colored by this viewpoint.
It is important to recognize that almost no
experimental work has been done that would support the validity of
these various theoretical views, although there is some evidence
already mentioned which tends to refute some of them. The general
acceptance of the motivational view is based on the clinical impression
of both experimentalists and clinicians that it accounts best for the
major portion of the clinical data.
Trance is commonly induced in situations where the subject is motivated a priori
to cooperate with the hypnotist, for example, to obtain relief from
suffering, to contribute to a scientific study, or (as in a stage
performance) to become, temporarily at least, the center of attraction.
Almost all the currently available knowledge about hypnosis has been
derived from these situations, and it is well to keep in mind the
source of these data when one attempts to evaluate the possible utility
of hypnosis in situations differing from these.
There is a small body of evidence stemming from the
criminal cases in which hypnosis has allegedly played a role, which are
radically different from those where hypnosis is normally observed.
Because these situations may be more relevant to the questions of
hypnosis in interrogation, this body of knowledge deserves particular
attention and is discussed subsequently.
The initial problem in utilizing hypnosis for
interrogation is to induce trance. It is to be expected that if the
subject wishes to withhold information he will not 'wish to enter
hypnosis. Therefore, hypnosis must either be induced against the
subject's will or without his awareness. A common conception of
hypnosis holds that it may be induced without any prior relationship
between subject and
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hypnotist and regardless of the subject's needs
in the situation, with only the hypnotist suddenly gazing at his
victim and commanding him to fall asleep. A motivational view of
hypnosis would hold that trance induction depends upon the subject's
needs of the moment and his expectation that the hypnotic relationship
is to fulfill them. In this section we will evaluate trance induction
procedures from the viewpoint of their dependence upon a positive
relationship between subject and hypnotist and the subject's wish to
cooperate.
There are three situations in which hypnosis has been reported to
have been induced without the subject's awareness. In the first,
hypnosis is induced while the subject is asleep. Another arises when
the subject is seeking psychiatric help and hypnosis is induced in the
course of a clinical interview with no explicit mention of the
process. The third situation involves a trance spontaneously entered
by individuals who are observing trance induction in another
subject.
1. Sleep. The older literature is replete
with statements that hypnosis may readily be induced by giving
suggestions to sleeping subjects in a low but insistent voice; the
subject becomes gradually more responsive to the suggestions until
eventually he enters a somnambulistic state of hypnosis [ Bernheim
(9), Braid (14), Binet and Fere (12), etc.]. Unfortunately, there are
no cases given to support these statements. As so often the case in
hypnosis literature, the statements appear to have been carried over
from one textbook to another without any critical evaluation.
In a recent study by Theodore X. Barber (2) sleeping subjects were
requested to perform standard hypnotic tasks. He found considerable
similarity between compliance to suggestions given during sleep and
reactions to customary hypnotic techniques. It should be pointed out
that, in his study, Barber requested permission from the subjects to
enter their rooms at night and talk to them in their sleep. Several of
them remarked that this was hypnosis, and one may reasonably assume
that most, if not all, of the subjects perceived that trance induction
was the purpose of the study. This study, therefore, tells us little
about what would happen if a truly naive sleeping subject were exposed
to such a situation. No investigation is available on this
point. Casual experimentation by the author failed to demonstrate the
feasibility of this technique. The sample consisted of only four
subjects, three of whom awakened to ask belligerently what was taking
place, whereas the fourth continued to sleep.
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Perhaps as in sleep learning (which seems to be
effective only in a twilight state), response to suggestion may be
obtained only in a receptive subject who has agreed to participate in
the study and who is neither deeply asleep nor fully awake. Whether any
increase in suggestibility over the normal waking state occurs has
never been established.
2. Rhythmic, Repetitive
Stimulation. Many trance induction techniques utilize the
fixation of the subject's attention on a rhythmic, repetitive
stimulus. Thus, metronomes, rotating spirals, mirrors, and swinging
pendulums (75) [even the subject's own breathing (39)] have been used
to induce hypnosis. In another context, the trance phenomena seen
among primitive people frequently occur in ceremonies involving
prolonged stimulation by rhythmic drums. Many authors have emphasized
the importance of monotonous rhythmic verbal suggestions, especially
during the induction stage of hypnosis. Recently, Kroger and Schneider
(38) have proposed the use of an electronic aid which gives a
repetitive signal approximating the alpha range of ten cycles per
second as an adjunct. It is not clear whether these techniques
directly facilitate hypnosis or whether they tend to produce a state
of drowsiness that is interpreted by the subject as "I'm responding to
hypnosis" which, in turn, facilitates further responses to
suggestions. Certainly, the use of such techniques or even of
monotonous rhythmic speech is by no means necessary in order to induce
hypnosis.
All sophisticated discussions of hypnotic trance induction
recognize that a successful response to a suggestion will facilitate
further successful responses to suggestions. Even early descriptions
of eye fixation advise the hypnotist to wait until the subject begins
to show signs of fatigue and only then begin to give
suggestions to the effect that the subject's eyes are growing
heavy. Ideally, the hypnotist times these suggestions to occur
immediately preceding the time when the subject begins to
experience heaviness. Thus he takes the credit for having induced the
state of drowsiness that is an inevitable consequence of eye
fixation. Mechanical aids of this type may facilitate induction only
to the extent that they bring about an event that is attributed to the
suggestive effect of the hypnotist. However, it is also possible, as
some of the proponents of these techniques suggest, that a
neurophysiological basis exists for the facilitation of hypnosis. In
this context it is relevant that road hypnosis and the break-off
phenomenon encountered by pilots occurs in individuals subjected to
peculiar types of repetitive, rhythmic stimulation despite a
high
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motivation to retain alertness. An
intriguing question on which no evidence exists is the relationship of
hypnotizability and susceptibility to road hypnosis or the break-off
phenomenon. Furthermore, in the context of this discussion, the
utilization of rhythmic stimuli as aids to trance induction is
particularly relevant insofar as being subjected to such stimulation
does not require the individual's cooperation. Whether an actual
relationship exists between the drowsiness which can thus be induced
and hypnosis is highly questionable and remains to be
investigated. What is a somewhat more likely possibility is that
drowsiness may be induced even in the uncooperative subject which may
be attributed to some hypnotic influences. This would then tend to
make the subject more liable to respond to other suggestions. Clearly,
it is an area that might fruitfully be explored. No investigation
utilizing such procedures in recalcitrant subjects has been made. In a
later section on "magic room" techniques, the implications of using
this and related tools are explored.
3. In a Therapeutic
Relationship. Studies by Adler and Secunda (1), Sargant and
Fraser (62), Schneck (65), and Rosen (59) have used techniques of
trance induction which were aimed at preventing the subject from
knowing that he was being hypnotized. These techniques all depended
upon the subject's desire to obtain help with his problems from a
therapist. It is frequently possible to utilize the therapeutic
situation in such a manner as to achieve a hypnotic state
eventually. For example, the therapist may talk to the patient about
relaxing, and the virtues of relaxing, or the virtues of
concentrating, thus obtaining his fixation on one particular
object. He may suggest that the patient will be more comfortable if he
closes his eyes, that in this way the patient can relax more or
concentrate better. Thus, in a suitable subject a deep level of
hypnotic trance can be achieved in a relatively brief period of time
without ever using the term hypnosis and without the subject ever
being aware that hypnosis is taking place. Meares (46) uses the
neurological examination in this fashion as a test for
hypnotizability.
In all the instances cited it must be emphasized that although the
subject does not explicitly consent to enter hypnosis, a relationship
of trust and confidence exists in which the subject has reason to
expect help from the hypnotist. Furthermore, the hypnotist is an
individual of high reputation and high prestige and there is some
legitimacy in the subject's expectations. Standard medical practice
includes many maneuvers by the physician which are essentially
meaningless rituals to the average patient, and to which the
patient
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complies without hesitation because
it is assumed by him that this will eventually benefit him. These
situations, despite their outward similarity, differ greatly from those
where trance induction is attempted by a stranger, without the
subject's knowledge or consent.
4. Spontaneous Trance. Subjects
who observe hypnosis in a demonstration may spontaneously enter
trance. An experience of the author's concerning a psychotherapy
patient with whom hypnosis had been used may be cited as an
example. The author appeared on an educational television program
where he demonstrated various hypnotic phenomena with several
subjects. The patient watched the program in a friend's home. She
reported that when the author induced trance in the subjects, she went
into a trance, coming out of it when the author terminated trance in
the television subjects. Spontaneous hypnosis occurred despite the
fact that its appearance was a source of embarrassment to the patient
since she was in the company of friends.
It is fairly easy to maximize the probability of this occurrence by
mentioning the possibility of this phenomenon and conveying one's
expectation that this may happen. Here again we are dealing with
subjects who are essentially in sympathy with the purposes of trance
induction in a situation which is viewed as safe by the individual
entering trance. Again, no conclusions can be drawn as to the
feasibility of inducing trance empathically in a subject who does not
wish to enter trance. It has been rioted clinically that individuals
who have negative attitudes about hypnosis do not enter hypnosis under
these circumstances. White's (86) study, in which he has demonstrated
that subject's attitudes about hypnosis, as shown on the TAT, are
predictive of their hypnotizability, is relevant here.
We have been able to uncover only three studies that
experimentally test whether a subject can resist the induction of
hypnosis. Wells (80) instructed his subject to fight actively against
trance induction — the subject was unable to resist. It should be
mentioned that this subject had been previously hypnotized by Wells.
This study was replicated by Brenman (16) who arrived at the same
conclusions.
An even more dramatic experiment is reported by
Watkins (74), again dealing with a subject who had previously been
hypnotized by the experimenter. A nurse, who was known as a good
subject, voiced the opinion to Watkins that under no circumstances
could she be hypnotized against her will. He took the challenge and
they set up
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an experiment. Another nurse and a
female psychiatrist were asked to witness the experiment. A dollar bill
was placed in front of the subject and she was told that she could keep
it if she did not enter trance. However, Watkins is careful to point
out that this was a matter of prestige, not of monetary remuneration.
Since no restrictions were placed on the subject, she closed her eyes,
plugged her ears, talked and shouted. Watkins, speaking close to her
ear, suggested that she would feel a pain in her head which would grow
stronger and stronger, and that the only relief she would find would be
to enter a deep sleep. The subject paused at times, removed her fingers
from her ears to hold her head, and said that her head hurt. After six
minutes she stopped shouting, tossed the dollar bill at the
experimenter, and said, "Here, take it," and went into trance.
In determining the significance of these experiments,
we feel that the "demand characteristics" of the situation are
relevant. Demand characteristics are defined as those aspects of the
experimental situation which implicitly convey the hypothesis of the
experimenter to the subject. The author, in another publication (52),
has shown that the demand characteristics of an experimental situation
may greatly influence a subject's hypnotic behavior. It is clear that
at some level a cooperative subject wishes an experiment to "work out,"
i.e., to help fulfill the experimenter's expectations. If a subject
grasps the purpose of the experiment and/or the bias of the
experimenter, he is disposed toward producing behavior which will
confirm the experimenter's hypothesis. This is particularly true in a
hypnotic relationship.
In all three studies, the subject had previous trance
experiences with the hypnotist, which, we may assume, initiated a
positive relationship between the subject and hypnotist. Although the
subject was instructed to resist entering hypnosis, it was in the
context of participating in an experiment to test this issue. It seems
possible that in all three cases the subject was responding as if the
experimenter were implicitly asking the subject to collaborate with him
in order to demonstrate that trance could be induced despite the
subject's resistance. The subject's motivation in this situation may be
conceptualized as: (a) the overt attitude of resistance requested
during the experiment and (b) the more fundamental attitude of
cooperation to show that trance can be induced against a subject's
will. In our view, the latter attitude was more relevant in determining
the subject's behavior.
The author feels that, because of the preceding
objections, these three studies offer no conclusive evidence regarding
the question of
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the possibility of inducing trance
in a resistant subject who has been previously hypnotized. An
experimental situation designed to test this question would have to
take two variables into account: (a) the usually positive relationship
between subject and hypnotist and (b) the demand characteristics of the
situation. These two factors are necessary since in the setting of
interrogation the aims of subject and hypnotist are apt to be at
variance. One possible experimental design might involve two
experimenters: one with whom the subject has a positive relationship,
and the hypnotist with whom he does not. It should somehow be conveyed
to the subject that the experimenter with whom he has the positive
relationship believes (or hypothesizes) that the subject will be able
to refrain from entering trance. Under these circumstances, we
hypothesize that the hypnotist will be unable to induce trance in the
resisting subject. We further assume that if the hypnotist is able to
create a positive relationship, he would then be successful. In other
words, whether a subject will or will not enter trance depends upon his
relationship with the hypnotist rather than upon the technical
procedure of trance induction. Admittedly, these predictions are based
on extremely subtle phenomena. A test of these hypotheses would
necessitate observers trained in evaluating nuances of feelings in
order to be able to judge the nature of the relationship between
subject and hypnotist. It is imperative that this factor be controlled
if we are to draw any valid conclusions about an interrogation
situation, since a positive relationship may come into existence only
after it has been carefully nurtured.
The same kind of situation could be utilized in
studying the induction of trance in resistant subjects who have never
before been hypnotized. No data are available on this question.
However, the problem is identical to the one discussed above except,
perhaps, that additional resistances would be encountered.
In summarizing the evidence we are led to the
conclusion that despite many apparent indications that hypnosis can be
induced without the subject's knowledge or consent, all these
situations seem to depend upon a positive relationship between subject
and hypnotist. The most favorable of these situations occur when the
subject (a) expects to derive benefit from his association with the
hypnotist and (b) has trust and confidence in the hypnotist's ability
to help. No reliable evidence exists that hypnosis can be induced
directly from sleep in an unaware subject, nor is there good evidence
that a subject is unable to resist trance induction if thoroughly
motivated
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to do so. An unexplored area
relevant to this problem is the relationship of rhythmic stimulation
and environmentally induced states of fatigue to suggestibility. It is
also suggested that the question of whether hypnosis can be induced
against the subject's will can be tested only by experiments that
control the relationship between subject and hypnotist. In a study that
utilized a hypnotist unknown to the subject and where the structure of
the total situation was clear to the subject that it was desired and
expected that he be able to resist hypnosis, current theory and
clinical data lead us to expect negative results. No studies of this
kind have been done, however.
Assuming an interrogator were able to circumvent the
technical obstacles and induce hypnosis in a subject who wants to
withhold information, to what extent would the subject remain master of
his fate, even in deep trance? This is an area where wide disagreements
prevail among authorities and where experimental evidence is highly
contradictory.
Throughout this discussion no differentiation will be
made between behavior that results from direct suggestion and that
induced posthypnotically. Erickson and Erickson (21) maintain that
posthypnotic behavior is performed in a self-limited hypnotic state.
All phenomena elicited by means of posthypnotic suggestions may also be
seen in trance, although the reverse is not always true. In line with
Erickson and Erickson, we feel that the subject carrying out
posthypnotic suggestions is in an hypnotic trance state, although at
times a less intense one. The difference between the two states, if
any, seems to be a difference in degree rather than kind.
Young (84) reports that subjects resist specific
hypnotic suggestions if they have decided in advance to do so. Wells
(79), on the other hand, reports contrary data. He found that none of
his subjects was able to resist the predicted command or, indeed, any
other. This contradiction exemplifies the controversial nature of the
question of behavioral control in hypnosis. The problem has generally
focused on the more specific question of whether a person can be
induced through hypnosis to violate major social prohibitions which he
has internalized or to commit some self-destructive act. It is the
usual practice to use the term "antisocial acts" to refer to such
behavior, but in this chapter terms more descriptive of the subjective
significance of the act for the person are preferred.
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The question is usually phrased in terms of whether an
individual will commit antisocial or self-destructive acts in response
to direct suggestion. Behavior considered to be antisocial is that
which is so defined by the culture in which the individual has been
raised. However, the question is complicated by the fact that some
behavior is defined as antisocial in one context and as socially
required in another, for example, murder vs. the soldier's obligation
to fight. One of the major research difficulties is that some behaviors
are considered taboo under normal circumstances, whereas they are felt
to be legitimized in an experimental setting. The extent to which
behavior is legitimized in this manner will depend largely on the
subjects orientation both to the behavior in question and toward
experimentation. All the material in the following discussion must be
viewed in terms of the major difficulty of creating a situation which
is contrary to the individual's internalized controls and which cannot
be legitimized by the situation in which it is tested. Heron (31),
Kline (35), Marcuse (43), Weitzenhoffer (76), etc., have discussed the
problem of definition in evaluating the literature on hypnotically
induced antisocial behavior.
The early view in this controversy over the
elicitation of "antisocial" behavior, which answered the question in
the negative, had been generally accepted until recently. Still, such
classic authors as Forel (23) and Moll (48) believe that hypnosis is
potentially capable of allowing sexual assault.
Supporting the negative view is the classic experiment
reported by Janet (34). He asked a deeply hypnotized female before a
distinguished group of judges and magistrates to stab people with
rubber daggers, to poison them with sugar tablets, and in this fashion
to commit several "murders," all of which she did without hesitation.
As the company dispersed, the subject was left in charge of some of the
younger assistants who, intending to end the experiments on a lighter
note, suggested to the subject that she was alone and would undress.
This promptly caused her to awaken. It should be noted that the
"murders" were committed in such a way as to be play acted, whereas
undressing would have certainly been real to the subject. In this
classic instance, at least, she had no difficulty in discerning the
difference. If, then, hypnotic subjects do not lose contact with the
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"real" situation, can they be
induced to violate internalized prohibitions? Several modern
investigators claim that this is indeed possible.
Wells (80), in an experimental demonstration, induced
a subject by means of a posthypnotic suggestion to take a dollar bill
from the hypnotist's coat which was hanging on the wall and to accept
it as his own money. Thus, in effect, the subject stole a dollar bill.
The subject was unaware of this "crime" and denied vehemently that he
had committed it. Wells maintains that failures to induce a subject to
commit certain acts do not negate this possibility since the subject
may not have been hypnotized deeply enough or improper techniques may
have been used; whereas even one success demonstrates the possibility
of achieving this result.
Brenman (16) conducted a series of experiments
involving minor aberrant and self-injurious acts. Thus, in repeating
the Wells study, she had a subject remember falsely that she had taken
$2 instead of $1. The subject returned the $2 to the experimenter. She
also was able to induce one subject to go through other people's
pocketbooks, and to have another subject insult an acquaintance.
Schneck and Watkins in two separate reports cite
evidence that behavior ordinarily constituting a crime can be produced
by hypnosis. Both these reports deal with military situations. Schneck
(64) inadvertently caused a soldier to commit a military offense by
carrying out a posthypnotic suggestion and thus deserting his duty. It
must be remarked, however, that Schneck himself was a medical officer
in the army at the time he was conducting this experiment. Although the
soldier may have neglected his duty, it was implicitly at the order of
the medical officer and Schneck later made certain that no harm came to
the soldier because of his military offense.
Watkins' (73) experiments, also conducted in this
setting, are of particular relevance to us. Watkins induced a soldier
to strike a superior officer by suggesting that the officer was a
Japanese soldier and, according to the report, the soldier had to be
restrained from inflicting serious injury to his officer. In another
more relevant instance, Watkins was able to obtain information from a
WAC under hypnosis which she had previously said she would not reveal
and which was classified SECRET. The experimental demonstration took
place before a professional group. Before the induction of hypnosis the
WAC was asked how she would respond to interrogation by the enemy; she
replied that she would reveal only her name and serial number. The
hypnotist asked the subject to pretend that he was a German military
intelligence officer and then proceeded to induct
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trance. When the WAC was in hypnosis
he represented himself as her First Sergeant and proceeded to question
her about classified matters, She answered all of his queries,
whereupon an officer stopped the proceedings "in the interest of
military security."
Although these demonstrations appear convincing, they
are open to the criticism that Watkins was an Army officer and although
offenses were apparently committed, no serious damage could possibly
result in this setting. At some level, at least, the individuals in
question must have been aware of this fact.
A different type of experimental situation was
constructed by Rowland (60) and also by Young (86). Two experiments
were performed; one required that the subject throw acid at a research
assistant, the other that he pick up a rattlesnake. Rowland's original
experiments employed an invisible glass which protected the research
assistant from the acid, and an invisible wire screen which prevented
the subjects from picking up the rattlesnake. Although there were only
two subjects in each experiment, all four carried out the hypnotist's
commands. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that, in one case,
this was a highly corrosive acid, and in the other, that this was a
poisonous snake.
Young (86) slightly changed the conditions of the
experiment by using a harmless snake which looked almost identical with
a water moccasin and replacing the acid with tinted water while the
subject was not looking, thus obviating the need for screens or
invisible glass which might be perceived by the subject. The similarity
of the colored water to the acid was dramatically shown by the fact
that in one instance the experimenters themselves became confused and
acid was thrown at the research assistant, necessitating the immediate
use of first aid. Again the subjects performed both the homicidal and
the self-destructive acts in the laboratory. Both experimenters report
that normal control subjects in the waking state refused to pick up the
rattlesnake or throw the acid when requested to do so.
Although these experiments seem to be extremely
convincing, we must take into account the setting in which they were
conducted. All the situations were clearly experimental ones, and were
perceived as such by the subjects. The hypnotists who request the
homicidal or self-destructive behavior are known to the subjects as
reputable men. It is highly probable that the subjects, at some level,
were convinced that in the experimental situation no serious harm would
be permitted to come to anyone. This kind of situation is similar to
that of a stage magician who asks a volunteer from the audience to cut
off some individual's head with a guillotine which has been
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convincingly demonstrated. Under
these conditions volunteers from the audience will readily trip the
appropriate lever. This could be be construed to be a homicidal act
were it not for the fact that the volunteer from the audience knows
full well that some kind of trick is operating that will prevent any
harm from occurring, even though he cannot see the mechanism of the
trick or know how it works. The question may be raised why control
subjects in the waking state refused to perform these acts. One wonders
whether the expectation that they ought not to do this was somehow
communicated to them. Ways in which these objections might be met
experimentally are discussed later.
By far the most sophisticated attempt to deal with
this problem of the possible recognition of the situation as unreal has
been undertaken by Kline (35). Unfortunately, only one subject was
involved. He performed an antisocial act, however, which was "not only
antisocial but punishable by law." Furthermore, while the subject had
agreed to participate in a study to test the legal implications of
hypnosis, the act was undertaken in a setting outside of the laboratory
which was, to all intents and purposes, "real" (personal
communication). The act, which is not detailed in the paper "for
reasons of legality and recognizability," was clearly opposed to the
internalized inhibitions of the subject. By most reasonable normative
criteria, it would be viewed as highly objectionable. Four
experimenters, competent hypnotists, failed in their attempts to induce
the subject to perform the act. When the subject's perception of the
reality situation was altered, however, he was willing to perform the
action for three of the four experimenters. The experimenter for whom
he refused revealed later that she herself was upset by the nature of
the requested act and by the deception. In a further experiment the
subject was reassured that the action was all right but no perceptual
alteration was used. Under these conditions he was willing to perform
the action for only one of the experimenters. It was also possible to
induce the subject to perform the act by first requesting him to
visualize its performance before directly requesting the action.
This study is particularly interesting in that the
subject was willing under some situations to perform an action for the
experimenter with whom he had the best rapport but not for the others.
He refused to perform this action in the waking state despite the
experimenters' attempts at persuasion.
Probably the most convincing aspect of this study is that with varying conditions, all, some, or none of the experimenters could
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induce the subject to perform the
act. The limitations of the study are that only one subject was
employed and that the subject was himself interested in investigating
the legal implications of hypnosis. In this context, it is interesting
both that the subject had amnesia for his action and that after he was
finally informed of his behavior he felt that the need to demonstrate
the point made the experiment legitimate. Further investigation along
this line, especially utilizing subjects less ego-involved in the
purpose of the study, would seem necessary in order to draw a more
definitive conclusion.
Speaking for the negative in this controversy is an
experiment reported by Haupt (30). The subject was a student who was in
hypnotherapy with Haupt. The posthypnotic suggestion was given that the
student would, upon awakening, pick up Haupt's notebook, leaf through
it, and read it. This is an action which the author feels the student
would never have dared under normal circumstances. After waking, the
student rose, went to the table, looked at the open notebook and asked:
"Here you write your notes, don't you?" He made no attempt to pick it
up or read it. When memory for the posthypnotic suggestion was
restored, the student reported that he had felt a drive to read the
notebook but restrained himself. Haupt observes that the subject's
behavior was a compromise between the suggestion and what was socially
acceptable and that since this minor infraction was not performed, it
is not possible to induce more deviant behavior by means of hypnosis.
A fairly elaborate study by Erickson (19), reporting
some thirty-six individual experiments, supports the view that
violations of social prohibitions cannot be achieved in
hypnosis. This study is open to question in view of the reported
results in laboratory settings by others. Erickson is known to his
subjects as a responsible investigator. The fact that he did not have
any positive results would lead one to wonder if he did not implicitly
convey his expectations of refusal. In view of the relationship between
subject and hypnotist in both the Haupt and Erickson studies, it may be
that the subject would act in accordance with the hypnotist's implicit
expectations.
In a review of the literature on this subject
Weitzenhoffer (75) attempts to reconcile the contradictory evidence on
inducing socially prohibited behavior. He points out that attempts
which have been successful are those in which the subject was given a
hallucinated pseudo-situation which redefined the behavior as socially
acceptable. An instance of this would be the Wells' (80) demonstration.
He induced the subject to "steal" a dollar bill by being told it was
his own money. Thus, from the subject's viewpoint he was no longer
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committing a transgression.
Weitzenhoffer attributes failure to induce subjects to perform
"antisocial" acts to those situations in which the subject perceives
the transgressive nature of his behavior. This explanation, although
seductive at first glance, does not appear to do justice to the
literature. Erickson attempted in some instances to create this type of
situation and obtained negative results. On the other hand, Schneck was
unaware of the normative implications of his posthypnotic suggestion at
the time it was given. Nor was there any attempt to disguise the
dangerous nature of the situations in the Rowland or Young experiments.
It seems appropriate, in this context, to note that
frequently subjects in hypnosis appear to show an increase of
super-ego-type inhibitions. This has been pointed out by Gindes (27)
and has been observed by the author. Bramwell (15) reports a case that
clearly illustrates this point. A patient suffering from pulmonary
disease was treated by hypnotic suggestion by her physician in the
presence of a nurse. Before trance was terminated, the physician
remembered that he had not examined the patient that week, and asked
her to bare her chest so that he could examine her. Much to his
amazement, the patient refused to do so despite the fact that this was
a routine procedure to which she had never objected in the past. After
the patient was awake, the physician again asked her and she permitted
him to proceed with the examination without any objection. The nurse
asked the patient sometime later why she had refused in hypnosis, and
the patient expressed disbelief that she had done so. Under some
circumstances, at least, behavior normally prohibited but appropriate
to the situation will not be carried out in hypnosis. Apparently, under
hypnosis the subject may interpret interpersonal motives and intentions
differently from when they occur in the waking state.
To satisfy the requirements of an adequately
controlled investigation of violations of internalized prohibitions in
hypnosis, a number of conditions would have to be met. These have not
been dealt with in any experimental study to date.
As has been pointed out previously, the experimental
situation legitimizes much behavior which the subject, in other
contexts, views as contrary to his internalized prohibitions. It is
desirable to determine whether the behavior is also legitimized in the
experimental setting by subjects who are not hypnotized. One way in
which this can be determined economically 'is to utilize a control
group of
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subjects who are highly motivated to
simulate hypnosis in order to deceive the experimenter. If the
experimenter is not aware that the subjects are simulating, he will
treat them as he does real subjects. If these controls perform the
antisocial act, we may assume that the experimental situation itself
has legitimized behavior that appears to be antisocial. A refusal of
the control subjects to perform the given action would lend support to
the hypothesis that the behavior cannot be legitimized solely by the
experimental situation.
An additional possibility must be considered. Abundant
evidence exists that under some circumstances of social legitimization,
individuals indulge in behavior that is ordinarily viewed as
antisocial; for example, lynching behavior, or extreme exhibitionism
and sexual license in association with drinking or marijuana. In some
instances, hypnosis may provide the legitimization for behavior which
the person wishes to perform but which he feels he cannot do under
normal circumstances. It is not clear whether it is hypnosis per se or
the hypnotic situation which is instrumental in the production of these
acts. Clinical evaluation of each experimental subject thus becomes
necessary for an understanding of the motivations involved.
If we assume that the subject, even in deep hypnosis,
retains an awareness of his surroundings and at some level a grasp of
the actual realities of the situation no matter how subjectively real
his hallucinated environment is, it becomes necessary to take into
account the total situation in order to evaluate the true meaning of
the subject's behavior. Thus, no set of experiments which asks the
subject to violate a social prohibition in a psychological laboratory
of a university, and which is conducted by individuals known to be
reputable investigators by the subject, can provide definitive answers.
The only purpose for which a psychologist would ask a subject to throw
acid at another individual would be to contribute to science or new
knowledge. And even these aims would be precluded by a concern for the
safety of the individuals involved. Thus the behavior, however
antisocial on the surface, is not contrary to the subject's values in
its total context.
A better test of the question would be an experiment
performed by someone who is not known to be a university professor. For
example, a carnival hypnotist might suggest to a subject obtained as a
volunteer during a demonstration that he return after the performance.
At that time during a reinduced trance he would suggest that he should
rob the local jewelry store and bring him, the hypnotist, the stolea
jewelry. This kind of an experiment would be psychologically totally
different from anything which has ever been attempted in
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a laboratory. The following
conditions would have been met: (a) the behavior would be in fact
criminal, (b) the motive of the hypnotist would be clearly for personal
or financial gain, (c) the hypnotist would not have a reputation as a
serious responsible investigator, and (d) the relationship between the
subject and the hypnotist is of brief duration and would not in itself
in any way justify the type of action being undertaken by the subject
for the hypnotist.
It is possible to approximate closely this type of
situation in a college environment. Thus, a graduate student assistant
might utilize a subject in an "unauthorized" trance-induction, and
request that the subject enter one of the senior-professors' rooms and
appropriate a Ph.D. examination paper, which the subject knows to be
confronting the graduate student. The arrangements required to make
this kind of a study feasible would be more practical and the test of
the hypothesis almost as severe. "Simulating" hypnotic controls would
be necessary to determine whether the situation is still perceived as
experimental by the subject.
What appears to be more relevant for the subject of
interrogation are those reported instances of criminal behavior that
were allegedly induced by hypnotic means. Considerable interest has
been expressed by the legal profession in this problem, and it has
generally been held that a crime committed under hypnosis would be the
responsibility of the hypnotist rather than that of the subject. For
this reason the plea of hypnotic influence has at various times played
a role in legal defense. There are a fair number of cases on record
prior to 1900, particularly among the German-speaking peoples (29).
Unfortunately, it is hard to evaluate these cases objectively at this
late date. For the most part, they deal with sexual offenses and we
must point out that hypnotic influence is often claimed to justify
behavior which might have been quite desirable to the subject at the
time of its occurrence. It has never been clearly demonstrated that
hypnosis has played a significant role in these cases, and it seems in
several instances that the relatives, rather than the subject, claimed
hypnotic influence.
We will discuss briefly the three documented cases
which have been reported within recent years in which hypnosis has
allegedly played a role in criminal behavior. Each of these three cases
was studied extensively by psychiatrists. One was studied by Walther
Kroener (58), another by Ludwig Mayer (44), and the most recent case by
Paul Reiter (58).
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In the case he
studied, Kroener reports that a sensitive, young, unmarred, male
schoolteacher came under the hypnotic influence of a "frieadly"
neighbor. The relationship began with neighborly hospitality and
proceeded to the point where, by means of hypnotic suggestion, the
neighbor induced the schoolteacher to give or lend him small sums of
money and goods. In order to test his power over the schoolteacher the
hypnotist gave him a posthypnotic suggestion that he (the victim) would
shoot himself in the left hand. The schoolteacher actually did shoot
himself in his left elbow joint, subjectively perceiving the event as
an accident. By means of a posthypnotic suggestion the hypnotist
induced his victim to confess to crimes that the hypnotist had
committed. Throughout the entire affair, which lasted for five years,
the schoolteacher had no recollection of the hypnotic sessions. The
schoolteacher was convicted, but began to suspect the nature of his
relationship with his neighbor on the basis of a chance remark. After
many appeals he was recommended for examination to Kroener, who
eventually uncovered the true state of affairs by re-hypnotizing the
schoolteacher and thereby causing him to remember all the hypnotic
experiences with his neighbor.
The study by Mayer (44), usually called the Heidelberg
case, involves a twenty-four-year-old housewife who was victimized by a
man who posed as a doctor treating her. Ostensibly he systematically
trained her in hypnosis for seven years. At first he swindled money
from her under the pretense of curing her of various complaints which
he himself had induced by hypnotic suggestion. Later, presumably by
means of his hypnotic influence, he compelled her to have sexual
relations with himself and with his friends. Also as a result of his
suggestions she made six attempts on her husband's life and several
attempts upon her own. The hypnotist was arrested and convicted despite
his consistent plea of not guilty.
The third case, investigated by Reiter (58), deals
with a man who was sentenced to prison for helping the Germans during
the last war. At this time he was in an extremely depressed and
disillusioned frame of mired. While in prison he met a man who
especially fascinated him because of his apparent knowledge of
religion, mysticism, and occultism. The two became friends and
experimented extensively with Voga and hypnotism. They were alone in
the same cell for nearly eighteen months, besides being together in the
workshop every day. After awhile, the hypnotist informed his victim
that he (the hypnotist) was an instrument employed by the guardian
spirit, and that the guardian spirit was speaking to the victim through
the medium of the hypnotist. From that time on the victim felt that
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he had to carry out all the orders
of the guardian spirit. After they were released from prison the men
continued their relationship — and the guardian spirit continued to
make demands. The guardian spirit ordered his victim to turn over his
wages to the hypnotist; he found a girl for the victim to marry and
ordered him to do so, which he did; he ordered him to procure money in
order to establish a political organization through which they could
create a better society and unite the Scandinavian countries, the goal
being the salvation of mankind. It was toward the latter end that the
guardian spirit, through the medium of the hypnotist, pointed out the
bank that the victim was to rob. The robbery was accomplished, and a
year later orders came for another bank robbery. During the execution
of this task the victim committed murder and was apprehended.
In all three cases a common element was present. In
some manner the subject was dissatisfied and the individual who later
became the hypnotist provided gratification. In the first case, the
schoolteacher lived alone, and appeared somewhat isolated because of
insufficient social contacts. The neighbor provided friendship and
initially performed many minor services for him. In the Heidelberg case
the subject initially met the hypnotist in a situation where he
presented himself as a physician who could relieve a symptom that was
causing her acute distress. The subject appeared to have had
psychosomatic symptoms before contact with the hypnotist, which might
have reflected tension in her marriage. Furthermore, the hypnotist
appeared to be a sexually attractive psychopath and hypnosis may have
provided the opportunity for the gratification of some of the victim's
needs. In the last case the subject was dejected with intense feelings
of worthlessness, as an aftermath of collaboration during the war. The
hypnotist became a friend prior to the beginning of the hypnotic
experiments. The intensity of this relationship can be inferred from
the fact that the subject at the time began to feel considerably more
comfortable. Thus, in each case the relationship between subject and
hypnotist was such that the former derived need gratification from the
association.
Frequently relationships exist between two individuals
that have no connection with hypnosis but are marked by intense
feelings and a strong tendency on the part of one individual to comply
with whatever requests are made of him by the other. The transference
relationship seen in psychotherapy is a case in point. If this type of
relationship exists between two individuals, it would seem unnecessary
to employ hypnosis to explain behavior on the part of one person which
benefits the other. Only in the absence of this kind of pre-
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existing relationship is it meaningful to speak of hypnosis as being a necessary prerequisite for the behavior.
Undoubtedly, hypnosis played some role in the cases we
have discussed. However, if we are to make inferences from these data
to the situation of hypnosis in interrogation it is necessary to keep
in mind that the relationship between the interrogator and the subject
is not often comparable to the long-term relationships which existed in
the cases cited.
In summing up the evidence on behavior violating
internalized prohibitions as it is applicable to an interrogation
situation, we find ourselves in the unfortunate position of having no
study available that is not vulnerable to serious criticism. The
experimental laboratory studies suffer from the defects of a
pseudo-reality situation where the "nansgressive acts" cannot be
defined as such in the context of the total situation, and from the
defect of the mutually shared wishes and motives of experimenter and
subject. The only three cases of criminal acts apparently involving
hypnosis which are reliably reported in the recent literature all
involve an intense emotional relationship between hypnotist and
subject. Such a relationship may be difficult to establish in the
interrogation situation. In the absence of meaningful evidence, any
conclusions reached must be of a conjectural nature. Experimental tests
of the question are feasible, but would require camouflage of the
institutional responsibilities of the investigators. The author would
postulate that only in rare interrogation subjects would a sufficiently
deep trance be obtainable to even attempt to induce the subject to
discuss material which he is unwilling to discuss in the waking state.
The kind of information which can be obtained in those rare instances
is still an unanswered question.
Despite the previously discussed technical problems,
it may be possible for an interrogator to obtain information from a
hypnotized subject. Also, a subject may willingly enter hypnosis. In
either case the interrogator must evaluate the veridicality of the
elicited material.
A great deal has been written, especially in the
press, about the unfailing accuracy with which subjects in hypnosis
will recall past events. Statements have frequently been made about
individuals
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having perfect memory in hypnosis,
about their ability to recall anything that has happened to them even
while infants, and, according to some, even prior to birth (37).
Two separate issues have to be examined: (a) is the
subject in hypnosis able to recall historically accurate information
which he cannot remember in the waking state and (b) is information
obtained from a subject in hypnosis necessarily accurate when it has
been suggested to him that he cannot lie?
A mechanism frequently used to facilitate recall is
that of hypnotic age regression. The subject is "regressed" or taken
back in time to the situations toward which recall is directed. For
example, if a subject in deep hypnosis is given the suggestion that he
is, let us say, six years old, he will begin to act, talk, and to some
extent think in the manner of a six year old. He will hallucinate the
appropriate environment and will give such details as the people
sitting next to him in school, teachers' names, color of walls, etc.
The subject's actions under these circumstances are exceedingly
convincing, and it has frequently been assumed that an actual
regression to the suggested age takes place, with many of its
psychologic and physiologic components. It is often assumed that the
information obtained under these circumstances is accurate.
Platonov and Prikhodivny (57) published two studies
which claim to prove the reality of age regression by means of
intelligence tests. One of the most striking studies is by Gidro-Frank
and BowersBuch (25), who demonstrated that the infantile type of
plantar response appeared in subjects who were regressed in age to
approximately five months. Unfortunately they did not investigate
whether the subjects were aware of the type of plantar response to be
expected in infancy. The subject population included medical students
and nurses, and it is reasonable to assume that they were not entirely
naive. Single case studies which claim to demonstrate "real" age
regression have been reported by a variety of investigators: Spiegel,
Shor and Fishman (69), Schneck (66), Mercer and Gibson (47), LeCron
(41), Bergman, Graham, and Leavitt (8), and Kline (36).
Despite these studies, which are based mostly on
single cases, there is little evidence for the validity of hypnotic age
regression. Young (85) in a study using a number of subjects has
demonstrated that their performance on intelligence tests was not
appropriate to their suggested age. Unhypnotized control subjects were
more suc-
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cessful in simulating their age than
were subjects in deep hypnosis. There was no correlation between the
apparent depth of hypnosis and the extent of regression.
Orne (51) conducted a study of hypnotic age regression
in ten subjects employing the Rorschach test and drawing samples, and
was able to demonstrate that, while some regressive elements appeared,
it was clear that nonregressive elements were also present.
Furthermore, the changes toward regression did not show any consistency
from subject to subject. The drawing samples in age regression were
evaluated by Karen Machover who characterized them as "sophisticated
oversimplification." They did not resemble the drawings of six year
olds. For one subject his drawings at age six were available, but there
was not even a superficial resemblance. In this context it is
particularly significant that subjects often gave their teacher's name
with great conviction. Later inquiry disclosed that the names were
inaccurate and did not refer to first grade teachers at all, but to the
subjects' teachers at a much later time.
Finally, there are studies by True and Stephenson (72)
and McCraitie, Crasilneck, and Teter (45) who investigated EEG's taken
during hypnotic age regression. Neither study demonstrated any change
in the direction of a childhood EEG. It is also of interest that these
studies do not report an increased heart rate (present in infants) nor
changes in EKG tracings.
To summarize, the literature on hypnotic age
regression fails to demonstrate that the phenomenon is anything more
than an extremely convincing form of role-playing, as suggested by
Sarbin (61), Young (85), and Orne (51). There is little evidence in any
of these studies to indicate that recall for nonernotional material is
significantly improved.
It is important for our purposes to distinguish
between emotionally neutral material and emotionally charged events,
which are subject to active forgetting or repression. There is abundant
evidence that emotionally laden material that is not normally
accessible can be recovered by hypnosis. Probably it is this phenomenon
which has led to the erroneous assumption that all types of material
may be recalled in this fashion.
Two specific studies deal with memory in hypnosis:
Stalnaker and Riddle (70) asked subjects in hypnosis to recall the poem
"The Village Blacksmith." At first glance, hypnosis appeared to
increase their recall of the poem. Much of the apparent improvement was
due to appropriate confabulation of poetic material in the manner of
Longfellow. The significant point is that subjects in hypnotic
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trance show a marked tendency to
confabulate with apparent verisimilitude. White, Fox, and Harris (82)
demonstrated that hypnosis does not improve memory for recently learned
material, but appears to improve memory for meaningful material, such
as poetry, slightly. They do not make any statements about the accuracy
of reproduction.
Considerably less material is available about the
veracity of the material furnished by a subject in hypnosis. As the
preceding discussion indicates, subjects in deep hypnosis tend to
confabulate in the direction of what they perceive to be expected of
them. We should like to examine the extent to which subjects in
hypnosis can purposely misrepresent material, although it has been
suggested to them that they cannot do this. As we have already
indicated, Young (84) has shown that subjects can resist specific
suggestions if they have decided in advance that they will do so. Wells
(79) had demonstrated the opposite. Earlier quoted comments on demand
characteristics apply to both these studies. The issue remains to be
resolved by an adequate empirical test.
Beigel (6, 7) reports three cases of hypnosis used in
an effort to ascertain the facts in marriage counseling situations. In
a personal communication, he maintains that people in hypnosis may lie,
refuse to answer, or wake up when asked direct questions on sensitive
matters. However, he claims to have successfully elicited information
which subjects were reluctant to reveal in the waking state by means of
a hypnotic reliving of the situation. The crucial factor, in Beigel's
opinion, is the indirect nature of this method, i.e., the subject is
unaware of revealing information since his major concern is the
reliving of an experience. However, this approach utilizes a form of
age regression, and is, as such, subject to the criticisms already made
with regard to this technique. Another objection derives from the fact
that the subject's motivations are not adequately taken into account.
Beigel's subjects were, for the most part, therapy patients. It is,
perhaps, not too far fetched to assume that psychotherapy patients
"want," at some level, to reveal information to their therapist. Nor is
it unreasonable to believe that they "need" to do so. Confessions to a
therapist satisfy multiple needs of patients in psychotherapy.
In reviewing the existing literature we have found
only one author who deals with prevarication under hypnosis (Beigel).
However, our own clinical work has amply convinced us that subjects are
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fully capable of deliberately lying
when motivated to do so. Although this report deals specifically with
hypnosis, it may, at this juncture, be useful to consider also the
question of prevarication under the influeuce of drugs commonly used in
narcosynthesis. Its relevance is confirmed by the findings of Grinker
and Spiegel (28) and others who, in the treatment of traumatic neurosis
by narcosynthesis, obtainod results which closely paralleled those
observed by hypnotic treatment of these neuroses (17). Individual
differences in response to treatment are found both in narcosynthesis
and hypnosis, whereas treatment techniques show marked similarities.
Friedlander (24), Schilder (63), and others have described
trance-induction techniques utilizing sleep-inducing drugs. With these
similarities in manner we feel that it is appropriate to mention here
some of the work done on the question of prevarication under the
influence of these drugs, which as treated in more detail in Chapter 3.
Muehlberger (49), for example, who considers
narcosynthesis as a useful technique, admits that nevertheless, "Unless
supporting evidence is obtainable, the reliability of results of 'truth
serum' tests are open to serious question" (page 524). In a study of
malingering soldiers Ludwig (42) reports that they remained
negativistic and uncommunicative while under drugs.
In a thorough discussion of drug-induced revelation, Dession et al. (18) conclude that:
In some cases correct information may be
withheld or distorted and, in others, erroneous data elicited through
suggestion. Nevertheless, narcoanalysis, when correctly used, may
enable the psychiatrist to probe more deeply and quickly into the
psychological characteristics of the subject. For these reasons, the
results should not be regarded by the psychiatrist as "truth" but
simply as clinical data to be integrated with and interpreted in the
light of what is known concerning the dynamics of the subject's
conflictual anxieties, motivations, and behavioral tendencies.
Thus the bare results of an interview under the
influence of drugs should not, standing alone, be considered a valid
and reliable indicator of the facts. As a sole procedure, narcoanalysis
is not sufficiently reliable.
We feel that these conclusions apply not only to narcoanalysis but to hypnosis as well.
If, as we have proposed, an individual under the
influence of these drags is in a state akin to hypnosis, then the
results of these drug studies support our theory that some subjects may
lie, confabulate, or withhold information while in trance. This poses a
special problem for the military interrogator. Even those informants
who believe they are telling the truth may in fact be offering a
composite of delusion, fantasy, and reality. Thus, the convincing
delivery of
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information obtained under hypnosis may easily lead an interrogator astray.
A mechanism frequently used to facilitate recall is
that of hypnotic age regression. There is no evidence to indicate that
this technique is anything more than a convincing form of role-playing,
real only on an emotional level. Thus it probably does not greatly
facilitate the recall of past events. Hypnosis does not improve recall
for nonmeaningful material, and does so only slightly for meaningful
material. However, there is evidence that emotionally laden material
that is not normally accessible can be recovered in hypnosis. It has
been demonstrated that subjects can be under both hypnosis and drugs.
It is possible that information may be obtained by
hypnosis. Such information may be either accurate or inaccurate.
Inaccuracies may be the result of deliberate prevarication, or of an
unwitting confusion of fantasy and reality. The determination of the
truth or falsity of information obtained in hypnosis would have to be
based on outside criteria.
An interrogator who employs hypnosis may find that his
subject apparently enters trance and gives the desired information. It
is possible that the subject may not be in trance but may be
simulating. The literature on the problem of simulation is extremely
misleading. The classical view holds that subjects are unable to
deceive experienced hypnotists because hypnotic behavior "looks
different" in a number of ways. Furthermore, claims have been made that
in order to detect fraud the hypnotist need only suggest anesthesia to
the subject and test for it with a painful stimulus.
However, there are some indications in the literature
that the detection of simulation is not a simple task. For example,
Pattie (55), a thoroughly experienced investigator, felt that it was
necessary to request his subjects sign forms reading as follows:
I, realizing that the experiment performed
on me will probably be published in a scientific journal, solemnly
declare that I was not faking or imitating the hypnotic trance but that
I was genuinely hypnotized and do not remember the events of the
experimental periods.
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When discussing
this problem with a number of clinicians, one invariably finds that
they report anecdotal evidence of having been deceived at one time or
another. Orne (52) has conducted a series of studies investigating
simulation. He has been unable to discover any physiological indices
which differentiate simulators from deeply hypnotized subjects. In
addition he also found that the overwhelming majority of apparently
naive subjects are capable of simulating well enough to deceive even
experienced hypnotists. Regarding pain, Orne (2) found and Shor (68)
has confirmed that the simulating subjects generally tolerated higher
levels of electric shock than did subjects in deep hypnosis. Using a
fairly wide spectrum of behavioral tasks, they found it was not
possible to differentiate unequivocally between real and simulating
subjects. However, certain kinds of behavior were observed only in the
true hypnotic subjects, although not in all of them. Orne (53) has
termed this behavior "trance logic." It is characterized by a mixture
of hallucinations and perceptions from the real world. Typically, this
mixture controverts the rules of logic normally operating in the waking
state. For example, a subject might describe an hallucination of an
individual sitting in a chair as "I can see Mr. X but I can see the
chair through him." The appearance of trance logic in naive subjects is
always indicative of hypnosis. However, trance logic helps discriminate
neither those real subjects who do not manifest this behavior nor those
simulators who have been taught to demonstrate it.
Considerable research remains to be done on the
recognition of simulating behavior. At our present state of knowledge
it is vital to bear in mind that the deep hypnosis is essentially a
clinical diagnosis. Although under some circumstances this diagnosis
can be made with a high degree of reliability, definitive signs of deep
trance have not yet been identified. Until such pathognomic signs are
developed, a subject trained to employ trance logic may not find it too
difficult to deceive an interrogator.
Three related suggestions have been made for what may
be called the defensive use of hypnosis. Thus, Estabrooks (22) proposed
that hypnosis might be useful in (a) preventing subsequent trance
induction in captured personnel, (b) causing personnel possessing
sensitive information to develop amnesia for this material in case of
capture, and (c) enabling captured personnel to resist stressful and
painful
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interrogations by training them to develop anesthesia and analgesia when required.
These suggestions are ingenious and appealing as
defensive measures. Any objective evaluation of these proposals is made
difficult by the paucity of relevant studies, and we are forced to
extrapolate from the meager evidence available. In judging the
practicality of these suggestions it is necessary first of all to take
into account that only approximately 20%, of the military population
can be expected to go into a sufficiently deep somnambulistic state
conducive to such training. Furthermore, both the full cooperation of
the military personnel involved and the availability of competent
hypnotists would have to be taken for granted. In addition, training
soldiers in this manner would be a time-consuming process.
Training Soldiers to Resist Subsequent
Trance Induction upon Capture. Here we are immediately confronted
with the question of whether trance can be induced against the
individual's wishes and whether posthypnotic suggestions are effective
in preventing trance induction. The first question has been discussed
previously. Although the crucial experiment has not yet been done,
there is little or no evidence to indicate that trance can be induced
against a person's wishes. The proposal to train individuals not to do
something they are able to avoid anyway appears to be of doubtful
utility. It may be sufficient to warn them of possible techniques of
trance induction and inform them that they are able to resist, if they
so desire. In fact, the question ought to be raised whether training
in hypnosis may not precondition an individual for subsequent trance
induction, regardless of suggestions that they ought to resist
hypnosis. There is no evidence that training in hypnosis predisposes
subjects toward trance induction with or without their
cooperation. However, there is considerable evidence that training in
hypnosis makes subsequent trance induction easier with only token
cooperation by the subject.
Effectiveness of Posthypnotic
Suggestions Designed to Prevent Subsequent Trance Induction. As
a matter of routine, subjects are given the suggestion that they will
enter hypnosis only with a competent psychologist or physician, and
only if they desire to do so. It is the writer's practice to suggest
further that they will begin to laugh if one of their friends or a
stage hypnotist attempts to induce hypnosis. Nevertheless, in several
instances these experimental subjects have permitted themselves to
enter hypnosis with individuals whom they
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knew to be inexperienced. At times
they have reported compulsive laughing jags just before falling asleep,
in line with the posthypnotic suggestion, which did not, however,
prevent their entering hypnosis. Two subjects trained in this manner
entered hypnosis while watching a stage demonstration from the
audience, again despite suggestions to the contrary. This observation
has been confirmed by Sutcliffe (71), who has had similar experiences.
Furthermore, the writer has himself hypnotized three subjects who had
received specific suggestions from other hypnotists that they would be
unable to enter trance with anyone else.
Spontaneous Trance. The
spontaneous appearance of trance warrants some consideration. It has
been noted during psychotherapy that patients who have had
considerable hypnotic experience will sometimes use the trance state
as a defense mechanism in order to avoid awareness of painful
material. Such material will emerge during spontaneous trance and will
subsequently be repressed when the patient emerges from the hypnotic
state. The writer has observed this several times in clinical
situations and it has been reported in personal communications by
several other therapists. Since hypnosis may occur spontaneously in
therapeutic situations as a means for avoidance of stressful
situations, it may well occur equally spontaneously in other stress
situations, and could be utilized by an alert interrogator.
We have been able to terminate hypnosis in several
instances when trance had been induced by inexperienced hypnotists who
were unable to terminate it. In these instances it was necessary to
establish a hypnotic relationship with an uncommunicative subject in
deep hypnosis. Contrary to popular belief, this can be accomplished
readily and rapidly usually in less than half an hour. These findings
are relevant to the dangers of spontaneously occurring trance during
interrogation. Thus, although the interrogator may not have induced the
trance, he could assume the role of hypnotist and communicate with the
subject.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it appears
not only fruitless but potentially dangerous to train subjects to
resist subsequent trance induction. If the hypnotist has sufficient
skill and experience, he might well be able to utilize the very
suggestions given against entering hypnosis as the necessary wedge to
induce hypnosis. Thus, if the suggestion has been given that the
subject will not enter trance but
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will laugh, and the hypnotist observes the
subject beginning to laugh, he might suggest that the subject will
begin to laugh more and more and will laugh so hard that he will
become exhausted and go to sleep. In the same manner a posthypnotic
suggestion of a headache or any other subjective experience which
aught to prevent hypnosis can be utilized as a means of inducing it.
Another danger of the hypnotically trained soldier is the greater
likelihood of spontaneous appearance of trance in a stressful
situation such as interrogation. Hence, the use of trance as a means
of preventing subsequent trance induction by a potential captor has
inherent dangers.
More appealing perhaps than the previous suggestion is the
possibility of causing captive subjects to forget whatever sensitive
information they may have learned. Here again we encounter several
technical problems. A blanket suggestion to forget all sensitive
material will frequently fail to take effect. It is well known that
the effectiveness and permanency of a hypnotic suggestion are directly
related to the concrete definition of a specific task. As a rule,
general suggestions such as blanket amnesia have unpredictable effects
even in very good subjects. It may be possible to suggest that a
soldier only remember his name, rank, and serial number in the event
of capture. However, this raises not only the serious question of
whether this could be accomplished but also of whether it might
deprive the soldier of information which may be vital to him during
captivity. A state of severe psychopathology would be artificially
induced, which may be adaptive in some respects but extremely
disturbing in others.
The decision of what to say during interrogation would be made for
the soldier beforehand. The inevitable impoverishment of knowledge
and loss of ego control would furnish the interrogator a very
effective way of controlling his captive. The captive would be
seriously distressed by the feeling of loss of self-evident and
necessary information, and the interrogator would be a able to assume
the role of a helpful individual ready to assist the recall of memory.
Such a quasi-therapeutic relationship would inevitably produce an
alliance between captive and interrogator with concomitant formation
of a strong positive relationship. Recall would eventually take
place, as in the treatment of amnesia under normal circumstances. The
captive's defense would be lowered so that, as recall takes place,
information would tend to be shared with the helpful interrogator.
In other words, the induced psychopathology may be sufficiently
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disturbing to the captive to make
him the easy victim of any technique aimed at relieving his discomfort.
He may become a willing and cooperative subject for hypnosis,
legitimized now as a treatment technique. Sodium pentothal may also be
used, and is generally successful in leading to rapid recall. Since
under these circumstances, control over the information is no longer an
ego function of the captive nor his responsibility, he would feel
little constraint in sharing his knowledge as it comes to him. Only
after re-establishment of complete recall would he became aware of
betraying vital information.
In summary, then, it does not appear feasible to cause
a potential captive to forget sensitive information selectively. Such
discrimination would require that, in giving the posthypnotic
suggestion, the hypnotist would have to be aware of all types of
present and potential future information that the subject has or will
have, and that he make allowance for all eventualities. The
alternative, to cause the soldier to forget everything about himself
other than his name, rank, and serial number, would work only in a
small minority of people. However, even for them a potentially
vulnerable situation would develop, more vulnerable in fact than if no
suggestion had taken place. The artificially induced pathology could
easily be broken down, if recognized as such by the interrogator, who
could secure the cooperation of the soldier by presenting interrogation
as treatment of a sick person. It may be far safer to rely on the
soldier's own ego control to decide what information ought not to be
revealed to an enemy than to make this decision for him by posthypnotic
means. Artificially induced amnesia would deprive the soldier of his
ego functions and put him at the mercy of his captors. This method also
has other serious defects; offensive action, such as escape or
cooperation with fellow prisoners to obstruct interrogation, would be
severely handicapped.
The final suggestion that we should like to discuss in
this section concerns the use of posthypnotic suggestion in training
individuals to resist stress, particularly pain. Extensive information
is available about the use of hypnosis as a means of suppressing pain.
Major surgical operations have been performed with hypnosis as the sole
anesthesic.
Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that with
hypnotic analgesia subjects do not report experiencing pain but
continue to respond physiologically much as they do in the waking state
(Shor, 68). Beecher (5) has shown that patients' reactions to placebos
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(a suggestive phenomenon analogous
to hypnosis) is far greater under situations of great stress and high
anxiety than in the laboratory. It appears that hypnosis and placebos
are most effective in situations of high anxiety and it is probable
that their major effect is on the anxiety component of pain. During
interrogation this component is most threatening to the individual, and
thus hypnosis seems to be a particularly appropriate method of
protection.
Whether such a procedure is feasible depends on a
number of considerations. As stated in preceding sections, only a
relatively small number of individuals will enter a sufficiently deep
somnambulistic state permitting the development of the profound
analgesia necessary for this purpose. Furthermore, the author is not
aware of any instance where a major surgical procedure was undertaken
during posthypnotically induced analgesia. Although we are certain that
in some individuals this is potentially possible, clinicians working
with hypnosis generally believe that the hypnotic state itself is more
efficacious in inducing analgesia than posthypnotic suggestions.
Another question that arises concerns the type of
suggestion which ought to be given to the subject. It would seem
manifestly inappropriate to attempt to suppress any and all pain
sensations that the individual may experience subsequent to hypnosis.
First, we seriously doubt the effectiveness of such a suggestion.
Second, if it should take effect, it may be dangerous since pain serves
a useful function as a physiologic warning signal. It would be more
appropriate to focus the suggestion on the inability to feel pain at
the hands of captors. However, if the subject were captured and felt
any pain at all, the entire suggestion would rapidly break down. This
is likely to occur in all but very few instances. (It is due to this
need for repetitive reinforcement of suggestions of analgesia that
major surgery is undertaken in hypnosis rather than posthypnotically.)
It is generally known that any one failure of a hypnotic suggestion
will diminish the effectiveness of subsequent suggestions. Such failure
will tend to eliminate almost completely the suggestion concerning the
modality where it failed. Here again, the soldier who is taught to rely
on hypnosis as an analgesic and finds it ineffective in certain
situations may be considerably worse off than if he had not trusted
this mechanism in the first place.
It seems, then, that the use of hypnosis in
withstanding stress, and particularly pain, is impractical. Few
individuals are able to enter a trance sufficiently deep to permit
profound analgesia. Furthermore, the analgesia would have to be
produced posthypnotically, a less effective method than that produced
during trance. The post-
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hypnotic suppression of all pain may
also be dangerous to the individual. Finally, if such posthypnotic
analgesia were possible and it should break down, it would leave the
individual more vulnerable than if he had not relied upon this
mechanism at all.
Our findings with individuals who have had
instructions to simulate hypnosis are particularly relevant. Much of
our current research employs simulating subjects as controls and, as we
have pointed out previously, these subjects are willing and able to
tolerate extremely painful stimuli. In fact, in a recent study Shor
(68) found that simulators uniformly tolerate a higher level of painful
electric shock than do subjects in deep hypnosis. These findings
indicate that appropiiate motivating instructions are as effective as
hypnosis in enabling individuals to tolerate laboratory situations of
pain. Whether this also holds true in situations which represent real
danger to the organism, such as major surgery or the threats
encountered during interrogation, remains to be demonstrated. This
suggests that motivational sets might be devised which would
effectively protect personnel against breakdown under stress. How
enduring such motivating instructions are remains to be studied.
One of the main defects of the three proposals
discussed is that each involves a lessening of ego control. There is an
application of hypnosis which might be explored fruitfully since it
relies largely upon the responsibility of the subject for his actions.
This is the technique of autogenous training developed by Schultz (67).
Instead of the usual procedure in which the hypnotist suggests the
occurrence of various events, the subject is taught that he is capable
of inducing them in himself by proper concentration. He is taught the
technique by a series of graduated steps. These are so designed that
each is mastered before the subject is permitted to go on to the next
one. For example, in the initial exercise the subject is taught to
concentrate on his right hand becoming heavy and he is shown the most
advantageous posture. After being shown the exercise by the teacher, he
is instructed to repeat the procedure by himself between three and five
times a day for a two-minute period each. Within a period of two weeks
or so a large proportion of the subject population is able to achieve a
considerable degree of subjective heaviness. He is then
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training may be a technique for
providing the potential captive with an untouchable and effective
technique of mastery in a situation where he is physically totally at
the mercy of his captors.
The suggestion that hypnosis be utilized as a means of
enabling potential captives to withstand enemy interrogation appears
impractical. At best, it could be utilized with an exceedingly small
percentage of subjects. Prevention of subsequent trance induction, by a
posthypnotic suggestion to that effect, seems unlikely. The
posthypnotic induction of amnesia and anesthesia for the event of
capture would leave the captive in a more vulnerable position than he
would have been otherwise, if indeed it is feasible at all. The
training in hypnosis necessary to achieve these phenomena might well
make the subject more accessible to attempts at trance induction by an
enemy interrogator.
Our primary objection to all three of the proposed
suggestions is based on the inevitable result of diminishing the
individual's responsibility for his own actions by placing reliance on
mechanisms outside his ego control. It is preferable and safer to
utilize techniques designed to increase the soldier's ego control and
potential mastery of unpredictable circumstances than to place faith in
a semiconscious mechanism. Information about what the soldier might
expect under conditions of captivity, about the techniques of enemy
interrogation, about the kind of reactions he might experience in
himself would all be desirable in terms of increasing his ego control
and therefore his mastery of a potentially difficult situation. Two
specific techniques designed to enhance ego control were suggested: the
use of motivating instructions and the technique of autogenous training.
The technical reasons for the limited utility of
hypnosis as an instrument of interrogation have been discussed here at
some length. It is highly questionable whether it is possible to induce
a trance in a resistant subject. Furthermore, even if trance could be
induced, considerable evidence indicates that it is doubtful whether a
subject could be made to reveal information which he wished to
safeguard. And finally, it has been shown that the accuracy of such
information, were any to be obtained, would not be guaranteed since
subjects in hypnosis are fully capable of lying. However, it is
possible that both
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hypnosis and drugs, such as
pentothal, scopolamine, sodium amytal, etc., may nonetheless be
applicable to interrogation procedures. It would be well to
differentiate between the effectiveness of hypnosis as such and the
hypnotic situation. The latter seems to offer greater potential
applicability for interrogation purposes.
The psychological meaning of the situation to the
captive during interrogation is one which varies widely from individual
to individual. It is not our purpose here to review the meaning of
capture and interrogation from a psychodynamic viewpoint, 1
but only to consider briefly why individuals will undergo extremes of
physical and mental suffering to prevent the interrogator from
obtaining the desired information. The answer seems to lie in the
extreme guilt such a person would experience were he to collaborate
with the enemy while he is in control of his faculties. His self-image
would suffer especially in terms of his values and his identification
with comrades, country, etc. For interrogation purposes it would be
extremely useful if it were possible to alleviate the guilt of an
informant.
Let us consider the captive who is in fever and delirious, and who
in this condition divulges vital information. Neither he nor his
comrades would hold him responsible for the disclosure. By the same
token a soldier who leaves his post as a guard is subject to court
martial, but if he collapses because of illness he would not be
committing a punishable offense. Parenthetically, it may be noted
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that in many cultures physical
illness would not be accepted as an excuse. For example, in the old
German army a soldier who fainted would be punished. At any rate,
contemporary United States culture clearly excuses the individual when
he is incapacitated. A sophisticated discussion of the relationship of
illness to social responsibility is given by Parson (54).
This principal has been extended to mental illness.
Although considerable controversy exists about mental illness as a
defense in criminal cases, the fact remains that our courts have become
progressively more liberal in this respect. Insanity is accepted in our
courts as a valid plea which modifies both verdict and sentence.
The captive in interrogation is apprehensive of a
dangerous and painful ordeal. If he is provided with a situation where
he is no longer held responsible for his actions, he may well be
"willing" to collaborate with an enemy. Both hypnosis and some of the
drugs inducing hypnoidal states are popularly viewed as
situations where the individual is no longer master of his own fate and
therefore not responsible for his actions. It seems possible then that
the hypnotic situation, as distinguished from hypnosis itself, might be
used to relieve the individual of a feeling of responsibility for his
own actions and thus lead him to reveal information. The hypnotic
situation is more complex than indicated here. A simplification of it
is undertaken since a more complete discussion would be inappropriate
in this context.
A number of social measures would increase the
prisoner's feelings of helplessness if such an approach were employed.
For example, the prevalence of rumors that semimagical techniques of
extracting information are being used over which the informant has
absolutely no control might operate in this way. A group of captives
who had collaborated, and who could verify that the individual has no
control over his actions, would enhance this indoctrination of the new
prisoner. The prisoners who did not reveal information might be
transferred rather than punished, with vague rumors filtering back as
to what had happened. This would have the advantage of maximizing
anxiety while not directing hostility at the immediate captors. In any
case, a captor seeking to exploit the hypnotic situation would prevent
consensual validation of the prisoner's feeling that he could control
himself during interrogation. The captor might treat the captive who
gives information somewhat like a sick individual in
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order to avoid any notion that there is an element of choice involved in his behavior.
The trance induction itself might be initiated through
the use of drugs since this would clearly convey to the prisoner that
he is unable to prevent himself from responding. The second stage of
"trance induction" might utilize a situation which the author has
described elsewhere (53) as the "magic room." This procedure involves
convincing the subject that he is responding to suggestions. An example
of this would be the case of the prisoner who is given a hypnotic
suggestion that his hand is growing warm. However, in this instance,
the prisoner's hand actually does become warm, a problem easily
resolved by the use of a concealed diathermy machine. Or it might be
suggested to the prisoner that when he wakes up a cigarette will taste
bitter. Here again, he could be given a cigarette prepared to have a
slight, but noticeably bitter, taste. The prisoner's own cigarettes, as
well as any lying about the room, would have been especially prepared,
and the hypnotist would also smoke these as though nothing were
unusual. In this manner, the idea could be conveyed to the subject that
he is responding to the given suggestions. It can easily be seen how,
with sufficient ingenuity, a large number of "suggestions" can be made
to work by means unknown to the subject. The vital issue here would be
that the subject became convinced that he was responding to suggestions
and, for example, that the cigarettes really do not taste bitter, but
that he experiences them as such because he cannot resist the suggesion.
An unresolved question is the classification of the
state in which a prisoner who collaborates under these circumstances
finds himself. We feel it helpful to recognize that it may or may not
be hypnosis. The crucial variable is the creation of a situation where
the individual is legitimately able to give tip responsibility for his
actions and therefore is permitted to avoid a threatening situation. It
is probable that these manipulations occasionally would elicit some
form of trance phenomenon, but the crucial aspect would be the
situation, not the presence of a hypnotic state.
Although the hypnotic situation as a tool of
interrogation might yield information, the interrogator would have no
more assurance of its accuracy than with the elicitation of information
by hypnosis proper. The same cautions which have been stated with
regard to hypnosis remain applicable here. Furthermore, for the success
of the
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technique the interrogator would
have to act, in his relationship with the captive, as though the
information must be correct. Unless the interrogator is certain that
the information is false, any doubt he betrayed would increase the
subject's feeling of control and decrease the effectiveness of the
hypnotic situation. Consequently, the interrogator would be denied the
use of techniques of cross examination upon which much of his success
in deriving accurate information ordinarily depends. In constructing a
pretense that the prisoner has lost responsibility for his behavior, he
is also relieved of any responsibility for giving accurate and
pertinent information. On the other hand, the interrogator could
utilize to advantage any information he has that the subject does not
know he has. For example, the informant could be given a hypnotic drug
with appropriate verbal suggestions to talk about a given topic.
Eventually enough of the drug would be given to cause a short period of
unconsciousness. When the subject wakens, the interrogator could then
read from his "notes" of the hypnotic interview the information
presumably told him. It can readily be seen how this technical maneuver
fits into the general concept of the "magic room," and how it would
facilitate the elicitation of information in subsequent interviews.
Although there is no direct evidence that such
techniques have been or will be employed by interrogators nor any
evaluation of their effectiveness, they represent simple extensions of
hypnosis to traditional interrogation practices as described by
Biderman (10).
The effectiveness of the polygraph as a lie detection
device is sometimes employed, apart from the use of the machine, to
create a situation where the subject feels incapable of preventing
himself from revealing the truth. According to Inbau and Reid (33),
many of the confessions obtained with the lie detector are obtained
before the actual use of the polygraph. This is clearly analogous to
our estimate regardiug the possible use of' hypnosis, i.e., separating
the hypnotic situation from the effectiveness of hypnosis per se.
The hypnotic situation has been discussed in detail in
order to point oat the defensive procedures which can be taken to
protect personnel from this type of interrogation. With lie detection,
to use this parallel once more, the most effective defense has been a
high level of sophistication of' the subject. Similarly in the hypnotic
situation, knowledge seems to be the most effective defense. Even one
or two lectures on hypnosis might be highly effective in conveying the
information that an individual cannot be hypnotized against his will,
but that a situation can be devised where he could be tricked into
believing that he has been hypnotized. Furthermore, demon-
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strating that the individual is able
to lie under hypnosis and cannot be compelled to speak the truth, or to
follow suggestions really contrary to his beliefs, would probably be
extremely effective.
If it were to be used on interrogation subjects,
hypnosis itself may be quite innocuous, but it is entirely possible
that the utilization of the hypnotic situation for this purpose
could be a serious threat. Such a situation would alleviate the
informant's guilt by relieving him of the responsibility for his
behavior, and would supply him with an alternative to a dreaded and
potentially stressful situation. A method of "trance induction,"
similar to what we have called the "magic room," could be employed to
produce a hypnotic situation. The use of the hypnotic situation, as
opposed to hypnosis, would make this interrogation technique applicable
to a greater percentage of potential informants. Defensive measures to
protect personnel from those techniques depend upon the knowledge and
confidence of the subject.
This report has attempted to evaluate the utility of
hypnosis in interrogation procedures. Various theoretical views as to
the nature of hypnosis were briefly reviewed. The author aligns himself
with the "motivational theorists" who maintain that an understanding of
the phenomenon of hypnosis is to be found in a consideration of both
the subject's motivation in the situation and his relationship to the
hypnotist.
Because of the dearth of evidence bearing directly on
the question of the use of hypnosis in interrogation, the problem was
broken down into a series of component questions, with each considered
separately. A review of the available literature bearing on the
question of whether trance can be induced in resistant subjects led us
to conclude that such a possibility is extremely doubtful. It seems
that while trance may be induced without the subject's awareness, this
generally requires the existence of a positive relationship between
hypnotist and subject, a requirement not always met in the
interrogation situation.
Assuming that a trance may be induced in a potential
informant, what degree of behavioral control does hypnosis allow? This
question generally focuses on the possibility of inducing a subject to
violate social prohibitions. Although many laboratory experiments have
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been directed at this question, they
suffer from the criticism that they are only, after all, "contrived"
situations and the subject, in all probability, perceives them as such
at some level. Although the author doubts that proscribed behavior can
be induced against the subject's wishes, he must admit that the crucial
experiments have not been performed, and the resolution of this
question must await this event. There are three documented cases of
"real, nonlaboratory" situations involving the use of hypnosis for
compelling criminal behavior. However, close scrutiny of these
instances reveals that in each case an intense emotional relationship
existed between hypnotist and subject. The bearing of these cases on
the question at hand is consequently in doubt. One need not invoke
hypnosis to explain behavior on the part of one individual to please
another, be it criminal or not, when an intense emotional relationship
exists between the individuals involved. One element which hypnosis
introduces is the subject's lack of awareness of his own motivation; a
motivation which seems to derive not from hypnosis but from the
emotional relationship between hypnotist and subject. Again, the
interrogation situation does not readily evolve such a relationship.
The question of the accuracy of information obtained
during a hypnotic trance has been considered. It seems clear from the
evidence that such information need not be veridical; the subject
remains fully capable of distortions, despite hypnotic suggestions to
the contrary.
These various proposals lo utilize hypnosis as a
defense against interrogation have been discussed: (a) to give hypnotic
suggestions designed to prevent further trance induction, (b) to
increase resistance to pain and psychic stress by appropriate
posthypnotic suggestion, and (c) to induce amnesia posthypnotically for
sensitive information in the event of capture. All these proposals
involve diminishing the subject's mastery of the situation. They
function as artificially induced repressive mechanisms and suffer from
the same drawbacks commonly seen in repression: a loss of ego control
and a consequent lessened degree of flexibility in dealing with
reality. Captured personnel are already threatened by loss of ego
control, and we feel that proposals which would further impoverish the
ego are extremely hazardous and would make the individual more
vulnerable than he already is. We have suggested alternative defensive
measures which would not sacrifice ego control, namely, appropriate
instructions and the technique of autogenous training.
The distinction has been drawn between the use of
hypnosis per se and the hypnotic situation. The hypnotic situation
could be used quite effectively for interrogation purposes. The common
belief that
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an individual in hypnosis is not
responsible for his actions, although probably incorrect, could be
exploited. The hypnotic situation, by relieving the subject of
responsibility for his actions, alleviates guilt and thus allows the
captive to divulge information which he might not otherwise yield. Ways
in which an interrogator might seek to maximize the effectiveness of
such a situation include the use of drugs, the use of a technique we
have called the "magic room," various social measures, etc. Defensive
measures necessary against such a technique would involve the
dissemination of appropriate information.
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77. Welch L. "A behavioristic explanation of the mechanism of suggestion and hypnosis". J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1947, 42, 359-364.
78. Wells W. R. Experiments in "waking hypnosis" for instructional purposes. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1923, 18, 239-404.
79. Wells W. R. "Ability to resist artificially induced dissociation". J. abnorm. Psychol, 1940, 35, 261-272.
80. Wells W. R. "Experiments in the hypnotic production of crime". J. Psychol., 1941, 11, 63-102.
81. White R. W. "Prediction of hypnotic susceptibility from a knowledge of subject's attitudes". J. Psychol., 1937, 3, 265-277.
82. White R. W., Fox G. F., and Harris W. W. "Hypnotic hyperamnesia for recently learned material". J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1940, 35, 88-103.
83. White R. W. "A preface to the theory of hypnotism". J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1941, 36, 477-505.
84. Young P. C. "Is rapport an essential characteristic of hypnosis"? J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1927, 22, 130-139.
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reluctantly in compliance to direct
questions, he may conform and yield to pressures for information as
long as they exist, or he may search for ways of being helpful once
some degree of conversion has taken place.
The change from the person's prior position which is
required for conformity with the group in these experiments rarely if
ever involves the intensity of conflict which is assumed to
characterize the interrogation of a resistant source. The relevance of
this review for the problem of the volume rests on the validity of the
assumption that the dynamics of influence operate beyond the range of
intensity of conflic. which has been studied experimentally. At the
conclusion of this review we will consider the problem of extrapolation
by briefly assessing the implications of the current knowledge of the
dynamics of interpersonal influence.
Several types of investigations have been excluded
from this review: (a) anthropological reports in which conformity
behavior has been noted but has not been subjected to experimental
analysis; (b) investigations of audiences or meetings of larger
assemblages where acceptance of or resistance to influence does not
result from direct interaction among those composing the situation; (c)
investigations dealing with shifts in reaction from knowledge or
awareness of norms attributed by the experimenter to groups
whose members are not psychologically present; (d) influence aspects of
reference group behavior which contain variables that differ in kind
and complexity from those inherent in influence exerted under
face-to-face conditions; and (e) programmatic research reports and
theoretical discussions of various aspects of the problem that are
available in a number of other sources (2, 17, 29, 39, 46, 65, 90, 91,
99, 121, 126).
Experimental situations used to study conformity,
compliance, and conversion are described here according to the
following characteristics: (a) types of stimulus materials employed;
(b) contexts or background conditions in which pressures are exerted;
(c) personal dimensions used to assess the contribution of individual
differences to conformity and conversion behavior; and (d) methods of
measuring the impact of conformity pressures on a critical subject.
A variety of tasks and performances figured in the studies which
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have been reviewed. Instructions and
stimulus materials have been used to produce the following types of
responses: (a) expressions of opinions, attitudes, preferences, and
interpretations, (b) perceptual and factual judgments, (c) attempts at
logical analyses, and (d) behavior in relation to a direct request or
an explicit prohibition.
The stimulus materials used to evoke expressions of
attitude, opinion, or preference have included attitude scales such as
the Thurstone Scale of Militarism (10, 18, 20, 60, 61), attitudes
toward Russia (52), toward feminism (79), and toward a variety of
campus, political, and economic items (129). Others have reported
findings for a number of attitude statements without giving complete
descriptions of their composition (8, 34, 64). The expression of
opinions or attitudes regarding typical cases or problem issues has
also been used (27, 81, 92, 114, 120, 134). Typical discussion topics
include federal aid to education (47), labor-management relations (40,
48), nationalism vs. internationalism (82), divorce (54), and the
handling of a juvenile delinquency problem (37, 41). Ratings of
personality and social characteristics of both self and others also
have been used as stimulus tasks (24, 57). The expression of personal
preferences has included such items as line drawings (8, 34), food
preferences (38, 73, 95), ranking of camping equipment for a
hypothetical trip (55, 56), and ranking men in order of desirability as
President of the United States (108). Pictures that are subject to
personal interpretation as the basis for composing a story (4), or
unclear drawings that are named by the subject (88, 90, 131, 132, 133)
comprise another type of problem. Making such judgments as the
truthfulness of a person defending himself against charges of revealing
a fictitious crime (25), the intelligence of people from photographs
(49), the better one of two paintings (97), the driver at fault from a
picture of an auto accident (129), or revealing of discrepancies in
examination grades (93) constitute other tasks that have been used.
Tasks eliciting responses that are predominantly
logical in character include the solution of puzzles and games (32,
33), constructing objects (67), sending messages over telegraph keys
(12), mental arithmetic problems (18, 94), the solution of a problem of
football strategy (41), artillery range problems (13), and the ordering
of patterns of thumbtacks according to perceptual criteria (127).
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Influence may be exercised directly through requests
and prohibitions. Examples are requests for volunteers (9, 112, 113,
117) and for the endorsement of a petition (19); prohibitions, such as
a poster forbidding entry to a building (45); a stoplight regulating
pedestrian traffic (83); a sign prohibiting drinking from a fountain
(78); a traffic light where turning signals are legal (5), or a command
to stop a designated activity (53). The task involving the cutting of
squares or other geometric forms under pressure from others to change
the rate of production contains some elements of the direct request or
prohibition stimulus (109, 110, 120).
Perceptual materials have included estimations,
procedures requiring the subject to match a standard stimulus to
variable stimuli, and discrimination problems. The first group includes
the autokinetic problem (16, 21, 23, 30, 36, 42, 58, 69, 75, 79, 84,
85, 91, 101, 111, 121, 122, 124, 125, 130), estimation of the number of
dots on a card or slide (37, 43, 74, 100), the number of beans in a jar
(70), the length of rectangles (22, 65), the distance between
rectangles (65), the length of lines (98, 102, 18), the length of a
slot of light (11, 97), the distance traversed by a moving light (118),
the number of flashes of light in a standard time interval (76, 77),
the number of clicks of a metronome (18, 103, 105, 123), the weight of
a series of standard objects (60), size estimation of unspecified
objects (72), and recognition of simple visual objects (115). matching
procedures have been limited to the comparison of a straight line to
lines of variable lengths (1, 3, 6. 7, 15, 35, 50, 105, 114), matching
of stimuli differing in brightness (3), and matching of rectangle sizes
and other geometric forms (8, 34, 71). Discrimination tasks include
judging which is the shorter of two lines (87, 89), whether there is an
odor in a bottle of odorless water (28), and which square has the
largest number of dots (74). Common information types of items (31,
126), and memory tasks (80, 113), have also been used.
Properties of the situation other than stimulus
materials and instructions for reacting to them contribute to the
particular adjustment that occurs. The effect of context or framework
in modifying the response that designated stimulus materials produce is
well known
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in sensory and perceptual research.
The analogue of context or framework is often provided by the reactions
of others to the same or comparable stimulus materials.
Social background may vary from simple awareness of
the reactions by others to direct efforts by others to exert influence
on the critical subject. An example of the latter is the judging
situation where others present give uniformly incorrect reports before
the response of the critical subject. A response conforming to the
social background provides an index of conformity, whereas a response
consistent with the stimulus material provides an index of resistance
to the influence exerted by others.
Direct influence also is exerted in the situation
requiring group members to agree on a single option from among a set of
alternatives, with the influence usually exerted in the direction of
converting the deviant member. Prohibition situations also contain
context factors. Observing a transgression may free the subject to
resist the prohibition.
A frequently used method of exerting influence is that
of presenting stimulus materials and letting the critical subject hear
reports of others before giving his own response. For some of the
studies the discrepancy is "spontaneous" or "natural" (28, 36, 52, 84,
111, 118, 121, 124, 125), e.g., two naive subjects react to the
autokinetic task (121), estimate line lengths (118), or judge attitude
statements (52). The degree of convergence toward the responses of
another person constitutes an index of conformity. In other experiments
the reports of instructed subjects are controlled by the experimenter.
Face-to-face and other methods of communicating the reports of others
to the critical subject have been employed.
In the face-to-face situation the subject joins a
group. He is given a fixed position in the sequence of responding, with
responses of others prearranged by the experimenter (1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11,
21, 23, 24, 30, 35, 38, 43, 48, 50, 51, 57, 58, 64, 69, 71, 75, 80, 87,
88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105, 107, 114, 115, 122,
126, 128). Responses may be uniformly correct or incorrect. Incorrect
ones may diverge from the correct or appropriate answer in varying
amounts. Reports by others also may be at variance with one another,
with some correct and others incorrect by varying degrees. In other
situations, one instructed assistant engages in the designated action
prior to the
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subject and serves as a model for him (5, 19, 45, 53, 72, 78, 83, 86, 94, 95, 112, 113, 117, 130).
A modification of the face-to-face situation is the
simulation of a group through the use of tape recordings (10, 18, 20,
31, 61, 63, 91, 103, 106, 109, 110). A naive subject participates under
the impression that he is a member of a group composed of several
persons, each of whom, like himself, is alone in adjoining rooms. All
are interconnected by a communication system. The subject hears the
instructions of the experimenter, experiences the stimulus materials to
be judged, and hears the responses by the others. He reacts at the
proper time by writing his responses in the blank spaces left for his
reports. With the exception of the naive subject's responses, the
entire experimental protocol usually consists of tape recordings. The
simulated situation provides a standard social context for all subjects.
Another variation of the basic face-to-face situation
is one where several people are tested together, with partitions or
booths separating them from one another. Each has a panel with a row of
signal lights that record the responses of others (8, 34, 35, 71). The
task is constant for all members, and usually consists of materials
presented by slides projected on a wall so that all subjects can see
them simultaneously. The experimenter controls the presumed responses
of the other subjects through a master switchboard. The effect is that
each subject acts as a critical subject. All respond at the same time,
with their responses recorded at the central control panel.
Also used is the requirement for requesting or
relinquishing pieces of a puzzle or game by one member when members
exchange parts to complete the puzzle. The participant understands that
he must complete his puzzle or task before the group goal is achieved.
Members are given a standard portion of the task at the beginning. Then
they interact by requesting necessary pieces from one another in order
to finish. Both the Group Squares Puzzle (33) and a Bingo game (32)
have been used in this manner. Social interaction is indirect. The
experimenter is able to arrange the responses of "other" members to
requests for pieces or parts. After a subject has correctly completed
his individual task, he is subjected to pressures from some other
member to yield a part so that someone else may complete a puzzle. The
index of resistance to social pressure is the number of trials in which
the subject refuses to yield.
Influence without direct interaction is employed by
the experimenter who communicates instructions to the subject on ways
to change his performance so that he can contribute more appropriately
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to the group task. This type of
pressure has been applied in studies of slowdown in production of
cutting paper objects (109), in utilizing information on an artillery
problem (13), and in sending messages on telegraph keys (12).
Still another version of inducing influence consists
of individual responses given in private and collected by the
experimenter. The experimenter either computes a norm actually
representing the responses of members and reports it (22), or appears
to compute a norm, but actually announces, according to a prearranged
design, an incorrect norm for the reactions of the group (26, 49, 64,
66, 75, 77, 129, 131, 132, 133).
Actual discussion, where members have the opportunity
to exert influence on one another, has been employed in numerous
studies (4, 9, 27, 48, 54, 55, 56, 70, 79, 81, 82, 92, 94, 108, 134).
Interaction is direct, without control by the experimenter. The
individual may be asked to indicate his position on a particular issue
in private prior to the group discussion, at various points during its
course or at the end of the discussion. Comparison of initial position
with later positions provides a measure of susceptibility or resistance.
Interaction in a group has been controlled through
notes, ballots, or votes passed among members. Each participant writes
notes to others in the group, which may be delivered so that
"discussion" among members is uncontrolled (25, 41, 47). Under other
conditions prearranged notes, ballots, or votes are substituted (40,
74, 116, 120, 127). Comparison of positions before and after exchange
of notes provides an index of change.
Another set of factors associated with conformity
inheres in the "state of the person" at a particular time. Such factors
can be identified through reference to individual differences in
previous experience, personality characteristics, or physiologic
states. Contrasted with a novice, a specialist in dealing with a
certain type of materials is more resistant to shifting.
Individual differences in acceptance of conformity
pressures related to properties of the person that have been
investigated include experimentally created prior experiences, measures
of physiologic states, and
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indices of psychological experiences subsequent to behavior in the pressure situation.
Experiences have been created prior to the subject's
exposure to conformity conditions to permit determination of the extent
to which the experimentally defined experiences contributed to the
adjustment elicited. These experiences include differences in the
degree of familiarity with the stimulus materials prior to the
influence situation (49), differences in the characteristics of a prior
task in which social influence has also been exerted (88, 90),
experiences with other members, including cooperative efforts in which
a response consistent with the false one reported by another in the
situation is rewarded (76, 87, 90), individual experiences of success
or failure (20, 58, 72, 75, 98, 100, 115), and experiences designed to
increase insecurity (124) or decrease self-evaluation (119).
Two physiologic characteristics have been related to
susceptibility. One series of studies contrasted subjects of different
ages (11, 38, 89); another compared men and women (25, 34, 79).
Differences in physiologic states that have been evaluated include:
degree of thirst (78); strength of food preferences (95); degree of
sleep deprivation (42); and anxiety states as measured by degree of
palmar sweat (64, 82). In several studies, it is impossible to
determine whether the measure is regarded as a physiologic index or
whether a physiologic difference represents a scale of psychological
differences.
A variety of measures have been used to assess
personality characteristics of subjects prior to the pressure
situation. Standard measures used are the A-S Reaction Study (10, 63,
72), Guilford-Martin Inventory of' Factors, GAMIN (23, 75), California
F-Scale (10, 34, 54, 101, 128), Fiedler AS Inventory (125), Likert
Scale of Attitude toward the Negro (23), Levinson-Sanford Scale of
Attitude toward Jews (23), Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(4, 33, 50), Cattell 16 PF (115), Barron-Welsh Art Scale (74), Welsh
Figure Preference Test (32), Terman Concept Mastery Test (32, 34), Idea
Classification Test (32), Rorschach Test (85), Thematic Apperception
Test (65, 105), and other measures of emotional instability (10, 27),
problem-solving (106), and age of independence training (80). Other
measures used are checklists and ratings procedures (6, 11, 33, 34,
70), and clinical
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diagnoses (36, 84, 125). Measures of
originality have been constructed to determine individual differences
in this dimension (8). Needs, such as achievement (80, 115), dependency
(69), anxiety (82), conformity (64, 131), self-approval (104),
conventionality (10), and affiliation (54, 115), have been used as
measures of personality in more recent conformity research.
Several different types of measures have been used to
determine if degree of susceptibility to some type of outer anchoring,
whether social or perceptual, is a general characteristic of
individuals, which will permit predicting their behavior in conformity
situations. Dependence on the perceptual field has been measured by the
Tilted Room, Tilted Chair, and the Embedded Figures Test (86). Personal
dependence on the social field (18, 34, 90) and susceptibility to
direct influence attempts (62, 133) have been measured through
experimentally created situations.
Specific adjustments toward or away from conformity
are determined by interactions among the three classes of factors. The
impact of each must be considered in relation to the others if accurate
prediction of adjustment is to be achieved. For example, under
conditions where (a) the stimulus materials are difficult to judge, (b)
the reactions of others constituting the social background are only
slightly divergent from the correct response, and (c) the individual is
characteristically conforming, the prediction is that his behavior can
be easily influenced in the direction of conformity. To understand
conformity, it is necessary to specify the interrelations among the
concrete nature of the stimulus materials, the properties of the social
context or framework, and the state of the person at the time of his
reaction.
Numerous indices have been employed to evaluate the
extent to which influence has been exerted in conformity situations.
The phrase "shifting of responses" refers to any of the several ways
used to measure the effects of social influence.
A standard procedure is that originally employed by
Sherif (121). Numerous trials are administered under group conditions,
with progressive shifts in responses evaluated as a function of
differences
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between trials (36, 51, 58). The
procedure has been used with the autokinetic task (121), in judging the
length of slots of light (97), and in estimating the number of dots
(37). A change in responses to accord with those given by other members
is regarded as conforming. No change or changes in an opposite
direction are regarded as independent or resistant.
A widely used procedure is that of evaluating
performance of a subject under private conditions and then under
pressure conditions (12, 24, 27, 30, 48, 49, 52, 54, 60, 67, 69, 72,
73, 76, 84, 92, 94, 98, 100, 101, 115, 116, 129, 130, 132, 133),
allowing interpretations either in terms of conformity or resistance.
Occasionally, the subject's performance on the same task has been
measured once again under private conditions (4, 21, 25, 37, 40, 41,
42, 43, 47, 48, 55, 56, 70, 79, 82, 94, 108, 111, 120, 131, 134), with
the magnitude of shift in behavior from combinations of scores from the
pre-pressure to the post-pressure conditions constituting the index.
When changes due to pressure persist in the post-pressure situation,
the index is a measure of conversion. When the individual gives a
conforming response in the pressure situation and returns to his
independent position in a later testing situation, the shift can be
interpreted as temporary conformity. An interpretation of independence
or resistance can be made when an individual acts in a consistent
manner from the pre-pressure to the post-pressure situation. A "sleeper
effect" is said to occur when an individual maintains independence in
the pressure situation, but shows the effects of the pressure situation
in the post-pressure private situation.
Error scores for factual or logical materials that are
answered correctly by the subject under private conditions are used to
assess the effects of conformity piessures. Performance of a comparable
group of subjects tested under control conditions has provided
standardization data as a basis for judging the degree of influence
exerted by pressure conditions (31).
Under conformity conditions, persons other than the
subject give responses differing from the correct or preferred one. The
number of times an individual gives a response either in the direction
of the correct score or of the erroneous judgments constitutes his
conformity score (1, 3, 8, 11, 18, 31, 34, 35, 48, 61, 71, 74, 77, 80,
87, 88, 89, 90, 96, 102, 103, 105, 106, 114, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128).
The conformity
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score distribution has been used to compare the personality characteristics of conformers and resisters (6, 7, 50, 65, 85, 86).
Another technique consists of taking the stated
opinion of others participating in the experiment as the baseline to
evaluate the magnitude of the discrepancy in the response made by the
critical subject (10, 20, 23). Responses closer to the position
represented by the background are interpreted as indicating a greater
degree of conformity than more divergent responses. A modification of
this method is establishment of a range of confederate responses so
that if the critical subject reacts within that range, he is regarded
as having conformed to the established pattern (16, 91, 122).
Another measure consists of comparison of performances
of groups of subjects confronted with pressures in varying degrees. The
criterion of change is the average performance of the group on a single
trial, or scores massed across trials, without regard for the serial
order of changes. Variability has been similarly measured to determine
the extent of decreases in the range of individual responses (11, 22,
63, 75, 81, 118, 121, 124).
A standard method consists of predesignating, as
evidence of conformity, a specific action that is identical to
responses by other persons present in the experimental situation. The
frequency with which such a response occurs constitutes an index of
conformity (5, 9, 19, 28, 38, 45, 53, 78, 83, 92, 93, 112, 116, 117).
Unreadiness to yield under other conditions constitutes an index of
resistance (13, 32, 33, 109).
A variety of experimental situations have been
employed in the study of conformity, resistance, and conversion. These
have been reviewed, together with various ways of measuring the impact
of the social context on the critical subject, including those which
constitute indices of conformity or conversion.
Stimulus materials with certain characteristics have
been employed most frequently. Relative simplicity and case of
measurement of
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and the conditions of their
presentation. Evaluation involves four considerations: the nature of
the material judged, whether factual, attitudinal, or expressive of
personal preferences; differences in selections from the same
materials, whether easy or difficult, clear or ambiguous; conditions of
presentation, whether permitting judgments to be made by the subject
with ease or with difficulty; and the experimenter's instructions to
the subject, whether strong and definite or weak and vague.
Reactions to materials that can be answered on the
basis of logic or "fact" appear to be more resistant to conformity
pressures than those for which responses depend on social experience.
Helson, Blake, and Mouton (61) studied the frequency of shifting as a
function of the content of the task. Greater shifting of responses from
the correct or modal report toward the erroneous responses expressed by
others was observed for attitude statements than for materials
involving knowledge or ability.
Festinger and Thibaut (41) employed two different
discussion problems as stimulus materials, and reported results
consistent with those by Helson, Blake, and Mouton (61).
Crutchfield (34) presented a variety of stimulus
materials to a test sample under social pressure conditions. Since he
describes results obtained for some but not all the materials, it is
impossible to determine if response shifts are a function of the
character of the stimulus materials.
The materials most subject to conformity effects
appear to derive meaning or validity from a social frame of reference,
such as attitudes toward war or general social problems.
Degrees of shifting vary with differences in
properties of the same materials. One source of variation is the
difficulty experienced by the subject in reacting to the materials
presented. The hypothesis tested holds that the more difficult the
materials, the more easily the individual is influenced.
Blake, Helson, and Mouton (18) had male college
students respond to arithmetic items and the metronome click counting
problems under simulated conditions. For the arithmetic items, shifting
increased toward the erroneous response of the simulated group as the
difficulty of the problems increased. Results for the metronome are
interpreted as indicating that variations in rate were not sufficiently
great
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for shifts from social pressure related to difficulty to appear in a statistically clear manner.
Coleman, Blake, and Mouton (31) have demonstrated a
significant relatiorkship between task difficulty and susceptibility to
conformity pressures. The results are interpreted as indicating that an
individual certain of the correct answer is more able to resist
pressures because he is more able to respond in terms of internal cues.
Asch (3) used the experimental task of matching a
standard to three variable. lines. Differences between the variable
lines and the standard were small for one set of trials, and larger for
another set. Fewer errors Nere made by subjects when the discrepancy
between lines was greater. These results support the hypothesis that
difficult stimulus milterials lead to a greater degree of conformity.
Bereada (11) used child subjects for two different
tasks, and investigated frequency of shifting as a function of the
difficulty of items. The gretatest shifting for both tasks occurred in
those trials that produced the highest frequency of errors under
private conditions. Goldberg and Lubin (51) tested and confirmed the
hypothesis that social itifluence on a subject's judgments is a
positive linear function of his errors for similar judgments under
private conditions.
In a study by Wiener (132), the task consisted of
selecting one of two naules for each of ten ambiguous designs, and
indicating the degree of certainty of each judgment on a four-point
scale ranging from "absolutely certain" to "absolutely uncertain."
Results indicate a greater percentage of change for designs rated on
the uncertain end of the judgment scale, and for higher ambiguity
designs within each category of certainty.
Kelley and Lamb (73) in an experiment on taste used
phenylthiourea (PTU), which is tasteless to some individuals but
extremely bitter to others. The results suggest that the tasters'
greater resistance to majority influence springs from the greater
intensity of their opinions about PTU.
Fisher, Williams, and Lubin (44) confirmed that a
measure of the subject's self-certainty regarding the stimulus
situation consistently constituted a fair degree of predictive power
for conformity scores: the more certain a person is of his judgment,
the more resistant he is to influences toward conformity.
Pressures have been maintained at a constant level in
some studies of the relationship between ambiguity of the materials and
conformity. Caylor (26) defined the ambiguity of the stimulus materials
as the number of equally probable reactions perceived as appropriate in
response to the Stouffer questionnaire approach to conflict in norms.
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produced frequency of shifting in
the direction of agreement with the majority three times greater than
that in the control condition, with disagreement reduced to
approximately one-half of chance expectancy.
Gorden (52) evaluated shifts in responses from an
initial individual administration of a twelve-item scale of attitudes
toward Russia to responses given in the presence of other members. Over
half of the subjects shifted toward group opinion, and approximately a
third shifted away from it, with no change in the total shift score for
approximately an eighth.
Helson, Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead (63) reported that
naive subjects expressed significantly different degrees of agreement
or disagreement with statements matched for degree of militarism as a
function and in the direction of prearranged responses by other
subjects.
Horwitz, Piana, Goldman, and Lee (67) found
significant differences in expressions of attitudes toward their
teacher by ROTC students following reported unanimity of group
attitude. Duncker (38) reports that children, responding after one,
two, or three other subjects expressed their food preferences, had a
selection rate of 81 per cent for foods chosen only 26 per cent of the
time earlier in private.
A series of experiments employing situations that
either restrict or prohibit an action, or else are designed to produce
compliance with a request, have consistently indicated that direct
knowledge of the reactions of others can produce shifts in behavior.
Grosser, Polansky, and Lippitt (53) found that a
significantly larger number of naive child subjects engaged in
unauthorized activities under the influence of perceiving violations by
a model in the experimental rather than in the control conditions.
Freed, Chandler, Mouton, and Blake (45) have reported similar results
in a prohibition situation (see foregoing), as have Barch, Trumbo, and
Nagle (5) who observed the behavior of motorists in turning lanes to
determine conformance with or violation of a state law requiring turn
signals. The behavior of a person following a lead car was
significantly related to that of the lead car driver. Blake, Mouton,
and Hain (19) obtained similar results for endorsement of a petition
(see the foregoing).
Frequency of acceptance of a request for volunteers as
a function of the perception of acceptance by another person has been
investigated by Rosenbaum and Blake (113) and by Rosenbaum (112). Both
studies demonstrate a decrease in acceptance frequency when subjects
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see an experimenter's assistant refuse the request as well as the converse.
Schachter and Hall (117) found that group influences
produced greater frequency of volunteering when half the class had been
preinstructed to volunteer. Confirmation of these results for public
versus private conditions has been reported by Blake, Berkowitz,
Bellamy, and Mouton (15).
The effect of the group situation in influencing
judgments was demonstrated by Munsterberg (104) in an early period of
psychological experimentation. Students first were asked individually
to identify which of two cards contained the largest number of dots.
Initially, 60 per cent reported the correct answer. After a preliminary
show of hands, correct judgments on an individual basis increased from
60 to 64 per cent. Significance of the differences obtained was not
evaluated, but findings are consistent with those of later
investigations. Clark (28) has reported that 20 per cent of students
perceived the "odor" of a bottle of odorless water in the presence of
other persons, compared with only 11 per cent in private.
The classical experiment in this area is by Sherif
(121). He employed the autokinetic situation to demonstrate the
influence of another's response on judgments by naive subjects. The
convergence under group conditions of initially divergent responses
showed the operation of social influence. Schonbar (118) duplicated the
essential experimental conditions of Sherif's study and reports similar
results.
Matching a standard line with three variable lines was
the task employed by Asch (1) to investigate the influence of erroneous
reports on naive subjects. Less than 1 per cent of the responses for
the same trials in private was incorrect. By prearranging for reports
by seven accomplices to be uniformly incorrect on certain trials, Asch
was able to show a significant tendency for naive subjects to shift
toward the incorrect position taken by others.
Blake and Brehm (16) investigated the effect on naive
subjects of hearing the recorded responses of five accomplices. Amount
of movement reported for the autokinetic task was varied in magnitude,
divergence, and convergence. Pressures created under simulated
conditions produced conformity effects apparently similar in character
to those created under face-to-face conditions. McConnell and Blake
(91) have confirmed this finding, as have Olmstead and Blake (107) for
both face-to-face and simulated group conditions.
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The studies just summarized are in general agreement.
Knowledge of the reactions of another person in the same situation can
influence the subject's response in the direction of the other person's
behavior, with susceptibility found for a wide variety of tasks.
Differences in susceptibility have been related to
various features of the social context, including the number of others
present, degree of unanimity in their reactions, and the magnitude of
the discrepancy between the subject's own position and that of others.
Number of Others Present. There is evidence that the presence of several
other persons giving uniform responses may produce increases in
conformity behavior beyond those attributable to the effect of a single
other person. The general proposition is that conformity pressures
increase with number of other persons present as a negatively
accelerated function.
Asch (1) varied the number of accomplices giving
erroneous reports from one, two, three, four, eight, to sixteen. He
reported direct but unequal increments in shifting for increases from
one to two to three accomplices but no significant increases for a
larger number.
Helson (60) arranged for one, two, or three other
persons to report their judgments prior to the critical subject. The
effect was found to be directly proportional to the number of
accomplices giving prior reports. Luchins and Luchins (89) report that,
of the group judging after three accomplices reported, 80 per cent
showed conformity effects, whereas only 10 per cent shifted their
responses after one other accomplice reported.
Group size has been investigated "in reverse" by
Ziller and Behringer (134). They varied the number of naive subjects
present relative to one instructed subject. The confederate was more
effective in two- and five-person groups than in three- and four-person
groups. Conditions of this experiment have not been described in detail.
Hare (55) investigated the influence of group size on
the attainment of consensus, and found that participants in groups of
five changed their opinions more toward the group consensus after
discussion than those in groups of twelve. This finding disagrees with
those just reported. No accomplices participated; discussion time was
constant,
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thus giving each member less opportunity to exert influence on others in the larger groups.
Three investigators reported no differences in
shifting as a function of the number of others participating. Sherif
(121) reported no significant differences in the degree of convergence
for subjects responding to the autokinetic task in the presence of one
or of two other members. Degree of unanimity was not prearranged; the
study thus is not comparable to those employing controlled responses by
others. Goldberg (49) varied the number of subjects working together in
judging the intelligence of persons in nine photographs. Judging in the
presence of others produced responses differing significantly from
those given under private conditions. No differences in shifting were
found for subjects who judged initially in the presence of two or of
four other persons. Data. were not given for results from three-man
groups. Use of imputed, falsified norms may in part account for his
findings.
Kidd (76) varied group size from one to two to four to
six, and supplied fictitious, imputed norms for each group. No
significant differences in shifting were found for differences in group
size.
Unanimity.
Asch (1), in one condition, arranged for the instructed "naive" subject
to respond correctly and the instructed majority of six other persons
to respond incorrectly. The degree of shifting toward the majority view
was comparatively slight. When the person who had been giving the
correct report began to agree with the incorrect majority, the
frequency of shifting was found to be comparable to that under the
condition of routine unanimity.
Mouton, Blake, and Olmstead (103) have confirmed one
aspect of Asch's finding. Little shifting from correct reports occurred
when, of four other persons reporting prior to the critical subject,
two gave correct and two incorrect responses. A significant increase in
shifting occurred when all four uniformly gave an incorrect answer.
In Hardy's study (54) of unanimous contrasted with
near-unanimous groups in a discussion of divorce, unanimity of
opposition was not related to susceptibility but was significantly
related to changes in attitudes expressed after exposure to the group
pressure situation, in the direction of conformity pressures. He
suggests that the differences between his results and those reported by
others may be attributable to the distinctive features of the tasks
employed.
Magnitude of the Discrepancy Between the Correct Report or the Subjects' Own Position and Reports by Others. The effect of the perceived discrepancy on shifting a critical subject away from his
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private position, and the extent to which the subject shifts toward full agreement with reports by others have been evaluated.
Jenness (70) used initial individual judgments of the
number of beans in a jar to assign students with initially divergent
estimates and those with initially similar estimates to groups of three
members and four members respectively. After discussion to arrive at a
group estimate, the variation among individual judgments was reduced
more in the three-member than in the four-member groups.
Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, and Raven (40),
using a labor dispute problem, prior to and during interaction measured
the opinions of undergraduate students of the same sex in groups
varying from six to nine members; the interaction was controlled by
fictitious notes distributed after ten minutes of apparent interchange.
Those who perceived themselves as initially disagreeing changed more
than those who perceived themselves as initially agreeing with others
present.
Goldberg (49) has reported significant differences in
conformity related to degree of discrepancy, but not for ratio of
actual conformity to discrepancy (see foregoing).
Wiener (132) reports a relationship between amount of
discrepancy from norms and susceptibility, whereas Helson, Blake, and
Mouton (61) confirm a positive relationship between the magnitude of
discrepancy and the amount of susceptibility (see previous discussion).
Under one condition of the autokinetic situation used
by Whittaker (130), a confederate estimated that the distance that
light moved was one inch more than the subject's largest judgment. For
other conditions the confederate's prior reports were two, eight, or
twelve times as large as the subject's largest, earlier judgment.
Greater shifts occurred for the two conditions using the smallest
discrepancies between responses. The author suggests that larger
discrepancies have a negative effect on the subject by tending to
influence him in an opposite direction.
Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (57) investigated the
relationship between the reaction of an individual to degree of
discrepancies between his opinion of himself and others' opinions of
him, and found a significant shift toward lower self ratings, with
change in an unfavorable direction greatest for the most unfavorable,
fictitious evaluations by acquaintances than by strangers.
Harvey and Rutherford (58) found that "unsuccessful,"
naive college subjects with one-half as many pretrials on the
autokinetic task were more ready than the same size, "successful" group
to shift
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in response to consistently and uniformly divergent pressures than to initially agreeing and increasingly divergent pressures.
Evidence for the greater impact of small discrepancies
on judging easily discriminated materials has been presented by Blake,
Helson, and Mouton (18) and by Asch (3) (see above).
Since results obtained by Olmstead and Blake (107) and
by Mouton, Blake, and Olmstead (103) (see the preceding) are not in
complete agreement with those just summarized, further clarification is
required.
Wiener, Carpenter, and Carpenter (131) report failure
to confirm the work of Asch (3), but do not explain their failure. The
per cents of college students who disagreed with subjects' choices of
names for ten ambiguous designs were entered next to the design for
half the trials. No relationship was found between number of changes
and per cent of disagreement.
Summary.
In four studies of the composition of the social situation and its
relation to conformity, size of the group has been demonstrated to be a
critical factor, with progressive increases in shifting for increases
from one to two to three persons, and little or no evidence of greater
influence by a larger number. Three other studies fail to confirm this
relationship. All studies agree in finding no further increments in
conformity associated with increases in number of divergent reports.
Currently available evidence suggests that increments beyond those
attributable to three other persons may be associated with a decrement
in amount of influence exerted toward conformity.
Findings clearly indicate that conformity influences
are significantly decreased when other members are not in unanimous
agreement. With objective, discriminable stimuli, subjects tend more to
agree when the discrepancy is small. For socially anchored materials,
more subjects shift when the discrepancies are large.
Studies of pressures as a function of personal
characteristics have evaluated such factors as age, sex, prestige,
degree of acquaintance, and degree of comparability in ability and
interests.
Age.
Duncker (38) found that the presence of another child, but not an
adult, significantly shifted food preferences above a control
condition, and younger children were more influenced by older children
than the reverse.
In a study by Berenda (11), the teacher serving as the
accomplice influenced younger children (seven to ten) more than older
children
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(ten to thirteen), and other
children as accomplices significantly influenced both age groups, with
younger children more influenced. Postsession interviews demonstrated
that giving a correct answer contradicted by eight peers was seen as a
violation of the group for which "majority" correctness was assumed.
Jacubczak and Walters (69) report contradictory results for the
autokinetic effect. In their experiment, the order of exposure to adult
and child peer proved highly important. The availability of an abstract
only makes it impossible to evaluate completely the findings.
Sex.
Luchins and Luchins (89) report that greater influence was exerted when
the prior report on a discrimination task was given by women than by
men college student confederates. Statistical significance for
differences was not reported; the number of experimental subjects was
small.
Prestige.
A number of investigations have tested the hypothesis that the higher
the status of the other person, the greater his influence.
Lefkowitz, Blake, and Mouton (83) introduced four
variations in a traffic situation for two-thirds of the trials, one for
each sixth, including a confederate dressed in high status attire who
(a) obeyed or (b) violated the traffic signal; and a confederate
dressed in low status attire who (a) obeyed or (b) violated the signal.
The confederate was absent for the remaining one-third of the trials.
Significantly greater frequency of violation occurred under the
influence of a violator. An additional significant increase in the
frequency of violations was found when the confederate appeared in high
status attire.
Mausner (96) arranged for the confederate to give the
wrong answer in all trials on the Maier Art Judgment Test. The mean
increase in wrong answers was significantly higher when the confederate
was introduced as an art director than as a fellow student.
Cole (30) varied expertness of the confederate in a
four-man group making judgments in the autokinetic situation. Subjects
were more influenced by his prearranged, extreme judgments when he was
given expert status. When the task was described as an intelligence
test and the confederate introduced as highly intelligent, the mean
movement score of subjects tended to shift away from that of the
confederate.
In another study, Mausner (97) created success and
failure for confederates participating with undergraduate students in
twenty trials of using a stylus to reproduce the length of a slot of
light. A greater degree of shift occurred when the critical subject
judged with
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a confederate perceived as
successful on the prior task. A similar design was used by Mausner and
Bloch (100), with results corroborating those by Mausner (99).
Raven and French (109) varied the status or prestige
of a person under two conditions: the person initiating the influence
was seen either (it) as elected by the group and having its support or
(b) as not elected or supported by the group. The elected supervisor
was able to exert more influence.
Acquaintances vs. Strangers.
The effect of acquaintances or strangers on the expression of attitudes
has been investigated by Lambert and Lowry (81). Male undergraduates
filled out comparable forms of the F scale alone, in groups of five
without discussion and in groups of five after discussion. Some of the
groups were composed of "high acquaintances," and others included
individuals who were relatively unacquainted. Results show a reduction
in variability of scores in the case of together and discussion
conditions for high acquaintance subjects, with low acquaintance
subjects apparently unaffected by either pressure condition.
Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (57) have reported a
significant shift toward lower self ratings under influence created by
acquaintances and by strangers (see above).
Kidd (76) created and controlled the degree of
acquaintance by restricting the duration of prior participation to 1,
2, or 3 hr. Subsequent judgments were not significantly influenced.
Minority Group Membership.
To evaluate the effect of minority group membership on susceptibility,
Bray (23) used Gentiles as critical subjects, whereas the confederates
were presented as Negro, Jew, and Gentile. Since results are
contradictory, only replication and refinement will make it possible to
comprehend the relationships.
Homogeneity-heterogeneity.
In all but one study of the homogerteity-heterogeneity dimension,
heterogeneity is artificially created by experimenters' remarks.
Festinger and Thibaut (41) found for discussion of
football but not juvenile delinquency significantly greater readiness
of homogeneous groups to shift opinion as a function of receiving notes
from others.
Gerard (48) created homogeneity and heterogeneity
similarly for discussion of federal aid to education, and found changes
in opinion to be unrelated to the homogeneity-heterogeneity dimension.
Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, and Raven (40)
report no differences in opinion change among groups told that
"experts" were
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present compared with control
groups. Since there were no influence attempts directly traceable to
"experts," this variation appears to have been a manipulation of
homogeneity-heterogeneity in the proper sense rather than a variation
in the prestige dimension (see above).
Summary.
Differences in susceptibility are related to characteristics of the
persons creating the influence. Age differences found include greater
influence exerted on children by children than by adults, and on
younger children by older children than on older by younger children.
Several studies have reported greater susceptibility to pressures
created by acquaintances than by strangers. Other differences reported
do not reveal a clear pattern.
Greater influences are exerted when the other person
has a higher status than the subject. This finding is obtained
consistently. Uniform results have not been obtained from experiments
designed to evaluate the influence of homogeneity-heterogeneity among
members.
Two related dimensions of influence exertion are
evaluated in tests of these hypotheses: conditions permitting anonymity
should decrease the extent of influence; and personal commitment in a
prior, private performance should increase resistance.
Anonymity.
Mouton, Blake, and Olmstead (103) found that influence was
significantly greater when college subjects disclosed their personal
identity than when conditions permitted anonymity (see above). Deutsch
and Gerard (35) and Asch (3) obtained similar results (see above).
Reduced susceptibility to pressures under conditions
of anonymity has been clearly demonstrated; this explains use of the
secret ballot as a basic instrument of personal expression.
Commitment.
Of two studies varying the personal commitment factor, one by Deutsch
and Gerard (35) introduced three variations. The highest frequency of
shifting occurred when recording was not required, with lowest
frequencies resulting when the responses were recorded, personally
signed, and given to the experimenter.
Fisher, Rubinstein, and Freeman (43) used a
tachistoscopic presentation for the task of indicating the number of
dots exposed on a trial-by-trial basis. The conditions were: first,
judging without partners; second, judging only after the
partner; third and fourth, judging both prior to and following the
partner. No differences in the frequency of shifting were found for the
experimental conditions
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evidence that he is liked by others
or feels that the group is attractive. Back (4) varied cohesion by the
experimenter's remarks among like sex pairs. Both subjects wrote a
story about three sets of pictures, differing primarily in details, and
then discussed them with each other. Greater change occurred toward
features in the partner's story under the high rather than under the
low cohesion conditions.
Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, and Raven (40) report similar findings, as does Berkowitz (13).
Schchater, Ellertson, McBride, and Gregory (116)
created high and low cohesion among undergraduate women subjects in
three person groups. During interaction each subject worked alone, but
communicated with fictitious other persons through a series of notes
controlled by an experimenter. Positive influence induction consisted
of notes encouraging increased production for half of the subjects
under each condition, and negative influence for the other half. No
effect was attributable to cohesion under the positive induction
condition. Under negative influence, high cohesion subjects
significantly decreased their productivity; the low cohesion group
showed no changes.
In a study of children by Grossner, Polansky, and
Lippitt (53), the collaborator was friendly with half the subjects and
encouraged their working together; with the other half, he acted
withdrawn and worked separately. The critical subject more frequently
chose the same toy as the friendly collaborator.
Gerard (48) used instructions to vary cohesion. High
cohesion subjects shifted their opinions toward the group
recommendation significantly more than those under the low cohesion
condition.
In the study by Dittes and Kelley (37), group members
were given false ratings of the degree to which others present liked
them and wished them to remain in the discussion. Those in the very low
acceptance group, who had the lowest index of private conformity,
showed the highest degree of public conformity. Those participating
under average attraction conditions exhibited the greatest degree of
shifting toward the group view, indicating a consistency in private
conviction and public expression. The finding implies that the person
of indeterminate or average acceptance is probably least secure and
most susceptible.
Jackson and Saltzstein (68) varied both the
congeniality dimension and experimentally induced acceptance and
rejection. The four conditions were: (a) psychological membership, in
which the member felt highly accepted and the group held high
attraction for him; (b) psychological nonmembership, in which the
person had low
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acceptance and the group was not
attractive to him; (c) preference group membership, in which the person
had low acceptance by the group but high attraction to it; and (d) a
marginal group relationship characterized by high acceptance and low
attraction. Subjects worked in four- or five-man groups under two
different orientations to the task: a normative condition, competing with other groups, and modal
conditions, in which they were compared as individuals. Conformity was
greater in the normative than in the modal situation and in the high
attraction than in the low attraction situation. However, conformity
for the low attraction condition was uniformly higher than had been
predicted. The combination of telling subjects that their performance
was inferior and that they were least accepted apparently led to
feelings of rejection and anxiety and to higher conformity.
In the study by Kelley and Shapiro (74), the
hypothesis that more highly accepted members would conform less because
the wrong answer would be detrimental to attaining the group goal was not confirmed. The results are consistent with other studies varying the acceptance dimension.
Thibaut and Strickland (127) varied pressure by high,
moderate, or low confidence expressed by others in the subjects working
under either the set to solve the problem or the set to maintain group
membership. Under group membership orientation, conformity increased as
other members, by ballots, showed increased confidence in the judgments
of subjects. For subjects given a task set, conformity decreased as
pressures increased. The study demonstrates the greater susceptibility
of individuals motivated to maintain group membership.
Each of the studies agrees in showing that subjects in high cohesion groups are more susceptible to conformity pressures.
The effect of increasing pressures toward uniformity has been investigated in several studies.
Festinger and Thibaut (41) found a significant increase in shifting as pressure toward uniformity increased (see above).
Jones, Wells, and Torrey (71) found that correct
feedback was more significant in increasing independence than incorrect
feedback in increasing conformity. Differences between partial and
total reinforcement were not significant. A second study, in which
subjects were told they would participate in later sessions with the
same group members and be evaluated by them, revealed an increased
amount of conformity.
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Gerard (47)
created pressures toward uniformity by indicating that a second
discussion of the same issue would follow with local politicians
participating. A significantly greater change from pre- to
postdiscussion occurred for the high pressure condition, but only for
subjects participating also under attributed homogeneity.
Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, and Raven (40)
found that significantly more shifting occurred among groups told there
was a "correct" answer (see above). Brehm and Festinger (24) tested and
confirmed the hypothesis that greater pressures toward uniformity occur
when the task is described as important.
Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead (20) emphasized the
importance of accuracy, and implied team penalties for mistakes by
individuals on a metionome-counting task. Subsequent shifting was
greater for the group subjected to high pressure. Accuracy requirements
reinforced by fear of penalty increase the readiness of individuals to
shift their opinions. Deutsch and Gerard (35) used a similar design,
and obtained parallel results.
Summary.
Increases in pressures toward uniformity have been shown to be related
positively to increases in frequency of conformity behavior. Emphasis
on rewards for successful performance and the importance of accuracy or
penalties for mistakes also have been found to be related to
susceptibility.
Personal characteristics of the subject may be psychologic, physiologic, or differing amounts or types of prior experience.
Individual differences have been created
experimentally by different amounts of familiarity with the task, prior
experiences of success or failure, differences in anxiety and
insecurity, variations in properties of the prior task, and pretraining
with reward.
Degree of Familiarity.
The assumption tested is that subjects with greater amounts of
experience should be more able to resist pressure exerted by others.
Goldberg (49) provided all subjects with three degrees of experience. The hypothesis was not confirmed (see above).
Harvey and Rutherford (58) found that subjects with fewer pre-
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trials showed significantly greater readiness to shift in response to pressures (see above).
Prior Success or Failure. Several studies have tested the hypothesis that failure results in decreased reliance on one's own judgments.
After creating individual, private experiences of
success or failure for undergraduate psychology students, Mausner (98)
arranged interaction for success-success pairs, failure-failure pairs,
and success-failure pairs. Those who had experienced failure showed a
significantly greater tendency to shift toward the answer given by the
partner. In the success-failure pairings, the unsuccessful member
shifted toward the successful one, but the successful ones did not
shift from their prior estimates. In the failure-failure pairings,
members' responses tended to converge.
Similar results have been reported by Mausner and Bloch (100) and by Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead (20) (see above).
Kelman (75) used the autokinetic task to investigate
the effects of success and failure. By comparison with the control and
the ambiguous conditions, shifts toward the confederate were
significantly higher for the failure group and significantly lower for
the success group. Similarly, differences in responses between the
interaction situation and the postindividual session showed that the
successful group shifted away from the confederate's report, and the
failure group shifted toward it. The data suggest not only that failure
experience increases susceptibility but that success decreases it.
Keisler (72) found no differences between the success
and failure groups in imitation of a model in the pressure situation
when his behavior was not labeled correct or incorrect. "Successful"
subjects who perceived a model obtaining chance scores followed him
significantly less often than "unsuccessful" subjects judging after a
successful model.
In the study by Schroeder and Hunt (119), subjects
wrote selfevaluations after disapproval by a neutral source. Those who
gave more self-devaluating responses yielded to a significantly greater
degree in the pressure situation.
When an individual has a prior alone
experience of failure, he is more susceptible to pressures on a second
task. However, subjects are less susceptible following a group
experience of failure than of success.
Degree of Anxiety or Insecurity.
Sherif and Harvey (124) varied familiarity with the experimental
setting and with the manner of the experimenter. Subjects judged the
autokinetic task initially in
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private; two to seven days later,
they judged in pairs. Comparisons were made of ranges and medians of
judgments for private and pair sessioiis. The greater the uncertainty
induced under private conditions, the more individuals fluctuated in
the ranges and medians of their judgments, with dispersion
significantly reduced in the pair sessions for those experiencing
maximum uncertainty. No differences occurred between private and. group
judgments for those experiencing lesser degrees of uncertainty. The
findings are interpreted as indicating that subjects served as
"anchors" for one another when field anchorages were reduced.
Properties of the Prior Task.
Pretraining has been provided on tasks with properties differing from
those of the tasks used to exert pressures. Luchins (88) used the task
of naming the percept in a series of twelve drawings. By comparison
with a control group, the erroneous response was given more frequently
by those who had had pretraining with a confederate whose identical
response was labeled "correct" in the preliminary series and
"incorrect" in the second series. When the confederate's preliminary
response was not supported by features of the drawing, no differences
were found between the experimental and the control groups for another
condition.
Luchins and Luchins (90) varied the responses of the
confederate to the preliminary series of pictures. Half the subjects
judged pictures of clearly delineated objects, and the other half an
ambiguous set of lines. Conformity was higher when the preliminary
series was ambigaous and when the confederate's responses to the
preliminary series were congruent with those of a control group judging
privately.
Reward Pretraining.
In some studies, independence has been rewarded, whereas in others
conformity to a false group position has been reinforced. In the study
by Luchins and Luchins (90) just reviewed, the experimenter called the
naive subject's responses "right" when they agreed with those of the
confederate. Subjects showed greater susceptibility on a subsequent
test series. Feedback has a stabilizing effect even when the
information is incorrect. Comparable conditions in another study by
Luchins (87) produced similar results (see above).
Crutchfield (34) reports that conformity increased on
a task involving perceptual judgments when the experimenter called the
erroneous reports of others "right," but that subsequent responses to
attitude statements by the same subjects were not influenced.
Conformity effects following pretraining with reward for erroneous responses appear to be related to the content of the tasks.
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ation found that students classified
in the dominant life style according to McGuire's Index of Value
Orientation reported significantly more errors (see above).
Age and sex of the subjects, differences in amount of
sleep deprivation, strength of food preferences, and degree of anxiety
have been related to susceptibility.
Sex.
Burtt (25) asked college women and men in groups of four to twenty-six
persons to judge the truthfulness of a person recounting an intaginary
crime, once prior to and once after the discussion. Analysis of the
data revealed only small and insignificant differences between men and
women in degree of shifting as a function of discussion, with a
tendency for women to shift more than men. Jenneis (70) reported
similar results (see above).
Crutchfield (34) has summarized unpublished results by
other investigators who have tested women on the same battery of items
that he has employed with men. By contrast with college men, responses
by college women showed a significantly higher degree of conformity,
and that, by comparison with adult men, a sample of college women
alumnae in their early forties showed significantly lower conformity
scores. The highly selected composition of the alumnae group means that
the findings cannot be easily interpreted as indicating that older
women are less compelled to conformity than men.
Kirkpatrick (79) has compared frequency of shifting by
men and by women toward responses given by the opposite sex. The
BeliefPattern Scale of attitudes toward feminism was administered
individually to college students, then to one man and one woman as a
committee, and again individually. Although women changed their
positions less than men in the group situation, they were less inclined
to revert to their original position.
The finding by Coleman, Blake, and Mouton (31) (see
foregoing), indicating differential susceptibility of men and women as
a function of the material being judged, makes it mandatory that the
nature of the task be considered in future work.
Age.
Differences in susceptibility have been related to age. Duncker (38)
has reported that children under two and two-thirds years of age did
not respond to food preferences expressed by others, thus demonstrating
a lack of susceptibility for the task employed.
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Berenda (11) found
that children aged seven to ten gave erroneous responses as a function
of the incorrect reports by others with significantly greater frequency
than children ten to thirteen years old (see preceding).
Luchins (89) used ten- to thirteen-year-old children
as subjects in one series and male college students in another series.
Attempts to increase conformity as a function of the assistant's
erroneous reports were more successful with children.
Physiologic States of the Person.
Fisher and Rubinstein (42) found that subjects who had been awake
continuously for 48 to 52 hr showed significantly greater changes in
autokinetic judgments, both between trials and within trials, than
control subjects.
Kimbrell and Blake (78) experimentally created two
degrees of inducement to thirst: strong and moderate. Subjects then
were asked to wait for the remainder of the experiment near a drinking
fountain with a sign forbidding its use. Under conditions of moderate
thirst, the naive subject was significantly influenced by the
confederate who violated the sign. No differences were found for the
strong thirst condition.
Four- to six-year-old kindergarten children were
placed by Marinho (95) in two groups, one showing a preference for one
of two kinds of fruit paste, and the other, with indefinite
preferences. Half of each group served as control and half as
experimental subjects. Susceptibility to a confederate's selection was
found in both groups, although predominant preferences were more
difficult to shift.
Lawson and Stagner (82) tested the hypothesis that
attitude change during group discussion is accompanied by increases in
anxiety, and that amount of change is proportional to the amount of
anxiety. Male undergraduate college students were preselected by
attitude scales to represent extreme positions toward nationalism or
internationalism. Anxiety was measured by palmar sweat both before and
after each subject participated in the pressure situation. Two naive
subjects interacted with an instructed majority who took the opposite
point of view. Attitude shifts were found to be accompanied by decreases in palmar sweat, particularly for those initially holding nationalistic opinions.
Hoffman (64) used selected items from the F-scale to
differentiate students with high and low inner conformity needs. In the
pressure situation, GSR readings were taken as each subject responded
orally to social attitude items after hearing erroneous group norms
that alternately agreed or disagreed with responses subjects had given
six
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weeks earlier. Unexpectedly, both
groups shifted significantly toward the false norms, with conformity
producing less anxiety than resistance, although the differences were
significant for high conformity subjects only.
The findings regarding sex are inconclusive, with
minor evidence that men may be more resistant. to social pressures than
women. A consistent finding is that younger people are more responsive
to social pressures than older individuals. Loss of sleep appears to
render a person more susceptible. Definite food preferences render the
individual more resistant to change. Two studies report that shifting
is accompanied by a decreased amount of anxiety.
Psychologic dimensions investigated have included
ascendancysubmission; lack of nervous tension and self-confidence;
authoritarianism; dimensions described by the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory; the Rorschach Test; the Thematic Apperception
Test; intelligence; complexity-simplicity; originality; dependence on
the perceptual field; pathologic tendencies of the person; and
characteristics assessed by self-ratings and self-descriptive check
lists.
Ascendancy-Submission.
Several different personality measures have been employed to assess the
effects of individual differences in ascendancy-submission. Helson,
Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead (63) used the Allport-Allport A-S Reaction Study
to classify subjects and then had them judge eighteen statements from
the Thurstone Militarism Scale. Submissive people were more influenced
to shift their responses (see foregoing). Mouton, Blake, and Olmstead
(103) also employed the A-S Reaction Study as a measure of
ascendancysubmission. Under name disclosure conditions only, submissive
subjects were found to conform more often as a function of the
erroneous reports; of others (see preceding).
Beloff (10) also used the A-S Reaction Study.
Both male and female subjects responded to the Thurstone-Chave War
Scale initially in private and later as the fifth person in the
simulated group situation. Others, gave strongly agreeing, neutral, and
strongly disagreeing responses, in random order and balanced, to the
anti-, pro-, and neutral attitudes toward war statements. He found a
negative rela-
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tionship for men only between
ascendancy and conformity. For women, a positive relationship was
observed, with more submissive women conforming less than those in the
ascendant. Beloff provides no basis for interpreting the divergent
results.
Kelman (75) classified subjects on the ascendancy
scale from the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors GAMIN. Subjects low
in ascendancy, who had participated under the failure, ambiguous, or
control conditions, were found to be more susceptible to influences.
Under the success condition, increased susceptibility was found for
those higher in ascendancy.
The ascendancy scale of the Guilford-Martin Inventory
of Factors GAMIN also was used by Bray (23) to classify subjects who
later responded to the autokinetic task. For the anti-Semitic subgroup
judging with a Jewish confederate, higher ascendancy subjects were more
susceptible; no relationship was found for the subgroup classified as
not anti-Semitic judging under the same conditions. For the subgroup
classified as not anti-Semitic judging with a Gentile confederate, high
ascendancy correlated significantly with shifting, with no difference
found for the anti-Semitic subjects under the same conditions. Low
ascendancy was correlated with increased susceptibility for the
subgroup classified as not anti-Negro that judged after a Negro
confederate. These complicated relationships do not fit a systematic
pattern.
Ascendancy-submission has been measured by teachers'
ratings in studies by Berenda (11) and Jenness (70). Neither
independencesubmission nor ascendancy-submission was found to be
related to susceptibility (see above).
The evidence indicates that a basic association exists
between these two sets of variables in the direction of greater
susceptibility as a function of greater submissiveness. The
relationship has been confirmed for male subjects only, with an
inversion of relationship reported for women in one study.
Lack of Nervous Tension and Self-confidence.
Kelman (75) and Bray (23) related two additional scales — I,
self-confidence and N, lack of nervous tension — from the
Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors GAMIN to susceptibility. Kelman
found that subjects scoring either low in self-confidence or showing
lack of nervous tension had significantly higher suggestibility scores
except under conditions of prior success. Bray reports the same
findings for lack of nervous tension. However, when the total sample
was subdivided for prejudice on the Levinson-Sanford Scale of Attitude
toward Jews or the Likert Scale
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of Attitude toward the Negro, most of the correlation was contributed by the prejudiced subgroups only.
As measured by the Maudsley Personality Inventory,
Beloff (10) found conformity to be positively related to neuroticism
for men negatively related for women (see preceding).
Autlioritarianism.
Susceptibility was related by Wells, Weinert, and Rubel (128) to scores
on the Gough version of the F-scale. The students who gave incorrect
answers under influence had significantly higher mean scores on the
F-scale, indicating a tendency to more susceptibility by higher
authoritarian scores. Crutchfield (34) reports a significant
correlation of +.39 between higher scores on the F-scale and more
yielding to others on a twenty-one item test. For the same subjects,
the correlation between yielding and staff observer ratings of
authoritarianism in a psychodramatic situation was found to be +.35.
Beloff (10) reports a positive relationship between authoritarianism on
the F-scale and susceptibility for both men and women. Hardy (54) found
no relationship between F-scale scores and public and private
conformity.
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
Goldberg, Hunt, Cohen and Meadow (50) used the Asch line judging
problems to obtain groups of undergraduate students showing differences
in susceptibility. The male high conforming group was found to make
lower scores on the masculinity-femininity (more feminine), the
hypochondriacal, and psychasthenic scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory, and to make lower anxiety scores on the Taylor
Manifest Anxiety Scale. The female: high conformity group rated
significantly higher on the psychasthenic scale of the MMPI and the
Taylor Scale. The divergent findings for men and women were not
interpreted.
Crutchfield (33) used the Group Squares Test to
identify three groups of male subjects differing from one another in
degrees of readiness to yield under influence. Those least responsive
to pressures were found to be low in introspectiveness and more
masculine, as measured by the MMPI. Using the Asch line judging
problems, Barron (6) selected extreme groups in independence and
yielding. He found no significant differences between groups on the
MMPI scales nor did Crutchfield (34) using a different task.
It is difficult to identify basic relationships
between MMPI measures and susceptibility. A probable relationship is
that men low on MMPI masculinity are more susceptible.
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Intelligence.
Neither Berenda (11) nor Jenness (70) found significant correlations
between intelligence measures and susceptibility (see above). Fisher,
Williams, and Lubin (44) report no relationship, but the measures used
were not explained. Other investigators have shown a significant
inverse relationship between intelligence and conformity. Crutchfield
(34) found correlations of -.51 with the Terman Concept Mastery Test
and -.63 with staff ratings between intelligence and frequency of
yielding (see above).
The relationship between intelligence and
responsiveness to pressures has been found in two studies by
Crutchfield to be curvilinear. One (32) employed the Group Squares
Test, and the other (33), the "Bingo" task. Those scoring in the
intermediate range of responsiveness scored highest on intelligence
measures, including the Terman Concept Mastery Test and the Idea
Classification Test in the first study and an undefined measure in the
second study.
Nakamura (106) investigated the possibility that
conformity as a nonintellectual variable contributes to variability in
problem-solving ability. Intelligence as measured by Part II,
Analogies, of Form B of the Concept Mastery Test was held constant by
statistical means. For men, there was a significant negative
correlation between tendency to conform and performance on all problems
combined, but especially on the restructuring problems. The negative
correlation for men above twenty-one years only was considerably
higher. For younger men, results were consistent with those for women.
A significant sex difference was found, with men superior in
problem-solving and intelligence, but lower on conformity.
Studies of the relationship between intelligence and
susceptibility are not entirely clear; if a relationship does exist, it
probably is inverse and curvilinear.
Complexity-Simplicity.
Barron (7) categorized two extreme groups of subjects as yielders and
independents. Using the Barron-Welsh Art Scale to measure
complexity-simplicity, he found that independents made significantly
higher complexity scores. Crutchfield (32) found that those who yielded
in the intermediate range showed less preference for symmetry on the
Welsh Figure Preference Test.
Originality.
From a sample of USAF captains, Barron (8) selected the extreme groups
on eight measures of originality, including scores from the Rorschach
Test, the Thematic Apperception Test, anagrams, and plot titles.
Susceptibility scores were obtained on a twenty-one item test.
Significant differences between groups were found, with those
classified as original yielding less. Crutchfield (32) found that
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students responding to the Group Squares Test in the intermediate range were rated by instructors as highest on originality.
Dependence on the Perceptual Field.
Linton (86) measured dependence on the perceptual field by subtasks and
a composite score on the Tilting Room, Tilting Chair, and Embedded
Figures tasks. Other measures included the degree of attitude change
after reading an article contrary to own opinion and the influence of
personal attitudes on a syllogisms test. Subjects were divided into two
groups according to the extent of change toward the judgments of a male
confederate who responded five inches above the subject's pregroup norm
on the autokinetic task. The conformity measure for the autokinetic
situation correlated significantly with the composite score for the
degree of dependence on the perceptual field. No significant
correlations were found between social influence and performance on the
syllogisms and attitude task. The Embedded Figures Test also was
administered to high and low yielders in a study by Rosner (114).
Yielders failed to locate the test pattern in the complex figures
significanitly more often than nonyielders.
Compliance with Requests.
Wiener, Carpenter, and Carpenter (132, 133) classified undergraduate
psychology students by three degrees of their compliance with a request
to return some experimental materials. The mean conformity score was
significantly higher for the group that completed and returned the
material. Helson, Blake, and Mouton (62) report comparable results.
Projective Materials.
Hoffman (65) composed extreme groups of those who shifted most and
least toward false group norms reported for two) tasks. High conformers
were found to score significantly lower on all Thematic Apperception
Test measures of ego strength, and higher on measures of parental
dominance, aggression directed toward self, success striving,
overconcern for parents, and readiness to submit to authority.
Linton (85) using the Rorschach Test found significant
correlations between high conformity and low W, high P, flexor M, high
Hd, high F%, high M; Sum C, high Sum C, and animal responses consisting
mostly of insects, sea life, birds or bats, in contrast to a
preponderance of dogs, rabbits, elephants, or bears. The picture of the
high conformity person is one of high constriction.
Needs. A cluster of studies have investigated relationships between conformity and strength of various needs or drives, as measured by
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personality tests, including affiliation, dependency, approval, and achievement.
In the study by Jacubczak and Walters (69), child
subjects, half classified as high-dependent and half as low-dependent,
were subjected to pressures, once from a peer and once from an adult.
Differences were small and not statistically significant.
Hoffman (64) found that subjects with high conformity
needs tended to conform when faced with divergent norms, and showed
less anxiety when they did so (see above).
Hardy (54) determined the degree of affiliation
motivation by subject's responses to TAT type pictures prior to the
discussion task. In the no-support condition, the high- and medium-need
affiliation groups were more conforming than the low group. In the
partner condition, the medium and low groups conformed more than the
high group (see above). Samelson (115) reports in an abstract that he
failed to find a relationship between need affiliation and conformity
on a discrimination task.
Moeller and Applezweig (102) placed women college
students into groups representing combinations of high and low social
and selfapproval needs, as measured by a sentence completion form of
The Behavior Interpretation Inventory. Consistent with findings
from Hoffman's (64) study of need affiliation and from the achievement
studies, summarized next, subjects high in social approval needs and
low in need for self-approval significantly and consistently yielded to
the erroneous reports by others. No differences were found for persons
scoring high in self-approval needs and low in social approval needs,
or for those scoring high on both measures. Qualitative data from
postexperimental interviews substantiate the findings.
Krebs (80) validated the hypothesis that the greater
the achievement need of a person, the more resistant he is to opinion
change.
Samelson (115) provided information that might allow
the individual to account for the discrepancy between physical and
social reality. Subjects identified simple visual stimuli presented
tachistoscopically. Personality data available included measures of
need achievement and affiliation based on McClelland's scoring of TAT
responses, a measure of sensitivity to social stimuli and approach, and
a measure of anxiety, both drawn from items on the Cattell 16 PF.
Significantly less conformity was found under the reduced conflict
situation when prior failure by the others provided the naive subject
with an "explanation" for the social discrepancy. No relationships
between conformity and need affiliation or anxiety were found. In the
usual full conflict situation, both need achievement and social
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approach were negatively but not
significantly correlated with conformity, whereas under the reduced
conflict condition the correlation was positive and significant.
Since only one or two studies have employed the same
measures of strength of needs, the conclusions drawn can only be
regarded as tentative ones.
Rating and Check List Procedures.
Barron (6) selected extreme groups in susceptibility. In self-ratings
on the Gough Adjective Check List, subjects low in conformity perceived
themselves as possessing intellectual and cognitive originality,
open-mindedness, a high degree of personal involvement, emotional
reactivity, and lack of social ease or absence of social virtues;
yielders perceived themselves as possessing ease and facility in
interpersonal relations, personal effectiveness, playfulness in
achieving goals, and personal stability and health. On the eighty-four
descriptive item check list, independents placed significantly higher
values on creativity, close interpersonal relations, and the importance
of the individual as opposed to the group. Yielders saw themselves as
practical-minded, physicalistic in thinking, and group-oriented.
Self-descriptive questionnaire and personality
inventories, used by Crutchfield (34) to contrast extreme groups,
characterized the independent person as one who is adventurous,
self-assertive, possessed of self-respect, and free from compulsion
about rules. Conforming persons were seen as rigid, externally
sanctioned, inconsistent, anxious, and possessing moralistic attitudes
and conventionality of values. High conformers described their parents
in rigidly idealistic terms; as parenc., they saw themselves as
restricting children, whereas independent subjects saw themselves as
permissive parents.
In another study by Crutchfield (33), staff ratings on
an adjective check list described those subjects most responsive to
social influence as fluid, impulsive, tense, and disturbed; those least
responsive as rigid, calm, conventional, and practical; those
intermediate in responsiveness as moderate, conventional, careful,
stable, quiet, intelligent, and serious. On self-ratings, those who
were most responsive agreed with the staff assessment; those least
responsive tended to overrate themselves; whereas those who were
intermediately responsive underrated themselves. Crutchfield (32) also
reports significant relationships between responsiveness and such
variables as impulsiveness, dominance, flexibility, spontaneity,
femininity, and independence of judgmemt, as well as differences
between groups in self-perception based on results from adjective check
lists.
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Responses of
students to Fiedler's inventory of assumed similarity (AS) have been
used to characterize subjects' tendencies toward acceptance or
rejection of the poor performance of co-workers, with a high score
indicating tendencies toward rejection. Nonconformers had larger AS
scores than conformers.
Pathological Trends in Personality.
In a study utilizing "normal" subjects, Cervin (27) selected as
subjects high and low scorers on several pencil and paper tests of
emotional stability. Highly unstable subjects were found to be
significantly more likely to change their opinions under opposition.
Levine, Laffal, Berkowitz, Lindemann, and Drevdahl
(84) contrasted the variability in individual scores on the autokinetic
task for patients in a Veterans Administration hospital. The
psychiatric group was found to be more variable in perceptual judgments
and to show less convergence toward group norms than the "control"
group. Didato (36) obtained similar results for schizophrenic compared
with normal subjects. Degree of regression in chronic schizophrenia has
been reported by Spohn (125) to be related to the tendency to modify
judgments in accordance with group norms, with those patients rated as
moderately regressed showing more conformity in perceptual judgments
than those rated as markedly regressed.
Personal Consistency.
Blake, Helson, and Mouton (18) investigated the generality issue for
responses to various tasks under simulated group conditions. Generality
of susceptibility was demonstrated by individual consistency for all
tasks. The split-half reliability for a composite conformity score of
+.93 also is interpreted as supporting the conclusion that the
conformity response is general. Helson, Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead
(63) demonstrated that individuals shifting their judgments on a larger
number of attitude items moved closer to the contradictory opinions of
others than those who shifted less frequently. Crutchfield (34) found
the split-half reliability of individual conformity scores for a
twenty-one item test to be +.90.
Rosner's (114) study revealed a high degree of
consistency in conformity for all tasks and for two different
administrations of one task.
Luchins (90) has reported a significant rank order
correlation between degree of agreement with responses given by an
assistant both in the preliminary and in the experimental series (see
preceding).
Asch (3) investigated intraseries consistency in
individual performance. Both subjects who conformed and those who
resisted initially tended to maintain their behavior throughout a
series of trials. Tripling the length of the series did not alter
results.
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Summary.
Results suggest that those who are more susceptible to conformity
pressures are more likely to be submissive, low in selfconfidence, less
intelligent, less original, show less nervous tension, score higher on
authoritarian scales, score on the simplicity end of the dimension of
the complexity-simplicity scale, show greater dependence on the
perceptual field, and comply with requests more frequently. Several
investigations reveal that conformity tendencies are geiteral across
several tasks.
Significant interactions between factors were found in
some studies, and pooling effects were obtained by simultaneous
variations in others.
A strong request complied with by another person has
been found by Blake, Mouton, and Hain (19) to produce the highest
frequency for signing a petition (see above). Highest frequency of
volunteering has been obtained by Rosenbaum (112) (see above). Freed,
Chandler, Mouton, and Blake (45) found that the largest and smallest
number of violations respectively occurred when subjects saw an
assistant (a) violate a "weak" sign forbidding entry and (b) conform to
a strong" sign (see preceding).
Blake, Helson, and Mouton (18) have varied difficulty
of arithmetic items in combination with degree of discrepancy between
correct answers and erroneous reports by background subjects. They
report greatest shifting for more difficult items when the erroneous
reports were only slightly divergent from the correct answers and the
converse (see above).
Uncertainty of judgment (or difficulty) also has been
varied by Deutsch and Gerard (35). Subjects were found to be most
susceptible when responses were given from memory, and when group
members were told that the group would be rewarded for accuracy with a
prize. Differences between manners of presentation were not found when
subjects wrote their responses prior to hearing the reports of others
(see above).
Weiner (132) reported positive relationships among
stimulus ambiguity, degree of certainty of judgment, discrepancy from
the norm, and conformity (see above).
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Cole (30) found that subjects shifted away and toward
the confederate's judgments respectively when he was alternately
represented as highly intelligent and as an "expert" (see above).
Coleman, Blake, and Mouton (31) have demonstrated a
significant relationship between task difficulty, susceptibility, and
sex of subject. Men and women college students responded to information
items after hearing the reports of two other men or women in the
simulated group situation. Difficulty level was varied by
precalibration on a comparable sample. Responses were analyzed
separately, since difficulty level was varied by sex. Conformity was
found to be positively and significantly related to difficulty of item
for both men and women.
Schachter, Ellertson, McBride, and Gregory (116) found
that pressures from other group members to increase production were
equally effective for both high and low cohesion groups, and influences
to decrease production successful only for the high cohesion groups
(see above).
Gerard (47) found that the higher the attractiveness
of the reference group and the greater the initial agreement, the
smaller the amount of shifting under exposure to influences (see
above). Dittes and Kelley (37) have investigated changes in public and
private opinion by group members varying in feelings of acceptance.
Those told that they were about average in acceptance showed higher
conformity in both public and private expressions.
Jackson and Saltzstein's (68) results support the
hypothesis concerning the behavior of highly accepted persons:
conformity was greater in the normative than in the modal situation, and greater for the high attraction than for the low attraction group situation (see above).
Interaction between degree of discrepancy,
characteristics of others in the situation, and extent of attitude
change has been found when the task involves ratings of the subject by
himself and by both himself and others. Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro
(57) found that changes in an unfavorable direction on self ratings
were greatest for acquaintances who evaluated the subject most
unfavorably (see above).
Jones, Wells, and Torrey (71) found that where
individual accuracy was stressed, correct feedback was more significant
in increasing inde-
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pendence than incorrect feedback in increasing conformity (see above).
The interaction between degree of confidence expressed
by others in the situation and group membership or task-solving
orientation has been shown by Thibaut and Strickland (127) to influence
conformity behavior. Under group mentbership set, conformity increased
as confidence shown by other members increased. For a task set,
conformity decreased as pressures increaied (see above).
Deutsch and Gerard (35) found that commitment to a
judgment prior to hearing the responses of others reduced the degree of
shifting and tended to eliminate differences between responding under
anonymous conditions and face-to-face conditions (see above).
Festinger and Thibaut (41) and Gerard (47) have
reported similar findings for the relation of homogeneity among persons
composing the group and readiness to shift opinions (see above).
In Hare's (55) study of shifting related to group
size, leaders were classified as good, average, or poor on the basis of
TAT responses. He found that leader skill was correlated positively
with amount of change for large groups only.
Mouton, Blake, and Olmstead (103) report that
submissive subjects only were found to differ in susceptibility as a
function of whether they participated under personal identity or
anonymity conditions (see above).
Hardy (54) found that high and medium affiliation
groups were more conforming in the no-support condition, and the medium
and low groups more so in the partner condition (see above).
Bray (23) has reported that the degree and direction
of the relationship between conformity and personality characteristics
varied for attitude subgroup and the ethnic characteristic of the
confederate (see above).
Samelson (115) found that, in the usual full conflict
situation, both need achievement and social approach were negatively
but not significantly correlated with conformity, whereas under the
reduced conflict condition, the correlation was positive and
significant (see above).
Blake, Mouton, and Olmstead (20) found greatest
shifting for subjects who had an initial experience of' failure and who
participated under conditions of high pressures toward uniformity (see
above).
A factorial design was used by Mausner and Bloch (100)
to study the additivity of variables. All variables-prior success or
failure, prestige of partrier, and prior cooperative
experience-separately affected to a
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shifting of responses under pressure
conditions; and at some later time the subject's behavior under
private, post-pressure conditions. Conversion is evident when
performance in the post-pressure situation differs from that in the
pre-pressure situation in the direction of the divergent reports others
gave in the conformity situation.
The phenomenon of conversion has received far less
attention in researcll studies than susceptibility. The result is that
at best only an imperfect picture can be drawn of psychological factors
associated with conversion. Additional limitations in assessing the
dynamics of conversion result from the failure of many experimental
studies to employ sound designs. Nevertheless, because of its
importance, it seems useful to evaluate the present state of
understanding of conversion behavior.
Severl investigators have reported effects of prior
group influence on later alone judgments of perceptual tasks. In
Sherif's study (121), male college students judged one hundred trials
in four sessions, each held one day apart. The first three sessions
were composed of groups of two or three members each, and the fourth of
individuals judging by themselves. Initially, different individual
judgments converged toward a common norm in the group situations, and
the group norm persisted into individual sessions. Sherif (122) has
reported similar results for prearranged responses given by an
assistant. For the majority of the subjects in the alone postgroup
session, greater convergence was found toward the responses reported by
others. Schonbar (118) obtained comparable results. Judgments of length
of lines and of a moving slot of light were made individually after a
series of judgments had been given in the presence of another person.
The influence of the subjects' reactions persisted into the postgroup,
private situation. She has also reported the important finding that the
longer the individual resists modifying his judgments, the longer the
persistence of the influence in the later private situation.
The autokinetic situation was used by Bovard (21),
with the degree of conformity determined by shifts in standard
deviations among pregroup, group, and postgroup judgment series. Rank
order coefficients showed significant correlations for the sizes of the
standard deviations among the three situations. Subjects were ranked in
order for degree of susceptibility to change in the group situation.
The susceptibility to conversion — the extent to which changes
persisted for twerity-eight days into the post-pressure situation-is
represented by a rank order correlation of.92. Subjects who showed
larger shifts in their mean judgments also showed a greater tendency to
retain the shift over the twenty-eight-day period.
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Rohrer, Barron,
Hoffman, and Swander (111), trained ROTC students under alone
conditions to make judgments for points of light traversing distances
of two inches for one-half and eight inches for the other half of the
subjects. They then had subjects judge in pairs. The mean distance
judged under the interaction conditions was six inches. Significant
consistency was obtained between estimates given under interaction
conditions and those given under private conditions one year later.
Similarities between performances after initial training and the
private situation were small, indicating that when the rank order in
the postgroup serves as the criterion, pretraining influences are
negligible by comparison with effects produced within the interaction
situation.
Schachter and Hall (117) used the frequency with which
subjects "followed through" on a volunteering commitment. Subjects who
volunteered independently (without knowledge of the responses of
others) showed the highest relative frequency of carrying out the
promised action.
Marinho (95) studied the persistence of experimentally
shifted food preferences in four- to six-year-old children. In a
private test situation one year later, the aftereffect of the social
influence situations persisted in all those children originally having
indefinite taste. Importance attaches to this study since it suggests
that those most susceptible to conversion effects are the ones least
committed before group pressures are exerted (see previous sections).
Duncker (38) investigated carryover effects on food
preferences, and found that when the experimental situation was
repeated two or three times a week for an unstated period, significant
effects were shown to persist, indicating the adoption of new
preferences under repetitive social reinforcement.
Gerard (48) studied conversion effects in groups of
three members, which differed both in degree of cohesion and in the
extent of initial disagreement on the solution of a labor-management
case. One week after participating in a fifteen-minute discussion,
subjects made individual judgments that were recorded on a seven-point
scale, both before and after discussion in a two-person situation with
a confederate. For persons initially interacting under high cohesion
conditions, individual judgments given prior to discussion with the
confederate showed significaritty greater convergence toward the
original group position. High cohesion members also showed more
resistance to shifting toward a different position under the social
influence condition than did subjects participating initially under low
cohesion conditions. Similar results were found relating degree of
initial agreement among members to resistance: the finding is that the
greater the
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initial agreement among members, the lesser the susceptibility in a second pressure situation.
Several studies have reported results that relate
degree of conversion behavior to variations in background factors or to
personality characteristics of the subjects.
Hardy (54) studied differences in the amount of
conformity pressure exerted by unanimous as contrasted with
near-unanimous opposition in a discussion situation. Conversion was
increased by unanimity of opposition in the pressure situation (see
previous sections).
Willingness to volunteer bas been studied by Bennett
(9) to determine the effect of perceived unanimity. One-third of the
groups of college subjects participated under discussion conditions,
one-third under lecture conditions, and one-third as control groups.
The measure for the degree of influence exerted was the number of
positive responses by subjects to subsequent mail requests for
volunteers. The factor of perceived group unanimity in the decision to
volunteer was found to be significantly related to the carrying out of
the specified action.
McKcachie (92) measured shifting of opinions among
students in six sections, three of which were taught by leader-centered
methods and the other three by group-centered methods. After one month,
classes were given hypothetical problems concerning either Negroes,
criminals or children, with class members asked to arrive at a
unanimous decision. One week later, the attitude scales used at the
beginning of the experiment were readministered. Leader-centered as
contrasted with group-centered classes showed more convergence. These
findings are opposite those reported by Bovard (22) (see above).
Hoffman (64) measured Conversion effects by
readministering a scale of social attitude items individually two weeks
after the pressure situation. The conversion score consisted of the
proportion of all conforming responses that persisted for the two-week
period. Persons classified as low in conformity needs had significantly
higher conversion scores than those classified as high in conformity
needs (see above).
Results are generally consistent in showing that
responses altered by social pressure persist into the future as
conversion phenomena. The degree of conversion is limited, however, by
the intensity of one's initial preference, with the general rule being
that the more indefinite one's position, the greater the impact of a
later social situation and the greater the carryover effect into the
future. Suggestive is the finding that the longer one resists altering
his position under pressure conditions, the longer he retains the
altered position in the postpressure situation.
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Although increased
susceptibility has been shown to be related to higher inner conformity
needs of subjects, one experiment suggests that those lower in inner
conformity needs may be more likely to show increased conversion
effects at a later time. Persons exposed to unanimous divergent
responses of others are more likely to demonstrate conversion behavior.
If the interaction is leader-centered rather than group-centered, then
greater conversion may be expected at a future time.
The implications for interrogation of research on
conformity can be evaluated by describing known key factors that are
likely to produce maximum suggestibility for any given individual. If
the goal is to aid an individual to resist interrogation pressures,
then opposite conditions must be created.
Individuals appear to be more susceptible to
conformity pressures when expressing social opinions, ideological
attitudes, and abstractions that are not rooted in concrete experience
than when they are dealing with factual materials, with which they are
well acquainted, or with personal preferences. Regardless of the
materials, increases in susceptibility appear when an individual is
uncertain of his beliefs, uninformed regarding the facts of the
situation, or when objective cues that could aid him in maintaining his
orientation to the situation are reduced or eliminated. Available
experimental evidence demonstrates the key importance for conformity of
inadequate individual knowledge and understanding. An important
inference is that resistance to conformity or to interrogation
pressures can be heightened by insuring that an individual is well
informed of necessary facts and their implications.
Tendencies toward conformity and conversion are
heightened when an individual is with at least three other persons,
when others are in
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unanimous agreement and when their
reactions represent only small departures from the position believed by
the individual to represent his own convictions. Resistance is
minimized by leading the individual away from his own position
gradually by small steps.
If the other individuals present are personally
acquainted with the subject, and are persons whom he respects,
additional conformity pressures are created. Furthermore, if the
individual is required to act in his own name and is not required to
commit himself to a position prior to the application of pressure,
greater influence in the conformity direction can be exercised. A group
situation tends to foster conformity, when the group is led according
to a permissive groupcentered approach, when members are dependent on
one another to obtain significant goals, when the situation calls for
unanimous agreement among members, and when the group is cohesive.
To create these conditions in life, it would be
necessary to compose groups by careful selection to insure friendliness
and responsibility among members, with all but one — the person on whom
pressures are to be applied — agreeing unanimously in support of a
position not greatly divergent from the position held by the critical
person.
It would appear that the best single antidote against
conformity pressures is intimate acquaintance and thorough
understanding of the issues involved. Although yet to be demonstrated
experimentally, it also is probable that an individual would be aided
in maintaining independence through understanding of conformity
pressures. If not understood, they can operate "silently" to render an
individual uncertain of himself, ready to follow others, and to
capitulate to an interrogator.
A peisonality profile of the kind of individual who is
least able to resist conformity pressures, and probably interrogation
pressures as well, would include such characteristics as
submissiveness, lack of self-confidence, lack of originality, lack of
achievement motivation, desire for social approval, and being
uncritical, conventional, and authoritarian.
As with conformity, conversion is highest for
individuals whose initial response regarding factual matters or
attitudes is indefinite,
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vague, and uncertain. Conversion
further appears to be more complete for individuals who resist
conformity pressures for a longer time. Unlike conformity, however,
conversion effects are heightened when capitulation occurs under
leader-centered group pressure conditions. Here again, it would seem
that one of the most powerful factors determining conversion is limited
understanding of the problem or minimum insight into one's own
attitudes or convictions. Resistance to conversion probably can be
increased through insuring that the individual remains well informed
and understands his own opinions and attitudes sufficiently well to
express them clearly.
A number of limiting factors make generalizations from laboratory situations to life difficult.
Laboratory situations are relatively bland as far as
involvement is concerned, at least in comparision with lifelike
settings where the personal stakes connected with conformity,
compliance, and conversion are higher. Because of the limited
investment a laboratory situation usually evokes in an individual,
direct or absolute comparisons between results obtained in it and
actual life settings are likely to be treacherous. There is a need for
the type of research that provides the experimenter with the
opportunity to control and manipulate variables under realistic
operating circumstances. Only then can generalizations be made with
higher probability of accuracy. Current knowledge of relevant variables
should make it possible to design experiments for lifelike settings
with a minimum of trial and error. Such studies could be combined with
experiments on sleep deprivation or simulated space flights, in which
the experimenter's control over living conditions and the duration of
the experiment is quite high.
Many of the experiments reviewed in this study have
employed tasks requiring adjustments of individuals under conformity or
conversion conditions that are extremely artificial. As a result,
conformity or resistance may develop under conditions that bear little
resemblance
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to actual situations. Future
laboratory investigations can benefit from employing tasks that arouse
deeper personal commitment and stronger group loyalties.
Even a cursory examination of the principal reports
summarized here shows that much of the work in this area has been
designed according to empirical understanding, intuition, and "hunch."
Experiments designed to test systematic and theoretical issues are
needed. Sherif's general formulations concerning frames of reference
(123) and Helson's adaptation-level theory (59), applied in analyzing
the conditions of social adjustment, constitute examples of theories
that have already demonstrated their usefulness in experimental
designs. Such theoretical statements can serve to bring order to an
otherwise chaotic field of endeavor.
Results from more recent experiments give substantial
support to the view that conformity, compliance, and conversion are
complex matters of adjustment that occur when a host of circumstances,
rather than a single factor, are favorable. Critical factors include
the nature of the task, the circumstances of the situation within which
the behavior occurs, and the characteristics of the individual on whom
pressures are exerted. Each possible source of influence needs to be
varied simultaneously within the design of a single experiment, if we
are to obtain a more nearly accurate picture of the dynamics of
conformity. In terms of present understanding, it can be stated that
the interaction of sources of influence is not additive, but that true
interaction among variables occurs.
The literature is riddled with "one-shot" studies that
make acceptance of conclusions tenuous. Replication experiments are
needed to insure that conclusions from single studies will stand.
Over 90 per cent of work in this area has been
concerned with conformity, yet the conditions under which changes
induced by conformity
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pressures extend into future
behavior are of critical concern. Such experiments are not difficult to
design. For the most part, they represent an extension of the
conditions already used in studying conformity to secure measurements
of the residual effects of conformity pressures. Great progress in the
understanding of both conformity and conversion phenomena may be
expected from investigations designed to measure the persistence of
conversion over time.
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Historically, the problem of psychopathology has been
the development of techniques which would discover and make apparent
emotional pathology that is not immediately evident. Screening tests,
lie scales, observational and interview procedures have all been
devised with the primary intent of unmasking the potentially or
actually disturbed individual who masquerades behind a front of
defensiveness and superficial social conformity. The opposite type of
unmasking, i.e., of the feigning or simulation of emotional illness
which is not in reality present or is exaggerated to an extreme degree,
has received comparatively less attention. Murphy (65) has written an
excellent history of malingering and has shown that the problem of
simulation has been present since Early Greek and Biblical times.
Although the simulation of psychosis or of epilepsy has a long history,
more attention has been given in the past to the feigning of diseases
of single organs, and the development of laboratory techniques which
would differentiate the sick from the well. The malingerer, on his
part, has shown amazing resourcefulness in keeping abreast of the
literature and in devising counter counter-measures.
The simulation of mental illness by captured prisoners
of war is a potential, and perhaps effective, technique for evading
interrogation. In almost all cultures, the mentally ill person cannot
be held accountable for his actions, is considered incompetent, and is
not
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expected to give a rational account
of himself, his past, or his environment. The prisoner of war, faced
with coercive interrogation, and reluctant to betray his country and
friends, might choose this as an honorable alternative which favors
self-preservation. Certainly this has become more frequent among
persons charged with serious crimes in courts of law. The increasing
popularization of the mental health movement and the publicity
attendant to the M'Naghten Rules and the Durham decision may lead to a
further confounding of criminal acts and mental illness. This chapter
is not concerned with the moral or ethical aspects of this problem, but
rather is directed toward understanding how malingering may become a
factor in situations involving the interrogation of a resistant source
by a captor.
Because of the focus of interest, it seems feasible to
limit the scope of this chapter to the feigning of those illnesses
which would render the person mentally incompetent. Although a person
may malinger a paralysis of the arms or legs, blindness, or a low back
pain, none of these symptoms would make it impossible for him to
testify or reveal information. However, psychosis, mental deficiency,
or amnesia would more than likely lead an interrogator or examiner to
the conclusion that the person is not a reliable source of information
who can be expected to report events accurately and realistically.
Thus, the primary aim of this behavior is evasion rather than the
financial gain which is often the motivation for simulating physical
disease. More specifically, it is an evasion of responsibility, the
responsibility for past acts or for future acts, as related to the
giving of information. In this chapter, then, malingering refers to the
planned and deliberate simulation of mental symptoms for the purpose of
evading responsibility.
Two things become apparent in reviewing the literature
on malingering. The bulk of it is impressionistic and subjective, and
at times there is more disagreement than agreement among the writers.
Much of the polemics revolve around issues such as the moral
reprehensibility of malingering; whether or not the malingerer is, by
definition, an emotionally disturbed person; the differentiation of
malingering from the Ganser syndrome; whether or not the Ganser
syndrome is an hysterical or psychotic reaction; and the difficulties
of detecting malingering. For the most part, it appears that those who
are optimistic about detecting malingering might do well to share some
of the pessimism of their colleagues. As Davidson (19) points out, even
the best clinicians make errors in this area, and MacDonald (58)
stresses the need for professional skill and long experience in
determining whether malingering is an element of the clinical picture.
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Primarily, this
chapter will attempt to bring some order and clarity to this area by
reviewing and evaluating the literature, and by attempting to fit these
findings to constructs taken from the broader area of social
psychology. Hopefully, this may present certain reference points for
thinking about malingering and evaluating it, and may provide an
orientation for organizing techniques to detect malingering. Studies
from the experimental literature which deal with related concepts will
be included. The following four pathological states will be considered,
the simulation of which might lead the interrogator to conclude that
the source is unreliable or incompetent: psychosis, the Ganser
syndrome, mental deficiency, and amnesia.
The simulation of psychosis or of any mental
aberration may be considered as a conscious and deliberate attempt to
take a specific social role. According to Sarbin (77), the concept of
role deals with the organized actions of a person in harmony with a
given status or position. A position may be considered a system of
rights and duties exercised by the person who occupies the position. It
is equivalent to a cognitive system of role expectations. The role
expectations, which are learned through direct or indirect experiences,
deal with with the behavior expected of the occupant of a particular
position, and with the behavior anticipated of the person occupying the
reciprocal position in the social interaction situation. Thus the
position or status of the mentally ill person is culturally transmitted
just as any other role, and consists of a system of expectations about
the behavior of the mentally ill person. It also includes the
reciprocal expectation that the person dealing with the deranged
patient will protect him, consider him not responsible for his actions,
prevent him from doing harm, make few if any demands on him to be
rational, and institute therapeutic and rehabilitative measures. The
organized behavior of the individual, directed toward fulfilling these
expectations of the self and other, is called the role. Thus, the
person who plays the role of the psychotic is trying to determine the
role of the examiner or interrogator, and he expects a certain response
from him. How successful he will be in enacting that role seems to be
dependent on three factors. The first relates to the adequacy and
validity of his role perception, i.e., how well he has perceived and
understood the organized set of actions comprising that role. The
second appears to be related to a generalized skill at taking and
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enacting roles. Finally, certain
enduring or temporary motivational and qualitative characteristics of
the self structure are probably influential in determining the choice
and adequacy of the role. This possible consonance of basic personality
to enacted role is one of the most complicating factors in recognizing
malingering, and is one with which almost all workers in this field
have wrestled.
Although these notions on role behavior may help in
understanding malingering in general, there is as yet little empirical
work which would aid in the prediction of the persons and the
circumstances which might combine to produce simulation of psychosis.
It is apparent that almost all individuals play different roles, and
the role played is partly dependent upon who the partner is in the
social situation. Block (9) and Block and Bennett (11) have
demonstrated that a single subject varies his behavior as the
interpersonal situation changes. Meltzer (62) has shown that there are
individual differences in the ability to shift roles, and this ability
seems partly related to the sophistication and complexity of the
person's understanding of others. The complexity of this understanding
did not appear to be a function of self and ideal-self discrepancy in a
homogeneous sample of college students. However, Gough (35) and Cameron
(14) have argued that role-taking ability is related to emotional
well-being. Studies by Sarbin and Farberow (78), Sarbin and Hardyck
(79), and Sarbin and Jones (80) have tended to confirm that adequate
role perception and validity of role enactment are positively related
to adjustment. However, in a study by Helfand (40), schizophrenics in
remission were found to be more adept at taking the role of a standard
stimulus person than were either normals or chronic schizophrenics. In
addition, Drake (21) found that the better actors in a college drama
department scored higher than did poorer actors and nonactors on two of
the three neurotic scales of the MMPI. Thus, there are somewhat
contradictory findings concerning the question of adjustment in
relation to skill for enacting a variety of roles.
The more specific question of the type of person who
will attempt to simulate the role of the psychotic has not been
investigated experimentally. From role theory comes the suggestion that
the role chosen and played well is the one which is congruent with the
nature and organization of the self (77). This would tend to support
those writers who feel that malingering of psychosis is a symptom of a
serious personality defect, if not a psychosis in itself. This position
is most clearly taken by Ossipov (69) who feels that the person who
simulates a psychosis is accentuating his own latent characteristics.
Moreover, several authors have pointed out that malingering may be used
to
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conceal an actual psychosis, and
that which was at first considered malingering may show up as a grave
disorder later (13, 22, 34, 47, 58). Eissler (22) explains this as an
attempt to hold a psychosis in abeyance by acting as if the behavior is
under control and not something one is submitting to. Furthermore, on
recovery from psychosis, a person may claim he was malingering because
it may be too humiliating to have others know that that he was
suffering from a psychiatric disorder (22, 58). Thus, regardless of the
problem of who is best at taking roles, the disturbed or the integrated
individual, there are many who would hold that the choice of a specific
role, that of the psychotic, usually indicates serious psychopathology.
However, others argue that while the malingerer may be
emotionally upset, there are also many normals and near normals who
malinger under extreme circumstances (22, 23, 29, 30, 41, 58, 88, 91).
As MacDonald (58) and Ossipov (69) indicate, the simulation of mental
incompetence is more frequent when there is danger of loss of life.
Certainly the malingerer does not expect to be punished more severely
for having committed a murder and feigning psychosis than for having
committed a murder without feigning psychosis, if through simulation
there may be a chance of avoiding punishment.
The interrogation situation appears similarly extreme.
The person may see himself in a role conflict, and failure to resolve
the conflict may cost him his life. He is occupying two positions
simultaneously, and the role expectations of the one are not compatible
with the other. As a loyal soldier he is expected by his country to
withhold information which would aid the enemy. As a prisoner of war,
the enemy expects him to reveal what he knows. As shown by Gullahorn
(38), a person who is placed in a situation where incompatible demands
are placed upon him because of his role relationships in two groups
will try to retain both positions and find a way of satisfying them
both. Toby (84) in his analysis of role conflict situations suggests
that illness is an excuse by which a person in role conflict may avoid
performing an obligation or duty of a role, without relinquishing the
position and without suffering sanctions for failing to perform the
duty. Thus illness, and particularly mental illness, would allow the
prisoner to escape the role dilemma, and since illness is such a
widespread excuse, special personality characteristics may not be
necessary for selecting this role under extreme circumstances.
Turner (85) has shown that nonconforming behavior is
excused by friends if they believe that the behavior is inconsistent
with the person's usual role and was caused by unusual stress. A person
may forgive himself in a similar fashion. Furthermore, if one conceives
of malin-
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gering as antisocial behavior
(Szasz, 83), then there is much evidence to indicate that many people
are dishonest at one time or another (15, 17, 39, 51, 59). Hartshorne
and May (39), using school children as subjects, concluded that deceit
or honesty is not a unified character trait but rather a specific
function of the person's life situation. One of the situations which
seems to enhance the possibility of deceit or cheating is a threat to
the person's role. This is one way of interpreting the rather
consistent finding that poor students who are having difficulty
maintaining their roles as students are more likely to cheat (15, 17,
39). Another indication that circumstances are influential in
determining antisocial behavior is the finding that examination
deception is a function of the particular peer group's attitude toward
dishonesty (59). Thus, it is possible to conclude that in conflict
situations and extreme circumstances, especially when one's life may
seem to be at stake, motivational factors could override enduring
personality traits, at least as regards an attempt at malingering. This
also seems to be congruent with the finding that a person will take a
particular role if it is seen as satisfying an important need (66).
The success of simulation appears to be greatly
dependent on the validity and adequacy of the malingerer's perception
of what comprises the role which he is trying to simulate. As pointed
out by several writers, the person who simulates is an actor who
portrays an illness as he understands it (8, 58, 69). It would appear
that the characteristics and behaviors which are perceived as crucial
to the role are acquired through experience and observation. Personal
experiences may have occurred with friends or relatives who were
psychotic. In the two cases described by Atkin (4), the role
perceptions necessary for the malingering were built up by confinement
in mental hospitals at eariler times. The cultural stereotype of the
deranged person also seems to be used as a basis for role enactment.
Observations made of criminal cases being psychiatrically evaluated
prior to trial tend to support this. Many Negro patients who are
thought to be malingering tend to play the part of a slow, somewhat
confused and defective person who understands little of what is going
on around him. Like members of other oppressed minorities, some Negroes
have adopted a mask of dullness and unawareness when interacting with
the Caucasian majority (5). The cultural determination of the
ingredients Which are perceived as comprising the psychotic
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role is also evident in the work of
Benedict (6). Her investigation of trancelike states in primitive
cultures led her to conclude that the content of the hallucinations
experienced is relatively constant within groups but highly variable
between groups. This suggests that the role of the person in trance is
learned from interaction with his own group. As she states, "Even in
trance the individual holds strictly to the rules and expectations of
his culture, and his experience is as locally patterned as a marriage
rite or an economic exchange" (6, p. 77). Sarbin (76) gives a similar
interpretation to the behavior of the hypnotized subject which can also
be approximated through simulation. Sarbin understands this behavior as
an unconscious attempt on the subject's part to take the role of the
hypnotic subject as perceived by him through previous experience (see
Chapter 5).
The detection of malingering depends to a great extent
on the simulator's failure to understand adequately the characteristics
of the illness he is feigning. This principle appears central to the
indices of malingering which are reported in the literature. Although
the simulator may have some understanding of psychosis, his
understanding is usually spotty. He fails to appreciate the underlying
disturbance and portrays isolated symptoms instead (19, 87). Thus, he
may complain of hallucinations or delusions but not show any of the
formal characteristics of schizophrenic thought. Often he presents
symptoms which are exceedingly rare, existing mainly in the fancy of
the layan (8). One such symptom is the delusion of misidentification,
characterized by the patient's belief that he is some powerful or
historic personage. This symptom is very unusual in true psychosis, but
is used by a number of simulators (19). In schizophrenia, the onset
tends to be gradual, delusions do not spring up full-blown overnight;
in simulated disorders, the onset is usually fast and delusions may be
readily available (47, 69). The feigned psychosis often contains many
contradictory and inconsistent symptoms, rarely existing together (8,
47, 69, 87). The malingerer tends to go to extremes in his portrayal of
his symptoms: he exaggerates, overdramatizes, grimaces, shouts, is
overly bizarre, and calls attention to himself in other ways (8, 19,
47, 55, 69, 87). In doing this, the malingerer presents a childish,
dadaistic, nonsensical picture rather than a psychotic one. On the
other hand, Atkin (4) feels that the malingerer fails by not
maintaining the simulation long enough rather than by failing to
portray a psychotic picture accurately. Eissler (22) is more
pessimistic and contends that a smart malingerer probably will maintain
an accurate picture over a long period of time and may get away with it.
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Jones and
Llewellyn (47) feel that psychosis and mental deficiency are more
frequently feigned than depression and euphoria, but others have
reported a wide range of simulated illnesses. Several of the more
frequently feigned symptoms are delusions, hallucinations, depression,
confusion, excitement, and mutism. Some of the inconsistencies and
fallacies apparent in the malingerer's enactment of these symptoms may
be specified.
The nondeteriorated schizophrenic is often reluctant
to discuss his delusions because he has discovered that people are
likely to scoff at him. If he is willing to talk about them, he will
probably talk at great length and answer questions if the interviewer
appears sympathetic and encouraging. The malingerer, on the other hand,
feels that he must continually remind the examiner about his delusions
and brings them up on each occasion. However, when pressed for
particulars he may become evasive, especially if he sees a doubting
attitude in the interviewer. Although some truly bizarre and
complicated delusions may be fabricated on the spur of the moment, it
is more likely that the delusions will be very vague and very limited.
It is rare to find delusions as the only symptom of mental illness, but
some malingerers present no other major symptoms.
Malingerers often report visual and auditory
hallucinations. Visual hallucinations are rather rare and are more
characteristic of acute delirium and hallucinosis due to toxicity than
of schizophrenia. Again, in toxic conditions this should not be an
isolated symptom, and one would also expect confusion, tremor, slurred
speech, and disorientation along with the visual hallucinations.
Auditory hallucinations, which are more characteristic of the
schizophrenic, should also be accompanied by the types of thought
disturbance characteristic of the schizophrenic.
Depression, especially psychotic depression, is
considered difficult to simulate, primarily because the concomitant
somatic and physiological changes are absent (19, 47, 58). The truly
depressed patient will show a poor appetite, loss of weight,
constipation, and a disturbance of his
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sleep cycle. Even more difficult to
feign are the alterations of the physiological processes which appear
in prolonged depressions. These may include lowered metabolism, lowered
temperature, dry skin and hair, and lowered red cell count. However,
there is evidence to indicate that motivation, attitude, and intent
will have an effect on physiologic processes; therefore the success of
the malingerer in actuating some of these changes should not be
discounted. Arnold (3) has reviewed some of that evidence. However, the
crude malingerer will probably not show these changes nor will he
manifest the selfreproachful and self-condemnatory ideas which are
characteristic of the depressed patient. Also, the simulator may be too
quick, alert, and responsive when he is examined.
Confusion, stupor, and amnesia may result from the
stress and strain of combat, capture, or arrest. If it is a temporary
anxiety state, it should respond to drugs and a sympathetic attitude.
Also it should at the outset be associated with other symptoms, such as
headache, agitation, restlessness, poor concentration, insomnia,
nightmares, ideas of physical disease such as heart trouble, the effort
syndrome, dyspepsia, tremor, poor appetite, and an exaggerated startle
reaction. The malingerer who feigns a confused state is usually slow,
puzzled, unaware, and unable to answer even simple questions. His
responses to questions may be bizarre, but if he is repeatedly pressed
for the correct answer, he may give it. Most important would be close
observation during periods when the patient does not know that he is
being observed. When alone or with friends, or even when talking about
certain topics with the examiner, the malingerer may show a surprising
amount of responsiveness and alertness. However, Eissler (22) warns
that the good malingerer is on guard to maintain his symptoms at all
times, and that the behavior of both the normal and the abnormal
changes when in solitude or when not being questioned by an authority
figure.
This appears to be a most difficult ruse to expose,
but also a difficult one for the malingerer to maintain. Mutism may
result from psychosis, organic brain disease, hysteria, or may just be
malingered. If it is a manifestation of cerebral involvement, the other
symptoms mentioned above may be evident. If it is of a psychotic
nature, the
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patient will probably be withdrawn
and not responsive to his environment. Of course, physical damage to
the speaking apparatus must be ruled out. The differentiation of
hysterical and malingered mutism is especially difficult. Since it is a
difficult symptom to maintain over a long period of time, the
malingerer may give himself away in an unguarded moment. Narcoanalysis
may help in making the correct diagnosis. The hysterical patient will
probably be able to speak during narcosis, whereas the malingerer will
probably continue to be mute.
Aside from the likelihood that the simulator will not
realistically and consistently portray the symptoms of the disorder he
is feigning, he may also show evasive and uncooperative behavior while
he is being examined (28, 47, 58, 72). Since he is aware of the
unreality or exaggeration of his symptoms, he is apprehensive lest
others recognize his ruse, and this leads him to be especially
suspicious, mistrustful, and cautious. Of course, this behavior is also
typical of the true paranoid patient and therefore cannot in itself be
taken as evidence of malingering. However, as Sarbin (77) indicates, a
person must move cautiously and uncertainly when he is not sure what is
expected of him and how his partner in the social situation may react.
Thus the hysteric, who is convinced of the reality of his symptoms, may
revel in being examined, but the simulator attempts to avoid
examination. Using Goffman's term (31), he is afraid of being found out
of face or in the wrong face, and he sees the examiner as a person who
may reveal his false face or provoke him into contradictory behavior.
In his attempts to forestall examination, he may complain of physical
illness, or he may behave in a sulky, aggressive manner. He may be ill
at ease, laugh in a self-conscious manner, be alert, watchful, and
quick to take issue.
Reid and Arthur (28), in their discussion of the
behavior symptoms of lie-detector subjects, observed that those who
were later proven guilty tended to show certain similarities in
behavior. The guilty persons were reluctant to take the test, and they
tried in various ways to postpone or delay it. They often appeared
highly anxious and sometimes took a hostile attitude toward the test
and the examiner. Evasive tactics sometimes appeared, such as sighing,
yawning, moving about, all of which foil the examiner by obscuring the
recording. Before the examination, they felt it necessary to explain
why their
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responses might mislead the examiner
into thinking they were lying. Thus the procedure of subjecting a
suspected malingerer to a liedetector test might evoke behavior which
would reinforce the suspicion of fraud. However, it should be noted
that certain persons such as psychopaths show few manifest signs of
anxiety (Lykken, 56), and others are cool, reserved, and underreact to
the lie-detector situation (10, 46). But, generally, the unskilled
malingerer is apt to to be reluctant to be examined and to exert too
much obvious effort in circumventing the usual diagnostic techniques.
Fortunately, few of them display the cleverness of Thomas Mann's hero
(60) who gave the impression that he was anxious to evade the
examination because he was hiding a symptom which would keep him out of
the army if discovered. This little bit of play acting made the
examiners only too anxious to strip away his mask of health and to
discover triumphantly the epilepsy which he was so cleverly simulating.
Among the "strategic ruses" offered by Jones and
Llewellyn (47) is the method of suggestion. In this procedure, the
interviewer suggests other symptoms by inquiring about their presence,
and usually about symptoms which might be inconsistent with the
syndrome originally presented. If the malingerer does not immediately
agree that he suffers with that symptom, he may show up with it at the
next interview. Cases are reported in the literature where the
malingerer picked up the most outlandish and unusual suggestions made
by the examiner and displayed that bizarre behavior shortly after the
interview. The method of suggestion can be supplemented by indicating
that an infallible cure for the patient's condition is available. This
may consist of any number of devices, including drugs, electroshock, or
hypnosis. The success of placebos in effecting symptomatic changes
derives from the patient's confidence in the physician and his
conviction that the drug will produce the predicted effect (74, 92). In
the malingerer the suggested potency of a therepeutic maneuver may
shake his confidence and lead to his dropping the symptom. This would
seem to occur because of the simulator's imperfect understanding of the
role he is playing, and of the fuzzy expectations he may have of the
effects of certain procedures on the symptoms he is portraying. There
is much in the literature to indicate that suggestibility is increased
when the situation is ambiguous, unstructured, or difficult, and the
person has few guideposts on which to rely. Under such
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circumstances, he seems to be
greatly influenced by the attitudes and perceptions of peers and
authorities. On the other hand, studies by Spohn (81) and Didato (20)
indicate that schizophrenics may be less susceptible to social
pressures to conform. They may therefore be less susceptible to
suggestions made by an interviewer regarding their improvement or
symptoms.
The success reported for the Rorschach in detecting
malingering seems to follow from the same principles. The malingerer is
confronted with an unstructured stimulus, and there is very little in
his background or experience which would indicate to him the responses
to the Rorschach which would be consistent with the illness he is
simulating. Thus, once again, the malingerer would be hampered by
inadequate role expectations and an unsatisfactory frame of reference.
Whether or not a Rorschach can be changed enough to fool an experienced
psychologist is still undetermined. Fosberg (24, 25) asked his subjects
to give two Rorschachs, a good impression one and a bad impression one,
and when he found high correlations between the scoring categories on
the two Rorschachs, he concluded that the Rorschach cannot be
manipulated, at least with regard to its formal scoring categories.
Carp and Shavzin (16) also asked their subjects to fake the Rorschach,
and using a somewhat different method of ordering the data, found
correlations between the good impression and bad impression Rorschachs
ranging from .16 to .97. However, the correlations between the F, F+,
and F- scores were all very high. The authors state that no attempt was
made to determine whether the subjects were successful in altering
their responses in the desired direction. Studies carried out with
persons actually suspected of malingering, rather than being asked to
malinger, all report a similar picture as being typical of the
malingerer's behavior on the Rorschach (7, 73, 87). In each of these
studies, the malingerer is described as constricted, evasive,
suspicious, reluctant to respond, and determined not to give himself
away. He may appeal for clues on how to respond, show increased
reaction times, and may very often attempt to reject a particular card
or the entire procedure. Productivity is not high, and most of the
responses are cheap, popular, or vague. There may be much card turning,
description, color naming, or perseveration. The malingerer must deal
with the unexpected when he is presented with the Rorschach, and very
often he seems to err by giving an extremely poor or wildly bizarre
Wechsler and then a constricted, evasive but "good" Rorschach. Thus,
there may be inconsistencies not only on the Rorschach but throughout
the battery of tests.
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Less ambiguous and
more content-oriented projective techniques appear to be more
susceptible to feigning. Weisskopf and Dieppa (90) found that subjects
when trying to make a good or bad impression on the TAT could influence
the diagnoses made by experienced TAT interpreters, and Meltzoff (63)
reports essentially the same finding for the sentence completion
procedure. It is interesting that in the TAT study, the subjects' worst
stories deviated more from their neutral stories than did their best
stories, indicating that it is easier to appear disturbed than to
appear well adjusted.
Before turning to the simulation of mental deficiency
and amnesia, it is necessary to mention a pathological state which
resembles malingering and resembles psychosis, but which may be
neither. That is the Ganser syndrome. In this condition, the person
appears to be psychotic, but his behavior is strikingly similar to that
of the person who is simulating psychosis. The symptoms usually arise
in a stressful situation, and it is readily apparent that it would be
to the patient's benefit to simulate psychosis. The symptoms are an
imperfect representation of the condition they resemble and correspond
to the mental picture that the patient might be expected to have of
psychosis (32, 53, 86). The patient's behavior may be childish,
theatrical, ludicrous, and wildly bizarre (8, 58). MacDonald (58)
reports that such a patient may enter a room and stand on his head,
wear his clothes inside out, eat the skin instead of the banana, and
try to light his cigarette with the wrong end of the match. Most
striking and characteristic of this disorder is the patient's inability
to answer the simplest questions precisely. Instead he gives an
approximate answer, one which is not too far wrong and is obviously
related to the question, but is wrong nevertheless. This has been
called "vorbeireden," or talking past the point, and it was first
described by Ganser (26). An example of this would be the patient who
says that 2 + 2 equals 5, 5 times 5 equals 24, a cat has three ears,
and that there are eleven months in the year. These responses are
usually given after great deliberation and concentration, and the
patient does not appear to be upset or irritated when he is told he is
wrong.
Almost all authors agree that this peculiar mental
state arises when the patient is faced with a crisis and when
irresponsibility would help mitigate the crisis. It is differentiated
from malingering in that malin-
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gering is a deliberate pose, whereas
the patient is unaware of the driving forces which lead him into the
Ganser syndrome (53, 58, 68, 89). Historically it has been considered a
hysterical twilight state, characterized by vorbeireden, clouding of
consciousness, excitement or stupor, and bizarre behavior (26, 49).
More recently it has been considered a last ditch attempt to ward off a
real psychosis (54), a prodromal sign of psychosis (53), or an acute
epidose superimposed on an actual psychotic condition (2, 8, 61, 82).
Golden and MacDonald (32) as well as Tyndel (86) see it as occupying a
position intermediate between malingering and hysterical fugue states.
Weiner and Braiman (89) feel that it occurs in a setting of hysteria or
psychosis, and interpret it as a reaction to intolerable stress in a
person who fells utterly helpless and who wishes to throw off his
identity and responsibility. They argue that it is not malingering
because of the uniformity seen among patients with regard to clouding
of consciousness, amnesia, and approximate answers.
Although the Ganser state may not result from
purposive deception, the overt behavior is similar enough to
malingering to make differential diagnosis an extremely difficult
problem. Indeed, the examples given of the Ganser state are sometimes
indistinguishable from those given for simulation, and the same
inconsistencies which establish a diagnosis of Ganser syndrome are on
other pages proof positive of malingering. However, Weiner and Braiman
(89) point out that the Ganser patient rarely if ever offers a peculiar
or approximate answer unless it is solicited, whereas the malingerer is
anxious to display his peculiarities. Two differences between
schizophrenia and the Ganser state have been noted: (a) the
schizophrenic differs in that his responses are given explosively and
impulsively rather than with great concentration and thought, and (b)
the answers are often irrelevant rather than approximate (53, 58, 89).
The Ganser patient also differs from the schizophrenic by being able to
adapt himself to the ward situation and to carry out the tasks of the
day in a manner which would be inconceivable if he had as advanced a
dementia as examination seems to indicate (53). Golden and MacDonald
(32) and Tyndel (86) report success in using electroshock therapy with
Ganser patients, with only a few courses being necessary. However, the
same treatment might be effective with the malingerer for other
reasons, and therefore this is not a crucial diagnostic test. The
Ganser state may clear fairly quickly with alleviation of pressures,
sympathy, and psychotherapy, which can also be the case in malingering.
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A criminal awaiting trial or a prisoner about to be
interrogated might feign feeblemindedness in hopes that the examiner
would conclude that he is not responsible for his acts and is unable to
give a meaningful account of himself. Mental deficiency usually entails
a reduced scope of awareness of the environment, failure to
discriminate between the consequential and the inconsequential,
difficulty in forming concepts and using symbols, and sometimes poor
memory. Although low intelligence would not preclude a source from
being able to supply some useful information, it might lead an
interrogator to reject such a person in favor of a more intelligent
source. Although a source may play dumb with regard to certain areas of
discussion, it probably is not too likely that he will play dumb in
general, or to the degree that he will be classified as defective. His
role as a soldier suggests that he has some capacity for training and
learning, and if he is a commissioned or noncommissioned officer, the
odds are very much against an extremely low level of intelligence.
Thus, it is apparent that the person's history, including his past
educational and vocational level, is important in evaluating his true
intelligence; thus it would be difficult for a person with certain
minimum accomplishments to deceive others into believing that he is an
imbecile or idiot.
Almost all the studies relating to the simulation of
mental deficiency have employed standard psychometric tests of
intelligence. In one of the earliest of these (43), naval recruits were
asked to behave as if they were defectives, and then their performances
were compared with those of true mental defectives. Hunt and Older
found that the simulators did not act dumb enough, and as a group,
their scores were higher than those attained by true mental defectives.
Goldstein's finding (33) was essentially similar. However, more
recently, Pollaczek (70) asked college males and naval recruits to
simulate feeblemindedness on the comprehension, vocabulary, and
similarities subtests of the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale (Form
I), and found that their mean scores did not differ significantly from
the mean scores of the mentally defective control group. Crowley (18),
using college females and comparing them with defective women on the
Kent EGY, found that the mean score of her malingering group was
significantly lower than that of her feebleminded group. However, all
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these authors would agree that
simulated mental deficiency cannot be identified on the basis of total
score alone unless that total score is extremely low and there is
contradictory information available.
Hunt and Older (43) report that the malingerer tries
more items than the defective and gets them incorrect; whereas the
defective does not even attempt many items. However, some malingerers
attempt only a few items, but they undertake and answer correctly some
of the difficult problems after failing easier items. This tendency to
pass difficult items after failing easy ones has been reported by
Crowley (18), Goldstein (33), and Hunt and Older (43), and reflects the
inability of the malingerer to estimate properly the difficulty of a
question. This behavior is out of keeping with the typical test
performance of the true defective who shows little scatter on most
intelligence tests. Also, Crowley(18) noted that the female malingerers
used in her study tended to give foolish, nonsensical answers which
often were wildly exaggerated or bizarre. The malingerers displayed a
better speaking vocabulary than the defectives, and answered more
quickly on hard questions, but more slowly on easy ones. Pollaczek (70)
constructed a key for malingering derived from three subtests of the
WechslerBellevue Intelligence Scale. Examination of the key suggests
that malingerers tended to do too well on vocabulary and similarities,
but did quite poorly on comprehension. Thus the malingerer may
misconstrue feeblemindedness as a condition in which the person is
unable to show judgment in even the simplest social situations, but is
able to form concepts, think abstractly, and attain a rather literate
level. Krout (50) suggests that the test be administered twice to note
inconsistent behavior. The simulator may come out with the same score,
but he may change some wrong answers to other wrong answers, or he may
even spoil some answers which were correct on the first administration.
Krout also suggests that the examination of the suspected malingerer
should begin with the most difficult questions and take the person back
to a point near imbecility. If he cannot answer even the simplest
questions, he is probably trying to be consistently defective and is
malingering. Hunt (42) indicates that the malingerer and the defective
may both give wrong answers, but that there are qualitative differences
either in the answers or in the manner of reaching the answers. On
arithmetic, for example, the defective may combine the elements of the
problem incorrectly and thereby arrive at the wrong answer. The
malingerer, however, may perform the correct operations, arrive at the
correct answer, and then spoil it. Moreover, his response is usually
closer to being correct and indicates that he was aware of the correct
procedure for solving the problem.
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Thus the
simulation of mental deficiency is uncovered by procedures similar to
those used in detecting pseudo-psychosis. Inconsistencies are most
important, whether they be inconsistencies within a test or with the
past history. The person who simulates defectiveness must be extremely
clever if he is to evade completely the reporting of events and
experiences. More than likely such extremely defective behavior in the
examining situation will be out of line with the adaptiveness and
resourcefulness shown in daily behavior. If the malingerer chooses to
be as low as the idiot or imbecile, then he must select the items to
which he will respond, and it is likely that he will overestimate or
underestimate their difficulty, or demonstrate the qualitative
differences between the simulator and the true defective in other ways.
Amnesia may be a symptom of organic brain disfunction,
hysteria, psychosis, or malingering. According to MacDonald (58), it is
a popular and frequent symptom among malingerers. By saying that he
cannot remember, the malingerer implies that he was not responsible for
any criminal acts which might have occurred when he was not himself. A
prisoner of war might plead an inability to respond to the
interrogator's questions because the stress and strain of combat and
capture have caused him to lose his memory. Since a symptom such as
this is not too uncommon among soldiers who have lived through rather
harrowing experiences, a thorough investigation and evaluation of the
amnesia are warranted.
Genuine amnesia associated with pathology of the brain
may result from head injury, acute infection, toxemia, narcotics,
alcohol, or epilepsy. There may be loss of memory for events which
immediately preceded the head trauma and for those which immediately
followed. In more extreme cases, other symptoms will be present, such
as stupor, delirium, and bizarreness (52). Immediately following
cerebral trauma, there may be a curious in and out state of awareness,
where the patient loses and regains consciousness (67). The patient may
have a spotty memory for this period of time, which seems to be a
function of a failure to acquire information rather than an inability
to recall it. This condition may last for hours or days, and the
patient will remember only very isolated events of that period.
Retrograde amnesia, or the forgetting of events prior to the injury,
usually spans only a short period of time prior to the trauma, and is
of short duration. Russell (75) studied retrograde amnesia in 200
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cases of head injury and found that
in 180 cases the retrograde amnesia lasted only a few seconds or
minutes, and that in only four cases was it more than 24 hours.
However, in severe cases, the memory loss may extend to the person's
entire life. Not only can there be a loss of personal memories, but
there can also be a loss of acquired facts and performances (aphasia).
According to Nielsen (67) the malingerer rarely imitates aphasia when
he complains of amnesia. Nor does he often feign loss of personal
identity, which sometimes occurs in genuine amnesia. The period of
amnesia in epileptics usually has definite limits. The epileptic may be
able to state what he was doing up to a certain point, then everything
goes blank, and after a blurred period, he can again remember
subsequent events (52, 67). Events during the seizure are not recalled,
however.
Under circumstances of war, head injury and amnesia
are possible, and a careful physical examination appears necessary. If
the prisoner complains of head trauma, if the scope of the amnesia is
limited to the period surrounding the time of the injury, and if the
laboratory and physical findings are positive, the amnesia probably has
a genuine basis in cerebral pathology.
Amnesia, however, may result from psychic trauma, and
almost all authorities are agreed that it is exceedingly difficult to
separate malingering from hysterical symptoms. Extreme combat anxiety
may result in an amnesia, especially for the traumatic events which
were most anxiety provoking. The patient's memory for this period is
usually a complete blank, and although he wishes to fill in the gap, he
finds himself fearful and anxious when he tries to think of the events
leading up to the trauma (36, 37). Although in most war neuroses, the
amnesia is for a circumscribed period, there are cases in which a
person's entire past experiences and identity are forgotten (44, 52).
Very often the person who is amnesic on a neurotic basis exhibits other
typical anxiety reactions, such as tremulousness, tenseness,
restlessness, overresponsivity, sleep difficulties, and poor appetite.
The malingerer, on the other hand, may not exhibit these correlated
symptoms, and instead of being somewhat anxious and withdrawn, he may
be dramatic, argumentative, and demanding (55). Amnesia resulting from
psychic trauma differs from that based on physical trauma in that there
is no cerebral pathology, and the memory loss is reversible once the
conflict is lifted.
The most effective technique for differentiating
neurotic and malingered amnesia appears to be narcoanalysis (see also
Chapter 3). The reason for this runs counter to popular conceptions. It
is effective because it does not make the malingerer tell the truth. The
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neurotic is usually able to recall
the traumatic experiences when given barbiturates, and thus differs
from the malingerer who continues to resist efforts to lift his
amnesia. This difference seems well documented in the literature.
Ludwig (55) felt that neurotic patients will talk freely under sodium
amytal and will cooperate willingly in attempts to regain the traumatic
episode. The malingerer when narcotized fails to show the productivity
of the neurotic patient and combats every effort to recover the lost
memory with negativism (37, 55). Hurst (44) and Nielsen (67) using
hypnosis report the same differential reaction. Gerson and Victoroff
(27) found only six out of 17 malingerers compliant to sodium amytal
interviews. In most of their cases fears and fantasies became so
intertwined with the truth that the malingerers' productions under
amytal could not be considered valid. Adatto (1) noted this same
tendency to fabulize under thiopental narcosis. Redlich, Ravitz, and
Dession (71) asked their normal subjects to withhold an embarrassing
incident from an interviewer during a sodium amytal interview. For the
most part the subjects were able to do so, and the authors postulate a
need for punishment in the two subjects who made full confessions.
These authors conclude, as does Inbau (45), that "truth serums" are
successful on persons who would have disclosed their information
anyway, and that the person who is lying will continue his deception
under drugs. See (Chapter 3.)
Not only does the person suffering from a war neurosis
usually recall the traumatic events while narcotized but he also
behaves differently during the interviews from the malingerer (1, 37).
Neurotic patients were found to be eager to recover the events, they
groped for an answer, and were upset at not being able to recall. In
discussing the events surrounding the period of amnesia they would
frequently become restless, perspire profusely, become tense and rigid,
breathe rapidly, move convulsively, and sometimes cry out. The
intensity of the emotion may become unbearable when the patient reaches
the climax of the story. The malingerer rarely shows these emotional
and physiologic reactions under sodium amytal. However, according to
Grinker and Spiegel (37), there are some neurotic patients who show
little overt anxiety and who block in the account of their experience
as they approach the moment of trauma. In such cases, Grinker and
Spiegel report that more than one session of narcosynthesis may be
necessary to recover the trauma.
This, then, appears to be the most effective procedure
for differentiating hysterical amnesia from malingered amnesia.
According to MacDonald (57) narcoanalysis may work in even another
fashion. It
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sometimes provides the malingering
criminal with an apparently honorable way of divulging what he claims
to have forgotten. Although narcoanalysis seems to help in
differentiating neurotic and malingered amnesia, it cannot rule out the
possibility of organic pathology. Sodium amytal will not lift amnesia
due to brain disfunction, and there is some evidence that it will not
restore memories to acutely psychotic individuals (12).
At first glance, interrogation would appear to be a
situation where malingering is quite likely to be employed. The captive
source is faced with the dilemma of which of two roles to play-that
demanded by his country or that demanded by the enemy-and his selection
of either role might result in serious sanctions, including loss of
life. The simulation of incompetence offers a solution to this role
conflict by enabling the prisoner to remain loyal to his country and by
providing him with an alibi for not submitting to the enemy. However, a
number of circumstances peculiar to the interrogation situation seem to
operate in an opposite direction and may be influential in reducing the
likelihood of malingering. These factors appear to have a restraining
influence on the prisoner and a liberating one on the interrogator.
As compared with the citizen, the prisoner must show
greater restraint and care in adopting malingering as a solution
because of his uncertainty of the effect of such a role. In civilian
life, simulation is attempted partly because of the humanitarian values
held by the society. The person hopes that he will be labeled mentally
ill, and when this happens, he expects that no further demands will be
made on him, that he will not be held responsible for his conduct, and
that he will be treated with kindness and care. The prisoner who
simulates in the interrogation situation has no such assurance about
the enemy's humanitarian and benevolent outlook. Mental illness may be
considered deviationism or negativism, either in the culture in general
or in the interrogation situation in particular. Moreover, the prisoner
may have become convinced, and perhaps realistically, that his life
depends on his worth to the enemy, and that if he cannot give
information, he has no worth. This may make the prisoner reluctant to
appear incompetent, or at least completely incompetent, and therefore
would act to reduce the amount and degree of malingering. Thus, the
prisoner is uncertain that simulation would
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produce the desired effect, and
indeed, there is the danger that if his ruse is accepted, the directly
opposite effect might result.
The prisoner may be restrained from or reluctant to
initiate or continue malingering because of the nature of the
prisoner-interrogator relatioaship. The relationship offers the
potential for rather great intimacy, and therefore for the development
of fear and guilt in the prisoner. Fear may not be as great a component
in civil life since the malingerer is assured a great deal of
protection. Many people are involved in his case, and appeals are
always possible to courts, civil rights boards, mental health
commissions, etc. The prisoner of war, however, may be placed in the
custody of a single interrogator, or he may be made to believe that it
is the interrogator alone who makes all the decisions about his
well-being, his value to the enemy, and his fate. With one authority
figure who has seemingly unlimited power, the game becomes more
dangerous, since the sanctions for being caught in a deception may be
immediate and great, and there is no recourse or appeal to other power
figures. Thus, the fear of being found out should be greater in the
interrogation situation; this should serve to reduce the amount of
malingering attempted and possibly reduce the adequacy of the
simulation that is attempted.
Guilt may become involved because of the closeness
which sometimes grows up between the interrogator and the prisoner. In
some lengthy interrogations, the interrogator may, by virtue of his
role as the sole supplier of satisfaction and punishment, assume the
stature and importance of a parental figure in the prisoner's feeling
and thinking. Although there may be intense hatred for the
interrogator, it is not unusual for warm feelings also to develop. This
ambivalence is the basis for guilt reactions, and if the interrogator
nourishes these feelings, the guilt may be strong enough to influence
the prisoner's behavior. Under such circumstances, the person who
attempts malingering may begin to feel that he is taking advantage of
the interrogator and may feel some guilt for misleading the one person
who seems to be interested in him and who is looking after his welfare.
Guilt makes compliance more likely, or at least it increases the
likelihood that the prisoner may drop his simulated role.
For his part, the interrogator has fewer of the
restraints and control than a psychiatric interviewer would have in a
democratic society dedicated to humanitarian values. He can easily make
the prisoner feel that his life is under his control, and that
psychosis or the simulation of psychosis would be punished just as
severely as any other type of resistance. Although persons charged with
major crimes are malingering in increasing numbers to avoid
imprisonment,
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it seems that simulation by persons
charged with less serious offenses is on the decline since these people
have realized that being committed to a mental hospital for an
indeterminate period can drag out longer than a delineated jail term.
Also, the physical techniques for treating mental illness can be quite
frightening to a patient; thus it is likely that a malingerer will
think twice before allowing himself to be subjected to a course of
electroshock treatment and be even more reluctant to undergo a
lobotomy. The interrogator is especially free to use these devices as
threats, whereas the civilian psychiatrist must consider many other
factors.
The interrogator has another advantage over his
clinical counterpart in civilian life when it comes to reducing the
amount of malingering in an entire group of men. When persons charged
with crimes are placed together on the same ward while undergoing
psychiatric observation prior to trial, there is a great deal of
coaching and training occurring among them as they teach one another
how to "bug out." Moreover, when a patient leaves the ward to go to
trial, the other patients have no idea whether or not his ruse has been
successful. The interrogator, however, can keep his prime sources
separated so that there is no cross-fertilization, and also he can
attempt to extinguish malingering in the group by exposing and
punishing an unsuccessful malingerer. Thus he can give himself or the
unit the reputation for being a shrewd detector of deception and a
harsh punisher of such duplicity.
Once the prisoner gets the feeling that his pretense
is endangered, the interrogator may supply him with many face-saving
devices which would allow him to relinquish the symptoms that prevent
him from cooperating, but without forcing him to admit his guilt.
Already mentioned was the technique of giving the prisoner "treatment"
for his illness, one that is guaranteed to bring about a cure. Thus the
prisoner may behave as if the pills or the electroshock did produce a
cure or that the hypnosis or narcosis did allow him to recover his
memory, and there will be no need to admit the malingering or suffer
punishment for it. The prisoner may use this way out if he gets the
impression that the interrogator is becoming wise or is demanding
recovery.
Another honorable way out for the prisoner could be to
remain "ill" but not to allow the illness to interfere with the
communication of relevant information. The interrogator might allow the
prisoner to keep his simulated depression, delusions, or posturing and
gesturing, but he would insist that these symptoms in no way interfere
with his ability to recall and communicate important facts. To augment
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this approach, the interrogator
might "treat" only those symptoms which cause memory or communication
difficulty, reassuring the prisoner that the other symptoms will remain
for a while and that he will be hospitalized and be given more care and
privileges than he might otherwise receive. This approach makes it
possible for the prisoner to cooperate without revealing his deception,
and it offers a substitute goal for the malingering — that of better
treatment and privileges. From the interrogator's standpoint, these
indirect approaches would appear to be preferable to direct
confrontation, except under some circumstances where the evidence of
malingering was overwhelming and he was certain that the prisoner had
great ego strength.
Direct confrontation could conceivably produce a real
psychic disorder, especially in those persons who are borderline
psychotics to begin with and whose symptoms are exaggerations of their
own latent tendences. As Hurst (44) and Eissler (22) point out, that
which was feigned at one time may show up as a real illness at a later
time. If the anxiety over sanctions for malingering is too great, the
prisoner may deny to himself that he is willfully faking, and the
symptoms may then become determined without awareness and thereby
become less amenable to the interrogator's procedures. This seems to be
the type of stress situation which produces a Ganser state. If forced
compliance to the interrogator would produce more anxiety and guilt
than would malingering, a serious disorder may be the alternative which
the prisoner will take.
Thus, it would seem that the rational interrogator is
constrained to use his extensive power over the prisoner carefully,
lest a real disorder be precipitated and the prisoner's potential value
be lost completely.
Exact procedures for the determination of malingering
are not available. Few true psychotics display the exact symptoms of
the textbook cases, and this wide range of variability among psychotics
requires evaluations of a wide variety of symptom patterns for the
detection of malingering. The malingerer may demonstrate a set of
symptoms which must be entertained as a possible deviation from the
more usual syndromes. It is only through rather skillful and lengthy
observations that an examiner may be able to come to the conclusion
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that the patient is feigning his
condition. Hurst (44) feels that malingering can be diagnosed with
certainty only when the simulator is caught flagrante delicto or gives
an unforced confession. Eissler (22) doubts the validity of
confessions, since psychotics or borderline psychotics may feign
malingering. The fact that borderline schizophrenics may try to
malinger complicates the matter and makes diagnosis more difficult.
Another complicating but undetermined factor is the effect the role may
have upon the malingerer. Hurst (44) suggests that what was simulated
may become a truly hysterical symptom after a time. There are
therapeutic techniques which are dedicated to the proposition that a
person may unconsciously take over portions of roles which he has
consciously enacted (48, 64). Experimental support for this may be
found in a study by Sarbin and Jones (80) which showed that the
subject's self concept may shift following role enactment, and the
change is in part a function of the specific role enacted. Thus, the
determinants and effects of malingering are only somewhat understood. Correct diagnosis must still depend on the skill and experience of the examiner.
The advantages of malingering to an individual
resisting coercive attempts to influence his behavior lie primarily in
the cultural definitions of the psychotic as incompetent and not
responsible for his acts. The discouragement of malingering involves
principally the creation of the impression that psychosis is no excuse
or that the person who is detected in malingering will be treated even
more harshly than he might otherwise have been. When the value conflict
is sufficiently great, however, neither threat nor actual punishment
may be capable of forcing the person to abandon malingering as defense.
The prudence in the use of threat and punishment forced on a rational
interrogator by the possibility of creating a genuine disorder confers
an additional advantage on the malingerer.
In considering recommendations of malingering as a
resistance tactic in training military personnel for the event of
capture, certain dangers follow from these same three factors: the
cultural definitions of the insane person, the rationality of the
interrogator, and the possibility of a genuine disorder being created.
Captors may not operate with humane cultural definitions toward the
psychotic, and
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they may not be constrained by
rationality in their use of threats and punishments. The risk the
malingerer takes must be evaluated in terms of the importance of the
goal of resistance and the possible effectiveness of alternative modes
of resistance and evasion open to him. The risks involve both the
damage the captor may inflict upon him and the possibilities of a real
and lasting personality disorder resulting from his simulation.
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Abramson, H. A., 123, 134, 138
Adams, J. K., 161, 167
Adatto, C. P., 295, 301
Adler, M. H., 176, 212
Aginger, J., 23, 35-36, 44
Ai Ssu-ch'i 6, 15
Akman, L. 21, 45
Albert, S. N., 21, 44
Alvord, E. C., Jr., 14, 16
Anderson, E. W., 290, 301
Andren, H. E., 120, 135
Applezweig, M. H., 219-220, 256, 274
Arnold, A. L., 126, 137
Arnold, Magda B., 285, 301
Arthur, R. O., 286, 303
Asch, S. E. 217, 219-220, 225, 229, 233, 235, 237, 240, 258, 270
Atkin, I., 232-283, 301
Azima, Fern J., 86, 91, 126, 135
Azima, H., 86, 91, 126, 135
Back, K. W., 218, 220, 222-223, 225, 243
Baker, A. A., 124, 135
Baldwin, J., 282, 301
Barber, T. X., 174, 212
Barch, A. M., 219, 221, 226, 232, 270
Barker, W., 171, 212
Barnett, C. C., 151, 167
Barnett, W. W., 120, 136
Baron, S. H., 219-220, 225, 264, 275
Barron, F., 218-221, 223-226, 253, 254, 257, 270
Barsa, J. A., 126, 135
Bartley, S. N., 27-28, 30-33, 44
Bass, M. J., 171, 212
Bauer, R. A., 2, 5-6, 15
Beach, F. A., 55. 91
Beck, F., 29, 44
Beecher, H. K., 34, 36-37, 44, 99-100, 104, 106, 108, 116, 120, 135-136, 138, 140, 201, 212
Behringer, R., 222, 225, 234, 276
Beigel, H. C., 194, 212
Bein, H. J., 125, 135, 139
Bellak, 121, 135
Bellamy, R. Q., 219, 233, 270
Belleville, R. E., 102, 137
Beloff, H., 218, 221, 223-224, 226, 251, 253, 262, 270
Benedek, Theresa, 109, 135
Benedict, Ruth, 283, 301
Benjamin, F. B., 31, 34, 36-37, 45, 125, 135
Bennett, A. M. H., 86, 91
Bennett, Edith B., 218, 222, 226, 265, 270
Bennett, Lillian, 280, 301
-305-
Bensheim, H., 108, 135
Benton, A. L., 288, 301
Benussi, V., 142, 144, 165, 167
Bercel, N. A., 123, 135
Berenburg, A. N., 283, 288, 304
Berenda, Ruth W., 219-220, 223, 225 226, 229, 237, 250, 252, 254, 270
Bergman, M. S., 192, 212
Bergman, P. S., 118, 135
Beringer, K., 107, 137
Berkowitz, A., 219, 233, 270
Berkowitz, L., 218, 222, 225-226, 242 243, 270
Berkowitz, M., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 273
Berlin, L., 24-25, 35, 37-40, 42, 45
Berman, E. F., 21, 45
Bernheim, H., 172, 174, 212
Best, C. H., 20, 45
Bexton, W. H., 2, 15, 28, 45-46, 55, 58, 60-61, 63-64, 67, 72, 74, 84, 91, 93 94, 111, 135, 137
Biderman, A. D., 2-3, 5-7, 12, 15-16, 44-45, 54, 69, 74, 91, 204, 206, 209, 212
Billings, R. M., 31, 45
Binet, A., 174, 212
Bird, E. G., 124, 135
Bischoff, A., 111, 135
Blackburn, I., 22, 49
Blake, R. R., 217-221, 223-226, 228-233, 235-238, 245-246, 249-251, 255, 258 262, 270-275
Bland, J. H., 22, 23, 45
Bleuler, E., 282-283, 289-290, 301
Bliss, T. L., 35, 49
Bloch, Barbara L., 219-220, 223, 225, 239, 246, 261, 274
Block, J., 280, 287, 301
Block, S., 108, 137
Boaz, T. J., 155, 168
Bogoch, S., 296, 301
Boling, J. S., 21, 44
Bombard, A., 52, 91
Bone, E., 29, 33, 45
Boring, E. G., 171, 212
Bovard, E. W., Jr., 219-220, 222, 225 226, 241, 263, 265, 271
Bowers-Buch, M. K., 192, 213
Bowles, J. W., 162, 167
Bowman, K. M., 281, 301
Boyd, R. W., 155, 167
Braid, J., 171, 174, 212
Braiman, A., 209, 304
Bramwell, J. M., 186, 212
Brauchi, J. T., 30, 45
Bray, D. W., 219-220, 223, 226, 239, 252, 261, 271
Brehm, J. W., 218-220, 225-226, 233, 215, 270-271
Brenman, Margaret, 177, 182, 195, 206, 212-213
Bressler, G., 66, 70-71, 76, 79, 82, 85, 92
Brickner, R. M., 118, 135
Bronner, A., 117, 135
Brown, E. B., Jr., 22, 45
Brozek, J., 23, 45, 35-36
Brun, C., 22-23, 45
Bruner, J. S., 60, 88, 91
Brussel, J. A., 119, 135
Buchwald, A. M., 149, 150, 153, 167
Burgwin, S., 171, 212
Burke, C. J., 143-144, 148-151, 154, 167
Burney, C., 52, 83, 88, 91, 111, 136
Burns, B. D., 34, 36, 47
Burtt, H. E., 218, 222-223, 225, 249, 271
Busch, A. K., 123, 136
Butler, B. A., 54, 91
Byrd, R. E., 52, 91
Cadwallader, T. C., 60, 92
Camberari, J. D., 64, 68-69, 72, 81, 82, 92
Cameron, N., 280, 301
Campbell, D. T., 219, 222, 273
Campbell, W. G., 282, 301
Candland, D. R., 62, 79, 95
Carlson, A. J., 34-35, 45
Carp, A. L., 289, 301
Carpenter, B., 218, 222, 224-225, 230, 237, 255, 275
Carpenter, Janeth T., 218, 222, 224-225, 230, 237, 255, 275
Cattell, J. P., 107, 121-122, 136-137
Caylor, J. S., 222, 229, 230, 271
Cecil, R. L. F., 50
Cervin, V., 218, 222-223, 225, 258, 271
Chalke, F. C. R., 31, 45
Chalmers, T. M., 22-23, 45
Chandler, P. J., 219, 221, 226, 231-232, 259, 272
Chapman, L. F., 24-25, 35, 37-40, 42, 45
Chapman, W. P., 45
-306-
Chappell, M. W., 147, 167
Charatan, F. B. E., 124, 136
Cherry, C., 40, 45
Chesley, G., 45
Christensen, H. J., 282, 301
Christian, R. M., 24, 48
Chute, E., 27-28, 30-33, 44
Clare, H. E., 125, 135
Clark, B., 30, 50
Clark, Helen, 219-220, 226, 233, 271
Clark, L. A., 120, 136
Clark, L. D., 108, 116, 136, 139
Cleghorn, R. A., 119, 136
Clements, H. S., 152, 168
Cline, H. S., 126, 137
Cohen, B. D., 63-65, 70, 92, 94
Cohen, B. P., 217, 271
Cohen, S. I., 66, 70-71, 76, 79, 82, 85, 92
Cohen, W, 60, 72-73, 79, 92, 219-220, 223, 226, 253, 272
Cohn, R., 118, 139
Cohn, W. M., 117, 119, 124, 136
Cole, D. L., 219-220, 225, 238, 260, 271
Coleman, fanct F., 219, 221, 225, 249, 260, 271
Collins, W, 70, 94
Conn, J. W., 23, 45
Conner, E., 28, 30, 48
Couston, T. A., 34, 36, 45
Cowden, P. C., 126, 136
Cramer, Fern J., 86, 91, 126, 135
Crane, G. E., 121, 136
Crasilneck, H. B., 193, 214
Crosskey, M., 34, 36, 37, 48
Crowley, Miriam E., 291-292, 301
Crutchfield, R. S., 218-219, 221, 223-226, 228, 247, 249, 253-254, 257-258, 277
Culler, R. L., 161, 168
Curran, D., 24, 26, 42, 45, 50
Dana, H. F., 151, 167
Daniels, R S., 108, 137
Danowski, T. S., 21-23, 45-46
Davidson, H. A., 278, 283-284, 301
Davies, L. A., 119, 139
Davies, M. E. B., 123, 136
Davies, T. S., 123, 136
Davis, F. H., 159, 168
Davis, J. F, 162, 167
Davis, J. M., 61, 65, 73, 82, 89, 92
Davis, K., 28, 45, 54, 92
Davis, R. C., 80, 92, 143-146, 148-155, 167
Dawson, H. E., 155, 167
Day, J., 126, 140
Delay, J., 119, 124, 136
Dement, W., 81, 92
Denbar, H. C. B., 122, 136
Denber, H. C., 124, 135
Deniker, P., 124, 136
Dennis, W., 54, 92
Dennison, D. R., 151, 167
Deshon, H. J., 103, 122-123, 136, 139
Dession, G. H., 114, 139, 195, 213, 295, 303
Deutsch, M., 219-221, 225, 230, 240, 245, 259, 261, 271
De Verteuil, R., 126, 135
Didato, S. V., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 271, 288, 302
Dieppa, J. J., 289, 304
Dill, D. B., 28, 31, 33, 45
DiMascio, A., 155, 167
Dittes, J. E., 218-219, 225, 243, 260, 271
Diven, K., 161, 167
Dlin, B. M., 99, 136
Doane, B. K., 28, 47, 58, 61, 64, 92-94
Dobie, S. I., 63-65, 70, 92, 94
Donnelly, R. C., 195, 213
Drake, Frances E., 280, 302
Dreikurs, E., 123, 135
Drevdahl, J., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 273
DuBois, E. F., 20, 45
Duncker, K., 218, 220, 223, 226, 232, 237, 249, 264, 271
Dye, W. S., 21, 47
Edwards, A. S., 28, 30, 33, 46
Edwards, W. L. J., 22-23, 46
Ehrmantraut, W. R., 21, 46
Eisenman, A. J., 127, 137
Eissler, K. R., 281, 283, 285, 299, 300, 302
Elithorn, A., 34, 36-37, 48
Elkinton, J. R., 21, 23, 46
Ellertson, N., 222, 225-226, 243, 260, 275
Ellis, F. P., 27, 46
Ellson, D, G., 143-145, 148-151, 154, 167
Ellsworth, R. B., 120, 136
Engel, B. T., 152, 168
Engel, G. L., 24, 48
-307-
Erickson, E. M., 180, 213
Erickson, M. H., 172, 180, 185, 213
Essig, C. F., 127, 136
Estabrooks, G. H., 197, 213
Evarts, E. V., 51, 53, 92, 94, 106, 138
Fabing, H. D., 120, 136
Farber, I. E., 2, 15-16
Farberow, N. I., 280, 304
Fazekas, J. F., 21-22, 46
Federn, E., 2, 16
Feldberg, T. M., 288, 304
Féré, C., 174, 212
Fergus, E. B., 22, 45
Ferguson, J. T., 120, 136
Ferracuti, F., 143, 168
Festinger, L., 217-218, 220, 222, 225, 228, 236, 239, 243-245, 261, 271-272
Finesinger, J. C., 45
Finnerty, F. A., 22, 46
Finney, R. C., 126, 136
Fischer, H. K., 99, 136
Fisher, S., 219-220, 223, 225, 229, 240, 250, 254, 272
Fishman, S., 192, 214
Flach, F. F., 126, 137
Fleming, T. C., 53, 94
Flicker, D., 281, 302
Floyd, W. F., 28, 31, 46
Foley, J. M., 28, 48, 75, 86, 93
Folkson, A., 125, 137
Ford, R. V., 22-23, 48
Forel, A., 181, 213
Forster, F. M., 111, 137
Fosberg, I. A., 288, 302
Fox, G. F., 194, 215
Frank, J. D., 287, 304
Frankl, V. E., 119, 137
Frankmann, R. W., 149, 153, 167
Fraser, H. F., 127, 137
Fraser, R., 176, 214
Freed, A., 219, 221, 226, 231-232, 259, 272
Freedman, L. Z., 195, 213
Freedman, S. J., 61, 64, 73, 76-77, 89, 92
Freeman, H., 126, 137
Freeman, R. W., 220, 225, 240, 272
French, J. R. P., Jr., 217, 219, 221-222, 226, 239, 272, 275
Freud, S., 53, 92
Friedlander, A. A., 195, 213
Galambos, R., 16
Galkin, T. W., 14, 16
Gamble, J. L., 22, 46
Ganser, S. J. M., 289-290, 302
Garafolo, Loraze, 152, 167
Garmany, G., 125, 137
Gault, F. P., 152, 167
Geiger, A. J., 23, 48
Gerard, H. B., 218-220, 222, 225, 230, 236, 239-240, 243, 245, 259, 260-261, 264, 271-272
Gerson, M. J., 115, 118, 137, 295, 302
Gibson, R. W., 192, 214
Gidro-Frank, L., 192, 213
Gill, M. M., 195, 206, 212-213, 286, 302
Gillespie, R. I., 281, 302
Gindes, B. C., 186, 312
Glazer, H. S., 23, 49
Gleser, G. C., 105, 108, 110, 137
Glueck, B., 281, 302
Godin, W., 29, 44
Goffman, E., 286, 302
Goldberg, S. C., 218-220, 222-223, 225 226, 229, 235-236, 245, 253, 272
Goldberger, L., 28, 46, 65-66, 70-71, 73, 77, 83, 89, 92
Golden, S., 289-290, 302
Goldiamond, I., 161, 168
Goldman, Della M., 225, 232, 273
Goldstein, H., 291-292, 302
Good, R., 281, 302
Goodell, Helen, 31, 34, 36-37, 46, 50
Goodman, R. J., 28, 30, 48
Goodnow, Jacqueline, 30, 46
Gorden, R. L., 218, 220, 225, 232, 272
Goss, J. D., Jr., 124, 135
Gottlieb, J. S., 64-65, 70, 92
Gottschalk, L. A., 105, 108, 110, 120, 137
Gottschick, J., 35, 46
Gough, H. G., 280, 302
Graham, H., 192, 212
Green, M., 118, 135
Greenblatt, M., 61, 64, 73, 76-77, 89, 92, 155, 167
Gregory, Doris, 222, 225-226, 243, 260, 275
Grinker, R. R., 113, 117, 137, 195, 213, 294-295, 302
-308-
Grosser, D., 219, 221, 226, 232, 243, 272
Grove, W. I., 21, 47
Grunebaum, H. U., 61, 64, 73, 76-77, 89, 92
Gulick, W. L., 62, 79, 95
Gullahorn, J. J., 281, 302
Guttman, E., 108, 137
Hacker, A., 2, 16
Hain, J. D., 218-219, 221, 226, 230, 232, 259, 271
Hall, K. R. L., 34, 36-37, 46
Hall, R., 219, 221-222, 226, 233, 261, 275
Hammerichlag, H. E., 188, 213
Hanrahan, G. E., 124, 138
Hanson, F. R., 31, 46
Hardy, J. D., 31, 34, 36-37, 46, 48-50
Hardy, K. R., 218, 222-225, 235, 253, 256, 261, 265, 272
Hardyck, C., 280, 304
Hare, A. P., 218, 222, 225, 234, 242, 261, 272
Haring, J., 2, 16
Harl, J. M., 124, 136
Harlow, H. F., 2, 15-16, 54, 92
Harris, A., 70, 92
Harris, W. W., 194, 215
Hartmann, H., 53, 93
Hartshorne, H., 282, 302
Harvey, O. J., 218-220, 223, 225-226, 236, 239, 245-246, 260, 262, 272, 275
Haugen, F. P., 36-37, 46
Haupt, J, 185, 213
Hawkins, J. R., 120, 136
Heath, E. S., 28, 46, 58, 73, 93
Hebb, D. O., 28, 46, 53-54, 58, 61, 73, 87-89, 93, 111, 137
Heintz, R. K., 218, 222, 225, 242, 275
Helfand, J., 280, 302
Helgesson, U. H., 281, 302
Helson, H., 217-219, 221, 223-226, 228, 232, 234, 236-237, 251, 255, 266, 270 272
Helweg-Larsen, P., 23, 35-36, 40, 46
Hemmager, E., 23, 35-36, 44
Heron, W., 28, 45-47, 55, 58, 60-61, 63 64, 67, 72, 74, 75, 77-78, 81, 89, 91, 111, 135, 137, 181, 213
Hill, H. E., 102, 137
Himwich, H. E., 120, 140
Hinkle, L. E., Jr., 2, 5, 15-16, 20, 29, 31-33, 38, 44, 47, 54, 69, 93, 98, 137
Hoagland, H., 103, 139
Hoch, P. H., 107, 121-122, 137
Hochberg, J., 60, 65, 69, 74, 93
Hoelzel, F., 34-35, 45
Hoffman, E. L., 219-220, 225, 264, 275
Hoffman, J., 61, 64-65, 67, 94
Hoffman, M. L., 217-220, 222-224, 226, 250, 255-256, 265, 273
Hoffmeyer, H., 23, 35-36, 40, 46
Hofling, C. K., 99, 137
Holland, J. G., 59, 93
Hollander, E. P., 222, 273
Hollister, L. E., 126, 138
Holt, R. R., 28, 46, 65-66, 70-71, 73, 77, 83, 89, 92
Hope, J. M., 108, 140
Horwitz, M., 225, 232, 273
House, R. E., 112-113, 138
Houston, F., 28, 47, 119, 138
Howard, W. J., 117, 119, 124, 136
Hughes, J. R., 14, 16
Hull, C., 172, 213
Hultgren, H. P., 35, 47
Humphries, O., 106, 138
Hunsicker, A. L., 125, 140
Hunt, D. E., 223, 225, 246, 275
Hunt, R. G., 219-220, 223, 226, 253, 272
Hunt, W. A., 291-292, 302
Hunter, E., 2, 15-16
Hurd, D. E., 125, 140
Hurst, Sir A., 294-295, 299, 300, 302
Huxley, A., 2, 5, 16
Hyde, R. W., 103, 122, 139
Hymovitch, B., 218, 222, 225, 236, 239, 243, 245, 271
Ikai, K., 125, 135
Inbau, F. E., 143, 146, 156, 168, 209, 213, 287, 295, 302
Isbell, H., 127, 137-138
Jackson, J. M., 243, 260, 273
Jacobson, A., 283, 288, 304
Jacubzak, L., 219-220, 224-225, 238, 256, 273
Janet, P., 181, 213
Janis, I. L., 2, 16
Jarvik, M. E., 123, 134
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Jaynes, J., 55, 91
Jenkin, V., 161, 168
Jenness, A., 219, 222-223, 225, 236, 249, 252, 254, 273
John, W., 105, 137
Johnson, W. C., 123, 136
Jonas, A. D., 119, 138
Jones, A. B., 281, 283-284, 286-287, 303
Jones, D. H., 124, 138
Jones, D. S., 280, 300, 304
Jones, E. E., 219-221, 225, 244, 260, 273
Jordan, H., 2, 16, 218, 222, 225, 231, 275
Julian, O. C., 21, 47
Kagan, J., 219-220, 223, 225, 248, 274
Kahn, R. L., 107, 140
Kandel, E. J., 85, 93
Kapp, F. T., 120, 137
Karp, D., 34, 36, 47
Katz, S. E., 28, 30, 33, 47
Kaufman, M. R., 123, 138
Keats, A. S., 34, 36-37, 44
Keisler, E. R., 219, 221, 223, 225, 246, 273
Kelley, H. H., 218-220, 222, 225, 229, 236, 239, 243-244, 260, 271-273
Kelly, A. R., 117, 139
Kelly, D. M., 118, 138
Kelly, G. A., 300, 303
Kelman, H. C., 219, 220, 222-223, 226, 246, 252, 262, 273
Kety, S. S., 22, 23, 47
Keys, A., 23, 35-36, 40, 47
Kidd, J. S., 219, 222-223, 225, 235, 239, 242, 273
Kieler, J., 23, 35-36, 40, 46
Kimbrell, D. L., 219, 221, 223, 226, 250, 262, 273
Kinkead, E., 2-3, 16
Kinross-Wright, V., 124, 238
Kirkpatrick, C., 218-219, 222-223, 249, 273
Kleh, J., 22, 46
Kleitman, N., 30, 47, 81, 92
Kletzkin, M., 36-37, 49
Kline, M. V., 181, 184, 192, 213
Kline, N. S., 121, 126, 135, 138, 139
Knudsen, E. O. E., 22-23, 45
Kolb, L. C., 23-24, 48
Kornetsky, C., 34, 36-37, 47, 106, 123, 134, 138
Kraemer, H., 6, 8, 16
Kraepelin, E., 290, 303
Kral, V. A., 35-36, 47
Krebs, A. M., 219-220, 223-225, 248, 256, 273
Krieger, G. E., 126, 138
Kringel, A., 126, 138
Krivitzky, W. G., 8, 16
Kroger, W. S., 175, 213
Krout, M. H., 292, 303
Krueger, W. C. F., 282, 303
Kubie, L. A., 112, 138, 172, 175, 213
Kubzansky, P. E., 69, 71, 76, 80, 82, 85, 93-94
Kutscher, A. H., 36, 47
Kutscher, H. W., 36, 47
Kverin, K., 152, 167
Lacey, Beatrice, 159, 165, 168
Lacey, J. I., 159, 165, 168
Laffal, J., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 273
Lamb, T. W., 218, 225, 229, 273
Lambert, C., 125, 138
Lambert, W. E., 218, 222, 226, 239, 273
Lancaster, N. P., 124, 138
Landis, C., 28, 30, 33, 47
Larson, J. A., 113, 138, 142, 144-146, 165, 168
Lasagna, L., 34, 36, 37, 44, 99-100, 106, 108, 120, 138, 140
Laslett, H. R., 30, 47
Laufman, H., 20, 47
Laverty, S. G., 106, 108, 138
Lawson, E. D., 218, 222-225, 250, 262, 273
Lazarus, R. S., 161, 168
Leavitt, H. C., 192, 212
LeCron, L. M., 192, 213
Lee, C. D., 143, 146, 156, 168
Lee, F. J., 225, 232, 273
Lefkowitz, M., 219, 221, 226, 238, 273
LeGuillant, L., 108, 138
Lehmann, H. E., 124, 138
Leiderman, P. H., 28, 33, 47, 49-50, 52, 55-56, 64, 68-69, 71, 76, 80, 82, 85, 87, 93-95
Lennox, W. G., 293-294, 303
Lermolo, Elizabeth, 29, 33, 47
Levin, M., 24, 47
Levine, A., 123, 138
-310-
Levine, J., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 273
Levine, K., 118, 138
Levy, E. Z., 55, 64, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81 85, 88, 94
Lewis, A., 289-90, 303
Lewis, B. I., 22, 47
Lewis, T., 34, 36, 48
Liddell, S. W., 119, 139
Lieberman, A. A., 290, 303
Lifton, R. J., 10, 16, 35, 48, 54, 74, 93
Lilly, J. C., 2, 14, 16, 48, 52, 55, 72, 81 83, 93, 111, 139
Lindemann, E., 28, 48, 76, 94, 108 119, 139
Lindemann, J., 219-220, 224-225, 258, 273
Lindsley, D., 89, 93
Ling, T. M., 119, 139
Linn, L., 107, 140
Linton, Harriet B., 219, 221, 223-224, 226, 255, 274
Lippett, R., 219, 221, 226, 232, 243, 272
Lipton, F. L., 118, 139
Livingston, W. K., 36-37, 46
Llewellyn, R. L. J., 281, 283-284, 286 287, 303
Loomer, H. P., 121, 139
Lowy, F. H., 218, 222, 226, 239, 273
Lubin, A., 220, 225, 229, 254, 272
Luchins, A. S., 217-220, 223-225, 230, 234, 238, 247, 250, 258, 274
Luchins, Edith H., 217-220, 223, 225, 234, 238, 247, 250, 258, 274
Ludwig, A. O., 195, 213, 283, 294-295, 303
Lummus, W. F., 22-23, 46
Luongo, E. P., 31, 33, 48
Luttrell, R. R., 125, 139
Lykken, D. T., 287, 303
McBride, Dorothy, 222, 225-226, 243, 260, 275
McCance, R. A., 23, 35, 48
McCleary, R., 161, 168
McConnell, J. V., 161, 168, 217, 219-221, 226, 233, 274
McCourt, W. F., 61, 65, 73, 82, 89, 92
McCranie, E. J., 193, 214
McGill, T. E., 55, 62, 64, 75, 77, 79, 94-95
McGrath, S. D., 27, 31, 48
McKeachie, W. J., 218, 222, 225-226, 265, 274
McNeil, E. B., 161, 168
McQueen, R., 218, 226, 248, 274, 282, 303
MacClay, W. S., 108, 139
MacDonald, J. E., 289-290, 302
MacDonald, J. M., 278, 281-282, 284, 286, 289-290, 293, 295, 303
MacDonald, M. D., 114, 139
MacKinnon, H. L., 119, 139
Mackworth, N. H., 58-59, 93
Mahatoo, W., 58, 61, 92
Maier, N. R. F., 218, 221-222, 225, 241, 274
Malamud, W., 108, 119, 139-140
Malitz, S., 107, 140
Mallinson, W. P., 290, 301
Malmo, R. B., 155, 159, 168
Mangold, R., 28, 30, 48
Mann, T., 287, 303
Marchand, W. E., 31, 49
Marcuse, F. L., 181, 213
Margolin, S., 172, 175, 213
Marinho, Heloisa, 218, 221, 223, 250, 264, 274
Marston, W. M., 142, 146, 160, 165, 168
Masserman, J., 98, 139
Mateer, F. M., 22, 45
Mattman, R. E., 35, 49
Mausner, B., 4, 17, 217-220, 223, 225, 238 239, 246, 261, 274
Mausner, Judith, 4, 17
May, A. B., 125, 137
May, M. A., 282, 302
Mayer, L., 188-189, 214
Mayer, W. E., 2-3, 17
Mayer-Gross, W., 290, 303
Mayo, C. W., 2, 15, 17
Meadow, A., 219-220, 223, 226, 253, 272
Meares, A., 176, 214
Meehan, J. P., 36, 48
Meerloo, J. A. M., 2-3, 15, 17
Meltzer, M. L., 1, 18, 86, 93, 277, 280, 303
Meltzoff, J., 289, 303
Mendelson, J., 28, 33, 47-50, 52, 55-56, 64, 68-69, 71, 75-76, 80, 82, 85-87, 93-95
Mercer, M., 192, 214
Merlis, S., 122, 136
Miller, A. T., Jr., 31, 48
Miller, J. G., 2-3, 14, 17
-311-
Miller, N. E., 112, 139
Millon, T., 219-220, 223, 225, 262, 274
Mills, L. C., 22-23, 48
Moeller, G., 219-220, 225, 256, 274
Moll, A., 181, 214
Monroe, J. L., 3, 16
Montgomery, K. C., 54, 94
Moore, E. W., 120, 139
Moore, J. R., 142, 168
Moreno, J. L., 300, 303
Morgan, C. T., 16
Morris, D. P., 114, 139
Morrison, A. V., 125, 139
Mosteller, F., 34, 36-37, 44, 99-100, 108, 120, 138
Moulton, J. A., 120, 136
Mouton, Jane S., 218-219, 221, 223-226, 228-233, 235-238, 240, 245-246, 249, 251, 255, 258-261, 270-273
Moyer, J. H., 22-23, 48
Muehlberger, C. W., 195, 214
Mueller, J. F., 23, 49
Müller, J. M., 125, 139
Munsterberg, H., 224, 233, 274
Murphy, D. B., 85, 93
Murphy, E. L., 277, 303
Murray, J. C., 3, 17
Mussen, P. H., 219-220, 223, 225, 248, 274
Myers, T. I., 85, 93
Nakamura, C. Y., 221, 225, 254, 274
Nangle, J., 219, 221, 226, 232, 270
Nevsky, M. P., 171, 214
New, J. S., 117, 139
Newman, S., 282, 303
Ni, T. G., 22-23, 48
Niell, K. C., 34, 36-37, 49-50
Nielson, J. M., 292-295, 303
Nitsche, P., 28-29, 48
Noyes, A. P., 23-24, 48, 290, 303
Older, H. J., 291-292, 302
Olds, J., 14, 17
Olinger, L. B., 123, 135
Olmstead, J. A., 219-221, 223, 225-226, 232-233, 235, 237, 240, 245-246, 251, 258, 261, 271, 274-275
Ormiston, D. W., 62, 73, 94
Orne, M. T., 178, 193, 197, 208, 214
Orwell, G., 2, 17
Ossipov, V. P., 281-283, 303
Packard, V., 5, 17
Parsons, T., 207, 214
Patt, H. H., 21, 45
Pattie, F. A., Jr., 196, 214
Pavlov, I. P., 171, 214
Payne, R. B., 120, 139
Pechtel, C., 98, 139
Pemberton, W., 138, 188
Penfield, W., 14, 17
Penman, J., 34, 36, 48
Pennes, H. H., 107, 121-122, 137
Peters, S. C., 217, 219-220, 225, 275
Peterson, D. B., 3, 17
Petrie, A., 70, 94
Piana, Gabriel M., 225, 232, 273
Pichot, P., 119, 136
Piercy, M., 34, 36-37, 48
Pinsky, R. H., 99, 141
Platonov, K. I., 192, 214
Polansky, N., 219, 221, 226, 232, 243, 272
Pollaczek, Penelope P., 291-292, 303
Posternak, Jean M., 53, 94
Pratt, R. T. C., 34, 36-37, 48
Preston, M. G., 218, 222, 225, 242, 275
Preu, P. W., 23, 48
Prikhodivny, E. A., 192, 214
Prugh, G. S., Jr., 3, 17
Raaschou, F., 22-23, 45
Raines, G. N., 118, 139
Rapaport, D., 87, 94
Rasmussen, T., 14, 17
Raven, B. H., 219, 221-222, 226, 230, 239, 275
Ravitz, L. J., 114, 139, 295, 303
Redlich, F. C., 114, 139, 195, 213, 295, 303
Rehberg, P. B., 22-23, 48
Reid, J. E., 209, 213, 286-287, 302-303
Reiter, P. J., 188-189, 214
Rice, R. L., 22, 48
Rich, M., 22, 49
Riddle, E. E., 193, 214
Riesman, D., 2, 17
Rietsema, J., 219, 221, 230, 275
Rinkel, M., 103, 122-123, 136, 139
Ripley, H. S., 103, 141
Ritter, Christiane E., 52, 94
-312-
Roberts, R. H., 126, 138
Roelens, R., 108, 138
Rohrer, J. H., 219-220, 225, 264, 275
Rolin, J., 98, 113, 121, 139
Romanet, B., 119, 136
Romano, J., 24, 48
Rosen, H., 176, 214
Rosenbaum, G., 63-65, 70, 92, 94
Rosenbaum, M. E., 219, 221, 226, 230, 232, 259, 275
Rosenberg, S., 156, 168
Rosenburg, S. J., 288, 304
Rosenthal, D., 287, 304
Rosner, S., 218-220, 225, 255, 258, 275
Ross, W. D., 120, 137
Roth, M., 290, 303
Rothman, T., 28, 30, 48, 119, 140
Rowland L. W., 183, 214
Royse, A, B., 28, 47
Rubel, Marilyn, 220, 223, 225, 253, 275
Rubenstvin, B. B., 109, 135
Rubin, M. A., 108, 140
Rubinstein, I., 30, 46, 219-220, 223, 225, 240, 250, 272
Ruff, G. E., 55, 64, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81 85, 88, 94
Russell, W. R., 293, 304
Rutherford, Jeanne, 219-220, 223, 225, 236, 245, 262, 272
Saher, E. V., 114, 140
Saltzman. I. J., 143-145, 148-151, 154, 167
Saltzstein H. D., 243, 260, 273
Samelson, F., 219-220, 223-225, 256, 261, 275
Samson, D. C., 24, 48
Saphir, W., 22, 49
Sarbin, T. R., 172, 214, 279-280, 283, 286, 300, 304
Sargant, W., 2, 5, 14-15, 17, 103, 113, 117, 140, 176, 214
Sarwer-Foner, G. J., 108, 140
Saslow, M., 22, 49
Saunders, J. C., 121, 139
Savage, C., 126, 140
Schachter. S., 89-90, 94, 219, 221-222, 225-226, 233, 243, 260, 264, 275
Schein, E. H., 2-3, 5, 15, 17, 35, 44, 49, 54, 94
Scheinberg, P., 22, 49
Schiffman, H., 55, 75, 77, 95
Schilder, P., 172, 195, 214
Schlitter, E., 125, 139
Schmidt, C. F., 22, 47
Schneck, J. M., 34, 36, 49, 176, 182, 192, 214
Schnitker, M. A., 35, 49
Schonbach, P., 90, 94
Schonbar, Rosealea A., 219-220, 226, 233, 263, 275
Schroder, H. M., 223, 225, 246, 275
Schultz, J. H., 203, 214
Schut, J. W., 120, 140
Scott, T. H., 28, 45, 47, 55, 58, 60-61, 63-64, 72, 74, 91-94, 111, 137
Scott, W. A., 218-219, 222, 225, 248, 275
Seaman, G., 60, 65, 69, 74, 93
Secunda, L., 176, 212
Segal, H. A., 35, 49
Segal, J., 44, 49
Seltzer, H. S., 23, 45
Shagass, C., 159, 168
Shankel, L. W., 119, 135
Shapiro, M. M., 218-220, 222, 225, 236, 239, 244, 260, 272-273
Shavzin, A. R., 289, 301
Sherif, D. M., 275
Sherif, M., 217, 219-220, 223, 225-226, 233, 235, 246, 263, 269
Shmavonian, B., 66, 70-71, 76, 79, 82, 85, 92
Shor, J., 192, 214
Shor, R., 197, 201, 203, 214
Shortt, L., 31, 45
Siddons, G. F., 149, 167
Silverman, A. J., 66, 70-71, 76, 79, 82, 85, 92
Simkins, L. C., 219-220, 223, 225, 262, 274
Simon, J. L., 119, 140
Sinevirskii, N., 6, 18
Singh, J. A. L., 54, 94
Skinner, B. F., 9, 18
Slater, E., 113, 117, 140, 290, 303
Small, M. H., 52, 53, 94
Smith, A. A., 155, 168
Soffer, A., 22-23, 49
Sokoloff, C., 28, 30, 48
Solem, A. R., 218, 221-222, 225, 241, 274
-313-
Solomon, H. C., 24, 49, 103, 122-123, 136, 139
Solomon, P., 28, 33, 47-50, 52, 55, 56, 61, 64-65, 68-69, 70-71, 73, 76, 82, 85, 87, 89, 92, 94-95
Speck, R. V., 117, 119, 124, 136
Spencer, W. A., 21, 44
Spiegal, E. A., 36-37, 49
Spiegel, H., 192, 214
Spiegel, J. P., 113, 117, 137, 195, 213, 294-295, 302
Spitz, R. A., 54, 86, 94
Spohn, H. E., 219-220, 223-225, 258, 275, 288, 304
Sprenger, J., 6, 8, 16
Sproles, J. A., 126, 136
Spurr, C., 22-23, 48
Squires, R. D., 22-23, 45
Stagner, R., 218, 222-225, 250, 262, 273
Stalnaker, J. M., 193, 214
Stanbridge, R. H., 31, 49
Steiner, I. D., 217, 219-220, 225, 275
Stephenson, C. W., 193, 215
Stern, E. S., 290, 304
Stewart, J. B., 27, 50
Stockings, G. T., 107, 140
Stoll, A. M., 36, 48
Stout, G. W., 149, 167
Stransky, E., 34, 36-37, 49
Strassman, H. D., 35, 49
Strickland, L., 222, 225, 244, 261, 275
Stride, E., 34, 36-37, 46
Strotzka, H., 119, 137
Stuart, E. A., 28, 46, 58, 73, 93
Sugarman, L. A., 107, 140
Summers, W. G., 142, 144, 147, 165, 168
Sutcliffe, P., 199, 215
Swander, D. V., 219-220, 225, 264, 275
Swank, R. L., 27, 31-32, 49
Sward, K., 119, 140
Swisher, S. N., 24, 48
Szasz, T. S., 282, 304
Szekely, E. G., 36-37, 49
Talbott, J. H., 20, 49
Taube, H., 119, 140
Taylor, N. B., 20, 45
Tennien, M., 2, 18
Teter, H. R., 193, 214
Thaler, Margaret B., 35, 49
Thaler, V. H., 55, 64, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81-85, 88, 94
Thetford, W. N., 24-25, 35, 37-40, 42, 45
Thibaut, J., 218, 222, 225, 228, 239, 244, 261, 272, 275
Thistlethwaite, J. R., 21, 44
Thorin, D., 44, 49
Ticktin, H. E., 21, 46
Toby, J., 281, 304
Torrey, R., 219-221, 225, 244, 260, 273
Tourlentes, T. T., 125, 140
Travis, L. E., 123, 135
Triebel, W., 60, 65, 69, 74, 93
Trovillo, P., 142, 168
True, R. M., 193, 215
Trumbo, D., 219, 221, 226, 232, 270
Turner, R. H., 281, 304
Tyndel, M., 289-290, 304
Tyler, D. B., 28, 30, 33, 48-49, 111, 140
Underhill, H. C., 114, 140
Van Valkenburg, J. D., 27, 50
Vernon, J. A., 55, 61-64, 67, 75, 77, 79, 94-95
Victoroff, V., 115, 118, 137, 295, 302
Vilter, R. W., 23, 49
Vispos, R. H., 91
Von Felsinger, J. M., 99-100, 106, 108, 120, 138, 140
Wachpress, M., 283, 288, 304
Wakim, K. G., 20, 50
Walters, R. H., 219-220, 224-225, 238, 256, 273
Wangensteen, O. H., 21-22, 50
Warren, N., 30, 50
Watkins, J. G., 177, 182, 215
Waud, S. P., 281, 304
Wayburn, E., 21, 30, 50
Weaver, E. M. F., 27, 50
Weil-Malherbe, H., 119, 139
Weiner, ff., 290, 304
Weinert, G., 220, 223, 225, 253, 275
Weinstein, E. A., 107, 140
Weisskopf, Edith A., 289, 304
Weitzenhoffer, A. M., 175, 181, 195, 215
Welch, L., 172, 215
Welford, A. T., 28, 31, 46
Wells, H. H., 219-221, 225, 244, 260, 273
-314-
Wells, W. D., 220, 223, 225, 253, 275
Wells, W. R., 171, 177, 180, 182, 185, 194, 215
Wendt,G. R., 111, 140
Wenger, M. A., 152, 168
Wertham, F., 281, 304
West, L. J., 2, 15-16, 18, 30, 34, 36-37, 45, 49-50
Wexler, D., 28, 33, 47, 49-50, 52, 55-56, 64, 68-69, 71, 76, 82, 85, 87, 94-95
Wheeler, D., 218, 222, 225, 231, 275
Whiles, W. H., 290, 304
White, F. W., 172, 194, 215
Whitehorn, J. C., 24, 50
Whittaker, J. O., 219, 221, 236, 275
Widdowson, E. M., 23, 35, 48
Wiener, M., 218, 222, 224-225, 229-230, 236-237, 255, 259, 275
Wikler, A., 102, 112, 121, 127, 137, 140
Wilkins, R. W., 125, 140
Williams, H. L., 229, 254, 272
Wilmarms, K., 28-29, 48
Wilson, D. C., Jr., 119, 135
Winkelman, N. W., Jr., 124, 141
Winokur, G., 2, 18
Wittkower, E. D., 27, 31, 48
Wolf, S., 34, 36-37, 50, 99, 103, 141, 287, 304
Wolff, H. G., 2-3, 5, 15-16, 18, 20, 24-26, 29, 31-40, 42, 44-47, 50, 54, 69, 93
Wycis, H. T., 36-37, 49
Yakovlev, P. I., 24, 49
Zax, M., 126, 136
Ziller, R. C., 218, 222, 225, 234, 276
Zimmer, H., 1, 18
Zimmerman, B., 21, 22, 50
Zimmerman, H. A., 27-28, 31, 50
Zingg, R. M., 54, 94
Ziskind, E., 28, 50, 87, 95
-315-
Abstraction, 39, 266
Accuracy, 43, 117, 170, 191-196
Acetanilid, 121
Adaptation, Level Theory, 269
Adaptation of responses, 148-149, 152
Adaptive mechanisms, 38
Addiction, 103, 106, 126-127, 132
Afterimages, 61
Age, 237, 249-250
Age regression, 192
Alcohol, 77, 104, 116, 153, 292
Algeria, 98
Allport-Allport A-S Reaction Study, 223, 251-252
Alpha activity, 79, 152, 175, see also Electroencephalogram
Amnesia, 119, 171, 197, 200-201, 205, 211, 278-279, 285, 289, 293-296
retrograde, 293-294 171
Amobarbital, 103-104, 114-115, 117
Amphetamine, 106, 111, 116, 119-121, 131
Analeptic, 120-121
Anesthesia, 196, 201-205
Anesthetics, 121, 130, 201
Anonymity, 240, 261
Anoxia, 22
"Antisocial acts," 180-191, 282
Anxiety, 32, 37, 39-40, 70-71, 73, 78, 107, 119, 124-126, 128, 131-132, 202, 204, 207, 246-247, 250-251, 285, 294-295, 299
Apathy, 110
Aphasia, 118, 120, 294
Apparent movement, 61-63
Appetite, 284
Armed Forces "Code of Conduct," 3
Arousal, 54, 81, 89, 128, 152
Articles of War, 115
Aspirin, 121
Atropine, 116, 121
Attention, 32, 64, 119, 131
Attitudes, 9, 11, 34, 41-43, 130, 216-276, 282, 285
of experimental subject, 163-164, 166, 176
of interrogation source, 165
Authoritarianism, 68, 251, 253, see also California F-Scale
Autogenous training, 203-205
Autokinetic effect, 61, 63, 219-220, 233, 246, 250, 263
Autonomic responses, 142-168
Avoidance, 163
-316-
Avoidance — Avoidance conflict, 133
Barbiturates, 114, 117, 119, 124, 127, 130-131, 153, 295
Barron-Welsh Art Scale, 223, 254
Behavior Interpretation Inventory, 256
Belief change, 53, 67-68
Bender-Gestalt Test, 62
Blindness, 278
Blood, 21-24, 295, see also Circulatory functions
Body fluids, 21-22
Body image, 74
Body schema, 69
Body sway, 67-68
Bogardus Scale, 67
Boredom, 73, 83-84, 90
Brain, 20-24, 34, 39-41, 89, 107
damage, 107
function, 27-30, 32-37, 39, 42
organic, disease of, 285
Brain syndrome, 24-26, 29, 32, 37-38, 42
Brainwashing, 5-6, 58, 88
Break, 41
Breakoff phenomenon, 86
Breathing, 142, 144-146
cycle of, 145, see also Respiration
Bromides, 124
Burns, 22
Caffeine, 116, 121
California F-Scale, 223, 250, 253, 262
Calmatives, 117-119
Captivity, 133, 204, 206, 278, 281, 285
Cataract patients, 87
Catechol amine, 80-81
Catharsis 117
Cattell 16 PF, 223
Cerebral functioning, 39, 130
Cheating, 282
Chicago Police Laboratories, 153
Chinese Communists, 6, 98
Chloral hydrate, 124
Chloroform, 112
Chlorpromazine, 108, 124-126
Circulatory functions, 22, 33, 38, 80
blood pressure, 104, 142, 146-147
pulse, 148-152
Clinical observation, 35
Cocaine, 108, 121
Coercion, 2, 29, 58, 69, 96, 165, 300
Collective reaction, 108
Cognitive functions, 39, 57, 64-67, 74, 112
disturbances of, 64-67
Color saturation, 63
Combat, 27, 31-32, 34, 285, 293-294
Combativeness, 126
Comfort, 41-43
Commitment, 240-241, 264
Communication, 99, 104, 120, 125, 131
theory, 28
Communist practices, 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 44, '53- 54, 98
Complex functions, 24, 29-30, 32, 34, 36-37, 39-43, 61, 71, 254
Compliance, 19, 42-43, 206, 216-217, 255, 295, 299
Conation, 112
Concentration camps, 35-36, 98, 204
Conditioning, 15, 161-162, 172
Confabulation, 26, 32, 35, 41, 194
Confessions, 1, 3, 7, 44, 97, 113-115, 300
Confinement, 57-58, 68, 204, 282
Conflict, 161-164, 216, 300
Conformity, 216-276
Confusion, 44, 284-285
Consciousness, 41, 96, 122, 127, 161, 173 174, 210-212
Constipation, 284
Constitutional characteristics, 33, 36, 54, 101
Conversion, 8, 125, 216-217, 262-266
Cortical inhibition, 171
satiation, 70
Cover story, 114, 116-117
Crime, 97, 158, 164, 165, 206, 278, 293, 297-298
Criminal behavior, 115, 130, 181-191, 211
Criminals, 43, 165-166, 173, 291
interrogation of, 144
Dachau, 98
Data processing, 39
Data interpretation, 156-160
Daydreams, 71, 74
Death, 38, 44
Debilitation, 57, 132, 153
-317-
Deception, 114-117, 130-131, 142-168, 209, 282, 298
detection of, 142-168, 283-300
Decorum, 26, 30, 32, 35, 40
Defenses, against interrogation, 133-134, 170, 210-211
Defenses, personality, 71, 206
Degradation, 204
Dehydration, 24, 26, 30
Deliria, 24, 206, 284, 293
Delusions, 26, 29-30, 32, 35, 69, 74-76, 113, 195, 284
Demand characteristics, 85, 99, 101-102, 178, see also Suggestion
Demonology, 4-6, 8
Dependence on the perceptual field, 224
Dependency, 4, 206
Depersonalization, 74
Depression, 168, 110, 120-121, 125, 130, 132, 284
psychotic, 284
Deserpedine, 125
Determinism, 3, 7
Diarrhea, 22, 24
Digit span, 64, 66
Discrimination analysis, 159
Disease, 25, 130, 206, 277-304
Disorientation, 75, 113, 132
Dissociative reactions, 116
Distortion, defense in interrogation, 126, 133, 170
perceptual, 130, 132
Dreams, 74
Drugs, 40, 96-141, 195, 206-209, 285, 287, 295-296, 298
aintidepressive, 119-121
hallucinogenic, 121-124, 132
psychotomimetic, 121-124, 132
reactions to person administering, 102-104
silent administration of, 99, 101
therapeutic use of, 97
tranquilizing, 97, 124-126, see also specific drugs
Durham decision, 278
Dyspepsia, 285
Educational level, 104-105
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, 69
Effort syndrome, 285
Ego, 53, 76, 87-88, 116-117, 201, 204
boundaries, 88
controls, 113, 200-205, 211
strength, 299
Electrical brain stimulation, 14
Electrocardiogram, 149, 193
Electroencephalograph, 78-81, 150, 152, 171, 175, 193
Electromyogram, 150
Electroshock, 287, 290, 298
Emotion, 25, 35, 40, 112, 123, 131, 165
Emotional reliving, 117
Epilepsy, 111, 287, 293-294
Epinephrine-norepinephrine, 80
Ethics, 96-98, 113, 278
Euphoria, 104, 106, 108, 284
Experimental controls, 57, 100-101, 106, 130, 164, 186-188, 217-227, 268-270
Experimental effect, 84
Exploratory drive, 54, 84, 87
Explorers, 90-91
Exposure, injurious, 25, 27
Extrovert, 106
Eye movement, 151
Failure, 261
and conformity behavior, 246
Fainting, 22
Fantasy, 29, 69, 71-72, 74, 76, 85, 115 116, 130, 133, 195
Fat, 23
Fatigue, 25, 27-44, 111, 130, 153, 180
Fear, 39, 41, 69, 73, 122, 134, 163, 297
Feedback, 102
auditory, 63
Feeling state, 72-74
Feral man, 54
Fever, 24, 30
Fiedler A-S Inventory, 223
Figural aftereffects, 63, 70
Food, see Hunger, Nutrition, Starvation
Frustration, 83
Galvanic skin response (GSR), 79, 142, 146-148, 154-161, 250-251, 262
Ganser Syndrome, 278-279, 289-290, 299
Ganzfeld, 60, 69
Gastrointestinal system, 38, 152
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Gestapo, 204
Gough Adjective Check List, 257
Group, homogeneity of, 239
norms of, 222
size of, 234
social, 216-270
Group Squares Test, 253
Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors, 223, 252
Guilford's R Scale, 106
Guilt, 108, 112, 114-115, 117, 130, 133, 164, 206, 210, 212, 277-288, 295, 297, 299
Hallucinations, 26, 29-30, 32, 35, 52, 69-70, 74-77, 79, 87, 90, 113, 121 123, 185, 187, 284
Hashish, 108
Headache, 36, 104, 285
Hearing, 125
Heroin, 106
Homeostasis, 20-24, 27, 30, 32, 38-40, 43
Hunger, 25, 34-38, 42
Hypnagogic states, 77-78
Hypnosis, 34, 98, 102, 168-215, 287, 295, 298
somnambulistic, 174, 202
Hypochondriasis, 86
Hypoglycemia, 110
Hysteria, 108, 114, 171, 285-286, 290, 293-294
Id, 87-88
Idea Classification Test, 223, 254
Ideation, 123
Identification with the aggressor, 206
Ideological change, 1, 10, 53-54
I/E Ratio, 145
Illusions, 26, 29, 32, 74, 76-77, 113
Imagery, 74-78
Immobility, 35, 57, 60-62, 65, 73, 87
Indiana University Study, 143, 147-159, 162
Individual differences, 108, 280
Induction of hypnosis, 169-215
Infection, 26, 293
Information, elicitation of, 19, 24, 27-28, 35, 41-44, 67, 89, 96, 99, 112-113, 116-117, 126, 128, 131-132, 170, 180, 191, 196, 201, 209, 266, 278
Injury, 26, 31, 40, 293-294
Inquisition, 8, 27
Insecurity, 246
Insight, 32, 40, 268
Insomnia, 126, 153, 285
Insulin, 110
Integrative capacities, 113
Intellectual functioning, 32, 106, 113, 122-123, 126, 132
Intelligence, 7, 11, 15, 104-105, 130-131, 254
agencies, 98
human, 104-105, 118, 130-131, 254, see Intellectual functioning
military and political, 7, 11, 15
tests of, 64, 192, 291-293, see specific test names
Interaction, 172, 216, 276, see also Social relationships and Interpersonal influence
Internalized norms and controls, 63, 67-68, 90, 180-181
Interpersonal influence, 25, 40, 216-276
Interrogation, 1-25, 29-30, 33, 41, 44, 54, 67, 74, 89-90, 98, 108, 112-126, 129 134, 142, 152-156, 164-165, 167, 169-170, 180, 191-196, 199, 204-210, 216, 266, 277-279, 293, 296-300
Communist, 1, 4-6, 8, 10, 22, 44, 54, 98
European, 22
experimental, 67, 112-118, 129-134, 155, 180, 191-195
ideological, 8, 12, 15
military, 167, 296-297
Nazi, 98, 121, 204
Oriental, 22
police, 98, 113, 142, 153-156, 165-166, 296-297
Soviet, 6, 33, 98, 108
United States, 12
Interviewing, 11, 113
free-associative, 112
non-directive, 112, see also Interrogation
Introvert, 106-107
Iproniazid, 120-121, 131
I.Q., 100
Irritability, 72-73
Isolation, 27, 29-30, 32, 34-35, 38, 42-43, 51-95, 111, 130
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Isolation, effects of duration, 81-83
social, 52, 56, 61, 82, 89
tolerance of, 69-70, 81
Judgment, 30, 32, 40-41, 44, 62, 219, 233
Jury verdicts, 143
Kent EGY, 291
Kidney, 22-23
Kinesthetic input, 57
Korea, 12, 35
war in, 2, 3, 22
Law, 3, 7, 9, 19, 113-115, 184, 207, 278, 297-298
Learning abilities, 64-67
Legitimacy, 181, 185, 187
Levinson-Sanford Scale, 223, 252
Lie detection, 142-168, 209, 286-287
Likert Scale, 223
Lobotomy, 298
Logic, 64, 66, 218
Lower level functions, 39
Loyalty, 41-42, 108, 278, 281, 296
Lying, 142-168, 195
Lysergic acid (LSD), 122-124, 132
McGill University, 58, 61, 65, 81-82
M'Naghten Rules, 278
Magic, 4-6, 8, 54, 169, 207
Magic-Room procedures, 102, 208, 210, 212
Malingering, 13, 114, 277-304
Manic psychoses, 124
Masking, 101
Mastery, 204-205, 208-209, 211
Maudsley Personality Inventory, 253
Memory, 25-26, 30, 32, 35, 39-41, 123, 191-196, 293-296, 298-299
Menstrual cycle, 109-110
Mental deficiency, 278-279, 284, 289, 291
Mental performance, 125
Mental state, 105
Meperidine hydrochloride, 106
Meprobamates, 127
Mescaline, 77-78, 107-108, 116, 122, 132
Metabolism, 22, 285
Metamphetamine, 116, 131
Military security, 98, 182-183
Mindszenty, Cardinal, 98
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 69, 106, 110, 223, 251, 253, 280
Monotony, 53-54, 56, 58
Mood, 38, 106, 110-119, 123, 131
changes of, 90
Morality, 3, 278, see Ethics Morphine, 103, 106, 116
Motivation, 7, 19, 31, 36, 41-44, 73, 85, 87-88, 108, 127, 130, 172-174, 178, 183-184, 187, 203, 205, 210-212, 285, 296
Muscular activity, 31, 59-64, 79-80
coordination, 125
fatigue, 31
tension, 150
Mutism, 284-286
Narcoanalysis, 114-116, 195, 286, 295
Narcosis, 116-118, 295, 298
Narcotics, 103, 293
Nazis, 98
Negativism, 295
Neopallium, 39
Nervous system, 28, 40, 53
Neurochemistry, 53
Neurophysiology, 53
Neuroses, 70, 96, 106-107, 114, 119, 122 124, 128, 253, 280, 295
Nonspecific effects, 98, 129
Novacaine, 121
Nutrition, 22, 25, 28, 35, 110, 130, 250 251, see Hunger
Obsession, 125
Office of Naval Research, 51, 142
Opiates, 127
Oxygen, 22, 33, see also Respiration
Pain, 25, 34, 36, 38, 40-42, 99, 104, 125, 127, 201-205, 211, 278
Panic, 116
Paraldehyde, 124
Paralysis, 278
Paranoid behavior, 4, 26, 32, 110, 286
Parkinsonism, 125
Passivity, 170
Pentobarbital, sodium, 103, 116
Perceived discrepancy, 236-237
Perception, 57, 59-64, 106, 123, 170
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Perception, disturbances of, 61-63, 122
of depth, 63
of time, 123
Perceptual field, dependence on, 255
Perceptual stimulation, 51-95
Perseveration, 26, 32, 41, 115
Personal characteristics and conformity behavior, 237-240
Personality, 34, 42, 69-72, 74, 100-101, 106-108, 117, 131, 262, 267, 280
and conformity, 251-259
constitutional factors, 101
evaluation of, 13
Personnel selection, 53, 72
Persuasion, 165
Pervitin, 107
Pharmacology, 96-141
Phenidylate, 120
Phenobarbital, 125
Phenothiazine derivatives, 124-125, 128, 132
Phi phenomenon, 62
Phobia, 125
Physician, role of, 96-97
Physiologic functioning, 78
Physiologic response measures, 53, 142 168
Pipradol, 120, 131
Placebo, 9, 99-101, 106, 108, 130, 201 202, 287
Plantar response, 192
Plethysmograph, 149
Pneumonia, 32
Poisoning, 24, 26
Police, 27, 33, 41, 44, 54, 98, 113, 142, 154-155
Polygraph, 142-168, 209
Posthypnotic suggestion, 170, 180, 185, 189, 198, 201-202, 211
Prestige, 101, 238
Primary process material, 70-71, 78, 88
Primitive needs, 206
Prison, 33, 52
Prisoner, 29, 33, 35, 38, 42, 44, 56, 57, 67, 69, 74, 86, 91, 170, 291, 294, 296-297
Prisoners-of-war, 1-4, 12, 22-23, 27, 35, 43, 206, 277-278, 281, 293, 297
Problem solving, 64, 66, 88
Projection, 26
Promazine, 106
Propaganda, 67
Proprioceptive input, 57
Protein, 23
Psychic trauma, 294
Psychoanalysis, 53, 70, 87-88, 162
Psychomotor functions, 127
Psychopathic states, 119, 130, 281, 287
Psychopharmacology, 96-141
Psychosis, 24-25, 91, 124, 128, 134, 278 279, 283-284, 290, 293, 297, 300
Psychosis, simulation of, 280
Psychotic states, 86, 96, 111, 114, 119, 121-123, 131-132, 280, 285, 299-300
Punishment, 161, 163-164, 281, 297-298, 300
Rationalization, 41
Rauwolfia, 125, 132
Reality, perception of, 63, 69, 86, 170, 181-182, 184
Reasoning, 64, 66, 71
Recall, 66-67, 191-196
of repressed material, 113
Regression, 206
Relationship, social, 172, 176, 179, 216 276
doctor-patient, 96-97
interrogator-source, 74, 210-212
subject-experimenter, 85, 178-191
Repetitive tasks, 87
Rescinnamine, 125
Reserpine, 120, 125-126
Residual stimulation, 75
Resistance, effectiveness of hypnosis for, 170, 205, 210-211
to hypnosis, 177-180, 196-200
to interrogation, 90, 119, 133-134, 145, 170, 277-304
to manipulation, 2-3, 29, 90, 96, 112 113, 116-117, 119, 126-127, 133-134, 145, 170-171, 180, 196-200, 210-211, 216-276, 278, 301
to stress, 90, 201-205
Respiration, 24, 80, 204
Responsibility, 133, 207, 209-210, 277 288, 296
Responsiveness, 124, 294
Rest, 25
Reticular system, 89
Retrospective reporting, 78
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Reward pretraining, 248
Rhythmic stimulation, 180
Rhythms, biologic, 109-110
Rorschach test, 70-71, 85, 100, 118, 123, 193, 223, 251, 254-255, 288
Role, 172, 279, 296
conflict, 281
playing, 193, 196
skill, 279-280
Rote learning, 66
Russian interrogation, 33, 98
Sailors, 57, 90-91
Salt, 21-22
Sanitation, 27
Schizophrenia, 70, 72, 107-108, 111, 120, 122, 258, 280, 283-284, 288, 300
catatonic, 113
Scopolamine, 112-113, 116, 121, 206
Secobarbital, 106, 111, 117
Sedatives, 117-119, 124-126
Self, 4
Self-confidence, 252
Self-control, 128, 204, 208
Self-defeating defense, 206
Self-descriptive procedures, 257
Self-destructive acts, 96, 181-183, 189
Sensory acuity, 123-126
Sensory bombardment, 62, 73
Sensory deprivation, 28-29, 34-35, 51-95
Sex differences, 104-105, 130, 238, 249
Shame, 108, 114
Shock, 21, 24
Side effects, 121, 125-126, 134, 147
Simulation of symptoms, 118-119, 134, 196, 277-304
Simulation, detection of, 196-197
Sleep, 25, 28, 31, 33-35, 38, 40, 79, 111, 171-172, 174, 176, 178, 250-251, 285, 294
deprivation of, 27, 29-30, 32, 35, 42-44, 153
learning during, 175
Smersh, 6
Social context, 228, 234-244, 280
Social norms and values, 2, 9, 11, 25, 108, 127, 180-191, 207, 210, 296-297
conflict of, 300
prohibitions, 220, 259, see also Internalized norms and controls
Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, ix, 169
Sociopathic personality, 70
Sodium amytal, 106-108, 113-115, 117 118, 206, 295
Sodium benzoate, 116
Sodium pentothal, 98, 106, 116-117, 206
Solitary confinement, 54, 56, 83, 86, 88 89, 204
Solitude, 52
Space, outer, 53
Spatial orientation, 63
Speech patterns, 32, 104, 110-111, 123
Startle reaction, 285
Starvation, 23-24, 26-27, 29, 32, 35-36, 110
Status, 279
Stimulants, 119-121, 131-132
Stimulus, ambiguity and conformity, 231
Stimulus-hunger, 83-84, 90
Stimulus-response theory, 54
Stress, 69, 100, 132, 134, 211, 281, 285, 293
resistance to, 201-205
Subception, 161
Subcortical stimulation, 14
Sugar, 23, 33
Suggestibility, 44, 67-69, 72, 90, 108, 130, 134, 169-215
Suggestion, 26, 102, 169-215, see also Demand characteristics, Hypnosis, Placebo
Super-ego, 186
Survival, 37, 41-42
Sweating, 21-22, 148
Symbolic processes, 112
Sympathy, 100
Tachometer, 149
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, 253
Temperature, body, 20-21, 24, 27, 285
Terman Concept Mastery Test, 223, 254
Thematic Apperception Test, 223, 248, 251, 254-256, 261, 289
Thinking, 29-30, 38, 123
Thiopental, 116, 295
Thirst, 24-25, 42, 250
Thought-reform, 10, 53-54
Threat, 37-39, 41-43, 73, 132-133, 149, 163, 282, 300
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Thurstone-Chave War Scale, 251
Thurstone-Gottschaldt Embedded Figures Test, 61
Thurstone Scale of Militarism, 218, 251
Time orientation, 66, 82-83, 90
Torture, 27
Totalitarianism 5
Toxemia, 293
Toxicity, 284
Trance, 169-215, 283, 295
logic, 197
spontaneous, 177, 200, see also Hypnosis
Tranquilizers, 124-126, 128, 132, 153
Trauma, 293-294
Truth, 8, 19, 114, 116, 130-133, 142-168, 191-196, 210, 278, 294
Truth serum, 112-113, 130, 195, 295
Twilight state, 175
Unanimity, 235
Unconsciousness, 24, 42, 283
United State Air Force, ix, 1, 3, 12, 254
United States Armed Forces, 3, 27
United States Constitution, 115
Validity, 117-118
Verbal behavior, 14, 105, 108, 111-113, 130, see also Speech patterns
Vigilance behavior, 59
Vision, 60, 63, 75
Visual-motor coordination, 61-63
Vitamins, 23, 110
Volunteering, effect of on experiments, 68, 85
Vomiting, 22, 24
Vorbeireden, 289-290
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 14
War neuroses, 113, 117, 294-295
Washington State University, 151
Water, 21, 25, 27
Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, 291-292
Wechsler Digit Symbol Test, 61
Weight loss, 79, 284
Welsh Figure Preference Test, 223, 254
White-out, 60, 79
Will, 7, 44, 97
Witchcraft, 4-6, 8
Withdrawal syndromes, 127
Witkin Embedded Figures Test, 61
Wonderlic Test, 105
World War II, 6, 22, 113
Yellow Springs Instrument Company, 149
Yoga, 189
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